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The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations were introduced in England and 
Wales in 2006, seeking to prohibit age discrimination in employment and vocational 
training. This thesis assesses whether the legislation adopted is an effective 
mechanism by which to address age discrimination in the workplace and achieve the 
dual but contradictory objectives of the European Union Framework Directive on 
Equal Treatment of achieving equal treatment between age cohorts whilst encouraging 
the active participation of older citizens in the workplace. The thesis sheds light on 
this hitherto unregulated suspect ground of discrimination by means of a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of all employment tribunal judgments which relate to an age 
discrimination claim over a three and a half year period.  
This study shows that very few claimants were successful if their claim of age 
discrimination was considered by a tribunal and there was considerable inconsistency 
of implementation and interpretation of the legislation by individual tribunals. 
Employers have quickly developed defences against claims of age discrimination in 
order to maintain their freedom to contract and the imbalance between the two parties 
was particularly noticeable with claimant credibility often under scrutiny – a process 
claimants appeared unprepared for. Regional discrepancies were found in terms of 
success rates and compensation awards. A gender award gap was found in both overall 
compensation and injury to feelings awards, with women given smaller awards than 
men, whilst younger workers were given smaller awards than older workers. Legal 
representation made a substantial difference to success rates and compensation 
awards, but the majority of awards were low and many would not have covered legal 
costs. The low compensation awards do not provide an effective deterrent, as required 
by the Article 17 of the Directive. The legislation is particularly ineffective for those 
who claimed they had suffered multiple discrimination.  
Although an important first step in regulating ageist behaviour, the Regulations 
and the subsequent Equality Act 2010 will be unlikely to achieve the aims of the 
Directive as they provide little incentive for claimants to undertake the stressful 
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‘He was somebody, once, but now he has grown old.’
1
 
Ageism has been described as ‘the ultimate prejudice, the last discrimination, the 
cruellest rejection’
2
 and yet it has only recently been the subject of legislation in the 
United Kingdom. On the 1st October 2006 the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006,
3
 (the Regulations) were introduced. This followed the adoption of 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of November 27th 2000 establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation
4
 (the Framework 
Directive) by the European Union. This placed an obligation on member states to 
introduce legislative protection for workers against age discrimination. The 
Framework Directive was introduced as a response to twin concerns; social injustice 
caused by discrimination and the fiscal consequences of an increasingly large number 
of economically inactive, older citizens. The domestic age legislation has subsequently 
been criticised as providing a weak standard of protection for employees, reflecting an 
ambivalent attitude to ageism
5
 and has been described as a ‘step into the unknown’.
6
 
This aim of this thesis is to assess whether the legislation adopted in England 
and Wales is an effective mechanism by which to address age discrimination in the 
workplace and achieve the dual objectives of the Framework Directive of enabling 
equal treatment and encouraging the active participation of older citizens in the 
workplace.
7
 It seeks to shed light onto this ‘unknown’ territory by examining age 
discrimination claims and furthering our knowledge and understanding of the 
interpretation and application of the Regulations. The thesis is based upon the premise 
that ageism – the adoption of negative stereotypes that develop from implicit prejudice 
against age cohorts – and resulting age discriminatory conduct causes injustice to 
                                                 
1
 Herondas, The Mimes of Herondas: VI The Gossiping Friends (first published c250 BC) trn M.S. 
Buck 1921. 
2
 EB Palmore, Ageism: Negative and Positive (Springer Publishing 1999) 3. 
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 2 
individuals and due to changing demographics will cause major financial problems for 
the economy.  
Chapter One sets out the context in which the Regulations have been introduced. 
It provides an introduction to ageism, negative stereotypes and age discrimination and 
examines the problems that prejudice reduction schemes have in addressing deep-
seated, implicit and explicit responses to age. It explores the difficulties surrounding 
the introduction of legislation and the type of equality that is sought with regard to age 
as a suspect ground. Chapter Two considers early attempts to prohibit age 
discrimination and the demographic change that provided the impetus for age 
legislation. It discusses the introduction of the Framework Directive in the European 
Union and the subsequent Regulations which were introduced in the UK, whilst 
reflecting upon problems that arise from the framework laid down in the Directive.  
Chapter Three explains the methodology used in undertaking this research. The 
study employs a mixed methodological approach to evaluate and analyse all of the 
judgments made under the Regulations over a period of three and a half years, as 
found in the UK Employment Tribunal Judgment Register. A traditional, qualitative, 
‘case-by-case’ examination of judicial decisions has been combined with a 
quantitative content analysis of all judgments relating to claims of age discrimination. 
This research attempts to quantify many of the characteristics of age discrimination 
claims by creating a unique data-set of 16 variables which relate to a wide variety of 
factors such as outcome of claims, gender of claimants and activity of respondent 
employers.  
Chapters Four and Five present the results of the quantitative study which 
encompassed all 4001 judgments pertaining to age discrimination claims handed down 
from October 2006 to April 2010. Chapter Four describes the characteristics of claims 
and parties, in terms of overall number, location, claimant age, gender, legal 
representation, concurrent discrimination claims and employer activity, legal status, 
size and solvency and issue, that is, whether the claim is made by a worker who 
alleged they were discriminated against because they were ‘old’, ‘young’ or part of a 
disadvantaged age cohort. Chapter Five concentrates on an analysis of the outcome of 
these claims and the remedies given to successful claimants, including overall 
compensation and injury to feelings awards. It quantifies the problems associated with 
 3 
multiple discrimination and examines the outcomes of claims and compensation 
awarded with regard to gender and representation – providing an understanding of the 
statistical difference that results from representation. The resulting information will 
enable action to be taken to address particular areas which are revealed as having 
significant problems, for example, the employer activities in which discrimination 
most often occurs. 
Chapters Six and Seven contain the results of a traditional case-by-case 
examination of hard-copy folio reports of judgments pertaining to age discrimination 
claims. These Chapters refer directly to the individual provisions of the Regulations in 
the context of the claim procedure and complaint. Chapter Six explores the 
establishment of an age claim by a claimant. It discusses the problems that employees 
and job applicants had in establishing that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the 
claim and in gathering sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim and reverse the 
burden of proof. Consideration is given to the difficulties that those making concurrent 
claims of discrimination suffer whilst making a claim. Chapter Seven describes the 
responses made to these claims by employers, including the objective justification 
given for discriminatory behaviour and the consideration of the justification by the 
tribunal. Chapter Eight discusses the findings of the qualitative analysis with reference 
to factors found significant in the quantitative analysis. It suggests further avenues of 
research which have come to light and presents the conclusions.  
A literature search indicates this is the first study of this type to be undertaken of 
such factors in the UK. Although the literature concerned with age discrimination is 
found over a widespread area, little is concerned with the details of difficulties that 
claimants have in establishing an ‘age’ claim, the outcome of claims and the 
relationship between, for example, gender, representation and compensation. This 
research seeks to fill the gap in the literature by uncovering evidence found in an 
under-utilised, primary source holding substantial information – the judgment reports 
issued by employment judges in tribunals, that is, those at the ‘coal face’ of the 
interpretation and application of the Regulations. O’Cinneide has asserted that 
‘equality rights can be interpreted and applied in a manner that can render them empty 
 4 
vessels, lacking any significant legal impact or substance’.
8
 The conclusion presented 
in this thesis is that the legislation is ineffective as a mechanism with which to address 
age discrimination and will lack any significant legal impact. As such it is unlikely to 
achieve the objectives of the Framework Directive of enabling equal treatment and 
encouraging the active participation of older citizens in the workplace. 
                                                 
8
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Ageism and Age Discrimination 
1.1: Introduction 
This Chapter explores the concept of ageism and subsequent discrimination 
based on stereotypical attitudes to particular age cohorts. Ageism has emerged ‘as the 
third great ‘ism’ in our society; partly because it affects everyone in society, young 
and old’.
1
 It has been described as a set of beliefs or attitudes ‘that undervalue 
individuals on the basis of assumed age-related characteristics’.
2
 In 1969 Butler 
described ageism as the ‘systematic stereotyping … of older people because they are 
old’.
3
 Butler referred specifically to the elderly but Palmore has extended the 
definition to ‘any prejudice … against or in favour of an age group’
4
 thereby including 
all age cohorts.  
On the other hand, age discrimination comprises differential treatment which 
separates individuals, usually using ‘age proxies’, that is, adopting age categories or 
making stereotypical assumptions instead of individual characteristics in order to 
allocate resources. Ageism and age discrimination are therefore closely inter-linked, as 
the adoption of age proxies often occurs as a result of stereotypical, ageist attitudes. 
The discussion that follows describes the concept of ageism, ageist attitudes in the past 
and possible reasons for its prevalence. The negative stereotypical assumptions that 
arise from ageist prejudice and the consequent discrimination that follows the adoption 
of such views are explored. Finally, the problems that surround prejudice reduction 
schemes and the enactment of legislation to prohibit age discrimination are considered.  
1.2: Ageism 
There is common agreement in the academic literature that ageism is a negative 
response to individuals in an age-cohort based on stereotypical assumptions regarding 
characteristics attributed on the basis of age. Butler and Lewis produced a seminal 
definition of ageism in 1973 as:  
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a process of systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against 
people because they are old, just as racism and sexism accomplish 
this for skin color and gender. Old people are categorized as senile, 
rigid in thought and manner, old-fashioned in morality and skills.
5
 
This association of ageism with racism and sexism suggested that all three types of 
stereotyping are equally censured and is highly significant as the latter two were 
regarded as offensive and unjust.  
Sunstein believes that the existence of prejudice such as ageist beliefs 
encompasses ‘three fallacies’
6
 which are:  
 a mistaken belief that members of a group have certain characteristics  
 a belief that many or most members of a group have certain 
characteristics when in fact only some or a few do 
 a reliance on fairly accurate group based generalisations when more 
accurate classifying devices are available. 
Discrimination only occurs when ‘someone is acting on the basis of irrational 
prejudice’
7
 based on any of these three incorrect assumptions. Hughes and Mtezuka 
also stress that ageism is the first stage in a ‘social process … based solely on the 
characteristics of old age itself’
8
 that can result in discrimination.  
However, all age-cohorts can be subject to negative stereotyping. Adultism, a 
form of ageism, refers to negative assumptions relating to young people who are 
assumed to portray such characteristics as irresponsibility and lack of judgment.
9
 
Bytheway drew attention in the 1990’s to adultism and stated that it ‘is by linking age 
to such presumptions that young people suffer from the ageist prejudice of their 
elders’.
10
 Indeed Rodham has argued that an overemphasis on ageism and older 
persons in academic literature has resulted in little attention being given to younger 
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age-cohorts, producing ‘ageist ageism literature’
11
 and feels that the problems of the 
young have been eclipsed by those of older individuals.  
It is claimed that ageism is ‘a relative newcomer to the equality arena’.
12
 There 
is widespread belief in the literature that ageism has developed as a result of the 
marginalisation of the elderly in the twentieth century and that recent unease over age 
discrimination is a renewal of interest which began in the 1930s when it became 
increasingly common to use age proxies.
13
 Achenbaum suggests that in ancient 
societies the aged were given esteemed supervisory roles as their physical health 
declined because their wisdom and experience were valued.
14
 The presumption is that 
the elderly were respected in the past, occupying a valued role in society. Simmons 
asserted that: 
the proportion of the old who
 
remain active, productive, and essential 
in primitive societies
 
is much higher than in advanced civilization, 
for they succeed
 
to an amazing degree in providing cultural 
conditions which
 
utilize the services of their few old people, thereby 





The Roman Senate was named after the ‘old men’ (senecta) who occupied 
positions of power. Prominent religious positions were normally reserved for 
candidates over 60 and political activists were often over 70. In Ancient Sparta the 
‘elders’ formed the city council – the gerousia – the qualification for membership 
being ‘a deserving individual aged over 60 years old,’ from whom the gerontes were 
chosen to sit in judgment in early jury trials.
16
 This is in sharp contrast to the modern 
day ageist behaviour towards Menzies Campbell who, at 65, was considered too old to 
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be a leader of a political party, and those over 69 who are automatically disqualified to 
serve on a jury in the UK.
17
 
However, there is evidence of an awareness of and debate on ageist attitudes in 
early Western philosophical writings, demonstrating a myriad of approaches to ageing. 
One of the earliest surviving documents describes old age as when ‘feebleness has 
arrived … What old age does to people is evil in every way’.
18
 Mimnermus in 630 BC 
asserts that ageing makes a man hateful and dishonoured.
19
 Aristotle describes ageist 
negative stereotypes in Rhetoric. He asserts that older people are positive about 
nothing, show an excessive lack of energy, are malicious, neither witty nor fond of 
laughter and incessantly talk of the past, rather than looking toward the future.
20
 




Cicero drew a very positive picture of old age stating it is marked by its wisdom, 
good sense and sound advice.
22
 In a remarkable analysis written two millennia ago, he 
asserted that moderate physical exercise, good diet, exercise for the memory and mind 
and a positive view of ageing will help enable adults to continue to participate in 
economic activity for as long as is wished – all of which are confirmed by recent 
gerontological research.
23
 He felt that ‘old men have their powers of mind unimpaired 
when they do not suspend their usual pursuits and their habits of industry’,
24
 a 
message echoed by Plutarch.
25
 He urged adults to keep working as society needed 
their skill – ‘for age does not so much diminish our power to perform inferior services 
as it increases our power for leading and governing’.
26
 For exceptional individuals age 
was irrelevant, but the lack of a functional military role, vitally important in the 
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ancient world, meant that many older men found it difficult to command respect. If 
economic resources permitted older individuals could participate in society for as long 
as they wished but poorer individuals had to work until death.  
Despite ageism now being recognized as a global phenomenon, the variety of 
views about ageing found in the West is not seen in the history of the Far East and 
negative stereotypes of older adults are difficult to find. This appears to be because of 
religious tenets which stressed that older individuals must be treated with respect. 
Confucianism lays down strict rules concerning filial piety and there is strict 
obedience to the will of older members of the family. Confucius described passage 
through the age continuum as ‘at fifteen I aspired to learning, at thirty I established my 
stand, at forty I had no delusions, at fifty I knew my destiny, at sixty I knew truth in all 
I heard and at seventy I could follow the wishes of my heart without doing wrong’.
27
 
Similarly in Taoist narratives the founding figure Lao Tzu was born as an old man of 
82 with flowing, grey hair, as this was the cultural image of a perfect adult.  
There are elements of ageist views of the young in eastern philosophies. The 
young were expected to defer to the old in all matters, even when the young 
demonstrated more ability, but this was thought justifiable in order to protect the 
hierarchical structure of society which allowed everyone to benefit from preferential 
treatment as they grow older.  
1.3: The adoption of ageist responses 
There are several postulated explanations for the prevalence of ageism, 
principally falling into three categories: economic, sociobiological and psychological. 
Economic and cultural changes over the last century have led to the marginalisation of 
older age cohorts. The increasing prevalence of early male retirement from the 
workforce has led to a negative impression of the fiscal burden of health, pension and 
social welfare costs of a large number of economically inactive elderly individuals. 
Socio-biologists argue that older individuals are given lower social status because 
society which prizes the youthful energy, strength and fertility of those in their prime. 
If human beings are biologically programmed to prioritise these values the question 
                                                 
27
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should be asked whether ageism will ever be eliminated, or will the symptoms merely 
be treated? 
Many psychologists believe that ageism is a factor of Terror Management 
Theory
28
 which argues that disturbing thoughts about our own mortality lead to 
anxiety buffers which produce negative attitudes to those people nearer death.
29
 This 
theory is used to explain unconscious reactions and discriminating behaviour and 
builds upon work by Freud, Rank and Ernest Becker.
30
 Depaola et al postulated that 
‘negative attitudes toward other older adults were predicted by personal anxieties 
about aging and death, and, more specifically, fear of the unknown’
31
 and this fear 
manifests itself in deep-seated, ageist attitudes. Older people are a ‘bleak reminder’
32
 
of the inevitable and by refusing to identify with the elderly this acts as a defence to 
mortality salience. The more frightened one is of old age the more likely to manage 
this fear by activating negative thoughts towards the elderly.
33
 Fear of death compels 
individuals to develop self-esteem in order to protect their vulnerability – achieved by 
identifying with their own ‘in-group’ and denigrating ‘out-groups.’ 
In 1998 Greenwald developed the Implicit Association Test, a commonly used 
assessment tool which measures unconscious responses to different age cohorts, in the 
manner of a ‘lie detector’ test.
34
 Greenwald, Nosek and Rudman have found older 
individuals have stronger responses than those younger
 35
 and adults favour those in 
similar groups to their own in-group.
36
 Over 80% of those tested showed implicit, 
negative responses to older people. Subjects were often completely unaware of their 
implicit biases and consciously asserted that they were not biased.
37
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Rudman has described how explicit age discriminatory behaviour is decreasing 
in the USA following the enactment of age legislation but implicit stereotyping is still 
affecting decision making and causing social injustice – ‘Biases that we do not 
acknowledge but that persist, unchallenged, in the recesses of our minds, undoubtedly 
shape our society … the application of implicit biases may be nonconscious’.
38
 It 
follows that discriminating conduct may take place without the instigator being aware 
of their action. Those that have stronger implicit biases have been shown to 
discriminate more than those with weak biases. Significantly, it has been found in 
several studies that the strength of ageist responses is much greater than those 




1.4: Negative age stereotypes 
Ageism manifests itself in a myriad of both subtle and overt ways that have led 
to a general acceptance of stereotypes exhibiting age-related characteristics such as 
decline and ineptitude or youthfulness and vigour. The Chief Justice of Canada has 
succinctly expressed the negative stereotypical view of senior citizens: 
Our society has a tendency to think of elderly people as less vital and 
less important than younger people. They’ve had their day. Their 
life-forces are waning. They’re on the way out … Our newspapers, 
magazines and television screens brandish the culture of youth … 
The message is that youth is good; age is not so good. The elderly 
are human beings, yes, but diminished human beings.
40
  
Stereotypes are based on standardised characteristics assumed to be shared by all 
members of a group. Plato talked of the irrationality of using such preconceptions in 
his dialogue Meno
41
 but Lippmann introduced the word stereotype, in its modern 
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sociological sense of ‘mental categorising’ in 1922.
42
 He expressed the view that 
stereotypes are invaluable in a democracy, embellishing human life by establishing an 
order to which the individual can respond. However, he emphasised that what ‘matters 
is the character of the stereotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them’.
43
 
Many psychologists feel that mental categorising is a part of human nature and 
that without it individuals would find the complexities of life too difficult to manage. 
Allport believed that ‘the human mind must think with the aid of categories. Once 
formed, categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid 
this process. Orderly living depends on it.’
44
 Stereotyping may be inaccurate, but it is 
efficient and enables the simplification, prediction and organisation of the world. It 
involves categorising people into sub-groups – in-groups, normally that which an 
individual aspires to or associates with and feels is superior, and out-groups – all other 
groups which are seen as inferior. It usually follows a two-stage process of automatic 
assessment followed by a conscious check, allowing the pre-programmed stereotype to 
be reinforced. It is seen by some as a positive process whereby holding negative 
stereotypes about out-groups enables individuals to feel more positive about 
themselves and build self-esteem,
45
 and may serve a ‘cognitive economy function’
46
 
and/or a social function as an aid to identification with a social in-group.
47
  
Age-based stereotypes lead us to assume that the old and young have particular 
attributes shared by their age cohort. For example, a young person with back pain 
might be assumed to have an injury which can be treated but an older person with 
similar pain is assumed to have a chronic condition. The assumptions may prove to be 
true, but many old people suffer short-term injuries and many young people have 
chronic conditions. Erber found that forgetting a particular name was thought highly 
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significant in a 70 year old but of little note in a 20 year old.
48
 This is of consequence 
if it leads to inappropriate age-related discrimination.  
Numerous studies have investigated the personal characteristics which are 
attributed to older individuals. In a ‘pioneering’
49
 study, Taylor and Walker
 
undertook 
a survey of 500 employers with over 500 or more employees and found employers 
thought older workers had inappropriate skills and qualifications, were more difficult 
to train but were reliable and productive.
50
 Hassell and Perrewe found that many 
thought older workers resistant to change, were absent more often than younger 
workers and not willing to train.
51
 The AARP in the USA
52
 and Ipsos-Mori in the 
UK
53
 found in separate studies that mature workers are valued for their experience, 
knowledge, commitment, punctuality and ability to keep cool in a crisis, but were also 
thought to be inflexible and unwilling to use new technology. Marshall,
54
 Munnell et 
al
55
 and Chiu et al
56
 found that older employees are valued for their dependability and 
honesty, whilst they are held in low esteem because they are seen as inflexible, poor 
with new technology and liable to suffer from ill-health. Kite and Johnson
57
 uncovered 
beliefs that competence, perceived intelligence and ability decreases with age and 
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Campbell observed that many employers thought memory and judgment-making 
processes were slow in older workers.
58
 
Gross and Hardin have demonstrated in controlled experiments that individuals 
also hold negative views of the young and ‘are not simply engaged in perception of 
adolescent behaviour alone. Given identical information, participants used stereotypes 
about adolescents in their judgments of members of the adolescent age group’
59
 and 
used these judgments to make decisions concerning the young people. Loretto, 
Duncan and White found that stereotypical attitudes held about the young were more 
often expressed than those of older individuals.
60
 A UK government study in 2001 
found two different forms of stereotyping exist with regard to the young. Firstly, they 
are thought to be well-educated, responsible and ambitious but are more likely to 
move to another job elsewhere as soon as they gain experience and training from the 
employer. Conversely, they are sometimes considered unreliable, cavalier about 
responsibilities, disrespectful, poor timekeepers, impetuous, less able to handle 
difficult situations and less loyal.
61
 Both of these stereotypical attitudes may lead to 
less favourable treatment of the young.  
Negative stereotypes of older individuals are found throughout society. Scrutton 
describes the wide diffusion of age stereotypes as ‘structural ageism’ when such 
attitudes ‘become part of the rules of institutions, govern the conduct of social life and 
blend imperceptibly into everyday values and attitudes’.
62
 Incidental items such as 
birthday cards perpetuate negative images of unfit, hapless, elderly people.
63
 In the 
best-selling books’ list for 2010-11 are some solely concerned with jokes about older 
people describing ‘senior’ examples of incompetence containing references to age 
which were identical to several comments which have formed the basis of age 
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discrimination claims to the employment tribunal.
64
 Zebrowitz and Montepare found 
that in a study of TV programmes only 1.5% of fictional characteristics are elderly and 
a substantial proportion of these are in minor roles and portrayed in a negative manner 
as ‘doddery,’ grumpy or hapless.
65
 Sargeant investigated stereotypes in newspapers, 
television and magazines and found that older individuals were categorised as 
eccentric, curmudgeons, overly conservative and physically or mentally afflicted.
66
 He 
suggests that the media industry itself displays considerable evidence of ageism as 
journalists, television presenters and actresses are mainly young.
67
 Donlon et al found 
that ‘exposure to television is a significant predictor of more negative stereotypes of 
aging’
68
 and found that ironically the elderly, who watch more TV than other age 
cohorts, were likely to develop ageist views of their own in-group as a result. 
Posthuma and Campion reviewed 117 research projects which examined 
negative stereotypes of older individuals and found, almost without exception, that the 
studies concluded there was no substance to them and that ‘skill is much more 




 and Hedge et al
71
 
found that older workers were less likely to be absent from work than younger 
workers. Liden et al
72
 discovered that, using both subjective and objective 
assessments, older workers are rated higher. In separate studies Prenda and Stahl
73
 and 
Warr ascertained that ‘there is no significant difference between the job performance 




 found that individual experience was more 
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important than attributes due to age whilst Bennington and Tharenou assert that these 
negative representations are ‘myths’
76
 and concluded that age is an inadequate 
indicator of performance. They found that older workers are as likely as those younger 
to adapt to new skills and undertake new training if offered and both the young and old 
are as effective as other age cohorts in their work.  
Age is a fluid attribute and workers move along a continuum from one cohort to 
another at differing rates because of personal experiences, health and well-being. 
Gerontological research has shown that although mental and physical functions can 
decline gradually with advancing age it will not be at the same rate or manner for each 
individual and these declines are often compensated for by knowledge and experience. 
The clinician Fries found that ‘variation between healthy persons of the same age is far 
greater than the variation due to age; age is a relatively unimportant variable’
77
 so an 
assumption that an individual’s performance deteriorates with age may be unfair to a 
large number of people. Fries’ findings have been reinforced in many studies – from 
sociological studies which have found that ‘chronological age in itself, although once 
a useful proxy indicator … is becoming an increasingly imperfect measure’
78
 – to 
medical surveys which conclude it ‘is no longer possible to make adequate 
generalizations about the ageing process that are grounded on biological assumptions 
about the ages of life’.
79
  
Cognitive decline is often stereotypically attributed to older workers, but if 
workers remain in employment a substantial majority will show no significant 
deterioration that will affect their ability to work.
80
 Studies have shown that the brain 
will continue to produce new cells if stimulated and the individual remains physically 
active.
 81
 Over time brain activity moves from the anterior to posterior circuitry in 
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order to make efficient use of the brain’s capacity in order to compensate for a slight 
decrease in size
82
 and such processing is ‘qualitatively different and possibly better’
83
 
than younger adults. Newton found that, on average, there is little change in 
intellectual perception with age – the slight decline in speed and reaction time is 
usually made up for in terms of general knowledge and experience.
84
 Similarly, 
language ability is maintained with age because a wider vocabulary compensates for 
any decline in speed.
85
 Perpetuating stereotypes is therefore manifestly unfair to those 
individuals who do not possess the assumed characteristics of their age group. 
1.5: Age discrimination  
The perpetuation of negative stereotypes leads to problems of age 
discrimination.
86
 The term discrimination is no longer a neutral process of 
differentiation and has assumed a derogatory quality so that it implies ‘unjust or 
prejudicial treatment of different categories of people’.
87
 Fredman asserts that 
discrimination occurs when ‘individuals are subjected to detriment on the basis only of 
their status, their group membership, or irrelevant physical characteristics’.
88
 
Thompson also attaches adverse consequences to the differential treatment and has 
defined discrimination as ‘unfair or unequal treatment of individuals or groups; 
prejudicial behaviour acting against the interest of those people who characteristically 
tend to belong to relatively powerless groups’.
89
  
The phrase ‘relatively powerless’ suggests that the differential treatment is of 
someone who belongs to a vulnerable group and Sunstein asserts that the victims 
belong to a ‘subordinate social group’
90
 and a suspect class which has suffered 
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 The Supreme Court in the USA has described a suspect 
class as one ‘subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process’.
92
 The Court went on in Murgia
93
 to describe 
the class of ‘older citizens’ as not defining a discrete and insular group in need of 
extraordinary protection. 
An ambivalent attitude to age as a suspect group has resulted in a tentative 
approach by the judiciary in interpreting age legislation, as evidenced above. 
Justification for interfering in the market economy and freedom to contract by 
enacting discrimination legislation is usually intended to remedy the disadvantage 
suffered by a suspect group. However, age cohorts do not form homogeneous, discrete 
groups. Indeed with regard to older age cohorts, even if they are accepted as a discrete 
group, the view is increasingly expressed that a substantial number of older citizens 
are relatively privileged and to whom society owes no remedial obligation.
94
 A 2012 
report for the ESRC suggested removing many benefits such as national insurance and 
tax exemptions for pensioners as over the past decade ‘the income of the median 
pensioner increased by 29.4% whereas the income of the median non-pensioner 
increased by 26.0%’.
95
 Many older citizens are financially secure and enjoy inflation-
proofed pensions and may not need additional protection. However, this type of 
argument can also be employed to race as a suspect group, where individual members 
of ethnic minority groups may not have suffered disadvantage, but the overall status of 
race as a suspect group is not questioned.  
An important issue to be considered is whether differential treatment based on 
age is discrimination if it is not irrational. Sunstein’s definition of discrimination, 
discussed above, relies upon someone ‘acting on the basis of irrational prejudice’.
96
 
An important difference between age and other suspect groups is that age 
discrimination is not always the result of irrational prejudice but can be based on 
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practical considerations and may be justified. For example, if an employer seeks to 
recruit a worker for a position for which a substantial amount of training is required it 
might not be thought appropriate to employ someone known to be near the normal 
retirement age for that activity. The employer may hold no stereotypical views or 
irrational prejudice against mature individuals but may favour a younger person who 
may stay working for a longer period and provide a greater return for the employer’s 
investment. In these circumstances there is a rational explanation for the 
differentiation but this may be unjustified as individual older applicants may intend or 
need to continue to work for a number of years. If discrimination ‘comes about only 
when we deny to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may 
wish’,
97
 an older applicant seeking work may feel that discrimination has taken place. 
In this type of instance a rational explanation exists for the employer’s conduct so that 
it fails to satisfy Sunstein’s test, indicating it is not discriminatory. The use of 
objective justification tests in age legislation is designed to permit this differential 
treatment. Legislative measures which prohibit age discrimination always permit the 
objective justification for differential treatment and this has become central to the 
judicial consideration of a claim of age discrimination. This allows a balancing act to 
be made between the needs of various age cohorts, the needs of employers and the 
right of individual citizens to be treated fairly.  
A report prepared for the European Commission revealed that age is frequently a 
factor in multiple discrimination and highlighted the fact that elderly disabled and 
young ethnic minority men were especially vulnerable to discriminatory treatment.
98
 
The concept of multiple discrimination has been described in a seminal work by 
Makkonen and is said to occur when an ‘individual suffers discrimination on two or 
more grounds at different times’.
99
 On the other hand, ‘intersectional discrimination’ 
occurs in a situation involving discrimination which is ‘based on several grounds 
operating and interacting with each other at the same time’,
100
 whilst ‘compound 
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discrimination’ occurs on ‘the basis of two or more grounds which add to each other to 
create a situation of compound discrimination … at one particular instance’.
101
  
With regard to age, it may be asserted that much discrimination falls under the 
heading of intersectional discrimination as age can rarely be disassociated from a 
person’s identity, interacting with their other qualities, and in the workplace may occur 
on more than one instance. Nevertheless the terms ‘multiple and intersectional 
discrimination are commonly interchanged with each other’.
102
 This thesis therefore 
uses a broad interpretation of the term multiple discrimination, inclusive of compound 
and intersectional discrimination, rather than the more specific definition suggested by 
Makkonen.  
The noteworthy problem with multiple discrimination is that when it occurs it is 
difficult to assess whether a person has been discriminated against on one or a 
combination of grounds which interact with each other. An elderly, disabled, black 
worker may be discriminated against because of her perceived identity – a result of a 
combination of four suspect grounds or on any one of age, gender, disability or race. 
Older women have a particular problem with discriminating behaviour in the media 
and are replaced, despite their capability, because they look old.
103
 Selina Scott and 
Miriam O’Reilly both received large settlements for claims that they suffered age 
discrimination in selection as television presenters.
104
 This pattern is also seen in other 
occupational groups, for example, Granlesse and Sayer found that female academics 
suffer from a combination of ageism, sexism and ‘lookism’ and subsequently often fail 
to improve their academic status.
105
 
Systemic age discrimination has a substantive impact on the employment 
relationship, evidenced in several large surveys undertaken by governmental 
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 As a result harm may be suffered by individuals, employers and the wider 
community. The effects on the individual can be life-changing as the loss of 
employment can bring a fall in self-esteem, financial insecurity and the end of a 
working-life and accompanying social circle. Irrational, discriminating attitudes are 
‘morally objectionable’
107





 and financial hardship to individuals.
110
 The subsequent 
mental and physical illness can be serious and long term.
111
 To those seeking a job or 
who are refused promotion it is demoralising and often creates a circle of 
disadvantage.
112
 Snape and Redman found that age discrimination contributes to a 
belief by a worker that they are unemployable or unwanted and destroys their feeling 
of self-worth.
113
 Perry and Freeland investigated the psychological effects of age 
discrimination on workers and found that it can cause ‘shock, grief, humiliation, loss 
of confidence and long term adverse effects on health and wellbeing … The 
demoralisation and age discrimination they suffer means that their employability 
depreciates at a rapid rate once unemployed’.
114
  
On the other hand, those older individuals who remain active in the workforce 
have been shown to have longer life expectancy,
115





 and enhanced quality of life in old age
118
 so that for the 
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individual worker there are many advantages in continuing to work. The removal of 
discriminating barriers enables more people to enjoy these rewards as well as making 
contributions to the nation’s wealth whilst making smaller demands on the welfare 
state. Individual employers who implement ageist practices may lose skills and 
experience garnered by older workers and human resources may be misallocated and 
underutilised.
119
 The government has estimated that the removal of age discriminatory 
practices would benefit the economy by £24 - 460m
120
 each year as ‘talent and ability 
will be better matched to recruitment and training decisions. Labour market 
competition will also increase from tapping a greater pool of applicants, increased 
training and improved promotion prospects’.
121
  
Studies have found that women are far less likely than men to discriminate but 
both sexes are equally subject to age discrimination.
122
 Gee and Pavalko used the USA 
National Longitudinal Surveys from 1972 to 1988 to show that age discrimination is 
felt to be suffered particularly by those under 25, falling to a low from 30-40 years old 
and slowly rises thereafter to a peak at 57-58 years old.
123
 These age-related patterns 




Evidence indicates that discrimination takes place throughout the employment 
process but particularly in recruitment. Unemployed older individuals have to respond 
to more advertisements in order to obtain a job than those younger.
125
 Shen and 
Kleiner found that those over 45 were out of work for longer than younger 
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unemployed and often faced failure in obtaining work by placing their age and whole 
career path (thereby disclosing their age cohort) on their curriculum vitae.
126
 Once 
through the selection process applicants often have to undergo stringent medical and 
fitness pre-employment screening to prove their suitability for a position. Older 
applicants are usually disadvantaged by such procedures as all consultations with 
medical practitioners over a lifetime are assessed and such screening tests may be 
indirectly age discriminatory. Ageist attitudes may also influence the training, job 
status and career development of workers, preventing their achievement of an 
optimum economic contribution. Cox and Nkomo found that older workers in 
employment scored lower in subjective performance assessment exercises despite 
achieving good scores
127
 and Cleveland and Shore found that older workers were less 
likely to be promoted than younger workers.
128
  
In 2009 the EU noted that 61% of individuals surveyed thought age 
discrimination ‘very widespread’
129
 in the UK, experienced by both younger and older 
workers. A government report in 2000 found that a third of those aged 50-65 were 
unemployed and a key factor impeding their re-entry into the workplace was age 
discrimination by employers.
130
 An Ipsos-Mori survey in 2002 found that 22% of the 
UK workforce has experienced discrimination and 38% thought it occurred on the 
grounds of their age.
131
 Of these, 38% felt it occurred in the recruitment process, 25% 
in selection for promotion and 16% in being offered training. A quarter of those aged 
50 to 69 reported age discrimination in work or when seeking work.  
Age discrimination is therefore a significant problem for both individuals and 
the economy. Over a quarter of people in the UK (28%) claim to have suffered from 
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age discrimination, more than any other suspect ground.
132
 For example, 17% claim to 
have suffered from religious discrimination and 15% from disability discrimination
133
 
and those disabled or belonging to an ethnic minority were found to have suffered 
more age discrimination than that directed towards their disability or race.
134
 In a UK 
survey one third of respondents thought the over 70’s incompetent and incapable.
135
 
Whilst age discrimination is acknowledged as a potential problem, many therefore still 
hold views that reflect stereotypical assumptions about ageing and capability.  
1.6: Prejudice reduction 
The vast majority of people in Europe – 83% – think ‘age discrimination is 
wrong’.
136
 Three primary avenues along which to address the problem have been 
suggested:
137
 these are ‘high-quality intergenerational contact’,
138
 exposure to 
‘positive stereotype images’
139
 and ‘individuating information’.
140
 Prejudice reduction 
schemes have been subject to much evaluation. It has been shown that training related 
to a specific prejudice can produce ‘reduced stereotype activation’.
141
 Hill and 
Augoustinos found that a combination of methods, such as workshops, leaflets and 
seminars,
142
 especially those stimulating mental imagery, are recommended in order to 
reduce negative stereotyping.
143
 Recent work in the USA and Australia has shown that 
all age-groups can modify their view of other age cohorts if explicit contradictory 
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 Martens et al recommend that ‘by more openly and 
consciously living with awareness of mortality, we may view elderly people as less of 
a threat’.
145
 This may be achieved by classes that ‘teach about death and the dying 
process that may help people to live more honestly with their mortality’.
146
 Research 
by the University of Kent has shown that ‘intergenerational contact can reduce 
vulnerability to stereotype threat among older people’
147
 and reduces ageist behaviour 
whilst inter-group contact has been shown to reduce implicit biases in the USA in 
several studies.
148
 Educational initiatives aimed at the young, as exist in Texas, can 
deliver high-quality intergenerational contact and their results are impressive.
149
  
A significant change could be achieved by requiring the media to promote 
positive stereotypes of all age groups by means of a public regulatory body. Sergeant 
maintains that it is ‘surprising’ that there are no age ‘pressure groups dedicated to 
influencing the media and criticising it’
150
 and he feels ‘that the establishment of such 
a body might be more influential than considering any legal alternatives’
151
 to 
eliminating ageism. The media frequently portrays older people as inept, whilst those 
younger are depicted as innovative and creative (although at times the young are 
unfairly portrayed as ‘lazy hoodies’
152
). Under the Communications Act 2003, 
OFCOM, in carrying out its statutory function, must have regard to the needs of 
persons, including the elderly,
153
 and ‘the opinions of consumers in relevant markets 
and of members of the public generally’
154
 but OFCOM has not intervened in the 
stereotypical portrayal of ‘senior’ individuals as it is regarded as acceptable. OFCOM 
also has a statutory duty to carry out research into ‘matters relating to, or connected 
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with, the prevention of unjust or unfair treatment in programmes’
155
 but little, if any, 
research has been carried out on its behalf into the prevention of unfair treatment of 
specific age groups.  
The removal of age as a differentiating factor in public administration, for 
example, in the provision of work experience and training schemes is also a 
prerequisite in the fight against ageism.
156
 Many commentators have asserted that only 
a ‘culture change’ will remove such discrimination.
157
 Such change may not evolve 
organically when pressures within our society, particularly evident in the media, are 
often focused on a youth culture. Social structures have not kept pace with 
demographic changes and gerontological research as society is suffering from 
‘structural lag’.
158
 It has been suggested that changes in employment practice can 
remedy this deficit by providing different opportunities for work throughout the age 
continuum, for example, providing more flexible working practices, more parental 
leave and benefits, phased retirement, promoting education and training at all ages.
159
  
Studies have consistently demonstrated that changes in implicit attitudes are 
more readily achieved by encouraging free choice decisions rather than as a result of 
‘induced compliance’
160
 such as age discrimination legislation.
161
 Significantly, 
research has shown that training in the ‘affirmation of counter-stereotypes’ leads to 
reductions in the use of stereotypes, in contrast to ‘training in the negation of 
stereotypes’
162
 which enhances rather than reduces negative evaluations. Merely 
instructing employers not to discriminate on the basis of age, rather than providing 
good counter-stereotypes, may therefore encourage such discrimination. It may be 
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surmised therefore that introducing legislation to regulate age discrimination, without 
promoting the use of positive counter stereotypes, may possibly enhance negative 
evaluation of susceptible age cohorts. 
1.7: Legislation to prohibit age discrimination in the workplace 
Concern over the fiscal problems caused by a growing number of economically 
inactive, mature citizens induced many countries to introduce legislation to prohibit 
age discrimination in the late 1990’s. As the impetus was stimulated by economic 
rather than social justice grounds most legislation was directed only to employment 
relationships rather than the wider environment, indicating that the prohibition of age 
discrimination is viewed as less important than other grounds. The response to age 
discrimination demonstrates very sharply the contrasting attitudes as to whether such 
behaviour should be prohibited by legislation – on one hand by the proponents of the 
‘economic reality’ theory which opposes legislative intervention in the freedom to 
contract and on the other hand by social rights supporters who advocate the 
achievement of equality. Economic realists argue that a rational employer will always 
employ the best candidate for the job, irrespective of age – if productivity is affected 
by age in any way then this will naturally be reflected in the higher unemployment 
figures of older people – merely a rational result to an economic reality.
163
  
Age discrimination can be as irrational as refusing to hiring someone because 
they have ginger hair based on an assumption that ginger-haired individuals are short 
tempered. Yet the law does not seek to intervene in such irrational behaviour because 
freedom to contract remains at the heart of the employment relationship. The tension 
stemming from legislative intervention was described by Marshall in 1949 as a 
conflict between social rights and market values and competitiveness.
164
 Even Hayek, 
who opposed ‘social legislation’ which aimed ‘to direct private activity towards 
particular ends and to the benefit of particular groups’, recognised that public law 
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The intervention of notions of equality and social rights by means of age 
legislation into the workplace, where the market forces of freedom to contract, 
efficiency and competitiveness are paramount, has been unwelcome in many places. 
Posner argues that age discrimination is an efficient, cheap form of differentiation and 
is less demeaning than using ability or performance.
166
 He suggests that age 
discrimination legislation may harm the elderly by pressuring workers to continue 
working and provides evidence to show that employers in the USA are less inclined to 
hire older workers for fear of later discrimination claims.
167
 Nevertheless the 
prohibition of social injustices such as age discrimination can be viewed as 
institutional support for personal capabilities which will improve the labour market 
freedom of all workers. By promoting legislation to prohibit discrimination, increasing 
access to the workforce for individuals, benefits can be felt by all. In addition, the 
mere existence of age legislation can be a catalyst for change, sending a powerful 
message to society that negative stereotypes are not necessarily accurate and raising 
awareness of ageist attitudes. 
However, evidence from the USA, where age legislation has existed for nearly 
fifty years, does not provide a basis for a convincing argument that the prohibition of 
ageist conduct is successful in tackling unfair treatment. Adams found that the 
adoption of age discrimination legislation resulted in fewer older individuals obtaining 
work and concluded that the ‘implications of age discrimination legislation for 
workers above specified age ranges are unambiguously negative, with a large decrease 
in net employment’.
168
 Sunstein argues that results in the USA demonstrate that 
‘adjudication remains an extremely poor system for achieving social reform … Courts 
simply lack the tools to respond to these problems’.
169
 Rothenberg and Gardner assert 
that the American Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 (the ADEA) has been 
‘ineffective’
170
 whilst in Australia the equivalent Age Discrimination Act 2004 has 
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been described as a ‘mode of regulation’ which ‘has not brought about the type of 
social change necessary for discrimination to be adequately addressed’.
171
 
Issacharoff and Worth claim that age discrimination legislation in the USA has 
disturbed the natural life-cycle of work and older workers are unfairly extending their 
working life to the detriment of those younger, producing cross-generational 
inequities, particularly in times of high youth unemployment rates.
172
 The ‘fair-
innings’ rationale, or ‘vampire theory,’
173
 whereby older workers are expected to stand 
aside to make way for younger individuals bringing new blood to organisations, is 
used to counter-act these inequities. However, this rationale assumes a standard 
pattern of working-life which is not viable for all. For instance, women who have 
spent years caring for family members may not have enjoyed the opportunity to work 
whilst young and may value the opportunity to work in later years.  
Nonetheless the UK Supreme Court declared lawful a fair-innings justification 
for an enforced retirement age of 65 which was based on a legitimate ‘social policy 
aim of sharing out professional employment opportunities fairly between the 
generations’ in Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes.
174
 If a fair-innings argument is 
considered valid this implies that when a certain age threshold is reached rights 
become diminished, placing the rights of those younger above that of older individuals 
– thereby effectively legitimising age discriminatory conduct. This illustrates the 
‘crisis’
175
 that age-equality agendas need to confront and which is perpetuated by 





 question the legitimacy of age discrimination 
legislation per se, as they feel if age-based differentiation in the workplace is 
prohibited this may create a new form of discrimination against those who may not 
perform well in performance appraisals. Duncan feels that ‘age-equality constructs 
may be contributing to, rather than confronting, the marginalisation of older 
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 Indeed, Macnicol argues that ‘some critics would argue that this is exactly 
what legislation against age discrimination in employment is fundamentally designed 
to do’.
179
 He believes that age legislation will disadvantage the majority of older 
workers by relying upon age-neutral appraisals and ‘it may be the Trojan horse of an 
attack [by employers] upon the welfare rights of older people’.
180
 Age discrimination 
legislation may be seen as permitting discrimination on the justifiable ground of 
productivity, encouraging the removal of age-related work practices which favour 
older workers.  
Two polarised views have also developed with regard to the type of equality that 
age legislation is based upon – those who want equal treatment with those in other 
age-cohorts and those who want recognition of the special problems that each age-
cohort faces. The perplexing contradictory nature of age equality constructs 
undermines the basic objective of most age legislation which often relies on an 
insistence of equal treatment, described as an out-dated concept and which treats all as 
‘ageless.’
181
 It has been claimed that to treat all individuals as ageless downgrades the 
‘distinctive needs and actual and potential contributions’
182
 of age cohorts and 
‘especially denigrates those who cannot conform’.
183
 The application of equal 
treatment may result in mature individuals losing benefits and advantages given in 
recognition of their specific needs if they are levelled down rather than up so that no 
age cohort receives them. 
Both the young and old suffer from negative stereotypes and all are entitled to 
protection, but using an equal treatment legislative format may undermine the interests 
of older and younger age cohorts. For example, allowing older workers to have 
flexible working or phased retirement may be considered age discriminatory when 
using a test of equal treatment if younger workers are not allowed to vary their 
working practices. Supporting the needs of particular age-cohorts is age-
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discriminatory to those cohorts who do not receive support. This conflict was 
illustrated by the first ‘age’ case heard by the ECJ, Mangold v Helm,
184
 where a 
relaxation of fixed-term contract regulations designed to encourage employers to hire 
workers over the age of 58 was found to be in breach of the principle of equal 
treatment and therefore discriminatory. McHugh has questioned whether ‘non-ageist 
thinking’ is even ‘fathomable or culturally possible’ as negative images of age cohorts 
are overtly ageist, whilst positive images are ageist because they may unreasonably 
deny the experience of the majority of older people.
185
  
Age discrimination is unfair when individuals are not treated with equal dignity 
or respect throughout the life-span. Fredman acknowledges that there is ‘little 
consensus on the meaning of equality in the context of age and how it can be 
achieved’.
186
 She supports an approach which facilitates the ‘equal participation of all 
in society, based on equal concern and respect for the dignity of each individual’
187
 
rather than equal treatment. This recognises that affording equal respect to individuals 
from different age cohorts sometimes requires treating them differently. Appiah has 
pointed out that equality ‘as a social ideal is a matter of not taking irrelevant 
distinctions into account’.
188
 However, the achievement of substantive equality 
requires more than this. The nature of negative perceptions regarding older and 
younger individuals will not be addressed by an insistence on equal treatment without 
confronting the roots of prejudice. The removal of negative stereotypical attitudes 
which lead to the adoption of ‘irrelevant distinctions’ is a prerequisite to age cohorts 
receiving equal treatment and this requires structural reform to counter-act their 
effects. 
The requirement to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ on grounds of age may 
provide a means by which allowance can be made of the needs of age cohorts. In 
Canada (where protection within an equal treatment format
189
 is extended outside 
employment to cover access to goods, services and facilities) a legal duty exists to 
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make ‘accommodation of the needs of an individual or a class of individuals 
affected’
190
 unless it ‘would impose undue hardship on the person who would have to 
accommodate those needs, considering health, safety and cost’.
191
 This requires 
providers and employers to take reasonable steps to adjust their practices to 
accommodate individuals according to their particular needs. For example, older 
workers finding they are not physically capable of fulfilling the role adequately 
because of age-related problems should be offered equivalent but less physically 
demanding work if it does not cause undue hardship to the employer, rather than being 
dismissed. Moon develops a persuasive argument for the adoption of such a 
requirement asserting that it ‘could facilitate those at the beginning and end of their 
working life being able to reduce their hours, work flexi-time or work in part from 
home’.
192
 However, this compelling suggestion was rejected by the UK government as 
it ‘would be unduly burdensome and reduce clarity if employers and service providers 
were required to respond to extensive new duties in this way’.
193
 
An alternative legislative format based on the need to uphold the dignity of 
individuals would allow all age-cohorts to be treated with equal respect whilst 
permitting different treatment according to their needs. However, O’Connell argues 
convincingly that, whilst legislative formats based on dignity appear to offer many 
benefits, case-law from Canada and South Africa shows that dignity is too ambiguous 
a concept to define and a dependence upon it often results in subjective and perverse 
decisions.
 194
 Similarly Moon and Allen, in a study of the suitability of dignity as a test 
in determining discrimination, conclude that it should only ‘be used as a tool for 
refining the analysis’
195
 rather than an independent right.  
Amartya Sen has developed a ‘capabilities’ approach in which an individual can 
be viewed as possessing a set of ‘functionings’ which vary ‘from elementary ones, 
such as being adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to very 
complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the life of the 
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community and having self-respect’. A ‘capability’ may be seen as ‘a kind of freedom: 
the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations’.
196
 An 
individual’s ability to achieve their functionings is determined by their personal 
characteristics and environment, including the legal and political context. Social 
rights, such as the prohibition of discrimination, act as conversion factors which 
extend and enable an individual’s functionings, enabling an optimum contribution to 
be made to society, which in turn enhances the labour market for all. As a result a goal 
of ‘equality of capability’ can steer the labour market towards more efficiency and 
competitiveness whilst enabling individuals to achieve an optimum contribution to 
society. This is a goal which has yet to be translated into legislation but it is clear that 
citizens from all age cohorts should be treated as individuals with particular needs, 
capabilities and circumstances, rather than using age as a proxy by which to decide 
when someone should be given employment, services or opportunities. 
1.8: Conclusion 
This Chapter has discussed the concept of ageism, the associated process of age 
discrimination, prejudice reduction schemes and problems which beset the 
introduction of age discrimination legislation. The damaging effects of age 
discrimination have wide ranging implications for the individual, employers and the 
economy. Irrational beliefs with respect to age are hard to eradicate but prejudice 
reduction schemes have been shown to have promising results in the USA. 
Nonetheless, legislation has been the chosen method of addressing the problem in 
most countries despite evidence which shows that it may not provide a suitable 
mechanism for change.  
There is a lack of agreement over the type of equality that is to be achieved with 
regard to age discrimination. Ageism is qualitatively different to racism and sexism in 
that age is not a fixed characteristic. Each individual obtains a benefit or detriment 
from the conditions prevailing at different ages and unequal treatment may be thought 
acceptable if all age cohorts share benefits and detriments over a life-span, described 
as ‘intergenerational fairness’
197
 but which is in itself age discriminatory. Equality 
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agendas which are based on equal treatment therefore may not be the most apposite 
with which to address the problem.  
A lack of consensus over the acceptability of discriminatory treatment on the 
grounds of age is at the heart of the paradox in efforts to address age discrimination. 
An ambivalent attitude towards ageism has arisen because it is seen as sometimes 
justified, unlike other suspect grounds of discrimination, because age cohorts do not 
form discrete suspect groups with a history of disadvantage or a lack of political power 
which lessens the need for a remedial function of prohibitive discrimination 
legislation. Age is an accepted proxy for defining rights and responsibilities, such as 
driving and marriage, and allocating entitlements and benefits. This continued use of 
age in administrative decision-making further contributes to the notion that it is 
acceptable to use age as a differentiating factor. Action to tackle age discrimination 
has therefore been slow, unenthusiastic and inconsistent. The legislation that has been 
introduced reflects this ambivalence and age is the most qualified of the proscribed 
grounds of discrimination, with a wide array of exceptions. It is against this 
background that the European Union introduced the Framework Directive on Equal 
Treatment in Employment in 2000, discussed in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter Two:  
Legislation to Regulate Age Discrimination 
2.1: Introduction 
This Chapter explores the legal response to the need for prohibitive action 
against age discrimination on an international, European and domestic level. The USA 
was the first country to regulate ageist conduct, stemming from concern over the 
arbitrary use of age-limits in recruitment and the consequent poverty experienced by 
older unemployed workers. However, the 1990’s saw increasing unease over the 
global financial problems that an economically inactive older workforce would have 
on national budgets and this resulted in many nations enacting ‘age legislation’. In the 
European Union (the ‘EU’) this action principally followed the introduction of a 
Directive in 2000 establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation.
1
 In the UK the Framework Directive was transposed by 
means of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006
2
 which were subsequently 
incorporated into the Equality Act 2010. After describing early efforts to prohibit age 
discrimination, the discussion in this Chapter will focus upon the introduction of the 
EU Framework Directive, the provisions it contains and the subsequent transposition 
of its requirements into domestic legislation. 
2.2: Early action to prohibit age discrimination 
Macnicol has described how interest in action to tackle the growing number of 
unemployed older workers stems from the early 1900’s when economic restructuring 
of major industries and increased mechanisation stimulated the rise in male ‘early’ 
retirement.
3
 Measures to encourage older individuals to work in order to address the 
economic consequences of demographic change in Europe were urged as long ago as 
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1928 by the French economist Alfred Sauvy.
4
 His forecast that severe financial 
problems would occur around 1954 because a fall in the birth rate would be 
accompanied by an increasing number of older citizens was only prevented from 
coming to fruition by the large number of deaths caused by the Second World War. 
However, legislative action to tackle age discrimination had already been seen in 
the USA. Colorado introduced age legislation that protected 18-60 years old in 1903,
5
 
Louisiana protecting 18-49 year olds in 1934 and Massachusetts protecting 45-65 year 
olds in 1937. In 1956 maximum recruitment ages for federal workers were abolished. 
Eight states had age legislation by 1960 and more than half of US states had 
legislation
6
 in place when the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the 
ADEA) was enacted in 1967.
7
 The rationale behind this series of legislative 
intervention in the freedom to contract was explained in the Wirtz Report.
8
 This was 
prepared by US Secretary of Labor Wirtz in 1965 following an extensive examination 
of labour problems in the USA and was directly instrumental in the enactment of the 
ADEA. The debate in the USA centred upon the need to alleviate the extreme poverty 
that Wirtz found associated with unemployed older workers. For example, he found 
that in the state of New Jersey 36% of those over 65 lived in poverty compared to 9% 
of those under 65 years old.
9
  
Wirtz found strong evidence of ‘statistical discrimination’
10
 which he defined as 
the rejection of a cohort based on general assumptions of the group ‘without 
consideration of a particular applicant's individual qualifications’.
11
 His focus was on 
the widespread arbitrary use of age limits of 35, 45 and 55 years in recruitment, as 
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once unemployed, older workers found it very difficult to re-enter the workplace. The 
emphasis was on those we now regard as ‘middle-aged’, rather than near retirement 
age. Over half of all private job openings in the USA were barred to those over 55 and 
over a quarter to those over 45.
12
 Wirtz placed an emphasis on the need to remove 
arbitrary assumptions although he accepted that not all stereotypical assumptions were 
incorrect as some were ‘valid,’ but false assumptions led to arbitrary decision-
making.
13
 However rational it seemed to individual employers to exclude older 
workers who might demand higher wages than those younger, Wirtz recognised this 
was detrimental to the individual and the economy. It was a ‘waste … of a wealth of 
human resources … and the needless denial … of opportunity for that useful activity 
which constitutes much of life's meaning’.
14
  
President Johnson agreed with Wirtz that age discrimination could result in ‘a 
cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these 
citizens and their families’
15
 and recommended the enactment of the ADEA. The 
rationale behind the enactment is set out in the ‘Congressional Statement of Findings 
and Purpose’: 
2 (a) (1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older 
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to 
retain employment, and especially to regain employment 
when displaced from jobs; 
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for 
job performance has become a common practice, and certain 
otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of 
older persons; 
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term 
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and 
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employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high 
among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and 
their employment problems grave; 
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary 
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens 
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce. 
 b) It is therefore the purpose of this Chapter – 
 to promote employment of older persons based on their 
ability rather than age 
 to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.16 
The impetus for the first piece of national age legislation was therefore based on 
consideration of the needs of ‘older persons’ coupled with the effect of their 
unemployment on the economy.  







 Little further action was taken elsewhere until the 
introduction of the UN International Plan of Action on Aging in 1982. This 
acknowledged that it would be necessary ‘to establish a new economic order’
20 
to 
address demographic change. Recommendation 37 of the UN Plan stated that: 
‘Governments should eliminate discrimination in the labour market 
and ensure equality of treatment in professional life. Negative 
stereotypes about older workers exist among some employers. 
Governments should take steps to educate employers and 
employment counsellors about the capabilities of older 
workers…older workers should also enjoy equal access to 
orientation, training and placement facilities and services.’  
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The aim was to encourage individuals to stay in work for as long as possible by 
voluntary means, but no specific methods were suggested for promoting these aims.  
The UN has continued to advocate a voluntarist approach to the problem of 
demographic change. Thirty-five broad-ranging objectives and two hundred 
recommendations with regard to age discrimination have been made and adopted by 
the UN, committing nation states to eliminate all forms of discrimination to older 
persons. It is recommended that age barriers be removed, flexible retirement policies 
promoted, damaging stereotypes about older workers corrected and disincentives to 
continued working removed. In 2002 the UN reiterated that ‘older persons should be 
enabled to continue with income generating work for as long as they want’
21
 but made 
no recommendation to enact legislation – instead governments were encouraged to 
promote an atmosphere where the objectives can be achieved.  
Age discrimination was not specifically subject to international convention 
rights or pledges prior to the 1990’s but implicitly fell into an ‘other status’ category. 
The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all are ‘entitled to rights 
without distinctions made on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.
22
 
Other international treaties followed this pattern by including ‘other status’ as a 
protected category, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966,
23
 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966,
24
 
the ILO Convention No. 111 1958,
25
 the European Convention on Human Rights
26
 and 
the amended European Social Charter 1996.
27
  
The inclusion of age within the phrase ‘other status’ was discussed in Love et al 
v Australia
28
 where four pilots were compulsorily retired before their 60
th
 birthday. It 
was held that a mandatory retirement age was objective and reasonable and a 
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‘widespread national and international practice’.
29
 The UN Committee found that age 
may be included in ‘other status’ only if the discrimination was ‘not objective and 
reasonable’
30
 which indicates that age is not automatically a prohibited ground. A 
similar view was taken in Solís v Peru.
31
 Solis, aged 61, had been selected for 
redundancy on the basis of age. As the UN Committee found this action ‘objective and 
reasonable’
32
 the action did not fall into the category of ‘other status’.  
Prior to the introduction of the UK Age Regulations, the House of Lords held in 
ex parte Carson and Reynolds
33
 that age did fall into the category of ‘other status’ but 
there was unanimous opinion that age was not a ‘suspect’ category which required 
severe scrutiny. Lord Hoffmann stated that certain characteristics ‘such as race, caste, 
noble birth, membership of a political party, … gender, are seldom, if ever, acceptable 
grounds for differences in treatment’ … but … ‘[D]iscrimination on grounds of old 
age may be a contemporary example of a borderline case’.
34
 Lord Walker agreed and 
added that age ‘is different in kind from other personal characteristics … There is 
nothing intrinsically demeaning about age’.
35
 This failure to acknowledge that age is a 
bona fide suspect ground, discussed in the previous Chapter, resulted in a paucity of 
binding measures to tackle age discrimination prior to the 1990’s and ‘soft’ voluntary 
measures were adopted by several countries, including the UK. 
2.3: Demographic change 
Despite the lack of acceptance of age as a suspect ground a rash of age 
discrimination legislation appeared in the late 1990’s in many countries around the 











 all came into force within 
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a few months. Almost every country in the world now has legislation prohibiting 
ageist practices.
41
 The impetus for this action stemmed directly from anxiety regarding 
demographic change following a report produced by the World Bank in 1994
42
 and a 
further seminal report for the OECD by Turner et al.
43
 These reports stressed the need 
for new policies to be adopted in order to address the increasing financial demands on 
national funds made by economically inactive, older citizens.  
Three factors have led to an increasing proportion of older citizens. The increase 
in the birth rate after the Second World War has led to the ‘Baby Boom’ generation 
reaching retirement age. Developments in medical care have led to improvements in 
health which has led to an increase in life expectancy. In addition birth rates have 
fallen by one-third since 1964 so the number of economically active, young people has 
decreased.
44
 The ratio of older people to young people – the ageing index – rose from 
64.0 in 1971 to 97.8 in 2006.
45
 Whereas in 2000 we had 30.8 economically inactive 
people over 65 for every 100 active individuals of all ages, by 2050 there will be 54.7 
economically inactive people over 65 for every 100 active individuals in the UK.
46
 By 
2050 the size of the older population worldwide will increase from 606 million in 
2000 to about two billion, with those over 65 accounting for one in five persons.
47
  
An ageing population places significant pressure on pension funds and requires 
increasingly expensive health and social service provision but if older citizens 
continue to work they enhance national funds by paying tax and national insurance 
contributions. There is also evidence to show that if individuals remain active by 
working they make lower demands on health services by remaining healthy for 
longer.
48
 The combination of an increase in life-expectancy coupled with a growing 
tendency for early retirement from the workplace led the OECD and the World Bank 
to predict that a large number of economically inactive, older citizens would put 
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severe strain on governmental finances. It was forecast that ‘a gradual slowdown in 
growth in OECD and non-OECD regions by about 1 per cent per annum between 2000 
and 2080’ would be ‘caused by a decline in population growth’
49
 but this would also 
be coupled with ‘a fall in the OECD private savings propensity resulting from an 
ageing population’. This would produce ‘OECD current account deficits and a 
consequent decline in OECD net foreign assets’.
50
 It is the combination of these two 
factors that was predicted to lead to economic difficulties. This forecast assumed that 
there would be continued economic growth and a gradual reduction in unemployment, 
which unfortunately has not transpired. The current recession may turn this predicted 
difficulty into a potential disaster. The recent change in governmental attitude towards 
age discrimination legislation has therefore been forced by the need to encourage older 
citizens to remain active in the workplace in order to address potential economic 
problems rather than concern for unfair treatment of citizens.  
2.4: Age discrimination as an issue in the European Union 
The EU was not unaware of the demographic changes. The European Parliament 
adopted a resolution in 1982 on the ‘situation and problems of the aged in the 
European Community’
51
 and in 1986
52
 which noted the increasing number of 
economically inactive citizens as a result of more workers taking early retirement and 
life expectancy improving. Figure 2.1 shows the projected changing relationship 
between the number of 15-64 and over 64 year olds in the EU, with the latter group 
increasing by 77% indicating a substantial increase in the age dependency ratio. 
Figure 2.1: Projected changes in the size and age structure of the populations of 
EU member states, 2004 - 2050 
Total population 
15-64 year old 
population 
65+ year old population 
2004 2050 change 2004 2050 change 2004 2050 change 
456.8 453.8 -1% 306.8 259.1 -16% 75.3 133.3 +77% 
Source: Information obtained from Carone et al, The Economic Impact of Ageing Populations 
in the EU25 Member States (Report No 236, EU Directorate-General 2005) 21. 
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In 1990 the European Commission set up a Liaison Group for the Elderly as it 
felt that the growing elderly population ‘will have considerable economic and social 
implications, inter alia, for the employment market, social security and social 
expenditure’.
53
 The European Foundation held a symposium in 1991 which concluded 
that the falling birth-rate, coupled with increasing early retirement and life expectancy, 
would lead to substantial socio-economic problems which could be addressed by 
fighting ‘against the systematic rejection of older employees’,
54
 balancing different 




In its early years the EEC was concerned with promoting a single market within 
which workers, having equal rights, could move freely.
56
 The original aim of 
European discrimination legislation was to avoid a situation where undertakings in 
some member states ‘suffer a competitive disadvantage in intra-Community 
competition as compared with undertakings established in states which have not yet 
eliminated discrimination’.
57
 Intervention was necessary for the maintenance of a 
level-playing field across the Community to address any ‘restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market’.
58
 McDonald and Potton claimed in 1997 that 
it was pressure from corporate employers ‘for the creation of minimum rights in this 
area to avoid competitive disadvantage arising from the diverse legislative conditions 
prevailing among member states’
59
 that led to the development of policies to combat 
ageism in the workplace. Fredman agrees that this new emphasis on ageism was not ‘a 
result of the sudden appreciation of the need for fairness but gains its chief impetus 
from business and macro-economic imperatives’.
60
  
                                                 
53
 Commission, Decision of 17 October 1991 on the Liaison Group on the Elderly (91/544/EEC) [1991] 
OJ L 296. 
54
 S Droit, F Guerin and P Paoli, Ageing at Work: A European Perspective (Proceedings of a European 
Colloquium, Paris 12 June 1991, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 




 The EC Treaty, Article 39 and Regulation 1612/68/EEC of the European Economic Council of 15 
October 1968 on Freedom of Movement for Workers [1968] OJ L 257. 
57
 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (No 2) [1976] ECR 455, [1976] ICR 547 [9]. 
58
 EC Treaty, Article 81. 
59
 F McDonald and M Potton, ‘The Nascent European Policy Towards Older Workers: Can the 
European Union Help the Older Worker?’ (1997) 26(4) Personnel Review 293, 304. 
60
 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP 2002) 62. 
 44 
This mirrors the development of sex discrimination policies in the EEC. Hugh 
Collins has noted how throughout the twentieth century ‘labour rights were not 
regarded as universal human rights, but rather as standards concerned to address 
problems of social justice or welfare caused by international regulatory competition 
and the globalization of markets’.
61
 Sen agrees with this assertion and feels that ‘the 
linkages between economic, political and social actions can be critical to the 
realisation of rights and to the pursuit of the broad objectives of decent work and 
adequate living for working people’
62
 and indeed these linkages have been critical in 
providing the impetus for age legislation.  
Nonetheless this economic pressure was accompanied by an increasing parallel 
concern to uphold fundamental rights. Developments in the 1980’s and 90’s saw an 
abandonment of purely market-based policies within the EEC and there was a growing 
recognition that social rights, both collectively and individually held, and economic 
efficiency are not indivisible. Indeed the European Court of Justice (the ‘ECJ’) 
stressed in 2000 that the economic aims of equality provisions law are secondary to 
the social aims of protecting fundamental human rights.
63
  
The adoption of a ‘rights’ approach found an expanded role for the EU in 
building a sense of European citizenship. The European Social Charter 1989, 
promoted by the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, concentrated on 
objectives which would help ‘the development of the social dimension of the internal 
market’.
64
 Delors felt the ‘ultimate aim must be the creation of a European Social 
Area’
65
 where ‘social legislation’
66
 guaranteed basic social rights to citizens. The 
Preamble to the Social Charter establishes that ‘the same importance must be attached 
to the social aspects as to the economic aspects’
67
 of the community. The goal was of 
‘equal treatment’ and ‘in order to ensure equal treatment, it is important to combat 
every form of discrimination, including discrimination on grounds of sex, colour, race, 
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 Age was not considered to be a suspect ground. Nonetheless 
the notion that all citizens deserved equal treatment so that solidarity between 
individuals from diverse backgrounds could be fostered was an essential element of 
the Charter, creating a unified feeling of ‘belonging’ to Europe. Giving the right to 
protection from discrimination to individual workers was set to achieve a socio-
political objective of engendering a sense of European fellowship, enabling citizens to 
identify with European Union values. 
Movements were also taking place in the European Commission itself. 
Criticisms had been made of its own employment policies as it was one of the ‘worst 
offenders’
69
 with regard to age discrimination. By October 1997 it had received many 
complaints about its use of age categories in recruitment – usually a maximum age 
limit of 32 or 34 was stipulated for administrators. However, in the face of 
Netherlands domestic legislation, which banned the use of age requirements in job 
advertisements, the EU was forced to abandon its practice as it was obliged to use the 
same advertisement in all member states. The EU Ombudsman threatened a legal 
challenge to the Commission and it was forced to change its policy. Age 
discrimination was becoming a more prominent issue. In a survey of 16,000 European 
Union citizens, 837 reported that they had experienced age discrimination in 
employment, which was greater than for any other type of discrimination and more 
than two-thirds thought those over 50 years old were disadvantaged in accessing 
training, work and promotion prospects.
70
 
2.5: The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 – Article 13 
It is difficult to overestimate the nature of the change that was made in the 
approach to age discrimination by the EU from 1996 to 1997 as a consequence of the 
concern for demographic change. Although an EU White Paper
71
 in 1994 suggested 
that citizens should be able to rely on equal treatment with respect to age, most 
references to suspect grounds in EU literature from 1994 to 1996 did not expressly 
refer to age. The Intergovernmental Conferences in Turin and Dublin in 1996 saw 
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demands from some member states to introduce wider-ranging provisions concerning 
fundamental rights. Bell and Waddington postulated in December 1996 that the EU 
was going to add a new Article 6a (renumbered 13) to the Treaty which would enable 
it to introduce provisions to prohibit ‘discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, 
sex, sexual orientation, disability, religion or any other social status’,
72
 thereby not 
specifically encompassing age. Nonetheless when the new Article 13 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam emerged in October 1997 it included age: 
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within 
the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate 
action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
73
  
This enabling provision was the first identification of a broader grouping of 





 were specifically targeted. Bell draws attention to the fact that Article 13 
represents a new horizontal approach where different suspect grounds are dealt with 
by a common measure with no hierarchy of grounds apparent.
76
 Article 13 does not 
have direct effect as it does not satisfy the third limb of the Reyners
77
 test, so it is 
merely an enabling clause, giving power to the EU to introduce further provisions. 
Nevertheless it is generally accepted that it marks the beginning of a ‘new climate 
within the Community legal order’.
78
  
Article 13 is not confined to discrimination in the workplace and may be used by 
the EU in the future to enable broader provisions. Waddington predicted that ‘Article 
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13 is likely also to exert more subtle influences, promoting the inclusion of equal 
opportunities clauses … and the development of inclusive policies’.
79
 This was 
apparent in the European Council Employment guidelines issued in Helsinki in 
December 1999 which stressed ‘the need to pay particular attention to supporting older 
workers, in order to increase their participation in the labour force’.
80
  
2.6: The European Union Framework Directive for Equal Treatment 
The rationale for introducing legislation prohibiting age discrimination was set 
out by the European Commission in May 1999 in a report entitled Towards a Europe 
for All Ages.
81
 The document concentrates solely on five ‘dimensions’ of demographic 
transition rather than a desire to uphold the rights of citizens. The dimensions 
comprise:  
1. the relative decline of the population of working age and the 
increase in the number of economically inactive older citizens 
2. the pressure on pension systems and public finances stemming 
from a growing number of retired people 
3. the increasing need for and cost of old age health care and the 
promotion of healthy ageing 
4. a recognition of the growing diversity among older people in 
terms of resources and needs 
5. gender differences in longevity have left insufficient pension 
cover for many older women.
82
 
The Commission noted that the ‘magnitude of the demographic changes as we enter 
the 21st century will force the European Union to rethink and change outmoded 
practices and institutions’,
83
 particularly with regard to pensions
84
 and health care.
85
 
Workplace-based discrimination on the grounds of age would be dealt with by means 
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of proposals based on Article 13 in an effort to enable and motivate ‘older people to 
stay involved in working’.
86
 There seems little doubt that it was this economic 
rationale that provided the stimulus for age legislation in the EU.  
However, Hepple claims that the enabling provision of Article 13 would have 
merely been an ‘empty vessel’
87
 without the events of 30
th
 October 1999 when the far 
right Freedom Party won a share of power in Austria. Member states wanted to be 
seen to be opposed to racism and other forms of prejudice and within a month 
proposals for two Directives were produced which were designed to fight 
discrimination.
88
 The first proposal was concerned with discrimination on grounds of 
race and ethnic origin
89
 whilst the second was Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 
establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and 
Occupation,
90
 aiming to offer protection to those subjected to discrimination on the 
basis of age, disability, sexual orientation and religion and belief.  
Splitting these suspect grounds into two groups stimulated critical comment by 
those who felt that this produced a hierarchy of grounds, with gender
91
 and race given 
preferential treatment, whilst age, disability, sexual orientation and religion and belief 
are treated less rigorously.
92
 For example, the Race Directive extends protection 
beyond the workplace to access to services and goods, whereas the protection given in 
the Framework Directive is limited to discrimination in ‘employment and 
occupation’.
93
 Given that the EU Commission felt that particular problems were 
occurring with regard to age equality in pensions and access to health care, limiting 
the Framework Directive’s scope to the workplace does not address these problems. 
Moreover negative stereotypes of older citizens are found throughout society and not 
just in employment. The non-regulation of ageist conduct outside the workplace 
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suggests that this conduct is acceptable and sends a ‘mixed-message’ to society. 
Nonetheless the seemingly horizontal approach suggested in Article 13, where all 
suspect grounds are treated equally, belies the reality found in the Framework 
Directive where protection is undoubtedly weaker with regard to age discrimination.  
Member states were given three years within which to transpose the 
requirements of the Framework Directive. It may be a reflection of the importance 
placed by member states upon the ‘age’ element of the Directive that Greece, the 
Netherlands and Denmark not only did not implement the ‘age’ requirements within 
three years, but failed to apply for an extension to the period. The UK implemented 






 elements within the three 
year period but took a further three to implement the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006. All member states eventually transposed the Framework Directive 
but have varying degrees of protection, following the principle of subsidiarity. 
The purpose of the Framework Directive is to lay down a construct in 
accordance with which member states can construct legislation to prohibit 
discrimination. The provisions contained in the Directive closely follow the precedents 
established in earlier EU legislation, particularly in the aim of implementing the 














 which occur on the grounds of age are to be prohibited. If a prima 
facie case can be made out by a worker, the burden of proof shifts to the employer 
who must show there has been ‘no breach of the principle of equal treatment’.
103
 In 
addition the provisions permitting positive action,
104





 are similar to those found elsewhere.
107
 Sanctions 
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for discriminatory treatment ‘must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive’
108
 and 
information concerning the legislation must be disseminated to citizens ‘by all 
appropriate means, for example at the workplace, throughout their territory’.
109
 
Member states must ensure that procedures ‘for the enforcement of obligations under 
this Directive are available to all persons who consider themselves wronged’.
110
 ‘Age’ 
is not defined and the Framework Directive applies to all age-cohorts, unlike the 
American ADEA which applies only to the over 40s.
111
 
The EU Commission in an Explanatory Memorandum claimed that the 
Framework Directive ‘does not rank … in any way’ suspect grounds ‘in order to 
adequately address problems of multiple discrimination’.
112
 The Directive only refers 
to multiple discrimination once and this is in terms of its effect upon women. Recital 3 
states that in ‘implementing the principle of equal treatment, the Community 
should…promote equality between men and women, especially since women are often 
the victims of multiple discrimination’. This recognition is important, but no 
recommendation is made on how to address the problem. The resulting legislation 
across the EU is accordingly directed to individual suspect grounds rather than 
addressing the manner in which the grounds may interact in particular instances. For 
example, in Bahl v The Law Society
113
 an Asian female claimant failed in her attempt 
to have the combined effect of her race and sex considered by the courts because 
evidence relating to each ground had to be separately presented, even though to the 
claimant they were inextricably linked. This lack of direction is a significant weakness 
in the Directive as those suffering multiple discrimination may find it difficult to 
obtain redress for their complaint in national courts. 
Ghosheh has described five necessary aspects of age discrimination legislation 
and all are found within the requirements laid out in the Framework Directive.
114
 
Firstly, provisions should address the following components – direct and indirect age 
discrimination; harassment, victimization, discharge and redundancy, possible 
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justifications, burden of proof and remedies. Secondly, it should address recruitment 
of workers and thirdly, protection should apply through the whole employment 
process. Fourthly, the legislation should have an expansive definition so that 
encompasses a very broad age-group or all age-groups, giving protection to the widest 
possible group of workers. Lastly, positive action in the form of the promotion of 
policies and practices within organisations which will prevent discrimination taking 
place should be encouraged. However, this latter element is only referred to in a 
negative manner in the Framework Directive with member states ‘not prevented’
115
 
from adopting positive measures rather than requiring that measures be taken that are 
proactive. This is a significant failing, especially bearing in mind that encouragement 
of older citizens in the workplace is the principal raison d’être of the legislation.  
The type of transformative equality that is required to eradicate negative 
stereotypes and dismantle systematic disparities between age cohorts needs to ensure 
that workers have the skills they need to participate fully in society – some may need 
more resources to enable them to participate. A positive duty on employers to promote 
age equality, to reasonably adjust practices or accommodate the needs of older 
workers may more readily address this aim. The Framework Directive imposes such a 
duty with respect to disabled workers: 
employers shall take appropriate measures … to enable a person 
with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in 
employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would 
impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.
116
 
Age may affect an individual’s ability to carry out tasks, for example, the young may 
not be old enough to possess a heavy goods vehicle licence or those older may lack 
more recent qualifications, but the Directive inconsistently imposes no requirement on 
employers to make reasonable accommodation or adjustments for age as it does for 
disability discrimination.
117
 Using this format over the range of all suspect grounds 
would have maintained a non-hierarchical approach whilst addressing the particular 
problems of older workers.  
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2.6.1: The principle of equal treatment 
The Preamble to the Framework Directive sets out the stated aim of the 
legislation to be enacted by member states; discrimination on the grounds of religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation is to be combated with a view to putting 
into effect ‘the principle of equal treatment’.
118
 Recital 4 contains justification for the 
prohibition of discrimination, based on international Declarations, Conventions and 
Covenants which uphold fundamental human rights:  
The right of all persons to equality before the law and protection 
against discrimination constitutes a universal right recognised by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, to which all member states are signatories. 
Convention No 111 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 




Ironically not one of these Declarations, Conventions and Covenants specifically 
mentions age discrimination but leaves it to be potentially and implicitly included by 
the use of the phrase ‘other status’, as discussed previously.  
As the title indicates, the Directive implements the principle of ‘equal treatment’ 
and 19 further references are made to this throughout the text of the document.
120
 
Particular mention is made of the need to achieve ‘equal treatment between women 
and men’.
121
 This follows the template well-established under previous Directives 
such as those for race and gender.
122
 As discussed in the previous Chapter, the 
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principle of equal treatment requires that all citizens have the right to receive the same 
treatment. This concept is one which, whilst admittedly tackling unjustified or 
irrational discriminatory treatment, does not achieve or seek to achieve equality of 
opportunity or capability. As it is also clear that the overall objective of the 
Framework Directive was to do more than ensure equal treatment – that is, to promote 
and facilitate the participation of older citizens in the workplace – the goal of equal 
treatment may not be a pertinent response. 
The real economic objectives at the heart of this Directive are referred to in 
subsequent Recitals. The importance of the ‘need to take appropriate action for the 
social and economic integration of elderly and disabled people’
123
 and the ‘need to pay 
particular attention to supporting older workers, in order to increase their participation 
in the labour force’
124
 are both highlighted. Further justifications for legislative 
interference in the freedom to contract are found in Recital 11 where the Directive 
recognises that discrimination undermines the achievement of ‘the Treaty objectives, 
in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, 
raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity and the free movement of persons’. Recital 25 adds that the prohibition of 
age discrimination ‘is an essential part of meeting the aims and encouraging diversity’. 
The prohibition of age discrimination therefore is not a subsidiary concern, but 
essential to achieving the aims of the EC Treaty.  
Using the template already adopted in earlier Directives, rather than specifically 
developing a format and provisions that would encourage older citizens to remain in or 
re-enter the workforce, may prove short-sighted. In approaching the task of tackling 
ageist practices the EU did not take advantage of learning from the experience of other 
jurisdictions, for example, from reports emanating from Australia in 1999 which 
highlighted the need for a radical format of legislation as the existence of numerous 
derogations from Australian discrimination legislation had proved detrimental to the 
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eradication of age discrimination.
125
 Using an existing template may have been 
expedient to the EU in terms of time as well as eliminating political problems which 
would ensue from the adoption of a new format requiring agreement from all member 
states. 
Seeking equal treatment across all age cohorts may discourage the adoption of 
appropriate action to tackle the problems caused by demographic transition, as such 
measures may be discriminatory against the young. The goal of equal treatment for all 
age cohorts has resulted in measures which are discriminatory against the young 
becoming subject to prohibition whilst discrimination to older citizens outside the 
workforce is not. This contrasts with the format adopted by the USA which was 
directly related to the objective of addressing poverty in older cohorts. Duncan asserts 
that the ‘symbolic priority accorded to younger employed people over those beyond 
state retirement age seems unmistakable’
126
 and that the legislation benefits the young 
whilst not really helping the old. Fredman has drawn a distinction between the 
problems of ageist conduct against the young and the old and claims that they are two 
distinct types of discrimination, needing two separate approaches.
127
 For example, the 
young will outgrow any stigma attached to their age cohort whilst the old cannot and 
the exclusion of mature individuals from the workplace is likely to increase with time. 
‘Old’ age discrimination has links with disability discrimination and a format similar 
to that developed for disability is more likely to achieve the objective of promoting the 
participation of older citizens in the workplace, whilst the goal of equal treatment is 
applicable to all age groups, including the young. In grouping the two types of 
discrimination together and ignoring their important differences the Framework 
Directive may fail to address its real objective. 
However, a real benefit of basing the legislation on equal treatment is that it 
ensures that the young are given protection irrespective of the prevailing predictions 
surrounding pension provision and funding for an ageing population. As the economic 
recession has deepened the plight of the young unemployed has become a significant 
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problem and the right to equal treatment will at least provide a foundation upon which 
to establish that the young are also deserving of equal consideration by employers.  
2.6.2: Age as a general principle of European equality law 
The ECJ sought to explain the position of age discrimination as part of the 
general principle of equality in community law in Mangold v Helm
128
 where the court 
held that the principle of the prohibition of age discrimination must be regarded as a 
general principle of Community law ‘deriving from common constitutional traditions 
and international instruments’.
129
 Advocate General Tizzano stated that national courts 
must: 
guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle of non-
discrimination in respect of age, setting aside any provision of 
national law which may conflict with Community law, even where 




This suggests that the prohibition has been longstanding and deep-seated and should 
be as rigorously interpreted and applied as that against sex and race discrimination.  
However, in Lindorfer v EU Council
131
 the ECJ held that ‘the prohibition of age 
discrimination should, both by its very nature and because of its history, be interpreted 
and applied less rigorously than the prohibition of sex discrimination’
132
 – firmly 
indicating that the principle of equality is not to be interpreted equally amongst 
suspect grounds. Ms. Lindorfer claimed that the operation of the EU occupational 
pension scheme was discriminatory on grounds of age and sex as it treated officials 
starting their careers late less favourably than those who start theirs much earlier and 
women less favourably as men as their life expectancy was greater. The ECJ found 
that it was discriminatory on grounds of sex but not age. Advocate General Sharpston 
asserted that the general principle of equality had always existed within the 
Community from its inception and by having such a principle ‘Community law would 
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indeed have precluded certain distinctions based on age’.
133
 But she drew a 
comparison between the specific prohibition of age discrimination and the general 
prohibition of discrimination present in the general equality principles of Community 
law. She felt the former ‘too recent and uneven’ to meet a description of a general 
principle and that ‘it is not appropriate – or indeed possible – to apply the prohibition 
of age discrimination to the present case as rigorously as the prohibition of sex 
discrimination’.
134
 A very similar reticence to acknowledge that age was as important 
a suspect ground was seen in Kleist.
135
  
Schiek has suggested that European equality laws can be divided into separate 
categories – firstly those that apply to biological groups over which the individual has 
no control – including gender, race and disability, and secondly, those which reflect an 
individual’s chosen characteristics, such as religious and political belief and sexual 
orientation.
136
 Those falling in the latter groups are more able to avoid discrimination, 
if they wish, and so require less protection. On this basis age should be included in the 
first group and therefore subject to exacting and rigorous standards. But Advocate 
General Jacobs in the ECJ explained the difference between age and the other 
‘suspect’ grounds as such: 
equality of treatment irrespective of sex is at present regarded as a 
fundamental and overriding principle to be observed and enforced 
whenever possible, whereas the idea of equal treatment irrespective 
of age is subject to very numerous qualifications and exceptions, 
such as age limits of various kinds, often with binding legal force, 
which are regarded as not merely acceptable but positively 
beneficial and sometimes essential.
137
  
Age is therefore, once again, a lesser ‘suspect’ category of differentiation than other 
suspect groups and subject to less rigorous standards of interpretation and application. 
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2.6.3: Derogations from the principle of equal treatment 
Notwithstanding the ‘essential’
138
 nature of the prohibition of age 
discrimination, the Framework Directive singles out age as subject to numerous 
derogations which firmly identifies age as at the bottom of the hierarchy of suspect 
grounds. Article 6 lays down specific constraints which apply only to age: 
6(1) ... differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not 
constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they 
are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, 
including legitimate employment policy, labour market and 
vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary. 
The wording of this provision reflects that seen in the ECJ’s decision in Bilka-
Kaufhaus
139
 which stresses that the measure should ‘correspond to a real need on the 
part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives 
pursued and are necessary to that end’.
140
 This implies that if alternative means can be 
used rather than the discriminatory treatment, then justification will not succeed. 
Notably no distinction is made between indirect and direct discrimination in Article 
6(1) and all differences of treatment on grounds of age are capable of justification.  
The suggestion that legitimate aims include employment policy, labour market 
and vocational training objectives indicates that a broad aim will satisfy this 
requirement. For example, an employment policy which aims to share ‘employment 
opportunities fairly between the generations’
141
 by dismissing older workers to make 
way for those younger or limits the need to expel older workers ‘by way of 
performance management’
142
 may satisfy this requirement. The enforcement of these 
types of aim undoubtedly discriminates against and discourages older workers from 
participating in the workforce. Employment policy aims may conflict: the need to 
encourage older workers to stay in the workforce clashes with the need to provide 
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young people with employment. Moreover it is indicated that legitimate aims are not 
restricted to those stipulated in Article 6 and further aims may presumably be 
acceptable if appropriate ‘within the context of national law’.
143
 
Article 6(1) provides additional exceptions to the principle of equal treatment, 
with the conspicuous use of the phrase ‘among others’ implying that this list is also 
non-exhaustive and brings a myriad of other possible age discriminatory measures into 
consideration: 
6(1) ... Such differences of treatment may include, among others: 
(a) the setting of special conditions on access to employment and 
vocational training, employment and occupation, including 
dismissal and remuneration conditions, for young people, older 
workers and persons with caring responsibilities in order to 
promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection; 
(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional 
experience or seniority in service for access to employment or to 
certain advantages linked to employment; 
(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is based on 
the training requirements of the post in question or the need for a 
reasonable period of employment before retirement. 
It is therefore apparent that potentially discriminatory age-quota systems and age-
based selection and reward procedures are acceptable. Further ambiguity is introduced 
in Article 6(1)(b) as no indication is given of the extent of the ‘certain advantages’ 
which are ‘linked to employment’. State financial incentives such as payments to 
employers and employees to encourage workers of particular ages, jobseekers and 
unemployment benefits,
144
 social security and protection schemes
145
 and occupational 
social security schemes
146
 are also exempt from regulation despite the fact that they 
may lead to age-related discrimination.  
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Additional derogations which apply to all four suspect grounds in the Directive 
are also stipulated. Genuine and determining occupational requirements
147
 are exempt 
and Article 2(5) lays down a potentially very wide exemption, not found in the Race or 
Gender Directives, for ‘measures laid down by national law … necessary for public 
security, for the maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, 
for the protection of health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
These numerous derogations, particularly when considered with the ambiguous 
phrasing of Article 6 and the justification of direct age discrimination permitted by 
Article 6(1), may severely hamper the achievement of age equality as member states 
are able to dilute protection given to workers. The ‘essential’
148
 nature of the 
prohibition of age discrimination is thus severely mitigated. 
2.6.4: Subsidiarity and national rules 
Recital 37 of the Framework Directive draws attention to the importance of the 
principle of subsidiarity. It states that the requirements do ‘not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to achieve’ the objectives, but permit member states to introduce 
national rules. The existence of a diverse assortment of national rules across member 
states will not produce a level-playing field within the community with regard to 
discrimination law. Recital 14 notes that ‘national provisions laying down retirement 
ages’
149
 will not be prejudiced by the Directive. A major factor in determining the 
withdrawal of citizens from the workforce is the existence of mandatory retirement 
ages and the offering of early retirement schemes. The removal of a fixed retirement 
age appears to offer increased opportunities for individuals to carry on working if they 
wish, thereby achieving an increase in the participation of older workers in the 
workforce.
150
 Nonetheless, Article 3 declares that all aspects of the employment 
relationship are within the scope of the Directive, including dismissals
151
 and the ECJ 
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 that mandatory retirement falls within the ambit of the 
Directive.  
The ECJ has stated that it is for national courts to assess the justification of 
mandatory retirement ages within member states but warned that they will face a 
‘burden of establishing to a high standard of proof the legitimacy of the aim relied on 
as justification’
153
 under Article 6(1). Therefore if member states can justify a 
mandatory retirement age before a national court with a legitimate employment policy 
aim of, for example, creating job opportunities in the workforce for younger workers, 
they will be able to continue to discriminate on the grounds of age, contrary to the 
aims of the Directive. However, this has led to some member states removing their 
mandatory retirement ages and others retaining a variety of retirement ages, leading to 
a wide variation in policy, contrary to another of the stated aims of the Directive – 
‘namely the creation within the Community of a level playing-field as regards equality 
in employment and occupation’.
154
 
There are many other manifestations of this inconsistency: for example, the 
Directive states that national laws may provide that indirect discrimination can ‘be 
established by any means including on the basis of statistical evidence’
155
 which gives 
member states considerable latitude in setting requirements. It may be that expert 
sociological or economic evidence is sufficient and statistical evidence is not 
necessary. If statistical evidence is provided the ECJ has consistently held that it must 
show substantial differences of treatment between comparators and claimants, 
although it may be sufficient that they show a ‘lesser but persistent and relatively 
constant disparity over a long period’.
156
 In the sex discrimination case ex parte 
Seymour-Smith and Perez the ECJ held that it was for the national court to assess 
whether the statistics ‘are valid … whether they cover enough individuals, whether 
they illustrate purely fortuitous or short-term phenomena and whether, in general they 
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appear to be significant’.
157
 The national courts and tribunals within the EU therefore 
have discretion to decide what is ‘valid’ evidence, creating further inconsistency 
across the community. 
Similarly member states have discretion to use rules pertaining to the burden of 
proof ‘in accordance with their national judicial systems’.
158
 Harassment and 
victimisation must also be as ‘defined in accordance with the national laws and 
practice of the member states’
159
 whilst ‘national rules relating to time limits for 
bringing actions’
160
 will be utilised. Sanctions vary enormously between member 
states. The ‘sanctions’ ‘may comprise the payment of compensation to the victim’
161
 
but in some member states no financial remedy is given to claimants. Under the 
Luxembourg Penal Code 2006 Article 454, employers guilty of age discrimination 
face criminal sanctions of up to two years imprisonment and/or a €25,000 penalty 
whilst the victim receives no remedy. In the UK the sanction is usually the payment of 
compensation to the victim.
162
 This undoubtedly encourages victims to seek a remedy 
in the UK, whilst there is little incentive for a claimant in Luxembourg to undertake an 
often stressful process. However, employers in Luxembourg may be less likely to 
discriminate as a criminal sanction may be a more effective deterrent. 
The principle of subsidiarity has enabled member states to enact legislation 
based on the internal social, legal and political pressures within each nation. This 
discretion, coupled with the numerous derogations in the Directive and ambiguous 
phrasing, has resulted in a myriad of different models of transpositions with 
requirements across member states varying considerably. For example, in Austria 
benefits based on seniority are not regarded as discriminatory whilst in the Czech 




Thus the Framework Directive encourages local-level solutions which have to 
comply with basic and loosely-articulated requirements. This is evident in reports 
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prepared by Ius Laboris which examined age legislation across Europe which found 
‘the varied interpretation countries are giving to the same piece of legislation and 
reaffirmed that any vision of standardised EU employment laws is far off’.
164
 It is 
apparent that, as the Directive aimed to provide a level playing-field across the 
Community, it needed to be more focused on ensuring a uniform application of the 
rules. If an EU citizen is unable to obtain work across member states because of age 
discrimination, free movement of workers will be prevented. As a result, one of the 
cornerstones of the EU internal market may be unattainable.  
Nonetheless the Directive has had significant positive impact in ensuring some 
legal protection against age discrimination in member states where previously none 
existed. But it is based on individual fault-finding, rather than the encouragement of 
positive action, and relies on retrospective examination of alleged acts of 
discrimination which may encourage defensive attitudes. Although it facilitates 
positive action it imposes no obligations to take such measures and may be criticised 
as ‘a sticking plaster approach’. The Framework Directive may therefore have only 
limited success in addressing the economic problems of an aging society.  
2.7: The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 
Sargeant claims that, until the intervention of the EU, all UK governments 
‘consistently opposed’
165
 any attempts to introduce statutory controls on age 
discrimination. In 1985 Ann Clwyd MP introduced the first of several unsuccessful 
private Bills to outlaw the use of age barriers in recruitment advertisements. In 1995 
Ian McCartney MP indicated that an incoming Labour government would ‘introduce 
legislation to make age discrimination illegal’
166
 but there was no specific pledge in its 
1997 manifesto, only a statement that, in work, older citizens ‘should not be 
discriminated against because of their age’.
167
  
When New Labour came to power it adopted a voluntarist stance. A Code of 
Practice was issued on 14
th
 June 1999 entitled Age Diversity in Employment, which 
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2002. The Code gave guidance on six stages in the employment process. It stated that 
procedures and practice in recruitment, selection, and promotion were to be based on 
ability, skills and potential rather than age and those chosen for training and 
development, redundancy selection and retirement schemes should be selected on 
objective job related criteria. Helen Desmond has pointed out that voluntary codes 
provide little ‘impetus for change’
169
 and commented that the Code was ‘weak and 
withering’.
170
 The TUC general secretary John Monks accurately predicted that the 
Code would be ‘largely ineffective’.
171
  
The government’s soft initiative to deal with the need for increasing the 
employment rate of the 50-65 age group, which had fallen from 84% to 70% over 
thirty years, failed to provide enhanced opportunities or reduce age discrimination.
172
 
In a 2001 report it was found that ‘few companies acknowledged that they had 
changed their company policies or practices as a result of the Code’.
173
 The 
government noted in 2001 that there had been a ‘marked increase in the number of 
economically inactive men’
174
 and recognised that the code ‘has not been sufficiently 
effective in combating age discrimination and that further measures are necessary’.
175
 
Hepple et al were told by employers in 2000 that ‘without legislation … the voluntary 
code of practice on age discrimination … is ineffective’.
176
 No employer interviewed 
by Hepple et al had taken any initiatives to combat age discrimination, even though 
they conceded that it was widespread. A typical comment on the voluntary code from 
one respondent was that it ‘is a waste of time’.
177
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However, the adoption of the Framework Directive by the EU meant that in 
2006 the UK was forced to introduce the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations,
178
 
now replaced by the Equality Act 2010 which maintains virtually identical provisions. 
The striking difference between the earlier soft initiatives and the Regulations is that 
the former were directed towards older workers, whilst the Regulations were based on 
the principle of equal treatment, as required by the Directive, and the rights of younger 
workers were also protected.  
Deakin and Wilkinson have described EU Directives as setting ‘basic standards 
in the form of a “floor of rights”’ and intervention as a ‘precondition for local-level 
experimentation’.
179
 The Framework Directive itself stipulates that it ‘lays down 
minimum requirements, thus giving the member states the option of introducing or 
maintaining more favourable provisions’.
180
 Hepple expressed the view that if the 
Directive was simply transposed by the UK without elaboration, this would have only 
‘limited effect’ on age discrimination and ‘at worst have some negative 
consequences’.
181
 However, the UK legislature failed to develop further the 
framework suggested by the Directive and transposed it in a minimalist manner, 
providing a very basic level of intervention in the workplace with a low standard of 
employee rights.  
The Regulations display a ‘half-open’ approach to transposition. There are 
several ‘closed’ specific exemptions, such as that for the National Minimum Wage 
(the ‘NMW’). This is combined with an open objective justification test which gives 
flexibility to employers in choosing the exact nature of legitimate aims rather than 
producing a ‘restrictive and prescriptive’
182
 list. Some member states
183
 have taken a 
fully open approach which requires the courts to assess justification and has been 
criticised as leading to ‘policy-making … in the laps of the judiciary’.
184
 Others have 
taken a closed approach in specifying the nature of each exception which gives 
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 on grounds of age, 
including ‘apparent age,’
191
 in employment and vocational training, unless objectively 
justified. In addition to the ability to justify all types of discrimination as permitted by 
Article 6, numerous exceptions allowed employers to continue to discriminate on the 





 the default retirement age (since removed),
194
 enhanced redundancy 
payments and service related benefits.
195
 The Regulations are discussed in detail in 
Chapters Six and Seven by reference to the interpretation of each provision by 
employment tribunals and an abbreviated text may be found in Appendix A. 
Age discrimination was predicted to become the most frequent ground for 
complaint at the employment tribunal
196
 and the Regulations were said to provide ‘one 
of the biggest changes in UK employment law for decades’.
197
 It was estimated that a 
‘flood of age discrimination claims could leave UK employers facing a £12m 
compensation bill’
198
 per year. The judiciary, primarily first instance employment 
tribunals, were given the difficult task of drawing the demarcation line denoting 
whether the age discriminatory conduct has a legitimate aim and is appropriate and 
necessary or is unjustified.  
The numerous problems inherent in the Framework Directive, highlighted in the 
previous section, such as a lack of an insistence on positive action, ambiguous 
phrasing and numerous derogations, were transferred directly into the domestic 
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legislation. The burden for addressing ageist conduct in England and Wales fell upon 
aggrieved claimants alone. Age discrimination outside the workplace was not 
prohibited by the Regulations as it was not required by the Directive. This has 
endorsed the perception that age equality is an economic issue rather than one 
concerned with justice for the individual, addressing the problem purely in 
employment rather than it being an equality or human rights issue.  
2.8: Conclusion 
In contrast to early attempts to prohibit age discrimination, which were 
undertaken because of concern over poverty suffered by older citizens, the EU was 
motivated to introduce age legislation in order to address predicted financial problems 
caused by demographic change. The EU aims, by means of the Directive, to eradicate 
ageist practices in the workplace with the intention of encouraging older citizens to 
participate in the workforce and remain economically active. Member states were 
directed to achieve this goal by ‘implementing the principle of equal treatment (which) 
shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever’.
199
 The 
equal treatment model of legislation leads to direct conflicts between measures which 
discriminate against older and younger citizens; this may not be an appropriate 
template with which to achieve the original objective of the EU which requires 
measures which are directed to mature citizens rather than all age cohorts. 
The specific requirements of the Directive were constructed with the intention of 
achieving equal treatment but its provisions are ambiguous, the justifications permitted 
for discriminatory treatment are wide-ranging and member states are allowed 
considerable latitude in many aspects of interpretation and implementation. The 
conceptual problem of how to achieve equality between age groups will be at the heart 
of many justifications and will determine the legitimacy of discriminatory conduct. 
The courts and tribunals have been given the task of distinguishing between prejudice-
based behaviour and rational judgments based on legitimate concerns. O’Cinneide has 
commented that, in ‘the absence of substantial pan-European agreement’ as to how 
this will be achieved ‘the courts are effectively left to do this job by themselves – they 
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have been left to “hold the baby” ’.
200
 The judgments that emerge from the courts can 
tell us much about how the needs of the employer are balanced with the rights of 
individuals and how intergenerational fairness is addressed in the establishment of 
justification for discriminatory treatment. This is of particular interest as legislation is 
now being extended to give protection outside the workplace
201
 and justification of 
discriminating practices will be at the centre of the debate regarding age proxies.  
The stated aim of Article 2 of the Directive that there shall be no ‘discrimination 
whatsoever’ seems unlikely to be attained as the scope for justified discriminatory 
treatment is extensive. It is inconceivable that this approach would be used for other 
suspect grounds and as a consequence age may be considered to be at the bottom of 
the hierarchy of suspect grounds. The true value of the Framework Directive can only 
be measured by the manner in which its provisions are implemented at a domestic 
level. The reality of the implementation of age discrimination legislation in England 
and Wales is assessed in the following Chapters. 
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‘Our case material is a gold mine for scientific work. It has not 




This Chapter details the methodological approach and process used to examine 
the decisions of employment tribunals which relate to age discrimination claims in 
order to complete an analysis of the implementation of age discrimination legislation 
in England and Wales. An examination has been undertaken of all tribunal judgments 
on claims brought under the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 made 
between October 1
st
 2006 – the date of commencement of the Regulations – and April 
1
st
 2010. The judgment reports are original documents written by employment judges 
and contain vital information relating to the parties, the issues brought to light in the 
hearings and the decision-making of the tribunal. This Chapter includes an explanation 
of the methodological approach and ethical considerations, an account of the data 
analysis process undertaken, that is, identification of and extraction of data from 
judgments, coding and input of data into PASW,
2
 and lastly, a discussion of the 
limitations of this process.  
3.2: Methodological approach 
This research project utilises a mixed methodology, combining the traditional 
legal method of a qualitative ‘case-by-case’ examination of judicial decisions with a 
quantitative content analysis of judgments relating to claims of age discrimination in 
the workplace. A qualitative study explores judicial decisions in depth whilst a 
quantitative analysis allows a study in breadth.  
The quantitative content analysis of discrimination claims has been carried out 
particularly in the United States, by researchers such as Kort,
3
 Färber & Matheson,
4
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 and Schuster and Miller.
6
 Kort was the first to apply this technique 
to judicial decisions and he developed a ‘scoring system’ to predict claim outcome 
which he claimed was 86% accurate.
7
 His development of ‘jurimetrics’
8
 has been 
criticised in that the facts of cases do not necessarily generate the outcome but rather 
the outcome is a reflection of the facts stated by the judiciary. It is claimed that judges 
are inclined to only mention those particular facts which justify their decision and this 
incompleteness leads to inaccuracy and distortion in predictive systems.
9
 Current 
literature supports the theory that ‘[I]nstead of predicting outcomes, content analysis is 
better suited to studying judicial reasoning itself, retrospectively’.
10
 Consequently the 
content analysis undertaken in this study is intended to be a retrospective study of 
judgments rather than attempting to be a predictive tool. 
Quantitative analyses of age discrimination cases in the USA have uncovered 
statistically significant differences in the context and outcome of discrimination 
claims. In 1984 Schuster and Miller investigated 153 age discrimination cases, chosen 
at random from a search of lexisnexis.
11
 They found that in the USA ‘57% of cases 
were brought on behalf of white men in professional and managerial occupations; 
employers won nearly two out of every three cases; women were more successful 
plaintiffs than men and more cases originated in the South than in any other region’.
12
 
Their findings have led to the use of the phrase ‘pale, stale, male’ typically applied to 
claimants in age discrimination cases. This study employs similar quantitative and 
statistical tools to those used by Schuster and Miller in order to produce a thorough 
analysis of British claimants, respondents and outcomes, creating a unique data-set of 
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64,016 pieces of data in order to analyse the characteristics and results of age 
discrimination claims. 
Case content analysis has been criticised because it is possible that small 
changes in judicial interpretation, indicating trends which may eventually transform 
the law, may be overlooked. Mendelson has pointed out that Kort’s jurimetrics 
predictive system failed to identify an unannounced and subtle change in attitude to 
interpretation, resulting in a complete reversal in the success of cases and an overt 
change in the law which Kort’s work failed to predict.
13
 Content analysis on its own 
may mask these changes in nuances and fail to identify important interpretative trends 
which can only be ascertained by means of a traditional, qualitative, ‘case-by-case’ 
examination of judgments. 
In a study of empirical legal research Hall and Wright found 134 projects which 
employed a systematic content analysis of legal decisions, 16 of which projects coded 
judicial decisions of over 1000 cases.
14
 They concluded that traditional qualitative 
method and empirical content analyses ‘renders different kinds of insights that 
complement each other, so that, together, the two approaches to understanding caselaw 
are more powerful than either alone.’
15
 This project therefore uses both quantitative 
and qualitative methods to extract information from age discrimination judgments. An 
interpretive method gives a detailed understanding suited to evaluation of legal 
principles whilst a content analysis can describe the social and economic landscape in 
which the judgments have been made. 
3.3: The examination of judgments 
3.3.1: The Judgment Register 
The Secretary of State is required to maintain a Judgment Register of 
employment tribunal decisions which must ‘contain a copy of all judgments and any 
written reasons issued by any tribunal or chairman … in accordance with the rules in 
Schedules 1 to 5.’
16
 The only documents to be omitted from the Register or to be 
entered with deletions or amendments are those relating to cases where the tribunal sat 
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or heard evidence in private.
17
 The Register must be open to the inspection of any 
person without charge at all reasonable hours.
18
  
The details and outcome of every judgment made by the 27 regional 
employment tribunals are forwarded to the Employment Tribunal Field Support Office 
situated in Bury St. Edmunds and entered onto the Judgment Register. The Register is 
maintained in a two-stage format. Firstly, a database is held on a computer at the Field 
Support Office and is accessed by means of five terminals located in an adjacent 
room.
19
 The information regarding judgments is transferred onto the computerised 
Register database manually by staff at the Field Support Office. The computer 
database gives basic information of each of the 4001 claims – usually party details, 
date, brief outcome and concurrent claims – in a single claim report spread-sheet, 
along with a designated folio number. Secondly, the Register uses the folio number to 
identify hard-copy information which the Field Support Office holds on each 
judgment, kept in a further adjacent room in box files. If a case has been dismissed, 
struck out or settled, the folio report briefly states this on one sheet of paper, signed by 
the tribunal judge. If a case is successful or has been challenged by the respondent in a 
‘meaningful’ way the folio report normally contains additional facts and the 
employment judge gives the reasoning behind the tribunal’s decision. The individual 
records vary substantially, often depending on the outcome of the claim, so that the 
information collected is in a sense ‘self-selecting.’ 
3.3.2: Judgment sampling  
Obtaining data from all employment tribunal judgments made following the 
enactment of the Regulations allows a thorough assessment to be made of the first 
three and half years of their operation, whereas a study of a shorter period may hide 
long term trends. A continuous time period prevents any difficulties occurring which 
might arise from a random selection of judgments. Bias in judgment sampling will 
also be eliminated. Three and a half years is a sufficiently long period over which to 
detect patterns and trends apparent within the judgments. The maintenance of the 
Judgment Register relies upon regional tribunals forwarding case reports and 
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judgments to the Field Office. In some instances a local problem occurs and reports 
are sent in batches which represent judgments handed down over many months. This 
would cause an excessive number of judgments to be entered on the Register at an 
arbitrary time which would give an unrepresentative view of the timing of judgments. 
By examining every judgment, rather than selecting particular time periods, a 
comprehensive analysis can be made and any anomalies which occur throughout 
different time periods will be removed from the data analysis.  
3.3.3: The Employment Tribunal Annual Report 
Consideration was given in this study to the utilisation of information relating to 
claims provided in the Employment Tribunal Annual Reports. The Annual Reports 
give a brief overview of tribunal activities, including the number of claims and awards 
made each year, but this system appears to be prone to inaccuracies. It does not, in any 
event, give details of individual judgments or awards, but gives overall totals and the 
maximum, median and minimum compensation awarded for each suspect ground. The 
Annual Reports use centralised information which is held on the Employment 
Tribunal Management Information System. This is gathered from ‘a subset of the data 
held locally in each office,’
20
 that is, each local Tribunal office forwards ‘anonymised’ 
data to the central system which is used for analysis. This method of amalgamating 
sub-sets of anonymised data will necessarily blur the specifics of the statistical picture. 
It is noticeable that the subsets of data presented in the Annual Reports are not 
always representative of claims made. For example, in 2008/9 the Report stated that 
53 claims
21
 were successful but only 21 awards were made.
22
 When the information 
system team were questioned on this data the following reply was forthcoming: 
Unfortunately footnote 20 on page 9 of the Annual Report Statistics 
states ‘Compensation awarded is that of which the tribunal is aware’ 
applies here, there were 53 successful age discrimination cases at 
tribunal in 2008/9 but details of only 21 awards are held on the ET 
                                                 
20
 E-mail from Traicey Dwyer, Forecasting & Modelling Officer, Strategic Planning and Information 
Unit, Finance and Resources Directorate, Ministry of Justice to author (2 December 2009). 
21
 Ministry of Justice, Annual Report and Accounts 2008 - 2009 (The Stationery Office 2009) Table 2, p 
6. 
22
 ibid 11.  
73 
 
management information system hence the discrepancy.’
23
 
‘Unfortunately due to operator error, not all of the awards made for 
the new discrimination jurisdictions were entered onto local office 
systems. Hence the discrepancies between outcome numbers and 
number of awards recorded centrally.
24
  
The Annual Report also contains the proviso that: 
the detail is subject to the inaccuracies inherent in any large-scale 
recording system. Whilst the figures shown have been checked as far 




Omitting 32 out of 53 pieces of data is a substantial error. This study aims to provide a 
more accurate, detailed analysis of all decisions contained within the Register and 
provide a breakdown of the actual awards given by employment tribunals. 
3.3.4: Ethical considerations 
Coventry University, through which this project was conducted, has ethical 
requirements which all researchers must satisfy. The University guidelines follow the 
key principles of the Economic and Social Research Council Research Ethics 
Framework,
26
 that is, the research should be designed and undertaken to ensure 
integrity and quality, independence of research must be clear and any conflicts of 
interest or partiality must be explicit. Participants must be aware of the risks involved 
and the purpose, methods and intended uses of the research. Harm to participants must 
be avoided; their anonymity must be respected and they must participate in a voluntary 
way, free from coercion. Coventry University has a procedure for obtaining ethical 
approval and projects which do not involve human participants are regarded as ‘low 
risk’ and proceed using self-certification. This project collects secondary data 
contained in publicly available judgments and does not directly involve such 
                                                 
23
 E-mail from Traicey Dwyer, Forecasting & Modelling Officer, Strategic Planning and Information 
Unit, Finance and Resources Directorate, Ministry of Justice to author (2 October 2009). 
24
 Dwyer (n 20). 
25
 Ministry of Justice (n 21) 14.  
26
 Economic and Social Research Council, Research Ethics Framework (2010); Coventry University, 
Ethics and Governance: Coventry University Ethics Statement (2009). 
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individuals. The requisite ‘low-risk’ forms submitted for this project can be found in 
Appendix C. 
This study concerns secondary data relating to both parties which may be 
regarded as sensitive. It may be difficult to identify accurately claimants from the data 
discussed in this thesis as addresses are not supplied but respondent employers can be 
directly identified. However, the English legal system is based on the premise that 
judicial processes are open to public scrutiny, ensuring that justice is not just done but 
is seen to be done. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that 
in ‘the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing … Judgment shall be pronounced publicly.’
27
 This study uses 
information obtained from the public Register at Bury St Edmunds – information 
which is already in the public domain – and claimants surrender their anonymity when 
submitting a claim.  
Although all hearings ‘shall take place in public’
28
 a tribunal judge has the 
power to ‘conduct the hearing in such manner as he or it considers most appropriate 
for the clarification of the issues and generally for the just handling of the 
proceedings’
29
 and the judge has the power to remove judgments relating to ‘sensitive’ 
claims from the Register, if necessary. Consequently material which is considered to 
be sensitive has already been removed from the Register before public inspection.  
A very small number of claimants are under 18. The ethical problems 
surrounding the collection of data from claims involving minors were considered in 
conjunction with the Ethics Advisory Committee of Coventry University when 
discussing ethics approval for the project. As far as can be ascertained, following 
discussions with staff at the Employment Tribunal Field Support Office, all claims 
concerning minors have been held in public with the full names of the claimants given. 
Full names of all claimants, whatever age, are included in judgments on the Register. 
However, as the information gathered in this project is already fully available in the 
public domain, this issue was considered not to have ethical implications for the 
purpose of this study. 
                                                 
27
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 as amended by 
Protocol No 1, Article 6 Right to a Fair Trial.  
28
 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, reg 26(3). 
29
 ibid reg 14(2). 
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3.3.5: Case and folio report case content  
The information gathered and available for public inspection falls into two 
categories: firstly, that which relates to all judgments, seen in the computerised case 
reports and secondly, that which relates to those claims given more detailed 
consideration in hard-copy folio reports. The systematic examination of this 
information reveals several claim, claimant and respondent characteristics. It is 
possible to identify the occupation, gender, age and representation of many claimants, 
as well as whether claims of multiple discrimination are being pursued. The type of 
respondent that claims are being made against, with regard to employer activity, size, 
solvency and structure, has also been ascertained. Previous empirical studies in the 
USA have had no success in identifying employer activity.
30
 However, it is now 
possible to examine this aspect in Britain using the comprehensive material available 
on the internet and at Companies House.  
It is possible to identify accurately in hard-copy folio reports the number of 
successful claims, the types of issue concerned and the amount of compensation that 
has been awarded by tribunals. This allows an analysis to be made of the degree of 
success of the average claimant, the amounts they are awarded and whether there is a 
difference in claims by women and men. Kort showed that those in employment cases 
with representation were more likely to be successful,
31
 although more recent research 
has shown no correlation.
32
 Hard-copy folio reports in the Register give details of 
claimant representation so that an examination can be made as to the accuracy of this 
hypothesis. It has been possible to examine factors such as systematic differences in 
success and awards made for claims concerned with, for example, retirement and 
discrimination against the young, regional patterns in the success of claims and 
compensation award size so that discrepancies may be addressed.  
3.3.6: Identification of judgments and data collection 
The data analysis process undertaken comprised three stages – firstly, 
identification and extraction of data from judgments, secondly, coding and input of 
                                                 
30
 MH Schuster, ‘Analysing Age Discrimination Act Cases – the Development of a Methodology’ 
(1982) 4(3) Law and Policy Quarterly 339, 343. 
31
 Kort (n 3). 
32
 A Brown and A Erskine, ‘A Qualitative Study of Judgments in Race Discrimination Employment 
Cases’ (2009) 31 Law & Policy 142, 147.  
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data into PASW and thirdly, analysis of results. In order to identify the relevant 
judgments it was necessary to search for claims made under the relevant jurisdiction 
using the drop-down menu on the start-up page on the computer terminal in the Field 
Support Office. The menu lists approximately 90 jurisdictions for claims ranging from 
discrimination to failure to allow time off for trade union duties. All judgments which 
included a claim of age discrimination, whether or not as a principal claim, can be 
selected by the search engine. However, a general search in this manner would give 
too many results for the system to handle so a time parameter was also used to select 
all age claims submitted within a specific period. For example, a search for claims 
brought under the ‘age discrimination jurisdiction’, looking for judgments which have 
been entered on the Register between 1
st
 January 2009 and October 1
st
 2009 reveals 
313 judgments. The 313 judgments each have one record per page on the computer 
database. This process was repeated to encompass all periods from October 1
st
 2006 to 
April 1
st
 2010. This is a fully replicable case selection procedure. 
The database page for each judgment gives the case number, a folio number, the 
name of the applicant and respondent, the location of the tribunal hearing the claim, 
the date the judgment was signed, the date the judgment was entered on the Register, a 
very brief summary of each of the grounds of claim, whether or not there are any 
related claims and a very brief summary of the judgment. From these records it is 
possible to move into the adjacent room and, using the folio number, identify the 
original hard-copy judgment reports sent by the regional tribunal office. The basic 
information from the folio reports was recorded on pro-forma search record sheets. 
The standard pro forma sheet that was eventually used can be found in Appendix D. 
Where an appeal to an appellate court was made, the case report was obtained from the 




 Further information was 
extracted and documented from all folio reports which contained additional records 
which cast light on the interpretation of the legislation. This information was used to 
make a qualitative analysis of the judgments found in Chapters Six and Seven. 
As the project advanced it was found that characteristics such as race, religion 
and union membership of claimants, factors that Schuster and Miller attempted to 







investigate in the USA,
35
 were not described in the folio reports. Another factor which 
it was hoped to investigate was the length of time taken for a claim to pass through the 
tribunal system but the date the claim was accepted is not stated on either the case 
report or the folio report. These aspects were therefore not included in the analysis.  
Various pro-forma search record sheets were experimented with in order to find 
the most useful method of recording the data collected. The sheets eventually used 
included spaces in columns to document four claimant, four employer and eight claim 
characteristics as well as case and folio report numbers and the names of both parties. 
The characteristics collected were the gender, age, representation and occupation of 
the claimant, concurrent claims of discrimination, the size, activity, status and 
solvency of employer, the location of the tribunal which heard the claim, the date that 
the judgment was entered on the Register, the issue, type and outcome of the claim, 
additional costs incurred by claimant and the amount of compensation awarded.  
3.4: Data coding procedure 
3.4.1: Trial data collections 
Two data collection pilot runs were undertaken, coded and entered into SSPS 
PASW Version 17 for analysis. The first trial used 45 case reports chosen at random. 
The second used 313 judgments, selected by choosing all cases entered on the Register 
between January 1
st
 2009 and October 1
st
 2009. These trials resulted in the 
modification of the parameters collected and the search record sheets. Replicability 
was tested at the first and second trial stage before the main data analysis by asking a 
fellow researcher to code 30 judgments to check that the coding process was reliable.
36
 
On the first trial three inconsistencies were found – one from an overt error and two 
from ambiguities in the ‘claim outcome’ category, which was subsequently amended 
to encompass more outcome factors. The second trial gave a resulting Cohen's kappa 
coefficient of 1, indicating perfect agreement.  
3.4.2: Statistical tools  
Each piece of data collected from the Judgment Register was coded, using 
numerical values, and entered into a database using the SPSS PASW Version 17 
                                                 
35
 Schuster and Miller (n 6). 
36
 As recommended by Hall and Wright (n 10) 113. 
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statistical software package. PASW was chosen because it can handle large amounts 
of data, possesses the facility to examine frequencies, descriptives and cross-
tabulations, perform multiple regression tests, t-tests and correlation analysis and has 
the capability to generate a wide variety of outputs such as tables, graphs, charts etc. In 
addition, Weitzman and Miles
37
 recommend choosing a package which has a good 
support network for the researcher and as Coventry University provides training and 
advice for users of SSPS PASW this Windows-based package appeared most suitable. 
As 16 variables were examined in the study multivariate, as well as univariate, tests 
were performed. The correlation of the variables was tested using the statistical 
hypothesis Pearson chi-square test at a 5% significance level. The resulting 
quantitative analysis of data is contained in Chapters Four and Five. 
3.4.3: Coding 
Details of the codes allocated to data used for the purposes of analysis in SSPS 
PASW can be found in Appendix F. In all categories where a particular piece of data 
was not evident, or was in any way ambiguous, it was given the code 999 (not known). 
If the information sought was not applicable to that factor it was given the code 91 
(not applicable). Codes 91 and 999 were regarded as ‘missing values’ in the data 
analysis.  
Each piece of information was coded as follows:  
3.4.3.1: Claim characteristics 
Location of tribunal where judgment is made: Each regional tribunal was given a 
numeric value.  
Date entered on the Register: All judgments contained a date which possessed 
the capability of being coded and this numeric value was used. 
Issue: The issue, that is, whether the claimant alleged they were thought ‘too 
young’ or ‘too old,’ was recorded. ‘Issue’ is not necessarily related to age, as a 25 year 
old may complain that they were regarded as ‘too old’ even though they are 
comparatively young. 
Type of complaint: Six areas of complaint emerged in the trial collections of 
data. These were recruitment, job status/benefits (including pay, promotion etc), 
                                                 
37
 E Weitzman and M Miles, Computer Programs for Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook (Sage Publishing 1995). 
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dismissal, retirement, redundancy selection and harassment/victimisation. In some 
judgments discharge and involuntary retirement were difficult to separate. In these 
instances if a claimant was over 64 years old the claim was included in the retirement 
category. 
Outcome: Ten claim outcomes were established after the second trial run of 313 
judgments. These were time expired, incorrect procedure, struck out, successful, 
settled, claim withdrawn, case dismissed, default judgment for claimant, not actively 
pursued and ‘other’ outcome. This latter category includes those referred for case 
management meetings or awaiting additional information. ‘Successful’ as a category 
was held to apply when a benefit of any type was awarded to the claimant by the 
tribunal. It is acknowledged that some ‘claim withdrawn’ outcomes could be ‘settled’ 
and some ‘incorrect procedure’ outcomes could be ‘time-expired’ but for the purposes 
of the study the outcome description stamped on the hard-copy folio report was 
utilised for coding.  
Additional costs incurred by claimant: The numeric value was coded.  
Amount of compensation awarded: The numeric value for the overall 
compensation and injury to feelings award was coded. 
3.4.3.2: Claimant characteristics 
Gender: Gender was inferred as data was collected from the claimant’s name on 
the case report. Claims made by groups of workers were coded as ‘not applicable’ and 
individuals for whom it was not clear which sex applied (e.g. doctors) were coded ‘not 
known.’ 
Age: The age of claimants was often difficult to establish. In cases where it was 
stated in the hard-copy folio report the numeric value was entered onto the data search 
sheet.  
Representation: Claimant representation could be established in some hard-copy 
folio reports; however, it was impossible to differentiate between legal representation 
provided by unions, law centres or paid legal representation. For these reasons ‘all 
legal representation’ and ‘self-representation’ were the two categories chosen for this 
parameter. Employer representation could not be identified accurately. 
Occupation: Very broad descriptions of claimant activity were utilised, 
following the nine major group categories of the International Labour Organisation 
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‘ISCO08 (COM) for the European Union (Eurostat)’ system of classification.
38
 The 
nine categories were: Legislators, managers and senior officials, Technicians and 
associate professionals, Clerical and related workers, Service, shop and market sales 
workers, Craft and related trades workers, Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers, Elementary occupations and Armed forces personnel. If a particular 
occupation was difficult to categorise the sub- and minor group activities of ISCO08 
were utilised to place an employee within a particular category.  
Concurrent claims of discrimination: Reference is made on the computerised 
report on the Register to all concurrent claims made by the employee. This was noted 
on the record sheet using the three or four digit code used by the Field Support Office. 
These codes were grouped into broad categories, for example, the codes DDA, DDA1, 
DDA2, DDA3 and DDA4 relate to disability discrimination and were grouped under 
code ‘3’. Code 9 was given to concurrent claims which did not appear to relate to a 
discrimination claim. 
3.4.3.3: Employer characteristics 
The name and address of the respondent employer is detailed on every 
computerised record. This information was used to access employer characteristics, 
principally from internet sources. The Companies House Register contains information 
revealed by the web-check service which was utilised to identify employer size, status, 
solvency and activity.
39





 and MacRAE’s Blue Book
42
 which were accessed through 
Coventry University e-library. When information about an employer from these 
sources was not forthcoming the direct link to FAME available at Birmingham public 
library was used. This database includes information on many small businesses which 
is difficult to find elsewhere. A sample search sheet is included in Appendix E.  
Size: Four categories of the size of employer organisation – micro, small, 
medium and large – were used. The Companies Act 2006 defines a small company as 
one that has a turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more 
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than £3.26 million or not more than 50 employees.
43
 A medium-sized company has a 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 
million or not more than 250 employees. A large company is one which exceeds these 
parameters. The European Union Commission adopted Recommendation 
2003/361/EC on 6
th
 May 2003, which included a fourth category called a micro 
enterprise.
44
 A micro enterprise has a headcount of less than 10 or/and a turnover or 
balance sheet total of not more than €2 million.
45
 In cases where parameters 
overlapped the primary indicator of size for the purposes of data collection was the 
employee head-count – a practice adopted by UK National Statistics.
46
  
Solvency: If an employer was in administration or insolvent this was recorded 
on the data sheet and coded accordingly. If an employer becomes insolvent after 
discriminating conduct takes place and subsequently has an award made against them 
the possible ‘protective award is a debt or liability’
47
 within the meaning of the 
Insolvency Rules 1986 ‘to which the company at that point ‘may become subject’ in 
due course’.
48
 The award will be a contingent liability and the claimant will be entitled 
to be paid from the assets of the employer. In Rank Nemo (DMS) Ltd v Coutinho
49
 the 
Court of Appeal held that where a business is taken over under TUPE Regulations the 
liability for compensation passes to the new employer, even though it was not 
responsible for the act of discrimination. However, for the purposes of this exercise 
the activity of the business responsible for the discriminating conduct was coded. In a 
few instances information concerning the solvency was not apparent in the folio 
reports but could be obtained from the Companies House. 
Status: Employers were categorised using the ‘Business Link’ guide developed 
with Companies House and HM Revenue and Customs.
50
 These categories are Sole 
Trader, Partnership including Limited Liability Partnership, Private Limited Company, 
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 Companies Act 2006, ss 382, 465. 
44
 Commission, Recommendation 2003/361/EC Concerning the Definition of Micro, Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises OJ L 124 (6 May 2003) 36. 
45




 Insolvency Rules 1986, Rules 12.3 and 13.12. 
48
 Haine v Day (liquidator of Compound Sections Ltd) [2008] EWCA Civ 626, [2008] 2 BCLC 517 
(Ch). 
49
 [2009] EWCA Civ 454, [2009] ICR 1296. 
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Public Limited Company, Government Agency or Public Body, Community Interest 
Company (CIC), Social Enterprise, Company Limited by Guarantee or Charity.  
Activity or Industry: The principal activity of a respondent employer was 
established, usually from the Companies House Register or by using other internet 
search tools. Principal activities of employers are generally carried out with the 
support of a number of ancillary activities, such as accounting, transportation and 
maintenance. Although claimants may be working within an ancillary support 
business, the main activity of the actual business cited as respondent in the Register 
was coded, in order to maintain consistency.  
The employer activity was recorded using the relevant UK Standard Industrial 
Classification SIC(2007) code.
51
 SIC(2007) is a classification system used to 
categorise business establishments and other statistical units by the type of economic 
activity in which they are engaged. The UK SIC(2007), introduced in 1992 and 
amended in 2003 and 2007, is the United Kingdom's version of NACE Rev.1
52
 which 
is the European Community's harmonisation of the classification of economic 
activities in member states introduced on 9
th
 October 1990. NACE Rev.1 is based on 
the United Nations Provisional Central Product Classification (CPC), Series M, No77 
established in 1991. SIC(2007) is identical to the United Nations system at the two 
digit Divisional level. Thus SIC(2007) relates coherently to other economic 
classifications at national and international levels. The Companies House Register 
uses SIC(2003) and where information from this source was utilised it was converted 
to SIC(2007) using the relevant conversion table.
53
 
3.5: Limitations of methodology 
This research has examined judgments, not applications or claims. A systematic 
evaluation of applications would reveal the details of all cases where employees felt 
sufficiently aggrieved to make a claim of discrimination on the grounds of age, but 
following the UK government decision to maintain a register of judgments rather than 
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applications, information regarding applications is very difficult to find. It is highly 
probable that applications are themselves only ‘the tip of the iceberg’ as regards 
discriminating conduct.
54
 If, as discussed in Chapter Two, a substantial proportion of 
the population feel that they have suffered age discrimination in the workplace, very 
few individuals feel that they are willing or able to make a claim to the Employment 
Tribunal. The UK currently has a workforce of 28.92 million people.
55
 Taking a recent 
estimate, 1.2% of the workforce feels they have suffered age discrimination in the 
workplace within the last two years, which would give a potential pool of 347,040 
workers who may feel they have suffered unfair treatment.
56
 Yet only 6,750 
applications were accepted by employment tribunals in the same period.
57
 The 
Judgment Register contains 2,833 decisions recorded on the equivalent two-year 
period, indicating that the majority of applications accepted are not pursued. In 
limiting this study to the collection of data from judgments it is acknowledged that 
data cannot be included which relates to the thousands who make a claim and 
withdraw before judgment. 
The analysis of party characteristics and case determinants is reliant on the 
limited type of information contained within the Judgments Register. The 2004 
Regulations specify that the information must include the issues which the tribunal has 
identified as being relevant to the claim,
58
 findings of fact
59
 and how the relevant 
findings of fact and applicable law have been applied in order to determine the 
issues.
60
 All of this information is not currently available for many judgments held on 
the Register. The majority of folio reports, particularly those which have been 
dismissed, time-expired, struck out or settled but for which a judgment was made, 
contain a single sheet and give no details of the issue, the applicable law or the 
findings of fact, indicating that the Register is not being maintained as it should be by 
the Ministry of Justice as specified in Schedule 1 para 30(6) of the 2004 Regulations. 
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If the Register contained the required full range of particulars a much broader study 
could be undertaken, for example, a more comprehensive study of the age of claimants 
and factors such as the effect of the use of performance appraisal systems on the 
successful defence of a claim.  
A limitation of the analysis is that the material contained in the folio reports is 
dependent upon the reporting consistency and capabilities of tribunal staff. The 
extraction of material from folio reports depends upon the efficient delivery to and 
organisation of records at the Field Support Office. The information available is reliant 
on the accuracy, consistency and completeness of facts given in the case report. It is 
assumed that each regional tribunal has forwarded the correct information to the Field 
Support Office but it is acknowledged that the process is subject to human error. The 
information is placed onto the computer system by staff who may make errors in 
transcription. In some instances spaces are left blank on the computerised record. In 
addition, when searching within overall time parameters it is conceded that some 
decisions which had been handed down were not added to the Register by the time the 
data collection was made. There may be further researcher errors in the process of 
collecting data from the reports and coding the data. However, as this process was 
undertaken by one person it was not subject to intercoder unreliability.  
The research has been undertaken by a single researcher who is not an employer 
but is of a similar age to many of the claimants and may not be objective in extracting 
information from folio reports. Researcher creativity in discussing the material relating 
to the discriminatory treatment may be constrained because preconceptions have been 
formed during the literature review and data collection. In addition, reading numerous 
case reports in which the claimant is alleging that they have suffered discriminatory 
conduct may lead the researcher to be biased in the interpretation of the case notes. 
A limitation of investigating employer activity is that this may not represent the 
particular activity the claimant is involved in. Using the SIC(03) code from the 
Companies House Register to gauge employer activity relies upon the employer 
supplying the correct code and as the SIC coding system is complex, errors may have 
occurred. It is often very difficult to identify the occupation of claimants accurately 
from case reports. For this reason very broad descriptions of claimant activity are 
utilised. A study of this type cannot establish whether claims are made in an industry 
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or profession because age discrimination is particularly prevalent in that industry or 
whether the claimants are more inclined to take action because of better knowledge 
and information about the Age Regulations. Some workers may be better supported 
by, for instance, a more supportive union or local advice bureau or may be involved in 
the legal profession and have more information pertaining to their rights. This study 
can nonetheless draw attention to any possible areas for further investigation. 
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Chapter Four:  
Quantitative Analysis - Results 1 
Claim and Party Characteristics  
4.1: Introduction 
This Chapter describes the characteristics of the claims found in 4001 age 
discrimination judgments in the Employment Tribunal Judgment Register for England 
and Wales. It was possible to obtain information on fourteen factors relating to the 
claim and parties in an age discrimination claim. The computerised records within the 
Register contain details of all claim dates, location, multiple claims and concurrent 
claims and nearly every claimant’s gender and respondent employer’s name and 
address. Using this latter information respondent employer size, status, solvency and 
activity data was obtained from internet information sources, such as the Companies 
House Register and FAME.
1
 The data-sets for these factors each contain over 3,940 
pieces of data. The hard-copy folio reports often contain details of five further factors: 
legal representation is sometimes specified on the first page of the judgment, whilst 
the age and occupation of the claimant, issue and complaint type is occasionally 
specified within the judgment. Consequently the data-sets collected on these factors 
are considerably smaller.  
Figure 4.1 shows the number of receipts and judgments relating to age and all 
jurisdictions handed down from October 1
st
 2006 to April 1
st
 2010. Despite the number 
of receipts increasing substantially throughout this period, the percentage of claims not 
receiving judgment has remained fairly constant – ranging from 67.34% to 69.07%. 
This analysis is therefore based on approximately 32% of accepted receipts, as the 
majority of applications are not pursued and information regarding them is not 
recorded. Although the percentage of ‘age’ claims increased in the period 2008-2009, 
such claims as a percentage of ‘all jurisdiction’
2
 claims fell in 2009-2010 to 1.3%, 
                                                          
1
 E-resources available online at <http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk> and <http://www.bvdinfo.com>. 
2
 Jurisdiction in this context refers to the jurisdiction categories used by the Employment Tribunal 
Service to describe the various heads of complaint brought by claimants. A claim can contain a number 
of grounds, known as jurisdiction complaints. 
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indicating that age has remained a relatively minor ground for complaint at the 
tribunal. 
Figure 4.1: Table showing claim receipts & judgments handed down by tribunals 
4.2: Date 
Figure 4.2 shows the number of ‘age’ judgments issued per month over the 
period of study. The Excel-generated best-fit line, shown in red, indicates a steady 
increase in judgments which reached a peak of 205 per month in March 2010.  
                                                          
3
 Ministry of Justice, Employment Tribunal and EAT Statistics 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 (The 
Stationery Office 2010) 4.  
4
 ibid. 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at 
the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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4.3: Tribunal office 
Figure 4.3 shows the number of ‘age’ judgments handed down by each tribunal 
during the total period of study. It is apparent that London Central and South, Reading, 
Manchester and Leeds handed down the highest number of judgments, whilst 
Sheffield, Shrewsbury, Exeter, Leicester and Nottingham handed down a smaller 
number of judgments than average. Over the period of study the South-east and 
London region issued the largest number of judgments (32.1% of the total), the North 
26.6%, the South and South West 22.9% and the Midlands 18.4%. 
 
4.4: Complaint type 
The specific cause of complaint of the employee was identified in 66.96% 
(2785) of the 4001 judgments examined. Of these, the overwhelming majority – 
75.5% (2,104) – were concerned with dismissal, 14.6% (408) with redundancy 
selection and payments, 3.4% (95) with recruitment, 2.1% (58) with job status and 
benefits, such as pension entitlement, 3.2% (88) with retirement and 1.1% (32) with 
harassment or victimisation. Over 93% of judgments were concerned with workers at 
the termination of their employment. 
The following bar chart, Figure 4.4, shows the frequency of complaint types 
























Figure 4.3: Bar chart showing number of age claims handed 
down at tribunals over period of study 
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with recruitment this has not matched the growth in claims as a whole. Judgments 
which relate to complaints concerned with victimisation, harassment, job status and 
benefits have remained low and those in the latter category have fallen gradually year 
on year since 2007. 
 
4.5: Issue 
The Regulations could be relied upon by all employees, regardless of age. 
Employees making claims of direct discrimination on the grounds of age had to show 
that they suffered ‘less favourable treatment’ than ‘other persons’
5
 and for indirect 
discrimination that they suffered ‘particular disadvantage’ as the result of the 
application of a provision, criterion or practice when compared ‘to persons not of the 
same age group’.
6
 Employees at the tribunal claimed that they were discriminated 
                                                          
5
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, reg 3(1)(a). Replaced by Equality Act 2010, s 13.  
6




























Figure 4.4: Bar chart showing number of judgments each year 
relating to six  complaint types 








against because they were thought either ‘old,’ ‘young’ or because they belonged to a 
particular age group in comparison with other persons or those not of the same age 
group. 
The Register contains 620 folio reports which detail whether the issue in the 
employee’s complaint was that they were discriminated against because they were 
thought old, young or belonged to a disadvantaged age group. Of these, 6.8% (42) 
were employees who felt the issue was that they were discriminated against because 
they were young, 91.1% (565) because they were old and 2.1% (13) because they 
belonged to a disadvantaged age band, shown in Figure 4.5.  
 
The characteristics of the claimants who felt that they were discriminated against 
because they were old generally followed the pattern of ‘all-age’ claimants. A 
significantly high percentage (42%) of these was handed down from offices in the 
South-east and London with 34% of judgments handed down from offices in Greater 
London. Over 50% of these claimants were ‘white-collar’ workers from the senior 
managers, professionals, technical and clerical workers occupational groups.  
There were two groups of workers falling into the category comprised of those 
were felt they were ‘too young’; firstly, those from the 15-27 year age band who 
claimed that they were dismissed or harassed because they were young and, secondly, 
those in the 28-46 year old age band who felt that a redundancy payment, pension or 
benefit scheme disadvantaged younger workers. This type of claim can be made by 
workers who are not normally considered ‘young’ but who suffer disadvantage 
because they are younger than another group of workers. For example, in Merchant v 
Figure 4.5: Pie chart showing proportion of claimants who 
felt they were discriminated against because they were 








 a 46 year old engineer complained unsuccessfully that he was disadvantaged 
by a redundancy matrix scheme which gave additional points to older workers. 
Conversely claims were made by those normally thought ‘young’ who claimed to have 
been subjected to less favourable treatment because they were older than a 
comparator. In Kent v Krazy Kidz Ltd
8
 a 25 year old claimed she was thought too old 
to work in a play centre for young children where ‘nearly all’
9
 of the 25 staff were 
seventeen years old or under. This latter type of worker is not included in the analysis 
of workers claiming they were discriminated against because they were young, even 
though they fall into a relatively young age category, as their complaint was that they 
were discriminated against because they were older than other workers.  
More young women (22) than young men (19) were found to have received a 
judgment, despite the fact that there is a smaller proportion of women under 25 in the 
workforce, with 1,790,000 females and 1,961,000 males from this age group in 
employment in this period.
10
 More young women than men had representation, as 
shown in Figure 4.6, following the pattern seen in ‘all age’ groups discussed in 
Chapter 4.10. Such women were considerably more successful in obtaining a remedy 
than men, as discussed in Chapter 5.5. 
Figure 4.6: Bar chart showing claimant representation by gender in judgments 
concerning discrimination against the ‘young’ 
                
                                                          
7
 (2009) ET 2601323/08. 
8
 (2008) ET 2701208/07. 
9
 ibid [12] (Thacker EJ). 
10
 Office for National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics August 2011 (ONS 2011). 
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A small group of thirteen claimants asserted that they had suffered 
discrimination because they were part of a disadvantaged age band. This included 
seven workers who made a claim in Leicester relating to the withdrawal of a benefit 
which disadvantaged a particular age group, three workers in Liverpool who were also 
complaining about a disadvantageous benefit scheme and two workers in London 
Central who claimed they was discriminated against because they were of child-
bearing age.  
4.6: Multiple/Individual claim 
The Register contains 3,964 ‘age’ judgments in which it is possible to identify 
the number of claimants involved in a particular complaint. Of these, 3,532 (89.2%) 
judgments relate to individual claimants and 432 (10.8%) relate to multiple claims, 
that is, an application made by two or more claimants arising out of the same 
circumstances against the same respondent employer. However, the Employment 
Tribunal Service (ETS) reports that in 2009, with reference to all jurisdictions, that 
there were 71,300 individual claims whilst 164,800 were part of multiple claims
11
 and 
accepted receipts relating to multiple claims showed an increase of nearly 90% in 
2008-2009.
12
 Age discrimination therefore appears to be very unusual when compared 
to other jurisdictions in that the number of multiple claims decreased over the period 
of study.  
Legal representation was obtained by 80.7% of those involved in a multiple 
claim, compared to 42.5% of those involved in individual claims. Four claimants were 
found to have made a number of claims of age discrimination to tribunals around the 
country. Multiple judgments were received by the following: J Berry (37 judgments), 
M Keane (12), P Lucas (5) and NJ Fletcher (3).  
The characteristics of individual and multiple claims differed considerably. 
There were no judgments handed down which concerned harassment/victimisation on 
the grounds of age related to claims by groups. Although dismissal was the major 
cause for complaint in both individual and multiple categories, judgments relating to 
job status and redundancy payment selection formed a larger percentage of multiple 
claims than of individual claims; nevertheless in terms of frequency there were 53 
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made by individuals and 34 by members of groups. This underlines the fact that even 
in fields where multiple claims are more prevalent, individual claimants form the 
majority in age discrimination judgments in stark contrast to other jurisdictions.  
4.7: Concurrent claims of discrimination  
The computerised Register contains comprehensive information relating to 
concurrent grounds of complaint for all 4001 ‘age’ judgments. Concurrent claims for 
discrimination on grounds in addition to age were found in 28% (1119) of judgments 
and such claims have increased over the period of study, in overall numbers and as a 
percentage of all age claims, as shown in Figure 4.7. Figure 4.8 shows the number of 
additional claims made under the various discrimination jurisdictions. The majority of 
those claims made under four, five and six jurisdictions were made by Lee Frayling.
13
 
Frayling made 38 separate unsuccessful claims involving multiple jurisdictions against 
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 Eg Frayling v McLeod (2009) ET 1305883/8. Frayling claimed discrimination on the grounds of age, 
disability, sex, race, sexual orientation and religion and belief. 
14
 Newspaper report of incident which led to claim available online at 
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Age Discrimination 4001 
Age + Sex Discrimination 609 
Age + Disability Discrimination 507 
Age + Race Discrimination 505 
Age + Sex + Race Discrimination 161 
Age + Religion/Belief Discrimination  140 
Age + Sex + Disability Discrimination 125 
Age + Race + Disability Discrimination 119 
Age + Race + Religion/ Belief Discrimination 108 
Age + Sexual Orientation Discrimination  100 
Age + Sex + Religion/ Belief Discrimination   73 
Age + Sex + Race +Disability Discrimination 71 
Age + Race + Sexual Orientation Discrimination 66 
Age + Disability + Religion/Belief Discrimination 58 
Age + Sex + Race + Religion/ Belief Discrimination 58 
Age + Sex + Sexual Orientation Discrimination  57 
Age + Race + Disability + Religion/ Belief Discrimination 52 
Age + Disability + Sexual Orientation Discrimination 51 
Age + Sex + Race + Sexual Orientation Discrimination 49 
Age + Religion/ Belief + Sexual Orientation Discrimination  48 
Age + Race + Disability + Sexual Orientation Discrimination  44 
Age + Race + Religion/ Belief + Sexual Orientation Discrimination 44 
Age + Sex + Disability + Sexual Orientation Discrimination 43 
Age + Sex + Disability + Religion/Belief Discrimination 42 
Age + Sex + Race + Disability + Sexual Orientation Discrimination 42 
Age + Sex + Race + Disability + Religion/ Belief Discrimination 41 
Age +Disability + Sexual Orientation + Religion/ Belief Discrimination 39 
Age + Sex + Race + Sexual Orientation + Religion/Belief Discrimination 39 
Age + Race + Disability + Sexual Orientation + Religion/ Belief  39 
Age + Sex + Sexual Orientation + Religion/Belief Discrimination 38 
Age + Sex + Disability + Sexual Orientation + Religion/ Belief 
Discrimination 
38 
Age + Sex + Race + Disability + Sexual Orientation + Religion/ Belief 
Discrimination 
38 
Figure 4.8: Table showing numbers of judgments with concurrent  
discrimination claims 
(Categories are cumulative, i.e. the 609 Age + Sex claims, include  
161 Age + Sex + Race) 
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The following table, Figure 4.9, shows the variation in numbers of complaint 
types made by those claiming under multiple and individual jurisdictions. This shows 
a significant difference in the number relating to dismissal and redundancy payment 
and selection. Over one third (144) of the 408 redundancy claims were made alongside 
multiple claims of discrimination, with claimants asserting that they were selected for 
redundancy for reasons relating to a combination of their age, sex, disability, sexual 
orientation and race. More claimants (56) cited disability as an additional reason for 
redundancy selection than any other ground.  
Figure 4.9: Table showing percentage of judgments relating to complaint types 
made under multiple and single jurisdictions 
 Judgments for claims 
made under multiple 
jurisdictions 
Judgments for 




Recruitment 3% 3.7% 3.4% 
Job status and benefits 0.5% 3.1% 2.1% 
Dismissal 65.4% 81.7% 75.5% 
Retirement 3.2% 4.1% 3.2% 
Redundancy 28.5% 6.3% 14.6% 
Harassment/victimisation 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 
More women (384 claims, 27.6% of all female claims) than men (218 claims, 
8.6% of all male claims) claimed under age and sex discrimination jurisdictions but an 
identical proportion of men and women (12.5% of both female and male claims) 
claimed under age and race discrimination jurisdictions. Men were more likely than 
women to claim under age and sexual orientation (73 claims compared to 25), age and 
religion and belief (95 claims compared to 40) and age and disability discrimination 
jurisdictions (351 claims compared to 145).  
4.8: Claimant age  
Information relating to the age of claimants, although a central factor in the 
consideration of the facts of each claim, was only detailed in 436 folio reports out of 
the 4001 judgments. The average age of claimants was 54.73, the mode 54 and the 
median 56 years old. Although the youngest claimant was 15 and the oldest was 80, 
indicating a wide range of ages, the 25-75% quartile range was much narrower, 
spanning from 52 to 62 years old. As can be seen in Figure 4.10, for two of the four 
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years the modal age of claimants was 65 years old reflecting the number of claims 
concerned with the former default retirement age.  
 
Figures 4.11-4.13 illustrate the age profiles of all, female and male claimants 
found in judgments. The average male claimant was 56.13, with a modal value of 54, 
followed by prominent peaks at 60 and 65 years old. The average age of female 
claimants was younger at 51.97, but the modal value was 65, older than that of men, 
with smaller peaks at 52 and 54 years old.  
 
Figure 4.11: Bar 












2007 2008 2009 2010
mode 65 54 54 65
mean 55.75 53.97 53.69 57.77





















Figure 4.10: Graph showing age of claimants over 
period of study 
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Figure 4.12: Bar chart showing age of male claimants 
 
 














These results underline the fact that, although claimants came from a wide age 
range, the majority of claims were made by those in their mid-fifties – a group 
identified as being at particular risk of age discrimination.
15
  
                                                          
15
 C Brennan et al, A Survey of the Literature in the Context of Current Research Agendas (Salford 
University Business Discussion Paper 2007) 32.  
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4.9: Claimant gender 
Claimant gender was identifiable in 3944 judgments; most of those claimants 
where gender was not identifiable were doctors. Men formed 64.8% (2,555) of 
claimants and women 35.2% (1,389). Male claimants outnumbered female claimants 
at all tribunal offices, as can be seen in Figure 4.14. The figures for the Newcastle 
Tribunal are skewed by the addition of an age claim to a large sex discrimination 
claim against Gateshead and Newcastle City Councils. The characteristics of claims 
made by men and women differed in that women made proportionally more claims 
relating to harassment (53% of all harassment claims) and fewer claims relating to 
recruitment (23% of all recruitment claims). 
Figure 4.14: Bar chart showing frequency of male and female claimants in 
judgments issued by tribunals 
 
4.10: Claimant representation 
Statistics produced by the Ministry of Justice indicate that the majority of 
claimants making claims to the tribunal under all jurisdictions have legal 
representation. Figure 4.15 shows figures collated from the ETS Annual Reports 
99 
 
which indicate that over a three year period the percentage of claimants with legal 
representation has varied between 62.71% and 73.86%, with a mean of 69.23%.
16
 
Figure 4:15: Table showing a summary of statistics on claimant legal 
representation in all jurisdictions, collated from ETS Annual Reports 2007-2010 
Information relating to the legal representation of age discrimination claimants 
was found in 1,311 hard-copy folio reports. This revealed that 659 claimants were 
self-represented and 652 had some manner of legal representation, whether by a 
lawyer, citizen’s advice specialist, trade union official or other advisor. Contrary to the 
ETS statistics therefore, very slightly more age claimants (50.3%) had no legal 
representation at the tribunal than had representation, although this is not as low as the 




It may be that age discrimination claimants differ from other claimants in that 
they are less likely to obtain legal advice or that those that who pursue their claim to a 
full hearing and receive a judgment do so because they are not legal represented, 
whereas a lawyer may advise a claimant to settle or withdraw their claim. However, 
the ETS figures may not be a true reflection of representation rates as they appear to 
be distorted by a large multiple claim against British Airways of over 10,000 
employees with legal representation. 
A change occurred in claimant representation around the end of 2008, when 
claimants became more likely to not have representation. In the first 18 months of the 
study 59.7% of claimants had representation whilst 40.3% had none, whilst in the next 
eighteen months this situation was reversed, as seen in Figure 4.16. This may be 
because when the Regulations were first introduced claimants felt they needed more 
                                                          
16
 Ministry of Justice (n 3) 6. It is not apparent how this information has been gathered - a footnote in 
the 2009 - 2010 Report states these statistics are ‘a snapshot of the information provided by claimants 
on 7
th
 May 2010’. 
17
 B Hayward et al, Findings from the Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications (DTI 2004) xix. 
Year 
Claimants with legal 
representation 





2007-2008 136,700 189,300 71.12% 
2008-2009 94,700 151,000 62.71% 
2009-2010 174,400 236,100 73.86% 
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help in pursuing a claim or because, as the economic recession has deepened, 
claimants have not been able to afford legal representation.  
Figure 4.16: Bar chart showing claimant representation over period of study 
 
The regional pattern of representation is shown in Figure 4.17. Despite a low 
representation rate in Newcastle, more of those in the North had representation, which 
is reflected in the higher success: dismissal ratios for that region, discussed in Chapter 
5.3. Those in the South and South-west had less representation than other regions – 
similarly reflected in their lower success: dismissal rates. 
 
Throughout the three year and a half period a fairly constant figure of 60% of 
women had representation, whilst the equivalent figure for men fell from 54.5% in 
2008 to 36.4% in 2009 and further to 26.7% in 2010. This fall in male representation 
rates accounts for the overall fall in representation numbers. In the first four months of 
2010, 26.7% of men receiving a judgment on an individual claim of age discrimination 





























Figure 4.17: Bar chart showing percentage of claimants 







representation rates of those claiming they were discriminated against because they 
were ‘young’ or ‘old’. Figure 4.18 shows that those claimants alleging that they have 
suffered less favourable treatment in recruitment, dismissal and retirement had low 
representation rates. In particular, 28.6% of those complaining that they had suffered 
discrimination in recruitment had representation, contrasting with those complaining 
about job status and benefits, of whom 86% had representation.  
Figure 4.18: Bar chart showing the relationship between  












4.11: Claimant occupation 
The occupation of the claimant was detailed in 903 folio reports. The 
employment statistics of each occupational group in the UK were obtained from the 
ILO
18
 and the number of judgments per 100,000 workers in each sector was 
established.
19
 The average number of judgments per 100,000 workers in all groups 
was 13.57, per 100,000 men was 16.57 and per 100,000 women was 10.05. As can be 
seen in Figures 4.19-4.20, service, sales and retail workers formed the largest claimant 
group; there was a substantial increase in claims from this group throughout 2008 and 
2009. The lowest number of complaints came from the legislators, senior managers 
                                                          
18
 International Labour Organisation – Laborsta, United Kingdom: Economically Active Population, by 
Occupation and Status in Employment (2010). Figures for the 2
nd
 quarter of 2008 were used (mid-way 
through period of study) to establish overall occupational group employment rate. 
19
 Number of judgments re occupation group recorded × 100,000/ Total number of workers in 




and officials group. Figures 4.21-4.22 illustrate the pattern of claimants by occupation 
groups, indicating a large number of professionals and associated technicians claiming 
in London Central and service, sales and retail personnel in London South claiming 
discrimination resulting in dismissal.  
 
2007 2008 2009 2010pro
Service and shop
workers
35 111 189 184
Technicians 20 60 41 84
Professionals 21 53 47 48
Elementary occup. 8 20 19 24
Clerical workers 5 28 29 32
Craft and factory
workers
10 8 13 21
Plant workers 6 13 27 8
Legislators, managers 2 8 7 8














 Figure 4.19:  
Summary of  
claimant  
numbers by  
occupation  




Sector occupation data from <http://laborsta.ilo.org> and <http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet>. 


















































Figure 4.20: Bar chart showing number of judgments per occupation sector 
No of judgments per hundred thousand workers in sector
No of judgments per hundred thousand women in sector






















4.12: Employer characteristics 
Employer activity was identified in 3964 judgments and classified using the SIC 
2007 system.
20
 The most frequently found employer activities are shown in Figure 
4.23 and the overall pattern is shown overleaf in Figure 4.25. The relationship between 
employer activity and outcome is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.6.  
Figure 4.23: Table showing frequently found employer activities in judgments 
The number of workers employed by each respondent employer could be 
ascertained in 3960 instances. Figure 4.24 shows the frequency of employer size 
groups. More than half, 57.1%, were employers with over 250 employees, whilst 
15.8% were medium-sized, 11.6% were small and 15.5% were micro organisations.  
Figure 4.24: Pie chart showing frequency of  
respondent employers found in judgments, categorised by size 
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Employer Activity SIC 2007 code 
Number of 
judgments 
Administration of the State 8410 319 
Hospital activities 8610 136 
Postal services 5310 124 
Construction of buildings 4110 101 
Passenger air transport 5110 100 
Higher education 8540 86 
Legal services 6910 85 
Employment agencies 7810 78 
Sale of motor vehicles 4510 68 
Secondary education 8530 58 
Restaurant and food services 5610 57 













It was possible to identify the legal status of the respondent employer in 3965 
judgments. Those complaining that they were discriminated against because they were 
young were more likely to be employed by private companies, sole traders and 
charities than government bodies and public limited companies. As can be seen in 
Figure 4.26, more than half (2170) of the employers were private companies. The 
Manchester Tribunal handed down the largest percentage, 8.8% (192), of judgments to 
private companies, although the majority were issued in the South-east. The second 
largest employer group was that of government bodies, with 807 judgments – a large 
number of these were from the London Central, London South and Watford Tribunals. 
Claims against government bodies were more likely to include a concurrent claim of 
discriminaton; over a quarter of these claimants alleged they had also suffered sex 
discrimination and a 100 claimed age and race or disability discrimination.  
There were 106 judgments which related to respondents whose legal status was 
that of a partnership. The average age of workers claiming against partnerships was 
lower than average at 48.29 years old and a higher percentage than average was by 
women, 49.5%. Almost all ‘partnership’ age claims were concerned with dismissal, 
with only 1.4% relating to with recruitment. Charities and not for profit organisations 
were the respondent employer in 187 judgments. The London Tribunals handed down 
over a third (52) of these judgments and a higher percentage of these claimants than 
average were women (41.4%).  
      Figure 4.26: Bar chart showing frequency of respondent employer 




The solvency of 3960 respondent employers involved in age discrimination 
claims could be ascertained and 353 judgments related to respondent employers who 
were insolvent, in administration or in a voluntary arrangement. The tribunals which 
handed down the largest number of these judgments were Manchester (38), London 
South (32) and Birmingham (31). The average age of related claimants was 51.58 
years old and a lower percentage of these claimants than normal (38%) had legal 
representation. The majority (87%) of these employers were private companies and 
51.3% employed fewer than 15 workers. The most frequently found employer activity 
in judgments relating to insolvent employers was that concerned with the construction 
of buildings (19), followed by restaurants and food services (16) and employment 
placement agencies (15).  
The Companies Register notes that 54,387 companies were declared insolvent 
during the period October 2006 to April 2010.
21
 The average liquidation rate as a 
percentage of the active register of registered companies varied throughout this period 
between 0.55% and 0.85%, with an average of 0.7%.
22
 The percentage of respondent 
employers found in folio reports in the Judgment Register who were insolvent, in 
administration or voluntary liquidation was 8.9%. This figure indicates that employers 
involved in age discrimination claims were more than 10 times more likely to be 
insolvent than the average employer on the Companies Register.  
4.13: Conclusion 
Initial forecasts that age discrimination claims would quickly become the most 
commonly pursued at the tribunal were not well-founded.
23
 Age discrimination claims 
over the period of study formed 1.2% of claim receipts at employment tribunals, which 
is a comparatively small number for a complaint that is said to have been experienced 
by nearly four million people in the UK.
24
 Such claims as a proportion of ‘all 
jurisdiction’ claims fell over the last year of study, indicating that workers were 
becoming less inclined to claim about discriminating conduct on the grounds of age to 
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 Her Majesty’s Government, The Insolvency Service Annual Statistics (2006-2011). 
22
 ibid.  
23
 G Vorster, ‘Age Discrimination Set to Become Most Common Form of Discrimination’ Personnel 
Today (8 January 2008). 
24
 Commission, Eurobarometer Special 317 - Discrimination in the EU in 2009 (Directorate General 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 2009) 74.  
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the tribunal, rather than increasing as more workers become aware of the legislation. 
Despite age continuing ‘to represent the most common ground of self-reported 
discrimination,’
25
 fewer complained of ageist treatment to the tribunal four years after 
the introduction of the legislation than, for example, race or sex discrimination.
26
 
However, the number of age claims rose steadily over the period of study indicating 
that more workers felt they were being discriminated against and/or that more workers 
were aware that they could make claims under the new legislation, particularly 
following media publicity of several ‘high profile’ cases. The South-east and Greater 
London Tribunals handed down a higher proportion of claims than those in other parts 
of the country, particularly those in the North. The London Central Tribunal has 
consistently handled a large number of these claims whilst Newcastle and Leicester 
have always had a lower proportion than normal.  
The typical claimant was a 54 year old male, with no legal representation, who 
was dismissed from a service, sales or retail position in a large, solvent, private 
company. The pattern however masks a complex situation where, for example, 
women, particularly female professionals, formed the largest group of claimants 
against public authorities, estate agencies and the legal services sector. Although 
judgments were found which related to claimants aged from 15 to 80 years old, the 
majority of claimants were aged from 52 to 62 years. Female claimants were on 
average five years younger than men and over a quarter of female claimants made a 
concurrent claim of sex discrimination, a trend which is increasing. 
The number of men receiving judgment was twice that of women (66.4%: 
33.6%) – this proportion was also seen when the number of women working in 
occupational groups was taken into account. This is in contrast to the proportion of 
judgments issued to the younger claimants group where more women than men 
received judgments, despite more young men than women employed in the workforce. 
It may be that older women, although consistently stating in surveys that they feel that 
they are discriminated against as much as older men, are less likely to make an 
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 Commission (n 24) 75. 
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 Ministry of Justice, Employment Tribunals and EAT Statistics, 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011 (The 
Stationery Office 2011) 7. 
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application to the tribunal following the pattern discussed by Walker et al,
27
 whereas 
young women are more assertive in upholding their employment rights. 
Legal representation was obtained by approximately half of claimants, contrary 
to ETS statistics for all tribunal claims. Such assistance was obtained by a consistent 
60% of women over the four years, yet from 2008-2010 representation rates for men 
fell considerably. Individuals making claims relating to recruitment had lower 
representation rates (28.6%) than, for example, those making claims relating to job 
status/benefits (86%). Those in the South and West had lower representation rates than 
those in the North and this is reflected in outcome statistics discussed in Chapter Five.  
Service, sales and retail workers formed the largest group of workers making a 
claim. These are occupations which involve contact with the public and where image 
and appearance may be an important factor in the role undertaken by the worker. 
Claims from service and sales workers rose considerably over the period of study, in 
contrast to a fall in claims from plant and machine operators and craft and trade 
workers. This reveals a pattern which differs from that found in other countries with 
age discrimination legislation, where white collar managers and professionals are most 
often found to be claimants.
28
 However, claimants in the South-east and London were 
more likely to be from white collar occupational groups and the London Central 
Tribunal handed down the largest number of judgments for these workers. More than 
half of respondent employers were large and were private companies, although the 
largest number of claims was made against employers involved in local and central 
government. 
Age discrimination is unlike other tribunal jurisdictions in that more claims are 
made by individuals, rather than groups of claimants. The vast majority of the 4001 
claimants took action because of circumstances surrounding the termination of an 
individual contract of employment – involving dismissal, redundancy selection or 
retirement. Nearly three-quarters of those complaining of less favourable treatment in 
redundancy selection made a concurrent claim of discrimination, with disability most 
frequently cited as an additional ground of complaint. Numbers complaining of 
                                                          
27
 H Walker et al, ‘Women’s Experiences and Perceptions of Age Discrimination in Employment: 
Implications for Research and Policy’ (2007) 6 Social Policy and Society 37. 
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 MH Schuster and CS Miller, ‘An Empirical Assessment of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act’ (1984) 38(1) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 64. 
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discrimination in recruitment, harassment and victimisation have remained low and the 
small number of claimants complaining of discrimination in job status and the 
allocation of benefits has fallen steadily.  
This study has confirmed, for the first time through empirical evidence, that age 
discrimination claimants are mainly older individuals complaining of discrimination 
surrounding the termination of their employment. Yet young workers, both male and 
female, made a number of claims against a wide range of employers at a steady rate 
over the period of study and a small number of claimants also claimed they belonged to 
a disadvantaged ‘age band’. These are new phenomena illustrating the possible 
emergence of claims arising because of an increase in intergenerational conflict in the 
workplace. The ‘equal treatment’ model of legislation encourages such claims, which 
are not seen in, for example, the USA because the ADEA does not give protection to 
younger cohorts. It may be that legislation which offers protection from age 
discrimination to all (on the same basis) may promote such conflict, whereas this may 
not happen with legislation which aims to ensure equal respect to individuals, by 
sometimes treating them differently
29
 and requiring reasonable accommodation to 
made in order to permit this, as found in Canada.
30
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30
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Chapter Five:  
Quantitative Analysis - Results 2 
Outcomes and Remedies 
5.1: Outcome overview 
Information was obtained on the outcome of 3904 age discrimination claims 
from the Judgment Register, which was grouped into ten ‘outcome categories’ 
established during pilot studies. A brief outcome of each claim was found in the 
computerised records and where this was unclear the folio reports were used to clarify 
the result and to acquire details of awards given to claimants. The outcome of each 
judgment used for analysis was either that recorded on the computerised report or, if 
not recorded, the outcome which was stamped on the hard-copy report. In 97 cases the 
judgment was missing or had been removed from the Register as the Employment 
Judge deemed it fit to keep details of the judgment private
1
 and these outcomes were 
registered as ‘not known’. The recorded data is summarised in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
Figure 5.1: Table showing outcome of ‘age’ claims on the Judgment Register 
Outcome Frequency Percent 
Incorrect procedure/time expired 
Struck out 
Successful for Claimant 
Settled by parties 
Claimant withdrawn 
Default for Claimant 
Other 
ACAS settled 
Fails and dismissed 
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    Figure 5.2: Bar chart showing outcome of judgments made under the age 
discrimination jurisdiction
 
The 1682 claims that were fully considered by tribunals fall into two broad 
categories –‘successful’ or ‘fail’ – in contrast to those withdrawn, not actively pursued 
or settled prior to consideration. The successful category includes the 3.2% declared 
successful plus the 2.7% of claims where employers failed to attend the hearing and a 
default award was given to the claimant. Those that failed include those struck out by 
tribunals, those which were considered and subsequently dismissed and those that 
were time-expired or had followed an incorrect procedure. 
Tribunals dismissed 747 of the 3904 judgments, that is, 19.1% of claims, 
because they were unsuccessful after consideration. A further 286 claims, 7.3%, were 
‘struck out’: these were usually cases which had only a slight chance of success and 
were not considered in as much depth as those which were ‘failed and dismissed’. A 
further 421 claims, 10.8%, were dismissed because the claimant had not followed the 
grievance or claim procedure correctly. The usual reasons for this were not citing age 
discrimination in a grievance letter, not waiting 28 days after lodging a grievance to 
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make a claim or waiting longer than three months before making a claim. Surprisingly, 
of the 162 judgments which had followed an incorrect procedure and which contained 
details of representation, 96 concerned claimants who had legal representation.  
Employers were significantly more likely to defend a claim successfully than 
claimants were to succeed if the claim was considered by the tribunal. Those which 
failed formed 37.24% (1454) of the 3904 judgments, whilst those which were 
successful formed 5.84% (228). This trend, illustrated in Figure 5.3, has increased 
significantly over the period of study as the number of claims has risen. The dotted 
linear, Excel-generated, ‘all success’ and ‘all fail’ trendlines, representing the overall 
trends of failure and success, have both risen as the number of judgments have 
increased over time. However, the number of those that were dismissed increased at a 
much higher rate than those successful. In the first quarter of 2010 judgments were 
over six times more likely to record ‘fails and dismissed’ results rather than 
‘successful’.  
If the judgments which recorded a settled result are grouped with those 
successful, on the basis that a remedy of some nature had been perhaps obtained by the 
claimant, the overall ‘success+settled’ number rises to 861 (22.05%) – 15% less than 
those which failed and were dismissed. The relationship between the judgments which 
were ‘successful+settled’ and those that failed changed considerably over the period, 
shown in Figure 5.4. ACAS settled 6.9% (268) of claims at the hearing and 9.3% 
(365) were settled by the parties. The number of claims settled with the help of ACAS 
increased steadily until June 2007, at which point it helped settle 56 individual claims, 
but the number settled by ACAS decreased rapidly after this date.
2
 A second peak can 
be seen in April 2008 when 59 claims were settled by the parties, 44 of which were a 
multiple claim. From September 2007 onwards the trendlines show that the number of 
claims failing has been greater than those settled and successful and the gap between 
the two has steadily widened. By April 2010 judgments recording a failed claim 
outnumbered those which recorded a success or settled result for the claimant by three 
to one.  
                                                          
2
 On enquiry, ACAS stated it is not aware of any changes in procedure or otherwise which would 






































































































































































































































































































































































































The largest outcome group was the ‘claim withdrawn’ category with 1230 
judgments, amounting to 31.5% of the overall total. It is acknowledged that this group 
could include claims which it may be appropriate to include in another category. Some 
may have been withdrawn because they were settled, not actively pursued, or the 
claimant had been reinstated. However, if the tribunal was aware of the circumstances 
of the withdrawal, this was usually stated in the judgment report so that if, for 
example, a claim was withdrawn because it was settled, it normally had this 
description recorded and is included in the ‘settled’ category rather than the 
‘withdrawn’ category.  
Two ratios are adopted in this Chapter for the purposes of discussion of 
outcomes. A ‘success: dismissal’ ratio represents the number of judgments recorded 
that were successful after consideration and by default compared to those that were 
dismissed after consideration plus those struck out or dismissed because they were 
time-expired or followed an incorrect procedure. The overall success: dismissal ratio 
was 1: 6.38, that is, for every judgment recording success for a claimant, 6.38 were 
dismissed. Secondly, a ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio represents the number of 
judgments recorded that were successful plus those that were settled at the tribunal 
compared to those that were dismissed. The overall ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio 
was 1: 1.69 but this had fallen to 1: 3.05 by the first quarter of 2010 as the number of 
settled claims decreased. 
5.2: Complaint type 
The outcome of a claim varied considerably according to complaint type, shown 
in Figure 5.5 and in the statistics in Figure 5.6. Although the total success of claims 
considered by the tribunal was 5.9%, claimants making complaints of harassment and 
victimisation were significantly more successful (25.1%) than those complaining of 
discrimination resulting in dismissal (5.4%). In judgments which concerned claims of 
age discrimination in recruitment only 4.2% of claimants followed an incorrect 
procedure, compared with the overall average of 10.8%, and far fewer claims were 
settled at the hearing with only 2.2% settled by ACAS and the parties. Although 8.4% 
of recruitment claims were successful, more than double the average, 52.6%, failed 
and were dismissed compared with the average of 19.1%. This gives the lowest 
claimant success: dismissal ratio and ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio amongst 
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complaint types – 1: 6.88 and 1: 5.64 – respectively, indicating the difficulty of 
making a successful complaint to the tribunal regarding discrimination in recruitment.  
 
Of the 88 judgments which related to retirement, only one was not actively 
pursued and eight were withdrawn by the claimant. More than double the average 
were struck out before consideration (13.6%); this was particularly noticeable after the 
Heyday
3
 judgment, an unsuccessful legal challenge to the default retirement age. Sixty 
were fully considered by the tribunal, with 17% proving successful for the claimant. 
Although this appears a higher success rate than other complaint types, with the 
proportion of successful judgments compared to those which are dismissed relatively 
high (1: 4.07), the very low number of settled claims brings the ‘success+settled’: 
dismissal ratio for retirement claims to a low value of 1: 3.59.   
                                                          
3
 C-388/07 R (Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Ageing (Age Concern England)) v 
Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2009] All ER (EC) 619, [2009] 

















































Figure 5.6: Outcome 















Count 4 4 176 3 24 0 210 421 
% Outcome 1.0% 1.0% 41.8% .7% 5.7% .0% 49.9% 100.0% 
% comptype 4.3% 7.0% 8.6% 3.4% 6.1% .0% 17.6% 10.8% 
% of Total .1% .1% 4.5% .1% .6% .0% 5.4% 10.8% 
Struck out Count 8 0 178 12 12 1 75 286 
% Outcome 2.8% .0% 62.2% 4.2% 4.2% .3% 26.2% 100.0% 
% comptype 8.5% .0% 8.7% 13.6% 3.1% 3.1% 6.3% 7.3% 




Count 8 7 49 14 28 6 12 124 
% Outcome 6.5% 5.6% 39.5% 11.3% 22.6% 4.8% 9.7% 100.0% 
% comptype 8.5% 12.3% 2.4% 15.9% 7.1% 18.8% 1.0% 3.2% 
% of Total .2% .2% 1.3% .4% .7% .2% .3% 3.2% 
Settled by  
parties 
Count 1 1 203 2 30 1 127 365 
% Outcome .3% .3% 55.6% .5% 8.2% .3% 34.8% 100.0% 
% comptype 1.1% 1.8% 9.9% 2.3% 7.6% 3.1% 10.7% 9.3% 
% of Total .0% .0% 5.2% .1% .8% .0% 3.3% 9.3% 
Claimant  
withdrawn 
Count 8 2 703 8 98 2 409 1230 
% Outcome .7% .2% 57.2% .7% 8.0% .2% 33.3% 100.0% 
% comptype 8.5% 3.5% 34.3% 9.1% 24.9% 6.3% 34.4% 31.5% 
% of Total .2% .1% 18.0% .2% 2.5% .1% 10.5% 31.5% 
Default for  
Claimant 
Count 1 0 61 1 21 2 18 104 
% Outcome 1.0% .0% 58.7% 1.0% 20.2% 1.9% 17.3% 100.0% 
% comptype 1.1% .0% 3.0% 1.1% 5.3% 6.3% 1.5% 2.7% 
% of Total .0% .0% 1.6% .0% .5% .1% .5% 2.7% 
Other Count 3 23 92 1 14 4 72 209 
% Outcome 1.4% 11.0% 44.0% .5% 6.7% 1.9% 34.4% 100.0% 
% comptype 3.2% 40.4% 4.5% 1.1% 3.6% 12.5% 6.1% 5.4% 
% of Total .1% .6% 2.4% .0% .4% .1% 1.8% 5.4% 
ACAS 
settled 
Count 1 0 157 0 26 0 84 268 
% Outcome .4% .0% 58.6% .0% 9.7% .0% 31.3% 100.0% 
% comptype 1.1% .0% 7.7% .0% 6.6% .0% 7.1% 6.9% 
% of Total .0% .0% 4.0% .0% .7% .0% 2.2% 6.9% 
Fails and  
dismissed 
Count 50 20 341 46 134 16 140 747 
% Outcome 6.7% 2.7% 45.6% 6.2% 17.9% 2.1% 18.7% 100.0% 
% comptype 53.2% 35.1% 16.6% 52.3% 34.1% 50.0% 11.8% 19.1% 
% of Total 1.3% .5% 8.7% 1.2% 3.4% .4% 3.6% 19.1% 
Not actively  
pursued 
Count 10 0 90 1 6 0 43 150 
% Outcome 6.7% .0% 60.0% .7% 4.0% .0% 28.7% 100.0% 
% comptype 10.6% .0% 4.4% 1.1% 1.5% .0% 3.6% 3.8% 
% of Total .3% .0% 2.3% .0% .2% .0% 1.1% 3.8% 
Total Count 94 57 2050 88 393 32 1190 3904 
% in 
Outcome 
2.4% 1.5% 52.5% 2.3% 10.1% .8% 30.5% 100.0% 
121 
 
The largest number of judgments related to complaints surrounding dismissal. 
Of these 2050 judgments, 703 were claimant withdrawn, 695 failed, 360 were settled 
at the hearing, whilst 110 were successful for the claimant – a lower than average 
proportion. This gives a success: dismissal ratio of 1: 6.32 and a ‘success+settled’: 
dismissal ratio of 1: 1.48 for such complaints. Judgments relating to job status and 
benefits were more likely than any other category to have an ‘other’ outcome, 
including referrals to case management meetings, further hearings or stayed awaiting 
additional information. The success: dismissal ratio of 1: 2.12 for 
harassment/victimisation judgments was higher than all other complaint types, 
indicating the comparative success of these claimants.  
5.3: Tribunal office 
Outcomes of claims varied considerably in judgments handed down by different 
tribunals, as shown in Figure 5.7. Claimants at Bristol had the highest percentage of 
judgments which recorded failed and dismissed outcomes (32.9%), whilst the lowest 
was at Reading (10.8%). A larger percentage of claims than normal followed an 
incorrect procedure at Reading (16.9%) and Watford (16.8%). The lowest percentage 
of incorrect applications was made at Leicester (3%, 3 claims), which was 
considerably lower than anywhere else in the country. Although the largest percentage 
of claims struck out was at Cardiff, (35.2%, 63 claims), 39 of these judgments were 
individual ‘scandalous and vexatious’ claims by Lee Frayling.
4
  
No age discrimination claim was declared successful after consideration by the 
Leicester Tribunal and only 1% at Exeter (1 claim) and 1.6% at Shrewsbury (2 claims) 
were successful. On the other hand a higher percentage of judgments was declared 
successful at Leeds (5.9%, 15 claims) and at Liverpool (6.3%, 10 claims) than at any 
other tribunal. No default judgments were handed down at Cardiff, Exeter or 
Shrewsbury, as all respondent employers attended the tribunal hearing, but at Leicester 
5.1% (5 claims) and at Liverpool 5% (8 claims) of all judgments were default 
judgments. 
                                                          
4
 Eg Frayling v McLeod (2009) ET 1305883/08. 
 
 







In Leeds 23.7% (60 claims) of judgments were settled by the parties, yet at 
Shrewsbury only 0.3% (1 claim) and at Ashford 0.5% (2 claims) were settled in this 
manner. ACAS facilitated settlements in 18.3% of judgments (11 claims) at 
Shrewsbury and 14.4% (21 claims) at Bristol, the largest percentages found, whilst no 
claims were settled with their help at Sheffield and only 1.2% (2 claims) at Bury St. 
Edmunds. There appears to be no relationship between the location of ACAS offices 
and the number of judgments in which they facilitated claims. For example, there is no 
ACAS office in Shrewsbury where it facilitated a large proportion of claims and there 
is a regional office at Bury St Edmunds where ACAS was relatively unsuccessful.  
Figure 5.8 shows the percentage of judgments which recorded failed outcomes 
plotted against the percentage of judgments which recorded successful and settled 
outcomes at tribunals. The largest percentage of ‘failed’ judgments was at Ashford, 
followed by Cardiff and Bristol. The largest percentage of claimants to obtain a 
remedy was found at Leeds and Nottingham, whilst the Liverpool, Leeds and 
Nottingham Tribunals handed down the largest proportion of successful judgments. 
The difference between the percentage of ‘failed’ and ‘successful+settled’ judgments 
at each tribunal is shown in Figure 5.9. At the Leeds and Southampton Tribunals this 
difference falls below the ‘zero’ horizontal axis, indicating that there were more 
judgments which were successful or settled than were dismissed. Ashford and Cardiff 
show the greatest difference between success and failure, followed by London South, 
Watford and Reading. Claimants at these five offices were less successful than 
average in their claims.  
The regional pattern, illustrated in Figure 5.10, reflects that found in individual 
tribunals. A Pearson chi-square test, undertaken using PASW, on the relationship 
between outcome and tribunals grouped on a regional basis produces a result of 0.00, 
indicating that there is a strong, statistically significant, relationship between these 
variables. The difference between ‘successful+settled’ and failed claims in the South 
and West is 21.9%, in the South-east and London it is 17.99%, the Midlands 11.03% 






















































































































































Figure 5.8: Graph showing percentage of failed/ successful/ successful + settled claims as a percentage 
of total number of 'age' judgments at each employment tribunal 
Dismissed claims as
% total no of 'age'
judgments
Successful+settled
claims as % of total
no of 'age' judgments
Successful claims as












































































































































Figure 5.9: Graph showing difference between percentage of judgments successful + settled and 








5.4: Claimant characteristics 
The average age of those who were successful was 54.89 years old and that of 
those whose claim failed was slightly older at 55.54 years old. The box plot in Figure 
5.11 illustrates the relationship between the outcome of claims and the age of the 
claimant. The green boxes in the box plot reveal the 25-75% percentile groups within 
each outcome group, whilst the outliers, represented by the red circles and stars, show 
claimants who fall outside of the statistical normal distribution pattern. The normal 
distribution group is shown within the small horizontal black lines at the top and 
bottom of the vertical bars. The numbers by the outliers on the box plot refer to the 
case identification numbers used on data collection sheets. The black horizontal lines 
across the green boxes mark the average age of claimants within each outcome 
category.  
The most striking feature of the plot is the large number of red outliers present in 
younger age groups in the ‘fails and dismissed’ and ‘successful’ categories. These 
outliers represent a secondary distribution group containing workers who claimed they 
were discriminated against because they were ‘young,’ whilst those in the green boxes 
mainly represent those who were claiming they were discriminated against because 
they were ‘old’. All of the workers who did not actively pursue their claim were over 
57 years old indicating that younger workers were less inclined to abandon their claim 
once initiated. All but one of those whose claim was struck out was over 50 years old. 


















































Figure 5.10: Graph showing difference between 











distribution group, between 50 and 63 years old, suggesting that younger workers and 
those over 63 were less inclined to settle. 
       Figure 5.11: Box plot showing relationship between  
       outcome of claims and age of claimant
 
The outcome of claims made by women and men followed similar profiles, as 
shown in Figures 5.12 and 5.13. These bar charts were produced using data from 3944 
judgments where gender and outcome were discernible. The principal difference 
between the sexes was that more women – 14.8% – followed incorrect procedures 
when submitting claims, compared to 8.5% of men. This figure is skewed by a 
multiple claim against Sunderland City Council by 54 women, whose initial grievance 
did not include a claim of discrimination on the grounds of age. Once at the tribunal 
women withdrew fewer claims, but 16% of claims were settled by both sexes. 
The statistics show that 6.4% of female claimants were successful, after 
consideration and by default, compared to 5.7% of male claimants. Men formed 
61.84% of the 228 who were successful, 62.19% of the 1436 who failed and 64.17% 
of the 628 who settled their claim. Women formed 38.16% of those successful, 
37.81% of those who failed and 35.83% of those who settled. These figures give a 
success: dismissal ratio of 1: 6.24 for women and a very similar ratio of 1: 6.3 for men 
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and ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratios of 1: 1.64 for men and 1: 1.74 for women, 
suggesting that gender may not be a factor in the overall success or dismissal of age 
discrimination claims.  
   Figure 5.12: Bar chart showing outcome of claims by men 
   in judgments relating to age discrimination jurisdiction 
 
   Figure 5.13: Bar chart showing outcome of claims by women 
     in judgments relating to age discrimination jurisdiction
 
Workers who made concurrent claims of discrimination were less successful in 
obtaining a remedy for their complaint than those claiming under age alone. The 
success rate of claims with more than one additional concurrent claim was lower, with 
each additional ground lowering the rate further. For example, one person out of 113 
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claiming age, race and disability was successful after consideration and two out of 123 
claiming age, sex and disability were successful. These statistics are illustrated in 
Figure 5.14.  
 
The statistics for different combinations of jurisdictions vary. For example, out 
of the 609 judgments with a concurrent claim of sex discrimination, 20.2% followed 
an incorrect procedure and 12.5% were struck out, whilst only nine were successful 
after consideration. Those claiming age and sex discrimination and age and race 
discrimination had very low success rates of 2.8% (including default judgments) 
whilst those claiming age and disability had a slightly higher total success rate of 
3.6%, although only nine out of 507 were successful after consideration. Seven out of 
505 claiming age and race discrimination were successful after consideration. Out of 
the 100 claimants receiving judgment on a claim on the grounds of age and sexual 
orientation discrimination only one person was successful, whilst 38 were struck out. 
No claimant was successful out of the 140 claiming discrimination on the grounds of 

































Figure 5.14: Graph to show claims dismissed by tribunal per 
remedy obtained in judgments relating to concurrent claim/s of 
discrimination 






judgment. Claims involving multiple jurisdictions were twice as likely (15.1%) to 
have followed an incorrect procedure as those made under single jurisdictions (7.7%). 
This usually appeared to be because one of the jurisdiction grounds was not mentioned 
at the grievance letter stage.  
Using data obtained from 3849 judgments where gender, outcome and 
concurrent claims were detailed, it was found that of the 647 women making 
concurrent discrimination claims, 25 were successful and 104 were settled, giving a 
low success: dismissal ratio of 1: 10.92 and a ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio of 1: 
2.12.
 
Of the 797 claims by men making a concurrent claim, 45 were successful and 
106 were settled, giving a success: dismissal ratio of 1: 7.07 and a ‘success+settled’: 
dismissal ratio of 1: 2.11. Men making concurrent claims were more successful than 
women in obtaining a remedy after consideration but women were more prepared than 
men to reach a settlement, achieving a near identical overall outcome. Figure 5.14 
shows that women making a concurrent claim of sexual orientation discrimination 
were eight times more likely to have a claim dismissed than to receive a remedy. 
Women not making a concurrent claim were the most successful, having a 
‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio of 1: 1.4. Making a concurrent claim may therefore 
not be helpful to the claimant in obtaining a remedy, particularly if the claim is 
considered by the tribunal.  
Outcomes for those claimants who felt they were discriminated against because 
they were young differed from ‘all age’ claims in that 11 out of the 41 judgments – 
26.8% – were successful for claimants with only one of these a default judgment. This 
is a far better outcome than for all age claimants who had a success rate of 5.9%. Nine 
claims were successful for young women and only two for men, as young women 
were considerably more successful than men or older women. Figure 5.15 shows data 
obtained from the 23 judgments which detailed outcome and age for young claimants. 
No claimant over 25 years old was successful when claiming discrimination because 
they were young. No judgment for young claimants recorded a settled claim and only 
one claim noted that the claimant followed an incorrect procedure, suggesting that 
young workers are less likely to settle a claim and are more likely to follow the correct 
procedure than older claimants. No claim was successful in the group of 13 claimants 
who felt they were discriminated because they were part of a disadvantaged age band. 
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  Figure 5.15: Bar chart showing the relationship between age and outcome 
   in judgments concerned with discrimination against the young 
 
The outcome of claims relating to claimant occupational groups is shown in 
Figures 5.16-5.17. The average success: dismissal ratio for all claims where the 
occupation was detailed was 1: 6.38 and the ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio was 1: 
4.17. These statistics differ from those in the previous section as they relate to smaller 
data-sets. The most unsuccessful claimants are shown in bold type in Figure 5.16; all 
white collar, office-based workers were more unsuccessful than average.  
Figure 5.16: Success/settled/dismissal ratios by claimant occupation group 
No. of judgments 
where occupation 








53 Elementary workers 1: 2.38 1: 2.07 
18 Armed forces 0: 18 1: 3 
38 Craft workers 1: 5.5 1: 3.14 
48 Plant and factory workers 0: 9 1: 3.5 
903 Average 1: 6.38 1: 4.17 
134 Professionals 1: 11.1 1: 4.3 
381 
Service, shop and market 
retail workers 
1: 6.1 1: 4.36 
142 Technicians 1: 6.1 1: 4.7 
70 Clerical workers 1: 38 1: 6.3 
19 
Legislators, senior 
managers and officials 




               Figure 5.17: Bar chart showing relationship of outcome to occupation group
 







5.5: Claimant legal representation 
Upon analysing data obtained from the 1272 folio reports which detailed 
representation and outcome, it was found there was a significant Pearson Chi-Square 
result of P = 0.00, highlighting a strong statistical relationship between outcome and 
claimant legal representation in age discrimination judgments. Claimants with legal 
representation were nearly twice as successful as those without, as shown in the 
summary bar chart Figure 5.18 and in the statistics in Figure 5.19.  
Figure 5.18: Bar chart showing relationship between representation and outcome 
 
Surprisingly, those with representation were more likely to make a claim that 
was either time-expired or did not follow the correct procedure. 88% of those whose 
claim was struck out had no legal representation. Those with legal representation were 
far more likely to settle with the employer at the hearing and 93.6% (88) of claimants 
settling their grievance had representation. No one without representation settled their 
grievance using ACAS but eight claimants with representation did so.
5
  
                                                          
5
ACAS works primarily before the hearing occurs, as evidenced in the ETS Annual Report – Ministry 
of Justice, Employment Tribunal and EAT Statistics 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 (The Stationery 
Office 2010) 5.  
 
 





























All claimants Total 
count 
162 75 101 94 106 60 39 8 566 61 1272 
All claimants %  
within all 
claimrep 
12.7 5.9% 7.9% 7.4% 8.3% 4.7% 3.1% 0.6% 44.5% 4.8% 100.% 
No  
representation 












40.7% 88.0% 33.7% 6.4% 43.4% 65.0% 15.4% 0.0% 55.7% 93.4% 49.9% 
Representation count 
 
96 9 67 88 60 21 33 8 251 4 637 
Representation %  
within 
claimrep 











Legal representation helped both sexes achieve a settlement and a declaration of 
success, as illustrated in Figures 5.20-5.22. Using data obtained from 759 judgments 
which detailed male claimant legal representation, it was found that men substantially 
increased their chances of obtaining a remedy by acquiring representation – achieving 
a ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio of 1: 1.45, compared to 1: 5.63 for those without 
representation and a success: dismissal ratio of 1: 3.27 for those with representation 
and 1: 5.96 for those without. Men with representation settled 65 claims, whereas only 
three claims were settled by those without representation.  
Figure 5.20: Summary statistics of a cross-tabulation analysis 
of outcome/gender/legal representation 
 No in  
Register 
Gender No of 
judgments 







627 Men  423 304 51 3 1: 5.96 1: 5.63 
Women 204 140 22 3 1: 6.36 1: 5.6 
Rep 630 Men 336 170 52 65 1: 3.27 1: 1.45 
Women 294 180 36 31 1: 5 1: 2.69 
Women who obtained legal representation also significantly increased their 
chances of obtaining a remedy and over 77% of women whose claim was declared 
successful had such assistance. Women achieved a ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio of 
1: 2.69 for those with representation compared to 1: 5.6 for those without. However, 
the success: dismissal ratio for women with representation was 1: 5.0 and 1: 6.36 for 
those without, indicating that the improvement made by women was not quite as large 
as that achieved by men. Legal representation made more difference to the outcome of 
claims by men than to those by women, even though a larger proportion of women 
obtained representation.  
The difference in outcome for men and women obtained from this data does not 
correspond with the analysis of all judgments discussed above in Chapter 5.4, as these 
statistics indicate that men were more successful than women in obtaining a remedy. 
This may be because it is based on a smaller sample of 1257 judgments rather than all 
4001 examined. In addition, the limited records kept in the computerised Register of 
claims which the tribunal does not examine in detail document outcomes which differ 
in attributes from those more thoroughly described in hard-copy folio reports. Claims 
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for which there is no record of representation are more likely to be those withdrawn by 
the claimant (31.5% of all judgments compared to 8.3% of those with representation 
details), struck out or not actively pursued rather than successful. Nonetheless, a larger 
percentage of women (59.1%) than men (43.7%) obtained representation. Legal 
representation undoubtedly improves the chances of success of a claim and it may be 
that without such additional assistance women would be less successful than men.  
Figure 5.21: Bar chart showing the outcome of claims concerning claimants with 
no legal representation
      Figure 5.22: Bar chart showing the outcome of claims concerning claimants 




Legal representation also made a considerable difference to the outcome of 
claims made by the ‘young,’ as shown in Figure 5.23. Only one young claimant 
without representation was successful in being awarded compensation by the Tribunal.  
       Figure 5.23: Bar chart showing the relationship between claimant 
     representation and the outcome of claims concerned  
    with discrimination against the young 
 
5.6: Employer characteristics 
The frequency of respondent employer activities found in judgments where the 
claimant obtained a remedy is shown in Figure 5.24. Figure 5.25 presents statistics 
which relate to the 23 most frequently found activities of employers defending a claim 
of age discrimination. The most frequently found employer activity was that related to 
local or central government,
6
 but the success: dismissal ratio of claims relating to this 
activity was only 1: 19.5, slightly lower than average, indicating that in the large 
majority of claims the claimant was not successful. The second highest employer 
activity was that relating to hospitals, employing 1,599,000
7
 workers and although the 
success: dismissal ratio for this sector was 1: 10.4, 24 judgments were either settled or 
successful at the tribunal giving a ‘success+settled’: dismissal ratio of 1: 5.6 – a 
similar proportion to that of public administration – indicating that claimants were less 
successful against these large public organisations.  
                                                          
6
 SIC 2007 codes do not allow for the differentiation of these functions. 
7
 Office for National Statistics, Public Sector Employment (ONS 2011) 19.  
 
 
         Figure 5.24: Bar chart showing frequency of activities undertaken by respondent employers in judgments recording a settled  











For details of statistics used in calculating ratios see Appendix G  
No. of  judgments and outcome  



































Administration of the State 8410 319 7 1 46 28 82 37 15 78 14 1:39.8 1:19.5 1:5.3 
Hospital activities    8610 136 3 2 21 11 20 6 13 49 3 1:27.2 1:10.4 1:5.6 
Postal services 5310 124 0 0 0 10 17 3 6 67 6 0:124 0:27 1:13.7 
Construction of buildings 4110 101 4 3 4 27 5 10 10 26 1 1:14.2 1:5.1 1:3.74 
Passenger air transport 5110 100 0 1 0 8 21 2 0 52 1 1:100 1:29 1:33.3 
Higher education 8540 86 2 0 2 14 10 4 5 31 8 1:43 1:13 1:7.8 
Legal services 6910 85 1 0 1 19 1 11 6 34 0 1:85 1:21 1:4.7 
Employment agencies 7810 78 2 0 2 13 4 7 3 20 12 1:39 1:9.5 1:6.5 
Sale of motor vehicles 4510 68 6 4 6 19 5 7 6 16 0 1:6.8 1:3 1:2.1 
Secondary education 8530 58 4 1 4 15 7 4 4 16 0 1:11.6 1:5.2 1:4.46 
Restaurant and food services 5610 57 1 5 1 11 3 3 6 11 3 1:9.5 1:2.5 1:3.8 
Residential care 8710 54 0 1 0 41 0 0 0 8 1 1:54 1:41 1:54 
Building societies 6419 54 2 1 2 10 5 0 0 28 2 1:18 1:5.6 1:18 
IT services 6209 48 3 0 3 11 7 5 2 15 0 1:16 1:7 1:4.8 
Hotels 5510 48 0 1 0 11 5 3 4 16 3 1:48 1:16 1:4 
Manufacture of machinery 2820 47 0 0 0 0 0 46 0 1 0 0:47 0:0 1:1.02 
Human health activities 8690 46 0 0 4 8 5 6 4 13 2 0:46 0:17 1:4.6 
Judicial activities 8423 46 1 0 1 6 6 4 0 22 2 1:46 1:13 1:9.2 
Real estate activities 6830 42 3 0 3 10 2 6 5 10 1 1:14 1:5 1:3 
Housing assoc. activities 6820 42 0 0 0 2 13 3 1 17 1 0:42 0:15 1:10.5 
Public order activities 8424 41 1 0 1 7 4 0 2 21 2 1:41 1:12 1:13.6 
Private security activities 8010 40 1 4 1 10 4 1 2 9 3 1:8 1:3 1:5 







Those activities with a higher success: dismissal ratio than average were those 
related to the sale of motor vehicles, restaurant and food services, the construction of 
buildings, secondary education and private security firms. Workers in these fields, if 
they reached the stage where the tribunal considered their claim, were far more 
successful than average. The highest success: dismissal ratio of 1: 2.5 was found in the 
restaurant sector, followed by the sale of motor vehicles sector, where one judgment 
was successful for every three which failed. The highest ‘success+settled’: dismissal 
ratio was found in the sale of motor vehicles sector which was 1: 2.1.  
There are 188,789 workers involved in motor vehicles sales and 23 judgments 
recorded either a settled or successful result for the claimant, resulting in one ‘remedy’ 
achieved per 8,208 workers. The equivalent figures for other activities are shown in 
Figure 5.26. It is noticeable that the statistics relating to real estate agencies, the sale of 
motor vehicles and legal services sectors are of a different magnitude to those for other 




Table showing number of workers in employer activity group per remedy 
obtained  
Activity Number of workers 
Real estate agencies 5,714 
Sale of motor vehicles 8,208 
Legal activities 8,925 
Judicial activities 16,528 
Postal services 25,833 
Higher education 29,630 
Other human health activities 37,700 
Secondary education (maintained sector) 56,984 
Hospitals 66,625 
Construction of buildings 76,622 
Local and central government 94,533 
Figures 5.27-5.28 illustrate the relationship between employer size and outcome. 
Those claiming against large employers were least likely to be successful or settle with 
the employer. No claims were found to be successful against sole traders after 
consideration but twice the normal number of employers in this group failed to attend 
and default judgments were more likely to be made against small employers.  
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Figure 5.27: Bar chart showing the relationship of frequency of outcome of judgments and size of 











































Figure 5.28: Bar chart showing the relationship between percentage of outcome of judgments and size of 











Partnerships were the most likely to settle with the employee or partner, with 12.7% of 
judgments relating to this category recording a settlement at the hearing. More 
judgments concerned with insolvent employers recorded a successful outcome 
(19.9%) for the claimant than failed (19%) after consideration which was extremely 
unusual. 
5.7: Remedies 1 – Compensation  
A tribunal, if it found a complaint well-founded, was empowered under the 
Regulations to make either a declaration upholding the rights of a claimant,
9
 an order 
requiring the respondent to pay compensation to the complainant
10
 or ‘a 
recommendation that the respondent take within a specified period action appearing to 
the tribunal to be practicable for the purpose of obviating or reducing the adverse 
effect on the complainant’.
11
 On examination of folio reports it was found that 
compensation awards were the remedy of choice of tribunals although on a handful of 
occasions tribunals made a general comment that, for example, an employer’s 
recruitment policy should be more transparent in future.
12
 The following sections 
describe the overall compensation and injury to feelings awards given to successful 
claimants. 
The Ministry of Justice has produced an analysis of awards it believes have been 
given to successful claimants by tribunals. This information bears the caveat that: 
Information presented in this report is Management Information 
drawn from a number of administrative sources. Although care is 
taken when processing and analysing the data, the detail is subject to 
the inaccuracies inherent in any large-scale recording system’
13
 and 
                                                          
9
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, reg 38(1)(a). Replaced by same wording Equality Act 
2010, s. 124(2)(a). 
10
 ibid reg 38(1)(b). Replaced by same wording Equality Act 2010, s 124(2)(b). 
11
 ibid reg 38(1)(c). Replaced by same wording Equality Act 2010, s 124(2)(c). 
12
 Delambre v Lycée Francais Charles de Gaulle (2009) ET 2201218/09. Employment Judge Stewart 
wrote to the respondent employer school board of governors and recommended a change in recruitment 
procedure. 
13
 Ministry of Justice, Employment Tribunal and EAT Statistics 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 (The 
Stationery Office 2010) 13. 
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‘[c]ompensation awarded is that of which the Tribunal is aware and 
entered onto IT systems.
14
  
Unfortunately, as has already been pointed out in Chapter 3.3, the ETS Judgment 
system does not always accurately reflect the true situation. A detailed breakdown of 
awards taken from folio reports indicates that more awards were given than were 
identified by the ETS. For example, in the year 2009-2010 the ETS analysis identifies 
28 awards whereas 54 awards were found recorded in the same period in folio reports 
in this study. The size of the awards also differs considerably, as illustrated in Figure 
5.29. This discrepancy is large and may mask the true overall picture of compensation 
awarded by tribunals.  
Figure 5.29: Table showing differing statistics relating to compensation 
awarded for age discrimination claims from ETS Annual Statistical Report and 
those found on examination of the Register 
Year Median Mean Maximum 
ETS Reported 2007 - 2008
15
 £1,526 £3,334 £12,124 
ETS Reported 2008 - 2009
16
 £3,000 £8,869 £90,031 
ETS Reported 2009 - 2010
17
 £5,868 £10,931 £48,710 




£3,464.66 £7,711.33 £50,288.33 
Compensation awarded to 
claimants recorded on 
Register found in this study  
Oct 2006 - April 2010 
£10,054.88 £19,400.89 £308,442.84 
An analysis of the 149 compensation awards found shows that the mean total 
award was £19,400.89; the mode, the most common value, was £1,000 whilst the 
lowest monetary award was £241.62. The 25%-75% percentile range was £4,074.80 to 
£21,155.73. The histogram in Figure 5.30 illustrates the large number of awards made 
                                                          
14
 Ministry of Justice (n 13) 7.  
15









in the lower monetary value groups. The largest group of awards, found in 34 
judgments, were under £4,000; 64 awards were under £8,000, whilst 107 of the 149 
examined were under £20,000. The mean award value is ‘skewed’ by three awards, the 
unusual nature of which is apparent in Figures 5.30-5.31 where they can be seen to be 
the only six-figure sums.  
Figure 5.30: Histogram showing frequency and amount of  
compensation awards in age discrimination claims 
 
The claimant in Wooster v London Borough of Tower Hamlets
19
 was awarded 
the highest sum of £308,442.84 after reconsideration of his claim by the EAT. 
Following the issue of the remedy judgment Tower Hamlets Borough Council 
announced they would make an appeal and John Wooster agreed a private settlement 
for an undisclosed amount in order to avoid further litigation. Nonetheless the 
judgment remains on the Register as an award ordered by the tribunal and therefore is 
included in this analysis. The second highest award of £189,074.50 was given to Linda 
Sturdy
20
 and the third highest of £124,182.27 was awarded to Thong Thiew Koh.
21
  
                                                          
19
 (2008) ET 3200639/07. 
20
 Sturdy v Leeds NHS Trust (2009) ET 1803960/07. 
21
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Figure 5.31: Scatter chart showing compensation awarded in £ for age discrimination claims from  



























The scatter chart in Figure 5.31 shows that, apart from these three, awards have not 
increased over the period of study. Figure 5.32 illustrates the relationship between the 
age of claimants and compensation. The majority of awards were given to workers 
aged between 49 and 67. The three highest awards were received by those between 49 
and 59.  
The mean award for the South-east and London was substantially higher than the 
other three regions, shown in Figure 5.33. Earnings in this region are higher than in the 
other areas of England and Wales and compensatory awards were consequently more 
substantial although the difference in mean awards is more than the regional pay 
difference would create.
22
 This may be because a large number of professionals and 
senior managers received judgments in this region and received awards based on their 
higher past and estimated future earnings. 






Mean  Median 
25%-75% percentile range 
Lower value    Higher value 
South and 
South-west 
29 £15,032.67 £7,500 £2,005.67 £19,261.97 
Midlands 21 £15,261.17 £11,200 £6,575.00 £18,171.04 




53 £26,948.09 £15,261.28 £5,607.28 £30,274.88 
Details of 80 awards were found which related to successful claims by men and 
45 to women. The median award to men was £13,100 and the 25-75% percentile range 
was £6,125 to £25,510. The median award to women was £5,171.61 and the 25-75% 
percentile range was £1,697 to £19,340. Women were awarded significantly smaller 
amounts, indicating the possible existence of a ‘gender award gap,’ only partly 
explained by higher compensatory awards given to men because they earn more than 
women. The gender pay gap for all employees in the UK in 2009 was 19.2%
23
 but the 
difference in awards, particularly in median awards, is substantially larger than this 
pay gap would dictate. 
                                                          
22
 Earnings per week in 2008-2009 in the South-east and London averaged £570.50, in the North 
£462.30, in the South-west and Wales £447.30 and in the Midlands £456.60. Office for National 
Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings Statistical Bulletin (ONS 2009). 
23
 Office for National Statistics, Labour Market Earnings (ONS 2011). 
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Those workers with legal representation obtained significantly higher awards 
than those without. Figure 5.34 summarises the relationship between awards, gender 
and representation. Unrepresented women were given the lowest mean awards, whilst 
represented men received awards nearly three times higher. 
Figure 5.34: Table showing relationship between compensation awarded, 










Mean  Median  
25%-75% 
percentile range 
Lower             Higher 
Female No 15 £11,059.79 £5,500 £1,500 £16,467 
All No 57 £13,885.29 £7,799.60 £4,501.60 £16,223.50 
Male No 42 £14,894.39 £10,054.88 £5,112.99 £16,589.33 
Female Yes+No 45 £15,697.90 £5,171.61 £1,697 £19,340 
All Yes+No 125 £19,400.89 £10,054.88 £4,074.80 £21,155.73 
Female Yes 30 £20,655.68 £8,499.60 £1,689.71 £26,724.65 
Male Yes+No 80 £21,739.29 £13,100 £6,125 £25,510 
All Yes 68 £27,210.49 £16,434.50 £7,537.50 £29,333.99 
Male Yes 38 £32,385.33 £18,513.44 £12,395.75 £38,636.05 







25% - 75% percentile range 
Lower                   Higher 
Recruitment 5 £7,123.46 £3,564.74 £11,181.72 
Job status/benefits 6 £11,983.19 £1,000 £17,641.25 
Retirement 12 £13,018.63 £1,950.25 £16,650 
Redundancy 32 £16,504.39 £2.442.75 £24,520.74 
Dismissal 74 £23,133.50 £5,262.65 £25,964.91 
Harass/Victim 7 £36,812.40 £11,200 £48,709.79 
Compensation awards for age discrimination in recruitment were lower than for 
other complaint types, shown in Figure 5.35. The awards for harassment and 
victimisation are skewed because of the high award given to Ms Sturdy, who suffered 
discrimination in both recruitment and victimisation. This award was included in the 
victimisation category rather than recruitment because the judgment stresses the 
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importance placed on the victimisation of Ms Sturdy when assessing the award.
24
 If 
the award had been categorised as discrimination in recruitment the statistics for these 
two complaint types would be reversed, indicating a shortcoming of this type of 
analysis when data numbers are low.  
 
The relatively low awards relating to retirement and job status/benefits reflects 
the smaller sums estimated to have been ‘lost’ by claimants when compared to those 
who suffered dismissal. Total compensation awarded by the tribunal is made up of 
several components and includes a basic element based on length of service and age 
(in itself age discriminatory). Past financial loss suffered from the time of the 
discriminatory act to the date of the hearing and future financial loss is assessed. This 
latter aspect is very difficult to evaluate and most tribunals took the view that a 
claimant would find another job within a few months, despite strong evidence that 
older workers find it difficult to find employment.
25
 Consequently future financial loss 
elements were often low. Although compensation in discrimination is theoretically 
uncapped, the existence of a default retirement age of 65 effectively limited future 
earnings estimates for many claimants. This resulted in smaller awards as someone 
near retirement age is considered to have suffered no loss because they could have 
been fairly retired using the procedure specified under the Regulations.
26
  
Details of compensation awards to ten ‘young’ claimants were found in the 
Register. The mean award was £4,785.65 which is roughly one quarter of that given to 
‘all age’ group claimants indicating that young claimants, if successful, are unlikely to 
be able to recover the cost of legal representation. The 25%-75% percentile range was 
from £782.07 to £9,059.53, compared to £4,299.90 to £23,330.91 for ‘all age’ group 
claimants.  
Compensation awards for those claiming under multiple jurisdictions were 
detailed in 45 folio reports and under single jurisdictions in 122 reports and are 
illustrated in Figures 5.36 and 5.37. The range for single jurisdiction claims was 
£241.62 to £308,422.84, compared to £1,250 to £57,867.83 for those made under 
multiple jurisdictions.  
                                                          
24
 Sturdy v Leeds NHS Trust (2007) ET 1803960/07 [9.6] (Lee EJ). 
25
 M Elsby, JC Smith and J Wadsworth, ‘The Role of Worker Flows in the Dynamics and Distribution 
of UK Unemployment’ (2011) 27(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 338. 
26
 Now no longer applicable: Equality Act 2010, Schedule 9 and The Employment Equality (Repeal of 
Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1069. 
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   Figure 5.36: Histogram showing  Figure 5.37: Histogram showing 
   compensation awards given for claims  compensation awards given for claims 
      made under single jurisdiction   made under multiple jurisdictions 
 
Superficially these graphs appear to suggest that single jurisdiction claims were 
associated with higher awards, but the 25-75% percentile figures for the two types of 
claim are very similar demonstrating that the single jurisdiction mean figure is skewed 
by four large awards. The modal value for single jurisdiction claims is £1000, shown 
in the high number in the bar on the left of Figure 5.36, whilst that for multiple 
jurisdictions is £4,821.30. Although claims made under single jurisdictions produced 
higher awards in particular claims, the lower modal value indicates that the majority of 
awards were lower than those given to claims under multiple jurisdictions.  
Figure 5.38 shows that there was a direct relationship between the size of the 

















Employer size by number of employees 
Figure 5.38: Graph showing relationship between 

























6 4 114 7 8 8 1 
Mean award £9,102 £5,733 £17,012 £28,457 £56,560 £19,559 £63,000 
With the exception of one very large award given to a worker employed by a 
business falling into the ‘other’ category, seen in Figure 5.39, the largest awards were 
given to workers employed by government bodies and plcs. Those employed by 
partnerships and sole traders were awarded considerably less than the mean award.  
5.8: Remedies 2 – Injury to feelings awards  
Almost all claimants made claims under additional jurisdictions when 
complaining of age discrimination, ranging from claims for unpaid holiday pay to 
allegations of breach of contract. The award recorded in judgments, discussed above, 
reflects the whole claim, rather than compensation given solely for the age component. 
However, the injury to feelings element of the award is directly related to the age 
aspect of the complaint and is not related to the earning capacity of the claimant. The 
‘Vento’ guidelines to tribunals set out three levels of compensation for injury to 
feelings. These are currently: £500-£6000 for less serious cases such as an isolated 
incident, £6000-£18,000 for more severe cases or for acts extending over a period of 
time and £18,000-£30,000 for the most serious cases such as where there has been a 
lengthy campaign of harassment.
27
 The Court of Appeal also recommended that 
‘awards of less than £500 are to be avoided altogether, as they risk being regarded as 
so low as not to be a proper recognition of injury to feelings’.
28
  
Details of 109 injury to feelings awards were found in folio reports. Ten workers 
were not given awards because the tribunal felt they had not suffered injury to their 
feelings although their claim was upheld. In Galt v National Starch and Chemical
29
 six 
workers selected for redundancy were successful in their claim that an enhanced 
redundancy payment scheme favoured older employees but they did not receive injury 
                                                          
27
 Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (No.2) [2002] EWCA Civ 1871, [2003] IRLR 102 
(CA). Amounts subsequently increased in Da'Bell v National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children [2009] UKEAT 0227_09_2809, [2009] IRLR 19. 
28
 ibid [65] (Mummery LJ).  
29
 (2007) ET 2101804/07. 
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to feelings awards. Linda Sturdy was awarded the highest and only award in the top 
Vento band of £42,037.50,
30
 seen on the far right of Figure 5.40. This histogram 
shows that the largest monetary value group with 23 awards is £625-£1,250, followed 
by £0-£625 with 12 awards and £1,250-£1,875 with 11 awards. Half of the awards 
were under £2,500. The mean award was £3,646.80, the median £2,500 and 16 awards 
were at the modal value of £1,000 with nine at a secondary modal value of £1,500. 
The 25%-75% percentile range was £1,000 to £5,000, wholly within the lowest Vento 
band. 
Figure 5.40: Histogram showing frequency and amounts of injury to feelings 
awards in judgments relating to age discrimination claims 
 
Figure 5.41: Table showing injury to feelings awarded in regions 
 of England and Wales 
 
No. of judgments 
with injury to 
feelings details 
Mean  Median  
25%-75% 
percentile range 
Lower            Higher  
South & 
South-west 
21 £2458.48 £1500 £1000 £4000 
North 36 £3802.67 £1650 £768.75 £5000 
London & 
South-east 
39 £4064.34 £3065.77 £1500 £6000 
Midlands 12 £4672.33 £6000 £1670.75 £6769.09 
                                                          
30
 Sturdy v Leeds NHS Trust (2007) ET 1803960/07. Award included aggravated damages of £5,700 and 
uplifts for failure to follow statutory procedure. 
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Injury to feelings awards were generally lower in the South and South-west of 
the country as shown in Figure 5.41. The highest awards were given in the Midlands 
where the mean was nearly double that given in the South and South-west. 
The Register holds details of 66 injury to feelings awards given to men and 43 
given to women, statistics for which are shown in Figure 5.42. The award given to 
Linda Sturdy distorts the mean award for women considerably and without this award 
the mean for represented women would be £2,963. The difference in the median 
awards and the 20% difference in the 25-75% percentile ranges suggest there was a 
‘gender award gap’ relating to injury to feelings awards.  
Figure 5.42: Table showing relationship between injury to feelings awards, 









Mean  Median  
25%-75% 
percentile range 
Lower            Higher  
Female No 12 £2690.90 £2500 £1125 £3900 
All No 47 £3122.85 £3000 £1200 £5000 
Male No 35 £3270 £3000 £1200 £5000 
Female Yes+No 34 £3608 £1500 £1000 £5000 
Male Yes+No 59 £3729.20 £3125 £1237.62 £6000 
Female Yes 22 £4613.25 £1250 £0 £7500 
All Yes 46 £4629.52 £3032.88 £1000 £6400 
Male Yes 24 £4644.44 £3950 £2250 £6208.50 
The mean injury to feelings awards received by those with legal representation 
was approximately 50% higher than those without – those with representation received 
£4,629.52 on average and those without £3,122.85. Women and men were given very 
similar mean awards if they had representation, but the figure for women is again 
affected by the very large award given to Linda Sturdy. Women without representation 
received on average £600 less than the average given to unrepresented men. This is 
also reflected in a lower median award value and a lower 25%-75% percentile range of 
awards given to unrepresented women. The four injury to feelings awards found in 
folio reports given to young claimants were also low – £1500, £3000, £4000 and 
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Those workers complaining of age discrimination with regard to job 
status/benefits received lower injury to feelings awards than in other complaint types, 
whilst those complaining about dismissal received higher awards, reflecting the 
gravity of the injury suffered as viewed by the tribunal. The mean figures for all 
complaint types fall within the lower Vento band, with the exception of harassment 
and victimisation, shown in Figure 5.43. As in the previous section on total awards, 
the sum awarded to Linda Sturdy skews the statistics for harassment and victimisation 
and without this award the figures for this category would be similar to those for 
recruitment.  












lower                     higher 
Recruitment: 4 £3,500.75 £1,752.75 £4,500 
Job 
status/benefits: 
6 £1,666.67 £875 £2,375 
Dismissal: 56 £3,784.65 £1,007.29 £5,953.25 
Retirement: 7 £2,759.37 £1,000 £6,000 
Redundancy: 21 £2,915.48 £0 £5,500 
Harassment/ 
Victimisation: 
5 £11,423.50 £1,790 £24,018.75 
Of the 31 awards relating to multiple jurisdiction claims, two fell into the middle 
Vento age band and 29 were in the lower band, as shown in Figure 5.44. The mean 
award was £3,781.10, whereas the equivalent figure for the 79 single jurisdiction 
awards found was slightly lower at £3,642.28. As found in the total compensation 
analysis, three awards over £10,000 given to single jurisdiction claims skew the 
statistics. However, the 25%-75% percentile figures for single jurisdiction claims are 
lower than for multiple jurisdiction claims and lend weight to the finding that although 
                                                          
31
 Vento (n 27) [65] (Mummery LJ).  
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multiple jurisdiction claimants were less successful, if they were successful, they were 
awarded more than single jurisdiction claimants. 
     Figure 5.44: Histogram showing     Figure 5.45: Histogram showing 
     injury to feeling awards                             injury to feeling awards  
     relating to claims made under                     relating to claims made under 
 multiple jurisdictions                                   single jurisdiction 
 
Details of 109 injury to feelings awards relating to employer size groups were 
found. The awards for each employer group increased directly with the size of the 
organisation defending the claim, as shown in Figures 5.46 and 5.47. 
 
Figure 5.47: Table showing relationship between employer size and injury 
to feelings awards 
 Large Medium Small Micro 
No of judgments  23 26 22 38 
Mean award £4,743.91 £4,599.06 £3,463.77 £2,634.56 



















Employer size by number of employees 
Figure 5.46: Graph showing relationship 









The highest injury to feelings and largest proportion of middle and high Vento 
band awards were given to claimants taking action against government bodies, such as 
NHS Trusts and city councils, as shown in Figure 5.48.  
Figure 5.48: Table showing relationship between employer legal status  














4 3 85 5 6 5 
Mean 
award 
£2,331 £1,412.54 £3,207.1 £4,480 £11,589 £3,755 
Vento 
band 








5.9: Additional costs 
Additional costs were ordered to be paid by claimants in 97 judgments. The 
frequency of such orders rose over the period of study as the red, Excel-generated, 
linear trendline indicates in Figure 5.49.  
 
The mean sum the 97 claimants were asked to pay was £1,869.05, the median 




























£1,112.25, indicating that the average cost was distorted considerably by five large 





number of claimants paying such costs varied from none at the Exeter and Shrewsbury 
Tribunals, to 13 at London Central and 10 at Watford. Considerably more claimants in 
London and the South-east (35) were ordered to pay additional costs than in the North 
(22), the Midlands (20) and South and South-west (20). However, the average 
additional cost was higher in the South and South-west – more than six times higher 
than those in the North, shown in Figure 5.50.  
Figure 5.50: Table showing additional costs paid by claimants by region 
 






Lower value  Higher value 
North 22 £493.31 £453 £250 £677.53 
Midlands 20 £1418.40 £714 £553.50 £1158.75 
London & 
South-east 
35 £2182.65 £862.50 £217 £1832 
South & 
South-west 
20 £3284.20 £413.85 £250 £8545.97 
5.10: Conclusion  
Much information relating to the outcome of age claims has been elicited in this 
study for the first time allowing conclusions to be drawn from a base-line of certainty 
rather than speculation. The most striking fact to emerge from the findings is that 
success rates for claimants were extremely low with only 3.2% declared successful if a 
claim of age discrimination was considered by a tribunal. However, a significant 
number of claims were settled at the hearing resulting in 37% of claimants obtaining a 
declaration of success or a settlement. Nonetheless the proportion of successful claims 
became steadily lower over the period whilst the number of claims increased and the 
percentage of claimants obtaining a remedy of some nature in the first quarter of 2010 
fell to 24.4%.  
Claims were spread fairly evenly throughout the country but success rates varied 
in the regions, with workers in the North more successful than those in the South and 
South-west. Claimants in Leeds were more successful than those in other tribunals 
                                                          
32
 Payment awarded to group of employers in 39 claims, Frayling v McLeod (2009) ET 1305883/08. 
33
 Employer’s costs in Hampton v Lord Chancellor [2008] IRLR 258, (2007) ET 2300835/07. 
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whilst no claimant was declared successful out of the 103 ‘age’ judgments handed 
down by the Leicester Tribunal. Those claimants complaining of less favourable 
treatment in recruitment were particularly unsuccessful. Those making an additional 
claim of discrimination were up to eight times less likely to be successful than those 
making age discrimination claims alone, with women claiming sexual orientation 
discrimination in addition to age least successful, reflecting the difficulty that those 
making such claims had in finding evidence to substantiate each part of their claim. 
Each additional claim of discrimination reduced the likelihood of success further, 
illustrating the problems that those alleging that they had suffered multiple 
discrimination faced when trying to obtain a remedy. 
Legal representation made a substantial difference to the outcome of a claim. 
Women relied on legal representation more than men but despite this their success 
rates were very similar to that of men and without this additional help their success 
rates would possibly be lower. Those with legal representation were twice as 
successful as those without assistance. Surprisingly, they were also more likely to 
follow an incorrect procedure but this may be because some claimants obtained legal 
assistance as they suspected they had made an error. Several claimants who had 
followed an incorrect procedure but hoped the tribunal would find it just and equitable 
to extend the time-period found they had additional costs awarded against them in a 
punitive manner.  
The least successful occupational group at the tribunal were the 70 claimants 
from the clerical worker group where no one was successful after consideration and 
seven were ordered to pay additional costs. Claimants in elementary occupations, 
particularly cleaners and construction workers, were the most successful. The outcome 
for men and women within occupation groups differed considerably. Female estate 
agents and lawyers and men involved in the sale of motor vehicles were typically 
successful claimants. No women who were members of plant, machine and assembly 
worker and craft and related worker groups were successful, either after consideration 
or by default. 
Respondent employers were frequently large organisations concerned with 
public administration, yet success rates against these bodies were low. The activities of 
employers most often found to have unlawfully discriminated against workers – those 
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connected with motor sales and estate agencies – were involved in a competitive world 
selling high value property in a recession, and a higher proportion than average were 
insolvent, indicating that discriminating conduct may be more likely when financial 
stress is placed upon an employer. 
If a claimant was successful the compensation awarded was usually low and 
often would not have covered legal costs. Women received lower compensation 
awards than men indicating the existence of a ‘gender award gap,’ visible also in 
injury to feelings awards. Most injury to feelings awards were in the lower Vento band 
as tribunals felt the injury was in the ‘less serious’ category and some successful 
claimants received no award, a practice recommended ‘to be avoided’
34
 by the Court 
of Appeal. Claimants acting as part of a group received injury to feelings awards 
which were on average less than half that of individual claimants. There was 
inconsistency in injury to feelings awards given between the regions, with claimants in 
the South and South-west given far lower awards and asked to pay substantially higher 
additional costs compared to those in the Midlands and North. Compensation awarded 
was in direct proportion to the size and legal status of the employer indicating that 
tribunals were taking into account the apparent ability of the respondent to pay rather 
than the actual injury suffered by the claimant. 
The outcome of claims made by the young differed considerably from those 
made by older workers. These claimants were more successful, followed the correct 
procedure, were less likely to have their claim struck out and were unwilling to 
withdraw or settle their claim. Young women received a larger proportion of 
judgments and were more successful than young men. However, compensation awards 
to the young were on average one quarter of those given to older workers, with injury 
to feelings awards low and young claimants were not likely to cover the cost of legal 
representation when given an award. All of those who felt part of a disadvantaged age 
band were unsuccessful. The pattern revealed by this study is therefore one of 
increasingly low success rates, small compensation awards and inconsistent regional 
patterns, linked to a claim procedure which many workers found difficult to navigate. 
The following Chapters seek to find an explanation for this emerging pattern by means 
of a qualitative investigation of tribunal judgments. 
                                                          
34
 Vento (n 27) [65] (Mummery LJ).  
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Chapter Six:  
Folio Reports 1 – Establishing a Claim 
6.1: Introduction 
This Chapter explores the problems that claimants had in establishing that they 
had suffered age discrimination. All of the 1682 folio reports which concerned an age 
discrimination claim which was successful, failed or struck out were examined for this 
part of the study. The hard-copy folio reports in the Judgment Register reveal details 
of the implementation and interpretation of the Regulations by employment tribunals. 
The majority of reports, particularly of those claims which had been time-expired, 
struck out or settled, but for which a judgment was made, contained a single sheet and 
gave no details of the claim, contrary to the requirements of the 2004 Regulations.
1
 
However, several hundred reports contained sufficient information to throw light on 
the decisions made by tribunals and appellate courts.  
6.2: Jurisdiction  
Many claimants failed in their application to the tribunal because they could not 
establish that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claim. This was usually because 
they were found not to be an employee, had exceeded the time-limits or were outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
6.2.1: Employee status 
Employment was defined very broadly in the Age Regulations
2
 but some 
claimants found it difficult to establish their employee status, as in Kuncharalingam v 
Word by Translations
3
 where a 60 year old interpreter was found not to be an 
employee but a contract worker and ordered to pay £862.50 costs to the respondent. 
The youngest claimant found on the Register, a 15 year old newspaper delivery boy, 
                                                          
1
 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1 para 
30(6). 
2
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, reg 2(2): ‘employment’ means employment under a 
contract of service or of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do any work, and related expressions 
(such as ‘employee’ and ‘employer’) shall be construed accordingly. Replaced by Equality Act 2010, s 
83(2)(a). 
3
 (2007) ET 3201663/07. 
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failed in his claim of age discrimination in Bebbington v Sturry News
4
 because he had 
no ‘mutuality of obligation’
5
 with the respondent and therefore was not an employee. 
However, in Pinnock v BDL Group Ltd
6
 the claimant’s contractual document 
specifically stated that he was self-employed and the respondent asserted that the 
tribunal had no jurisdiction. The Employment Judge found that the claimant had 
always turned up for work for over 15 years as a plasterer, had never hired a substitute 
and so was an employee. He stressed it was important to look at the ‘realities of the 
relationship’
7
 in deciding whether to establish jurisdiction and the claimant was 
allowed to continue with his claim.  
In some instances workers, although not found to be employees, were able to 
rely on another provision within the Regulations. For example, in Train v DTE 
Business Advisory Services Ltd
8
 the claimant tried to show he was an employee and 
failed, but was able to show that he was a partner and able to rely on Regulation 16. 
Several claims failed because the worker could not correctly identify their employer: 
this would have been evident from a Section 1
9
 statement if the claimant had received 
one. Thatcher v Homes in Havering
10
 and Cooper v BA plc
11
 both concerned claimants 
who were found not to be employees of the respondents, but were sub-contractors 
from other agencies, highlighting the complexity of the modern employment 
relationship. 
6.2.2: Time limits 
As discussed in Chapter 5.1, 421 age claims were dismissed over the period of 
study because the claimant had not submitted a grievance at the correct time, had 
failed to wait 28 days for a response to the grievance before making an application or 
had failed to make their application within three months of the alleged discriminating 
conduct. The factors the tribunal take into account when considering whether to 
extend the time-period are: 
                                                          
4
 (2009) ET 1101938/08 (Salter EJ). 
5
 ibid (Salter EJ citing Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] UKHL 47, [1999] 1 WLR 2042 
(Hoffmann LJ)). 
6
 (2007) ET 3300353/07. 
7
 Quoting the precedent discussed in Gunning v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 546. 
8
 [2009] UKEAT 0201_08_0601. 
9
 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 1. 
10
 (2009) ET 3203224/08. 
11
 (2009) ET 3303226/08. 
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the reasons for and the extent of the delay; whether the claimant was 
professionally advised; whether there were any genuine mistakes 
based on erroneous information; what prejudice, if any, would be 
caused by allowing or refusing to allow the claim to proceed and; the 
merits of the claim.
12
 
In addition Sir Thomas Morison stated in the EAT that a ‘tribunal must balance all the 




Tribunals rarely used their discretion to allow claims to progress if the claim 
procedure had not been followed correctly. Although a tribunal has the power to 
extend time periods if it is thought ‘just and equitable’,
14
 this was found to occur only 
eight times over the period of study. This is in contrast to the numerous times when 
employers failed to respond to a tribunal’s communications, had a default judgment 
ordered against them and were then given a further opportunity to have the claim 
reconsidered.
15
 However, many claims were considerably out of time, for example, in 
Fryett v Suncrust Bakery
16
 the claim was eleven months out of time and in Norris v 
Etern IT
17
 the claim was over a year out of time. On seven occasions a claimant was 
ordered to pay the respondent’s costs as the tribunal felt the claimant could have 
submitted in time; for example, in John v DHL Excel Supply Chain
18
 the claimant was 
ordered to pay £1000 towards the employer’s costs as it was felt he had wasted the 
tribunal’s time in making a time-expired claim.
19
  
                                                          
12
 The Limitation Act 1980, s 33. 
13
 Mills v Marshall [1998] UKEAT 528_97_1102, [1998] ICR 518. 
14
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, reg 42(3): A court or tribunal may nevertheless 
consider any such complaint or claim which is out of time if, in all the circumstances of the case, it 
considers that it is just and equitable to do so. Replaced by Equality Act 2010, s 123(b). 
15
 As in Cooke v Barn Brasserie (2008) ET 1500335/08 and Beetham v Duchy Catering (2008) ET 
2102031/08. 
16
 (2008) ET 1501483/08. 
17
 (2009) ET 1501495/08. 
18
 (2009) ET 1201092/08. 
19
 Other such instances – Stratford v Corporate Event Services Ltd (2009) ET 1400934/09, claimant 
ordered to pay £250; Williams v Glendale Managing Services (2009) ET 2702556/08, claimant ordered 
to pay £400; Harn v Premier Direct Group (2007) ET 2505723/07, claimant ordered to pay £360; Altoft 
v RBS (2007) ET 2601401/07, claimant ordered to pay £2000; Doyle v Ernst & Young LLP (2009) ET 
2300667/09, claimant ordered to pay £500; Cain v Priory FFEC Group (2009) ET 1400915/09, 
claimant ordered to pay £250. 
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There was usually one of three reasons for a time-expired claim to be presented. 
Firstly, workers were uninformed of their employment rights and of the need to follow 
the grievance and disciplinary procedure precisely. In Joseph v Veolia Environmental 
Services
20
 the Employment Judge commented that the claimant was ‘ignorant of the 
law’ about time limits, but found it was not just and equitable to extend the time-
period despite the fact that the claimant was clearly unaware of his rights, a factor said 
by the EAT to be taken into account.
21
 Several claimants received inaccurate advice 
from advisors, such as Citizens Advice Bureaux or Trade Union officials. Tribunals 
accepted this as a reason to extend time twice, but on numerous occasions did not. 
Employment Judge Ryan, in Freehan v Rolls Royce, extended the time-period because 
it was ‘understandable’
22
 that inaccurate advice taken from a Trade Union advisor 
should be accepted by a claimant as correct. In Boorman v Steifel Labs
23
 an 
unrepresented claimant brought evidence to show he had used guidance from the Help 
the Aged web-site, an IDS Brief on Age Discrimination and a textbook written by 
James Davies,
24
 all of which indicated that the time-limit could be extended and 
Boorman thought this would apply to him. The tribunal thought it just and equitable to 
extend the time-period, although they refused to do so when a claimant who was a 
solicitor brought similar evidence in Tomlinson v Isis Computer Software.
25
  
Several claimants were eager to press on with their claim and did not wait 28 
days after submitting their grievance before making an application, as in Annonio v 
Alitalia.
26
 Irrespective of the merits of their case, all of these claimants had their 
applications dismissed by tribunals, who rigorously applied the authority established 
in Basingstoke Press Ltd (In Administration) v Clarke
27
 that 28 clear days must pass 
before a claim is lodged. This could presumably be checked at an earlier stage than at 
the full hearing and a pre-hearing inspection of such factual matters would save both 
parties time and money.  
                                                          
20
 (2009) 2303224/09. 
21
 Mills (n 13). 
22
 (2007) ET 2140025/07 [4.5].  
23
 (2008) ET 2700466/08. 
24
 Partner in employment law specialists Lewis Silkin. 
25
 (2008) ET 2312661/08. 
26
 (2007) ET 2700038/07. 
27
 [2007] UKEAT 0375_06_0901, [2007] ICR 1284. 
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Secondly, some employees did not realise within the three month period that 
they had suffered age discrimination, particularly in recruitment cases where the 
interview and selection process may have taken considerable time. For example, 
Buraik-Hume v Co-operative Group
28
 concerned a worker who was a refused a loan to 
attend a NVQ course which would have enabled her to obtain promotion. She did not 
raise a written grievance within the time period as she did not realise for several weeks 
that the decision may have been influenced by age. These ‘delayed recognition’ 
reasons were not accepted as a basis for extension of time by the tribunal in any claim. 
A written letter of complaint must actually specify that the claimant feels 
discriminated on the grounds of age, a factor several claimants overlooked. In 
Arakelyan v Nicholas Ltd
29
 the claimant wrote several letters of complaint to the 
employer expressing her dissatisfaction at her treatment by her manager. As she did 
not specifically say her complaint concerned ‘age discrimination’ the letter did not 
suffice for the purposes of the Regulations. Claimants who felt they had suffered 
discrimination on multiple grounds often did not mention all of their complaints in 
their grievance letter, perhaps omitting age.
30
 A tribunal has power under the 
Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure
31
 to allow age to be added to a claim which 
had not initially included it but no instances were found in folio reports where it was 
thought fit to do so. 
Thirdly, in some cases a claimant used a lengthy employer internal grievance 
procedure and found they were unable to submit within three months. Tribunals, citing 
the authority established in Robinson v Post Office where the EAT recognised that ‘an 
employee who awaits the outcome of an internal appeal … must realise that he is 
running a real danger’,
32
 did not find this a legitimate reason to allow a time extension, 
as in Matthews v Land Securities plc.
33
 Similarly in Sellwood v B & Q plc
34
 the 
claimant waited until the grievance procedure had finished before making his 
                                                          
28
 (2007) ET 2404806/07. 
29
 (2009) ET 3301185/08. Claimant ordered to pay £150 costs because of failure to correctly make 
grievance. 
30
 Eg Dunne v The Legal Practice (2008) ET 3301441/08 – claimant also claimed sex and disability 
discrimination but was not allowed to proceed with age; Pullinger v University of Kent (2007) ET 
1102944/06 – claimant also claimed sex discrimination but was not allowed to proceed with age. 
31
 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, Schedule 1 Rule 10 
and Cocking v Sandhurst (Stationers) Ltd [1974] ICR 650. 
32
 UKEAT 1209_99_1207, [2000] IRLR 804 [35] Mr Justice Lindsay.  
33
 (2008) ET 2203748/07. 
34
 (2008) ET 3302196/07. 
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application but the time limit was not extended as the tribunal thought it could have 
been presented within the time period.  
The precedent established in Robinson appears to encourage workers to make a 
claim before the grievance procedure has been exhausted, which may in itself affect 
the outcome of a grievance. This runs counter to advice given to employees who are 
encouraged to fully explore all internal methods of obtaining a remedy for their 
grievance before making a claim.
35
 The procedural time-restriction may aggravate the 
situation, forcing the worker to choose between continuing to negotiate along a non-
litigious route or making a claim to the tribunal to avoid being time-barred. The leap 
that a worker must take when deciding to give up negotiation and make a claim to the 
tribunal is a pivotal point in a workplace dispute and it is unfortunate that a worker is 
compelled to choose which path to follow because of a statutory time-limit.  
6.2.3: Territorial issues 
Jurisdiction was problematical in some age claims because of a ‘territorial’ issue 
– either the employer or the worker was not based in Great Britain. The complex 
nature of employment today requires workers to be flexible with regard to their place 
of work. Some may be sent abroad for periods on placements whilst overseas workers 
may be sent to Great Britain whilst employed by an overseas registered company. The 
EU encourages the freedom of movement of workers between member states and 
requires that such ‘freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’.
36
 
An employment tribunal has jurisdiction to hear matters concerning an employer 
if ‘the respondent … carries on business in England and Wales’.
37
 The Regulations 
could be relied on by a claimant alleging age discrimination if the employee: 
10 (1)   (a) does his work wholly or partly in Great Britain; or  
 (b) does his work wholly outside Great Britain and para (2) 
 applies 
(2)   (a) the employer has a place of business at an establishment in 
                                                          
35
 Department of BIS, How to Resolve a Problem at Work (The Stationery Office 2011). 
36
 EU Treaty, Article 45(2).  
37
 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004, reg 19(1). 
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        Great Britain; 
(b) work is for the purposes of the business carried on at that  
establishment; …  
   (3)    The reference to ‘employment’ in paragraph (1) includes— 
  (b) employment on an aircraft or hovercraft only if the aircraft 
  or hovercraft is registered in the United Kingdom.
38
  
The tribunal must consider whether the employee is completing duties at least 
‘partly’ in Great Britain, using the principles set out in Lawson v Serco
39
 where it was 
held that the employee should fall into one of three categories to establish reliance on 
UK employment legislation. These categories are firstly, the worker living and 
working in Great Britain, secondly, the employee who moves around, including 
outside the country and thirdly, employees who work outside the UK for a British 
company. The decision in Lawson v Serco has been thrown into doubt
40
 as many 
employees do not fall neatly into these categories and, in any event, the requirement in 
Regulation 10 to show that an employee works ‘partly’ in Great Britain is a much less 
rigorous requirement than that discussed in Lawson v Serco, which insists that the 
worker be ‘based’ in Great Britain. In theory therefore, this requirement should have 
enabled claimants under the Regulations to establish more easily that they are an 
employee in Great Britain than under other employment legislation. 
In Abrams v Gartner Ltd
41
 however, a research director was found to have 
worked more in the USA than the UK over the past year and was therefore not ‘based’ 
in England, although the requirement to work here ‘partly’ appears to have been 
satisfied, indicating that the tribunal required a stricter test than the legislation actually 
demanded. The requirement was clearly not satisfied in Washington v British 
Council
42
 where a teacher employed by the British Council was found to carry out her 
duties wholly in Bahrain and as her employer was not based in Bahrain, but Britain, 
she had no claim in that country. Other employees, although working wholly in the 
                                                          
38
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, reg 10. No equivalent clause in Equality Act 2010. 
39
 [2006] UKHL 03, [2006] ICR 250. 
40
 Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law (Issue 215, 2011) 1110 – ‘There is still a 
considerable degree of uncertainty over the territorial limits.’ L Merrett, ‘The Extra-Territorial Reach of 
Employment Legislation’ (2010) 39(4) ILJ 381. 
41
 (2008) ET 2700668/08. 
42
 (2009) ET 2203833/08. 
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UK, found that their employer was ‘based’ elsewhere. In Saliba v Premier Research 
Group
43
 the tribunal held that the respondent, despite employing a worker living and 
working in England, was registered and mainly based in Switzerland and the tribunal 
had no jurisdiction to consider the claim. It is therefore apparent that some workers 
found they were unprotected as their individual employment circumstances left them 
‘falling’ between two countries and without an appropriate forum for their complaint. 
The Court of Appeal found in 2011 in British Airways plc v Mak
44
 that workers 
based in Hong Kong were entitled to have their age discrimination claim heard 
because the aircraft that they worked on were registered in Great Britain. This claim 
involved workers who lived in Hong Kong and were forced to retire at 45 years old 
whereas similar BA British-based employees were allowed to continue working. Mak 
signed her contract of employment on a 2 day training course in England and her 
employment was held to be ‘partly’ in England because she had an eighty-five minute 
stopover in England on flights from and to Hong Kong. Mummery LJ found that as the 
stop-over ‘was a regular and crucial part of her role, which she could not have done 
without’
45
 this was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that she work ‘partly’ in this 
country.  
This finding is in stark contrast to that of a claim by two 55 year old pilots based 
at Heathrow in Mcllory v Cathay Pacific Airways.
46
 This claim also concerned 
involuntary retirement, but the tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction to hear the 
claim because the aircraft piloted by the claimants were registered in Hong Kong, as 
precluded by Regulation 10.
47
 Mcllory was unprotected by the Regulations because his 
employer chose to register the aircraft elsewhere, yet overseas workers such as Mak 
are protected by the legislation. Mcllory lived in the UK and paid his taxes and 
national insurance to the UK government, factors said to be important in Halliburton v 
Ravat.
48
 Denning LJ in Todd v British Midland Airways
49
 held that ‘a man’s base is 
the place where he should be regarded as ordinarily working’
50
 but the rule in 
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 (2009) ET 2701983/09. 
44
 British Airways plc v Mak [2011] EWCA Civ 184, [2011] ICR 735. 
45
 ibid [50] (Mummery LJ). 
46
 (2008) ET 2701058/08. 
47
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, reg 10(3)(b). 
48
 [2012] UKSC 1, [2012] ICR 389. 
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Regulation 10 regarding aircraft registration negates this finding. Ironically the 
circumstances of one of the claimants, Croft, in Lawson v Serco were very similar to 
that discussed in Mcllory as they concern a pilot based at Heathrow, employed by 
Cathay Pacific. Croft was found to be based in ‘quite manifestly, London’
51
 by Lord 
Hoffmann, yet Mcllory was denied this status under the Regulations.  
The claimant must have been in Great Britain ‘at the time when he applies for or 
is offered the employment’
52
 and tribunals were rigorous in applying this provision. 
For example, in Neary v Service Childrens Education,
53
 where the claimant 
complained of unfavourable treatment in recruitment, the tribunal found it had no 
jurisdiction because he was temporarily not resident in UK at the relevant time – he 
had ended his letter of application ‘yours sincerely from sunny Germany’ without 
realising that this would lead to repercussions. This illustrates the failure of the 
legislation to regulate discrimination across the EU. The Directive states that in the 
field of employment ‘any direct or indirect discrimination based on … age … should 
be prohibited throughout the Community’.
54
 Nonetheless the Regulations permitted 
discrimination of workers such as Saliba and Mcllory, both living and working in 
Great Britain, and Neary, applying for a post from Germany but within the EU.  
It is important to define territorial jurisdiction as otherwise claimants with no 
substantive connection with Great Britain could claim protection from discrimination 
law handed down by Parliament, but Regulation 10 allowed inconsistencies to occur 
which left workers unprotected and was surely not intended. In addition, if each 
member state of the EU has similar requirements to that of the UK, only 
discrimination which occurs within member states will be proscribed whilst that which 
occurs across member states of the Community will not be prohibited. The Equality 
Act 2010 does not have an equivalent definition of territorial jurisdiction to that in the 
Age Regulations and the Explanatory Notices to the Act provide: ‘As far as territorial 
application is concerned … the Act leaves it to tribunals to determine whether the law 
applies, depending on for example the connection between the employment 
relationship and Great Britain’.
55
 The Equality Act was enabled in order to simplify 
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 Lawson (n 39) [33]. 
52
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, reg 10(2)(c)(i). 
53
 (2009) ET 2202984/08. 
54
 Framework Directive, Recital 12. 
55
 Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010, para 15. 
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discrimination provisions rather than create further problems. But the contradictory 
decisions apparent in Abrams v Gartner Ltd
56
 and Washington v British Council
57
 over 
the interpretation of a claimant ‘partly’ working in a particular country suggest that 
giving overall responsibility to tribunals may lead to more inconsistent decisions. This 
perhaps indicates that parties to such a claim may expect further uncertainty. 
However, the Court of Appeal has recently considered the territorial jurisdiction 
of employment law in Duncombe v Secretary of State for Children, Schools and 
Families
58
 and Ministry of Defence v Wallis.
59
 In Wallis, a sex discrimination case, 
Lord Justice Mummery upheld the supremacy of European Union law and asserted: 
It is the function of the national courts to interpret the statutory 
provisions of domestic law, so far as it is possible to do so, to be 
compatible with the Directive … Domestic courts are required to 
disapply incompatible provisions of domestic law to the extent 




Lord Justice Elias agreed that ‘whichever system of law within the European 
Union is the appropriate state law to apply, either it gives effect to the EU right when 
appropriately construed, or it must be disapplied to the extent that it does not’.
61
 In 
future therefore claimants within the European Union are more likely to be able to rely 
on the tribunal to find it has jurisdiction to hear their age discrimination claim, 
although those whose claim involves a connection with a country outside of the EU 
may still have a problem finding an appropriate forum for their complaint. 
 
6.3: Discriminatory treatment 
Once a claimant establishes that the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear their claim 
he/she has to show that they have suffered less favourable treatment on grounds of age 
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 Direct and 
indirect discrimination were defined as follows: 
Regulation 3(1) 
For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (‘A’) discriminates 
against another person (‘B’) if— 
(a) on grounds of B’s age, A treats B less favourably than he treats or 
would treat other persons, or 
(b) A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which he applies 
or would apply equally to persons not of the same age group as B, 
but— 
(i) which puts or would put persons of the same age group as B at 
a particular disadvantage when compared with other persons, and 
(ii) which puts B at that disadvantage, and A cannot show the 
treatment or, as the case may be, provision, criterion or practice to 
be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
67
 
O'Cinneide and Hepple have suggested that ‘age-based’ factors lead to findings 
of direct discrimination whilst ‘age-linked’ factors lead to indirect discrimination.
68
 
For example, advertisements specifying a particular age group may be direct 
discrimination. On the other hand, tribunals have to consider whether neutral 
characteristics such as being ‘experienced,’ ‘youthful’ or ‘mature’ could imply an age 
link which is indirectly discriminatory. Vacancies only advertised on the internet may 
be susceptible to claims of indirect age discrimination as there is a link between age 
                                                          
62
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and computer use as 92% of 25-44 year olds use computers compared with 31% of 
those aged 65 and over.
69
  
6.3.1: Shifting the burden of proof 
The claimant must first prove facts from which the tribunal could conclude that 
the respondent has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant and if 
successful the burden of proof then shifts to the respondent to prove that he did not 
commit that act. The Court of Appeal in Igen Ltd v Wong
70
 set out guidance on 
requirements to be fulfilled in establishing a case of discrimination and this was 
reiterated in the Regulations: 
Where, on the hearing of the complaint, the complainant proves facts 
from which the tribunal could, apart from this regulation, conclude 
in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent – 
(a) has committed against the complainant an act …; 
(b) …. the tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the 
respondent proves that he did not commit, or as the case may be, 
is not to be treated as having committed, that act.
71
 
The difficulty that most claimants had in making a successful claim was trying 
to shift the burden of proof by providing such facts because evidence of age 
discrimination is often intangible and undefined. Yet in Madarassy v Nomura 
International plc
72
 the Court of Appeal held that it is: 
not sufficient for the complainant to prove facts from which the 
tribunal could conclude that the respondent ‘could have’ committed 
an unlawful act of discrimination. The bare facts of a difference in 
status and a difference in treatment only indicates the possibility of 
discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from 
which a tribunal could conclude that on the balance of probabilities 
the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination. 
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‘Could conclude’ … must mean that ‘a reasonable tribunal could 
properly conclude’ from all the evidence before it. This would 
include evidence … such as a difference in status, a difference in 
treatment and the reason for the differential treatment.
73
  
This requirement proved challenging for very many age discrimination claimants 
as they could usually point to a difference in age and treatment but could not find the 
third factor – a ‘reason for the differential treatment’ or an additional factor which 
would shift the burden of proof. If, as much research indicates, age discrimination is a 
function of implicit, unconscious, stereotypical ageist attitudes held, yet denied by the 
discriminator, there often will be no tangible evidence.
74
 
The type of additional factual evidence provided by claimants varied from 
indications of statistical differences between age groups to discriminatory comments 
or language, lack of transparency, discriminatory selection criteria and questions 
concerning age. The claimant in Richold v Signature Industries
75
 was told by his 
manager that the ‘company needs young blood’ and he was subsequently made 
redundant whilst others who were younger were not. He produced evidence to show 
that 51.3% of the workforce was over 50 years old but 70% of those being made 
redundant were over 50. This selection of evidence (a remark, statistics, a difference in 
treatment and a difference in age) was insufficient to turn the burden of proof as the 
tribunal felt there were ‘certainly no inferences pointing to age discrimination’.
76
 
Statistical evidence was only accepted as significant by tribunals when it was 
submitted alongside, or to back up, other evidence of age discrimination, unless the 
tribunal felt it was overwhelming.
77
 The 60 year old claimant in Oakley v Cannock 
Chase Council
78
 brought statistical evidence to show that those in the 50-60 year old 
age group were more than six times likely to be selected for redundancy by the 
Council than those in the 30-40 year old group but the tribunal felt that ‘statistical 
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evidence is of marginal relevance as there is no evidence to indicate a policy of 
discrimination’.
79
 It was this broader evidence of a policy of discrimination that 
claimants had particular difficulty in providing.  
In Court v Dennis Publishing Ltd
80
 the kind of evidence that is necessary to 
reverse the burden of proof was discussed. Court, aged 55, was an advertising 
promotions director with five colleagues who were under 31. He was made redundant 
and the five younger employees kept on following the appointment of a new 37 year 
old chief executive and he subsequently submitted a claim to the tribunal of direct and 
indirect age discrimination. The tribunal concluded there was sufficient evidence to 
reverse the burden of proof as Court cited three additional factors to support his claim. 
Firstly, the employer publicly advocated a philosophy that young people were good 
for business and three-quarters of his employees were under 30.
81
 Secondly, those not 
chosen for redundancy were all more than 20 years younger than Court and the new 
manager was 22 years younger. Further, if six people were selected for possible 
redundancy and five were under 30, the statistical likelihood was that the one chosen 
would be young.  
Court provided a variety of evidence which undoubtedly helped his case but in 
many instances claimants could only point to a difference in age and treatment which 
was insufficient. A lack of evidence provided by claimants sometimes appeared to 
frustrate tribunals. In Bennett v DSG International
82
 the tribunal was very critical of 
the employer in a judgment relating to a claim by a 62 year old liaison manager who 
had worked for Currys for 45 years. He was selected for redundancy yet had no 
evidence to show age played a part in his selection apart from a difference of treatment 
and age. The tribunal felt it ‘manifestly lacking that an employer of the size and 
administrative resource of the employer could not have found him another job’
83
 but 
we ‘are not here to be sentimental, we are here to apply the law’
84
 and found the claim 
unsuccessful. 
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Written evidence provided the most convincing support for a claim, whether it 
was a hand-written letter,
85
 a print-out of an e-mail
86
 or a facebook page.
87
 Where 
evidence constituted disputed, disparaging, ageist remarks without substantiating proof 
the tribunal had to weigh up whether, on the balance of probabilities, the remarks had 
been made and whether they had a connection with the discriminatory treatment.
88
 For 
example, in Uppal v Anuyu Hair and Beauty Ltd
89
 it was alleged that ageist remarks 
were continually made about the claimant but the tribunal preferred to believe the 
employer who denied making the comments.  
The existence of some remarks was not disputed but the ‘ageist’ intent was 
contested. A comment that a manager was ‘in need of a young blonde’ was found to be 
‘a saucy comment’
 90
 and did not represent ageist views. Where the remarks were not 
made by the person responsible for the unfavourable treatment this was insufficient to 
reverse the burden of proof. In Gosling v IGS Lottery Management Ltd
91
 derisory 
remarks concerning the claimant’s age were made by another employee rather than the 
person responsible for the dismissal and the claim was therefore unsuccessful. In 
Holmes v AMC New Homes
92
 a 62 year old site manager was dismissed after being 
referred to frequently as ‘old boy’ and an ‘old git’. The tribunal found the comments 
were age-related and the employer apologised at the hearing but there was no 
‘evidence that the dismissal was connected with the remarks’
93
 so the burden of proof 
was not reversed. 
The task of proving that a claimant had suffered discrimination on multiple 
grounds was even more challenging than for those claiming under a single jurisdiction 
and is reflected in the low success rates for such claimants as shown in the statistical 
analysis in Chapter 5.4. The legislation required tribunals to consider each suspect 
ground independently and claimants often failed to produce comprehensive evidence 
relating to each element. No consideration was given to the possible compound or 
intersectional effect of multiple discrimination and evidence was ‘split’ between the 
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concurrent claims, resulting in weaker arguments for the individual claims. In 
numerous multiple discrimination claims no evidence was produced for the age 
element of the claim which was dismissed by the tribunal without discussion. For 
example, in Chweidan v J. P. Morgan
94
 a hedge fund manager complaining of age and 
disability discrimination concentrated on providing evidence relating to the disability 
claim. The evidence given in support of the disability claim was specific and overt 
whereas that for age appears to have been more difficult to acquire. The tribunal 
commented that with regard to the age claim the ‘tribunal has inadequate information 
from which to draw conclusions’.
95
 The age claim potentially could have resulted in a 
very large award and the claimant was represented by both Counsel and solicitor, yet 
lack of evidence prevented a full consideration of the claim at the hearing.  
6.3.2: Recruitment 
In cases which concerned recruitment it was extremely difficult to find evidence 
that would reverse the burden of proof. Lack of transparency concerning the number 
and age of applicants and employees hindered numerous claims. Marks v News 
Shopper
96
 concerned a 51 year old ‘cold caller’ who was not asked to an interview, 
whilst two comparators aged 21 and 41 were. He was ordered to pay employer costs of 
£900 because he produced no evidence to show age discrimination played a part in the 
decision apart from a difference in age and treatment, illustrating the punitive 
approach taken by some tribunals.  
Several claims surrounded the wording of job advertisements. No judgments 
were found which related to a specific age group stipulated in an advertisement and 
which may have constituted direct discrimination. However, the EAT agreed with the 
tribunal in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Beck
97
 that the use of the word 
‘younger’ in a job specification was sufficient to turn the burden of proof and may 
constitute direct discrimination. The term ‘over-qualified’ was equated with a high-
earning capacity rather than age by the tribunal in Fletcher v West Horsley Dairy 
Ltd.
98
 As Fletcher was thought to be over-qualified, the tribunal agreed with the 
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employer that he was unsuitable for a position at the dairy and his claim was 
unsuccessful. In Rains v The Commission for Racial Equality
99
 the terms ‘senior’ and 
‘over-qualified’ were considered. Rains was recommended for a position at the 
Commission for Racial Equality by an agent who said he may be ‘too senior’ for the 
post. The Commission’s interviewer felt that Rains was ‘over-qualified’ and did not 
have the relevant case-experience. The tribunal referred to the Irish case of Noonan v 
Accountancy Connections
100
 where the court felt that ‘senior’ could be a reference to 
age and was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. However, as the term ‘too 
senior’ was used by the agent, not the respondent, and that as ‘over-qualified’ could 
apply to any age group, the tribunal found that Rains had not suffered indirect or direct 
age discrimination.  
In Lyons v Leeds NHS Trust,
101
 a claim heard at the Leeds Tribunal where 
claimant success rates were higher than at any other tribunal, a 40 year old applicant 
for a customer service position was successful in his claim when he was informed after 
the interview that he was ‘over-experienced’. The tribunal recognised that ‘an older 
candidate for employment is more likely to be over-experienced than one younger’
102
 
and also discussed other factors taken into account at the interview such as ‘team-fit’ 
and ‘keenness’ for which Lyons scored poorly. It was held that the inclusion of these 
factors was indirectly discriminatory ‘because of subjective generalisations that older 
candidates are less likely to possess those characteristics than younger ones’.
103
 This 
finding was unusual however, as most tribunals took the view that such age-neutral 
factors were not discriminatory and perhaps reflects a tribunal which is more 
sympathetic to claimants. 
Numerous claims were concerned with potentially indirectly discriminatory 
requirements for workers to have a particular number of years’ experience. These 
included those made by two ‘serial litigants’ who made repeated claims that job 
advertisements were indirectly discriminating. Both litigants took their claims to the 
EAT but were unsuccessful. In Keane v Goodman Masson Recruitment
104
 a 51-year-
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old accountant applied for at least 20 positions that were advertised by a recruitment 
agency as being suitable for a recently qualified accountant with two to three years’ 
experience.
105
 She claimed the advertisements were indirectly discriminatory as older 
workers usually were not recently qualified and often had more experience. Keane 
failed in her all of her claims as it was felt she did not seriously intend to take up such 
a position but was using the claim process to highlight the problems of older workers. 
Berry v Reed Employment
106
 was one of several unsuccessful claims made by Berry to 
highlight advertisements which specified a requirement for a school-leaver or newly 
qualified worker. Most of Berry’s claims were withdrawn before a hearing but he 
appealed to the EAT against the decisions in four judgments.
107
 Mr Justice Underhill 
dismissed Berry’s claims as he felt Berry did not seriously intend to take any of the 




It is clear that the Regulations did not provide a remedy for those who believed 
that particular job advertisements were age discriminatory and felt that their age would 
exclude them from consideration for the position. The Regulations relied, as the 
Equality Act 2010 relies, upon an individual not in the requisite specified age band 
going through the whole process of selection, despite the advertisement indicating that 
their particular age or amount of experience was not required or would be 
disadvantageous, which seems unlikely. An unusual exception to this was seen in 
Rainbow v Milton Keynes Council
109
 where a 61 year old claimant with 34 years’ 
experience unsuccessfully applied for a job that was advertised as suitable for 
someone in the ‘first five years of their career’. The tribunal found that she suffered 
indirect discrimination as someone in her age group was liable to be disadvantaged as 
they were not likely to be in the ‘first five years of their career’. Most applicants 
would be deterred from applying for the position upon reading that they would be 
unsuitable yet the model of legislation relies upon an unfunded, individual litigant 
taking such action.  
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The questionnaire procedure set out in the legislation was utilised by many 
claimants who lacked evidence to prove they had suffered discrimination as they were 
able to ask for information to assist them in assessing whether or not they had a 
claim.
110
 Regulation 41 states: 
if it appears to the court or tribunal that the respondent deliberately, 
and without reasonable excuse, omitted to reply within eight weeks 
of service of the questions or that his reply is evasive or equivocal, 
the court or tribunal may draw any inference from that fact that it 
considers it just and equitable to draw, including an inference that he 
committed an unlawful act.
111
 
Evidence was found in several folio reports that questionnaires were not returned 
to claimants yet tribunals did not draw an inference of discrimination. For example, in 
Keane v Goodman Masson Recruitment Services Ltd
112
 one of the respondents, Robert 
Walters plc, failed to return the questionnaire sent to them by Ms Keane under 
Regulation 41 asking for information on the age of candidates for a position. The 
tribunal admitted that because of this failure it did not know the ages of the eleven 
comparators put forward by Ms Keane but was not prepared to find an inference that 
an unlawful act had been committed. A 55 year old bookshop salesman in Black v The 
Travel Bookshop
113
 failed to shift burden of proof because of lack of evidence as his 
employer would not supply the age and salaries of other staff, ‘pleading confidentiality 
of employees’.
114
 A questionnaire served on Network Rail failed to reveal information 
relating to the ages of those that applied for an apprentice scheme and those who were 
selected in Baskaran v Network Rail
115
 without explanation. The tribunal dismissed 
the claim as it found that without this information it had no prospect of success, yet the 
fault lay with the respondent, not the claimant. 
The truthfulness of evidence given in questionnaires by employers was thrown 
into doubt in some claims but tribunals did not always find this led to an inference of 
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discriminatory conduct. In Fraser v Healthcare Commission
116
 the employer answered 
a questionnaire served under Regulation 41. The first question asked how many of the 
Commission’s employees were over 60 years old. They replied that 288 out of 751 
were over 60, yet only nine were in reality. The name of the member of staff involved 
in the interview process and the number and age of those short-listed was also 
incorrect. Despite this the tribunal found that the burden of proof did not shift to the 
employer.  
This reflects the manner in which Mr Justice Underhill, President of the 
Employment Tribunal, dismissed an incomplete questionnaire in the EAT in Deer v 
Walford and Oxford University.
117
 He commented that ‘there are no special rules of 
law about what inferences should be drawn from unsatisfactory answers to the 
statutory questionnaire’
118
 as if ‘they were simply the result of a busy man failing to 
give the questionnaire the attention it deserved, or to appreciate the extent of his 
obligations, that might be reprehensible but it would not by itself justify any inference 
of an intent to victimise’.
119
 Nonetheless claimants placed in this situation have no 
means by which to further determine ‘the reason for the difference in treatment’
120
 and 
marginalising the significance of a questionnaire can create real difficulties for the 
claimant in establishing their case. 
The ECJ considered the amount of information that a discrimination claimant 
should expect to be given by a respondent employer in Meister v Speech Design 
Carrier Systems GmbH.
121
 Meister asked for information concerning the successful 
applicant for a position which she had unsuccessfully applied for. Although the ECJ 
found that she had no right to have access to the successful candidate's file they did 
find that an employer's refusal to grant access to information may be a factor to take 
into account in the context of establishing facts from which the burden of proof may 
be reversed. They held that a national court should ensure that ‘such a refusal is not 
liable to compromise the achievement of the objectives pursued by Directives’.
122
 The 
refusal of an employer to supply information to a claimant is vital, particularly in 
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recruitment cases, and the refusal to supply a questionnaire must surely affect the 
achievement of the objectives of the Framework Directive if an employer can avoid 
responsibility for discriminating treatment by merely refusing to cooperate. 
6.3.3: Particular disadvantage 
In claims of indirect discrimination the claimant must show that she/he has 
suffered ‘particular disadvantage’ when compared with other persons due to the 
imposition of a provision, criterion or practice applied equally to persons not of the 
same age group.
123
 ‘Age group’ was defined very broadly in the Regulations as ‘a 
group of persons defined by reference to age, whether by reference to a particular age 
or a range of ages’.
124
 In all but a handful of judgments in the Register there was no 





 age bands as providing the correct pool for comparison. 
Nonetheless the EAT found in Abn Amro & Royal Bank of Scotland v Hogben
127
 that 
an age difference of nine months was insufficient and a claim of indirect 
discrimination failed in Lyall v Welwyn Hatfield Council
128
 because the comparator 
was only two years younger than the claimant – a 49 year old comparator was kept on 
whilst the 51 year old claimant was selected for early retirement. In Patel v Pepisco
129
 
the tribunal accepted two comparative groups, one older and one younger than the 
claimants. 
Tribunals were sometimes not supplied with evidence that showed that an age 
group had been placed at a particular disadvantage as claimants unfortunately 
expected that the tribunal would base its judgment on stereotypical assumptions. The 
claimant in Kowalik v Robert McBride Ltd
130
 was dismissed because she could not 
operate new machinery installed on the factory line. She claimed a requirement of 
‘skill with computers’ put persons of her age at a particular disadvantage but produced 
no evidence to substantiate this. The employer produced evidence to show older 
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workers than Miss Kowalik had been able to operate the machinery and the tribunal 
felt she held a stereotypical attitude which could not be substantiated. Similarly, in 
Warlow v ZEAG(UK) Ltd
131
 a 64 year old engineer was selected for redundancy on the 
basis of a matrix with six factors, one of which was computer skills and he received a 
lowest score for this. He suggested to the tribunal that older people would find it more 
difficult to master computer skills but his assumption was rejected.
132
  
A similar belief was seen in Pendrich v David Lloyd Leisure
133
 where a 
swimming teacher asked to use a computerised booking system claimed that workers 
of her age were placed at a disadvantage because they were less likely to be able to use 
computers. The respondent surprisingly agreed with this supposition but asserted that 
the requirement was a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate end, namely the 
introduction of a computerised marketing system’.
134
 However, the tribunal found the 
claim unsuccessful because it ‘heard no evidence that persons of the claimant's age 
group (55 and over) were put at a particular disadvantage’ as Ms Pendrich appears to 
have merely invited the tribunal ‘to assume that this age group would be less able to 
use computers than persons of younger age groups’.
135
  
This type of problem was plainly manifest in Perry v Royal Mail.
136
 Perry made 
an unsubstantiated complaint that older workers were more likely to be ill and that a 
‘disciplinary absence procedure’ discriminated against them. In response the Royal 
Mail produced data which showed that younger workers were ill more often and took 
more time off work than those over 55 years old and the claimant was unsuccessful. 
The particular disadvantage that a claimant near retirement suffered as a result of 
a requirement to hold a degree was considered by the tribunal and appellate courts. 
The tribunal found in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police
137
 that a 
requirement to hold a degree was a provision, criterion or practice for the purposes of 
Regulation 3(1)(b). Homer could not obtain a degree before his retirement because of 
his age and as he was prevented ‘from accessing the financial benefits of increased 
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remuneration and status’ he felt he had suffered a particular disadvantage.
138
 The 
Chief Constable appealed to the EAT where it was found the requirement applied to 
all employees without a degree, whatever their age, in precisely the same way and it 
was no more difficult for someone aged 60-65 to obtain the qualification than 
someone younger. Homer had undoubtedly suffered a disadvantage, but it was not a 
‘particular disadvantage’ as workers in younger age groups might find themselves in a 
similar position. Judge Elias stated that as all employees were required to have a 
degree, in principle it is not: 
more difficult for an older than a younger person to acquire the 
degree. The need for a degree does of course impose a barrier, but it 
is a barrier which applies to all alike. It is not one which is affected 
by age ... the requirement has nothing to do with age discrimination 
and everything to do with the consequence of age.
139
 
Homer appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed with the EAT in finding that the 
inability to acquire a higher salary and status was a disadvantage, but all age cohorts 
were equally subject to the requirement so Homer was not suffering a ‘particular 
disadvantage’. It was the result of his impending retirement rather than a consequence 
of age discrimination. Mummery LJ stated that: 
the particular disadvantage results from stopping work before being 
able to obtain the qualification for appointment. In those 
circumstances the same result would follow for persons in the 
comparator age group who also stopped working before qualifying, 
so that there would be no inequality that was the result of the impact 
of the law degree provision on age.
140
 
In theory, Lord Justice Mummery is correct. But in reality, those in younger age 
groups would probably not retire before graduating if they decided to study for a 
degree. Homer’s circumstances were quite different to those in younger age groups as 
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he could not comply with the requirement at all. Very few judgments after 2009 which 
concerned potentially indirect discriminatory requirements recorded success for the 
claimant. However, the Supreme Court re-examined the decision in 2012 and 
disagreed with the Court of Appeal. Lady Hale SCJ emphasised in her judgment that 
Homer had no choice but to suffer a disadvantage whereas those younger did and 
referred the claim back to the tribunal for consideration of the justification of the 
requirement.
141
 In future therefore claimants may find it easier to show that have 
suffered such a disadvantage. 
A very similar requirement to possess a degree was discussed in McCluskey v 
Edge Hill University.
142
 The tribunal found as fact that McCluskey would have been 
appointed to a position of university tutor if she possessed a degree. Drawing on its 
own knowledge, the tribunal found that older workers are statistically less likely to 
have a degree than those younger. It was ‘self-evident’
143
 therefore that the claimant 
was at a particular disadvantage.
144
 Although the Supreme Court has reconsidered 
Homer, these two cases illustrate the inconsistency with which tribunals and courts 
addressed the problem of indirect age discrimination. The facts of the two cases are 
distinguishable yet have parallel themes and the judgments reveal very different 
approaches to assessing particular disadvantage. For example, in Hume v Dover 
District Council
145
 a 54 year old accountant complained that the withdrawal of a 
health benefit was indirectly age discriminatory as he would find it harder to obtain 
health insurance than a younger person. The tribunal found that as it was withdrawn 
for all employees the particular disadvantage suffered by Hume was a consequence of 
his age, not age discrimination.
146
  
However, an extremely similar complaint which considered the removal of a 
health insurance benefit was considered in Swann v GHL Insurance Services.
147
 The 
tribunal found that this would have been direct discrimination, rather than indirect 
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discrimination, but there was ‘a divergence of view’
148
 between tribunal members over 
whether it could be objectively justified. Not only did tribunals disagree over the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘particular disadvantage,’ some could not even agree over 
the distinction to be made between indirect and direct discrimination. A report by the 
Employment Lawyers Association stated that 83% of their members felt that tribunals 




6.3.4: Redundancy selection 
Redundancy selection is a very challenging process for an employer needing to 
retain the most productive staff whilst treating employees in a transparent and fair 
manner. Using ‘last in, first out’ and length of service selection criteria, which are 
linked to age, constitutes using a ‘provision, criterion or practice’ which may 
indirectly discriminate against younger workers, contrary to Regulation 3(1)(b). 
Selection of older workers because they are near to retirement age may be less 
favourable treatment on the basis of age, contrary to Regulation 3(1)(a). In the period 
studied in this research tribunals considered 408 cases where claimants felt that their 
redundancy selection constituted discrimination on the grounds of age. The judgments 
broadly fell into two categories – those which concerned individuals who felt they 
suffered direct discrimination on grounds of age and those which concerned 
redundancy selection procedures and matrices, which may have been indirectly 
discriminatory. Most respondent employers denied the redundancy selection was made 
on the grounds of age but a small number of claims concerned selection procedures 
that included criteria found to be age-related and which employers claimed were 
objectively justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
150
 Four 
judgments concerned claimants who were able to show that, whilst their initial 
redundancy selection was fair, they had been treated differently to younger workers 
after selection. For example, in Troman v Colliers of Birmingham
151
 the employer did 
not try to find Troman alternative employment and the tribunal found that a younger 
employee would have been treated differently.  
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Claimants arguing that a selection procedure was unfair because it was not 
transparent were able to use this as a third and ‘additional’ piece of evidence, along 
with the difference of status and treatment, and found it easier to turn the burden of 
proof than in other type of complaints. For example, in Molloy v Pressure Coolers
152
 a 
60 year old bench fitter was able to show a difference in age of 25 years between those 
not made redundant and himself, a difference in treatment in that he was selected and 
they were not and, additionally, that the employer carried out no consultation or 
transparent selection process – these three were sufficient to reverse the burden of 
proof which the employer could not discharge.  
In all judgments examined as part of this study tribunals found that a redundancy 
selection process was lawful if a matrix contained ‘last in, first out’ or length of 
service as one of a number of criteria and if consultations were carried out with 
employees during the selection process. Selection matrices which contained subjective 
criteria, giving the employer discretion to award points as he wished, were also found 
lawful
153
 unless demonstrable inaccuracies were exposed.
154
 In Inchcape v Symonds 
the EAT held that ‘once an element of subjectivity is put into the criteria, it is not for 
the employment tribunal to substitute its view as to what the scores should have 
been’.
155
 If therefore an employer holds a stereotypical view that older workers do not 
have initiative, enthusiasm or an appropriate attitude and this is reflected in a matrix 
score, it is likely to be found lawful. 
Selection criteria within a redundancy matrix system were discussed in Holland 
v Zeag(UK) Ltd
156
 Holland, a 64 year old car-park pay-machine engineer, was selected 
for compulsory redundancy following a downturn of 50% in new orders. No 
consultation took place with the staff in the development of the selection matrix, 
which included computer literacy, hardware skills, location, software management 
skills, customer focus and adherence to company procedures. The tribunal found that 
although the selection criteria were reasonable there was a lack of consultation and 
transparency in the selection process. However, Holland failed to provide the tribunal 
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with ‘basic’ evidence that showed those not selected for redundancy were younger and 
they were therefore ‘unable to conclude on the evidence that the respondent had 




This illustrates the importance of providing sufficient evidence to support a 
claim (and asking the correct questions using the questionnaire procedure), which was 
lacking in many cases concerning redundancy selection, particularly where claimants 
were unrepresented. Nevertheless self-representation was successful in straightforward 
cases. In Killa v Electronic Motion Systems Ltd
158
 59 year old Killa, an electronics 
engineer, was made redundant with immediate effect following a first consultation 
meeting. No objective criteria whatsoever were applied in the selection process which 
was therefore found contrary to Regulation 3(1)(a). 
6.3.5: Harassment 
Harassment is ‘a common aspect of age discrimination’
159
 and was prohibited by 
Regulation 6:  
(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (‘A’) subjects 
another person (‘B’) to harassment where, on grounds of age, A 
engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of 
(a) violating B’s dignity; or 
(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for B. 
(2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect specified in 
paragraph (1)(a) or (b) only if, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including in particular the perception of B, it should 
reasonably be considered as having that effect.
160
 
Judgments reveal that claims of harassment were usually based upon ageist 
remarks. Only one judgment recorded physical harassment associated with age 
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discrimination – this claimant was pushed around, elbowed and had his glasses 
knocked off.
161
 Typical comments which older claimants found offensive were 
‘having one foot in the grave … past her sell-by date,’
162





 ‘you should be in an old people’s home,’
165
 ‘pensioner,’ ‘silly, 




 ‘you belong in a graveyard’
168
 and ‘old 
codger’.
169





 These phrases were interpreted as age discriminatory by some 
tribunals yet dismissed as ‘banter’ by others – in these instances the comments may 
have been unwanted but were found insufficient to violate dignity. For example, in 
Vallely v Whitbread Group plc t/a Brewers Fayre
172
 Ms Vallely, aged 54, claimed that 
a fellow 61 year old employee said to her ‘it is easy to forget things at our age’. The 
tribunal dismissed her claim of harassment finding that this was just a ‘common-or-
garden comment’ in which she referred to her own shortcomings rather than Ms 
Vallely’s. 
Inferences about age also offended and violated the dignity of some claimants. 
In Kessell v Passion for Perfume Ltd
173
 comments about possible deafness and poor 
eyesight were interpreted by the tribunal as age-related and were held to constitute 
harassment as the comments severely undermined the employee’s confidence and 
caused her significant distress. In Acheampong v National Car Parks Ltd
174
 it was 
suggested that the claimant, a 42 year old car park support officer, may be unable to 
defend an attempt to steal from the pay machines. His line manager asked ‘life begins 
at 40, what do you say about that?’ which was interpreted by Acheampong as a 
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‘suggestion that his life had not begun at 40’.
175
 After a request to work day-shifts his 
line manager replied that it was not good for him ‘at his age and with children’ to be 
doing night work. The tribunal found these comments had ‘the purpose or effect of 
violating Mr. Acheampong’s dignity’.
176
 
Harassment also took place via e-mail. In Lambert v BAT Ltd
177
 a fellow 
employee of BAT sent an e-mail to Lambert, aged 56, entitled ‘Perks of being over 
50’ with 15 statements such as ‘kidnappers are not very interested in you … you can 
live without sex but not your glasses … and … things you buy now won’t wear 
out’.
178
 Mr Lambert’s claim for harassment was time-expired and therefore 
unsuccessful but the tribunal found that the e-mail amounted to unwanted conduct 
which had the effect of violating his dignity. Tribunals held that the comments had to 
be directly related to the claimant, rather than referring to generalised stereotypes 
about age. Yet generalised ageist comments can be perceived as offensive and create 
an intimidating or hostile environment, as precluded in Regulation 6(1)(b). For 
example, the 18 year old claimant in Vaughan v S & GM Bryden
179
 was asked ‘not to 
behave like a petulant and delinquent teenager’ which she felt constituted harassment. 
The tribunal disagreed as it felt ‘this could be asked of anyone, whatever their age’.
180
  
Several claimants had difficulty showing they found the alleged conduct 
‘unwanted’ because they did not object to ageist comments at the time they were 
made. Samuels has described the tendency of workers to ‘underplay’ conflict in the 
workplace in order to minimize the impact of disputes by reacting in a passive manner 
and not complaining about harassment at the time it occurs.
181
 Yet if a complaint is not 
made at the time of the harassment it may not be obvious that the worker objects to the 
conduct. In Peters v Personal Financial
182
 a manager emailed an assistant on holiday 
and told her ‘you have left a legacy of senior moments’ and that he was ‘on 
Alzheimer’s alert’. After several more emails she replied ‘Are you saying it’s time I 
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retired as I have not been around to defend myself’.
183
 Her claim of harassment failed 





The numerous exemptions contained within the Regulations enabled employers 
to use more age-based criteria than permitted in equivalent equality legislation, 
although the exemption for the default retirement age (DRA) has been removed.
185
 An 
exemption was provided in that if age was a ‘genuine and determining occupational 
requirement’
186
 and it was ‘proportionate to apply that requirement’
187
 it was not 
unlawful to use age as a discriminating factor. The government expected there will ‘be 
very few cases where age is genuinely a requirement’
188
 and indeed this was only 
found to have been discussed in four judgments.
189
 Other exemptions covered acts 
required for national security
190





National Minimum Wage (NMW)
193
 enhanced redundancy pay,
194
 benefits linked to 
seniority
195
 and occupational pension schemes.
196
  
Discriminatory age limits specified under statutory authority, such as those in 
the New Deal programmes,
197
 are therefore only challengeable through a reference to 
the ECJ. One such discriminatory age limit, relating to a training scheme, was 
discussed in Spyrka v The Club Company Holdings Ltd
198
 where an employer stated to 
an older claimant that ‘it was strictly correct to say that it was cheaper to train young 
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people because grants were available’.
199
 The tribunal found that the comment was 
‘extremely unfortunate, not to say thoroughly injudicious’
200
 but nevertheless found 
that age played no part in the non-selection of the claimant. 
6.4.1: The National Minimum Wage  
The NMW, which constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of age, was 
permitted under the exemption contained in Regulation 31.
201
 The NMW perpetuates 
the idea that the young should be paid less, even if undertaking the same work as an 
older worker. A person under 21
202
 cannot be paid more than the adult minimum rate 
if a comparable person over 21 is being paid more than the young worker, as the age 
differential is not exempt. On the other hand, if the younger person is paid less than 
the adult minimum rate the age differential falls into the exemption.
203
 This 
encourages employers to pay those under 21 no more than the adult rate even if they 
wish to reward good workers.  
The government’s rationale behind the lower rates for young workers in the 
NMW is that: 
the minimum wage should be set at a lower rate for young people 
because the evidence shows that they are more vulnerable in the 
labour market and the threat of unemployment (and the associated 
damage it causes) is greater for young workers.
204
  
The aim of the even lower rate for 16-17 year olds is ‘to afford very young workers 
some protection from poverty pay, while maintaining the incentives for 16-17 year 
olds to remain in education’.
205
 
The discriminatory nature of the NMW caused problems for a small number of 
claimants at the tribunal who found that employers would rather pay a lower wage to 
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younger workers than those entitled to the adult rate of pay. The preference of 
employers to take on younger workers who can be paid less has been highlighted by 
Heyes and Grey. They have described how employers ‘responded to the minimum 
wage by … replacing older workers with younger workers: The same number of 
people are employed, but they get paid less’.
206
 This occurred, for example, in Kent v 
Krazy Kidz.
207
 Kent, aged 25, was told by the play centre’s manager ‘I have been 
trying to get rid of you because you’re old staff’
208
 and ‘I would rather have employed 
16-year-old girls working for £4.00 an hour doing the same job that you are at 
£5.35’.
209
 The tribunal found it reasonable that Kent found this offensive and she 
received compensation of £27,667. The employer in Kent v Krazy Kidz wanted to take 
advantage of the lower wage he could lawfully pay to younger workers and the 
expression of this desire led to his discrimination of an older worker. This claim 
highlights the paradox contained within the exemptions included in the Regulations – 
they permit discriminatory conduct which is authorised by the legislature whilst at the 
same time endeavouring to achieve equal treatment. 
6.4.2: Retirement and the Age Regulations 
The vast majority of the 88 claims concerned with retirement issues and 
examined as part of this study were directly related to the DRA. Compulsory 
retirement of an employee at a specific age is direct discrimination on the grounds of 
age but was lawful provided an employer followed the procedure in Schedule 6 of the 
Regulations. This required an employer to give the employee between six months’ and 
one year’s notice of the intended date of the retirement.
210
 Subsequently the employee, 
had a right to request not to be dismissed
211
 which had to be considered by the 
employer.
212
 Although the procedure was modelled on the right to request flexible 
working the employer did not have to give any reason for refusal. The employer was 
required to hold a meeting with the employee to discuss the request but was allowed to 
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forego this ‘provided he considers any representations made by the employee’
213
 but 
was not required to provide any evidence of consideration. This enabled a very easy 
dismissal of the employee request to be made and the employer retained absolute 
discretion in deciding whether to insist on an employee’s retirement. Retirement that 
did not fall under the exemption, for example that of a partner as in Seldon v Clarkson 
Wright & Jakes,
214
 had to be objectively justified as a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim.
215
  
The exemption with regard to the DRA was subject to campaigns for its removal 
by several organisations including the Employers Forum on Age,
216
 Age Concern and 
Help the Aged (now AgeUK). A challenge in the High Court, known as the Heyday
217
 
case, was successful in drawing attention to the discriminatory nature of the DRA. 
After a reference to the ECJ, Mr Justice Blake in the Heyday case stated that if: 
there had been no indication of an imminent review, I would have 
concluded … that the selection of age 65 would not have been 
proportionate. It creates greater discriminatory effect than is 
necessary on a class of people who both are able to and want to 
continue in their employment. A higher age would not have any 
general detrimental labour market consequences or block access to 
high level jobs by future generations.
218
  
This statement expressed the view that the provision could not be justified and was 
therefore unlawful in September 2009, yet the DRA remained in force until October 
2011 when it was subsequently abandoned.
219
  
The 15 successful claims in the Judgment Register relating to retirement were 
those where the employer had not followed the procedure correctly, usually because 
the employee had been given insufficient warning of their retirement. The exemption 
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in Regulation 30 applied to retirements on or after the 65
th
 birthday of the claimant and 
tribunals interpreted the requirements of the legislation strictly. In Plewes v Adam 
Pork Produce Ltd 
220
 the normal retirement age in the company was the day before the 
employee's 65th birthday – Plewes’ dismissal one day too early was found to be direct 
age discrimination which could not be justified.  
A very strict approach was also taken with regard to employee requests to 
continue working. Almost all of the unsuccessful 59 claims concerned with retirement 
were those where either the claimant had not followed the claim or ‘right to request’ 
procedure correctly or where it was found that the employer had followed the 
Schedule 6 procedure correctly and the retirement was lawful. In Holmes v Active 
Sensors Ltd
221
 Holmes, an assembly technician, was told on 24
th
 October 2006 that he 
must retire when he reached the age of 65 on 24
th
 November 2006. On 25
th
 October, 
Holmes asked in writing if he could continue working until January 2007 but his 
employment was terminated. The tribunal found, as his request did not specifically 
mention that it was being made ‘under Schedule 6, para 5(3),’ which specifies that a 
‘request must be in writing and state that it is made under this paragraph,’ it was not a 
valid request and the employer was under no obligation to consider it.  
Tribunals were apologetic to those claimants who proceeded with a claim 
concerned with retirement which was heard after the Heyday
222
 decision but before the 
abandonment of the DRA. In Andrews and Crumpton v Amersham and Wycombe 
College,
223
 considered after the Heyday decision, two 65 year olds who did not want to 
retire were told with clear regret by Employment Judge Metcalf ‘I have to apply the 
law as it currently is, not as it might become’.
224
 Claims concerned with retirement 
made under the Equality Act 2010 will undoubtedly centre on the capability of the 
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6.4.3: Enhanced redundancy payments  
Workers are often offered enhanced redundancy payments in order to encourage 
them to take voluntary redundancy or early retirement. If the redundancy payment 
scheme followed the standard formula used in the statutory redundancy scheme it fell 
under an exception which permitted age discriminatory schemes.
226
 If the scheme used 
a different formula the employer was required to demonstrate the scheme was a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. For example, in Randall v London 
Borough of Croydon
227
 a 38 year old Learning and Development Officer complained 
that his payment was calculated using a multiplier of 3 years, whilst his 48 year old 
job-sharer with the same length of service received a much higher payment because it 
was calculated using a multiplier of 5. His claim was unsuccessful because the 
payment scheme mirrored the statutory redundancy scheme and the exception in 
Regulation 33 applied.  
6.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the many problems that claimants found when they 
made a claim of age discrimination. The complicated nature of the modern 
employment relationship, where workers are contracted to other employers, made it 
difficult for some to establish that they were protected by the legislation. A small 
number found that they were unprotected by the Regulations because of territorial 
jurisdictional restrictions – these also hindered the achievement of the objective of the 
Framework Directive as discrimination across member states was not proscribed. It 
was apparent when examining judgment reports that many claimants were ignorant of 
their employment rights, time limits and the importance of following the grievance 
procedure correctly. There is a clear need for workers to be given employment advice 
in order that they can avail themselves of their rights. 
The problems inherent in age legislation, discussed in Chapter 1.7, surrounding 
the difficulty in establishing ‘age equality’ for some cohorts whilst disadvantaging 
others, were evident in the judgments. Conflict in the workplace was apparent in 
numerous judgment reports where tension had arisen between generations who were 
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treated lawfully but unequally, for example, where workers were complaining that 





 The various exemptions in the Regulations allowed employers to lawfully 
utilise age discriminatory criteria in many aspects of working life, ranging from 
providing benefits to those with long service to paying lower wages to the young.  
Evidence of inconsistent and contradictory interpretations of the legislation by 
tribunals was apparent. For example, interpretation of the phrase ‘particular 
disadvantage’ appeared to challenge tribunals in several judgments. A less demanding 
approach was also seen in cases of harassment, where it was found that ageist 
comments had to be directed to the claimant rather than creating an offensive 
environment, and in redundancy selection, where a criterion indirectly linked to age 
was found lawful if it was used with other criteria. Evidence could also be seen of 
unsympathetic tribunals which were usually unwilling to hear a claim if it was 
incorrectly made or out of time whilst employers were often given the opportunity to 
submit evidence when a default judgement had been made against them. This 
imbalance represents a substantial barrier for those seeking redress for their complaint 
– a difference in treatment by tribunals that is itself discriminatory.  
Claimants often found it difficult to establish a claim of age discrimination 
because they were ill-prepared rather than because their claim had little merit. 
Numerous claimants came to the tribunal with insufficient evidence to support their 
claim. Those suffering multiple discrimination had concomitant evidential problems 
and repeatedly failed to garner information in support of their age claim because they 
concentrated on other grounds. Claimants could usually point to a difference in 
treatment and age but many could not find an additional factor, required by tribunals 
following Madarassy v Nomura
230
 in order to reverse the burden of proof, because 
such evidence was often intangible, indistinct or difficult to find, particularly in 
recruitment cases. The questionnaire procedure did not help claimants in several cases 
as tribunals refused to find an inference of discrimination when they were not 
returned, or even more surprising, when they were untruthful, further demonstrating 
the disparity of treatment of parties by tribunals. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
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evidence indicates that discrimination takes place particularly in recruitment, yet 
claimants in recruitment found it almost impossible to substantiate their assertions of 
unfair treatment. As Rudman has found that age discrimination resulting from the 
‘application of implicit biases’ which ‘may be nonconscious’
231
 such evidence may be 
often unattainable. This lack of tangible evidence is a major hurdle that many age 
discrimination claimants simply cannot overcome, highlighting a major flaw in the use 
of legislation to challenge age discrimination. 
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Folio Reports 2 – Response and Outcomes 
7.1: Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Six, once the burden of proof has shifted to the 
respondent employer in a claim of age discrimination, the tribunal ‘shall uphold the 
complaint unless the respondent proves that he did not commit, or as the case may be, 
is not to be treated as having committed, that act’.
1
 This Chapter explores the 
responses that employers made when discharging this burden of proof and reflects 
upon the awards given to successful claimants if the burden was not discharged. In the 
vast majority of ‘age’ judgments it was found that the employer denied discriminatory 
treatment. In a minority of cases the employer did not deny differential conduct but 
sought to prove that the treatment was objectively justified as a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim. The judgment reports examined as part of this study reveal 
inconsistent and often contradictory interpretations of the legislation and a significant 
power imbalance between the two parties. 
7.2: Capability and performance 
The most usual response by employers to an allegation of age discrimination, 
once the burden of proof had been reversed, was to deny that the alleged treatment 
related to the age of the claimant but was a response to his/her capability or 
performance.
2
 In the majority of instances the assessment of the capability of older 
workers to perform their work centred upon the general competence of the claimant. 
For example, the claimant in Howlett v BT plc
3
 was found to have been dismissed on 
‘grounds of inefficiency arising from unsatisfactory performance’
4
 rather than on the 
grounds of age. In Mott MacDonald v Rivken
5
 Counsel for the employer stated that the 
unrepresented claimant had ‘failed to demonstrate interpersonal skills, intuitive 
knowledge … the claimant’s presentation was not to standard … the claimant lacked 
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motivation and demonstrated an unwillingness to consider an alternative view’.
6
 In the 
face of such personal criticism many claimants had no response.  
However, employers were more likely to cite more specific instances of poor 
performance of younger workers rather than generalised criticism of the claimant. For 
example, in Westby v Cyber Checkout Ltd
7
 it was found that a 19 year old customer 
services assistant was dismissed because she did not answer the telephone within 3 
rings and was found sending personal emails when there was still work to be done 
rather than because she was young. The 36 year old claimant in Hill v Parenta Group 
Ltd
8
 was found to have been dismissed because she took breaks outside the allotted 
time rather than because she was older than most of the other workers. 
In cases where safety was an issue the employer’s view of the lack of capability 
of the claimant was always accepted by the tribunal without question. For example, in 
Houghton v Moorland School
9
 a 74 year old school mini-bus driver was seen driving 
through a red light by the school head-master and was immediately dismissed. The 
tribunal found that age was not the reason for his dismissal, but his ability to drive 
safely. Similarly a truck driver in Baxter v TNT (UK) Ltd
10
 was seen driving with the 
shutter door of his vehicle left open and dismissed from his position. He claimed he 
was dismissed on the grounds of age but the tribunal felt the incident showed he had a 
disregard for safety. 
Tribunals normally required evidence from the respondent in support of their 
assertions to rebut the burden of proof. However, the EAT held in Seldon v Clarkson 
Wright & Jakes
11
 that we ‘do not accept the submissions of the appellant, and indeed 
repeated by the Commission, that a tribunal must always have concrete evidence, 
neatly weighed, to support each assertion made by the employer’.
12
 The Court of 
Appeal in Seldon went as far as to suggest that evidence should be produced by the 
claimant to rebut the respondent’s assumption, rather than insist that the respondent 
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produce evidence to support their case, despite the fact that it should be the 
respondent’s duty to discharge the burden.
13
  
Indeed, several claimants were able to rebut the employer’s evidence by coming 
to the tribunal with solid evidence of their own or by producing references. In Hussain 
v Live Nation
14
 a tribunal observed, when considering the dismissal of a house 
manager at the Bristol Hippodrome by two younger members of staff that it had: 
never seen such a wide ranging selection of witnesses who were 
willing to attend to heap praise on a claimant. The level and range of 
this support has quite properly influenced us in assessing the 
evidence of the respondent's witnesses.
15
 
In Williams v Luminair Leisure Ltd
16
 an employer claimed he dismissed a 42 
year old disc jockey because night-club attendances were falling as the claimant’s 
music choices were becoming ‘stale and complacent’
17
 rather than because of the his 
age. Williams was able to rebut this by producing evidence that showed attendances 
had fallen at all night-clubs in the area. Similarly in Wilkinson v Springwell 
Engineering Ltd
18
 the employer dismissed an 18 year old and stated that her dismissal 
was because her work was error-ridden not because she young. She was able to bring a 
copy of the accounts that she had worked on to the tribunal and only 2-3 errors were 
found out of the 80 figures per week she entered which was described as ‘modest’.
19
 
The tribunal concluded the employer believed that ‘there exists a link between age and 
capability’
20
 and found Wilkinson’s dismissal was on the grounds of age. 
Clear, transparent selection procedures undoubtedly helped employers defend 
claims. Large employers in particular used such procedures and were able to discharge 
the burden of proof by doing so. In Ferguson v Anglia Water Services
21
 a 52 year old 
complained that she was not selected as a senior data management scientist because of 
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her age. The employer presented a comprehensive breakdown of marks given in the 
selection process which included an online personality profiling test and an aptitude 
test. The claimant’s score was 191, whilst the 28 year old successful candidate scored 
195, indicating that it was the ability of the claimant, not her age, which had 
influenced the selection process.  
Where capability was an issue the presentation of the case by the claimant at the 
hearing had a substantial effect on the outcome. Factual evidence and more intangible 
qualities were assessed in a ‘credibility contest’ with the reliability of the employer 
and employee at the heart of the judgment. Comments in judgments show that the 
demeanour of the claimant, the consistency of the evidence and the manner in which 
the claimant handled their complaint (including the diarising of events), both in the 
workplace and at the hearing, were aspects that were taken into account. If the 
claimant seemed unsure or hesitant in their answers this may have been taken as 
reflecting uncertainty in decision-making at work. For example, in Mattin v Clacton 
Family Trust
22
 an 18 year old care assistant failed in her claim because it was found 
she was dismissed because of her ‘capability and incompetence’.
23
 The judgment 
noted how she sat at the back of the room looking with ‘complete disinterest’ with: 
her head on a male friend’s shoulder whilst her mother sat at the 
front with her solicitor giving instructions … When she gave 
evidence she did so in a similarly disinterested way and from time to 
time when she was unable to answer questions put to her she told us 
that her mother had told her what to say but that she had forgotten … 
it has, in our judgment a distinct bearing upon the application.
24
  
In Lewis v Magmatic Ltd
25
 a discussion centred on whether the claimant was 
suitable for a position and the employer thought that at times the claimant went off ‘the 
point of the question’ sometimes. Employment Judge Carstairs commented that, when 
giving evidence, ‘he did on occasion wander away from the question asked’
26
 and 
subsequently found age did not play a part in the recruitment process. Judgment 
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reports indicate that the hearing became a proving ground for the personal qualities of 
the claimant and those without representation were at a distinct disadvantage. 
7.3: Comparators  
In numerous judgments employers discharged the burden of proof by 
introducing a comparator of a similar age to the claimant who was treated differently, 
providing evidence to show that the employer did not discriminate on the grounds of 
age.
27
 For example, in Nutt v Tim Samways & Sporting and Historic Car Engineers 
Ltd
28
 the tribunal found the claimant’s selection for redundancy was not on the 
grounds of age as three of the other seven employees not selected were the same age 
as the 56 year old claimant. Similarly in Richards v Gladedale SE Ltd
29
 a 60 year old 
sales consultant selected for redundancy was unsuccessful because another 60 year old 
was not selected and in Charlish v Mref Trade Co
30
 it was found that, as another 
employee aged 70 was kept on, the employer did not discriminate against a dismissed 
60 year old housekeeper at Brandon Hall Hotel on the grounds of age.
31
 In Black v 
Northumbrian Agencies and Distributors
32
 the employers presented evidence that, 
having selected a 54 year old for redundancy, they had retained two employees aged 
64 and 70. The tribunal accepted this as evidence that the employer did not 
discriminate on the grounds of age. Folio reports indicate that large employers were 
more readily able to provide such a comparator who, with very few exceptions, was 
accepted as evidence that the employer did not discriminate on the grounds of age. 
7.4: Objective justification 
Age is unusual amongst suspect grounds in equality legislation in that it is 
possible to objectively justify direct discrimination. As observed above, most 
respondent employers denied discriminatory conduct at the tribunal but in a number of 
cases they claimed, sometimes as an alternative defence, that their treatment was 
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discriminatory but was objectively justified. Article 6 of the Framework Directive 
provides that: 
Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds 
of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of 
national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a 
legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour 
market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 
This was transposed in the Age Regulations as: 
3(1) a person (‘A’) discriminates against another person (‘B’) if 
(a) on grounds of B’s age, A treats B less favourably than he treats or 
would treat other persons, or 
(b) A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which he applies 
or would apply equally to persons not of the same age group as B, 
but 
(i) puts or would put persons of the same age group as B at 
a particular disadvantage when compared with other 
persons, and 
(ii) puts B at that disadvantage, 
and A cannot show the treatment or, as the case may be, provision, 




The Directive’s phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’ was transposed as 
‘proportionate’, whilst ‘legitimate aim’ is not circumscribed using any examples. The 
objective justification defence in the Regulations, criticised as ‘wide and uncertain’,
34
 
therefore fell into two sections – firstly, the discriminatory treatment must have a 
legitimate aim, and secondly, proportionate means must be used to achieve the aim.  
                                                          
33
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7.4.1: Legitimate aims 
7.4.1.1: Introduction 
The government preferred to take an open interpretation to ‘legitimate aims’ 
when transposing the Framework Directive, not producing a ‘restrictive and 
prescriptive list’
35
 and ‘legitimate’ is not defined in the legislation. The EAT has 
insisted that: 
equality laws are not designed to determine for companies what 
might be appropriate objectives. A business which places 
considerable weight on environmental or charitable objectives, even 
if they do not believe that they have only direct business benefit, can 
pray these in aid as legitimate aims.
36
  
Consequently employers may attach weight to their own objectives in 
establishing a legitimate aim and are able to cite, not only broad aims such as 
‘business needs,’ ‘considerations of efficiency’ and ‘facilitation of employment 
planning,’
37
 but also those that do not even have any direct business effect. In Seldon v 
Clarkson Wright & Jakes the Court of Appeal found that ‘an aim intended to produce 
a happy work place has to be within or consistent with the government's social policy 
justification for the Regulations’
38
 and in Rolls Royce plc v Unite the Union the ability 
to select employees for redundancy in a ‘peaceful manner’
39
 was sufficient as a 
legitimate aim.  
The legitimate aim is able to be established ex post facto as ‘a discriminatory 
measure may be justified by a legitimate aim other than that which was specified at the 
time when the measure was introduced’.
40
 Conversely, it has been asserted that a 
‘legitimate aim is not the same thing as a current business need’ but it could have been 
a need at the time the discriminatory action was initiated.
41
 In other words, the 
employer has the right to declare an aim that was either important at the time the 
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discriminatory conduct was initiated or has become relevant in the following period, 
giving extremely wide latitude.  
Legitimate aims may in themselves accept the legitimacy of ageism. For 
example, one of the government’s suggested legitimate aims is ‘the recruitment and 
retention of older people’
42
 – it is hard to see how this is not discriminatory to younger 
age groups. Using the Framework Directive for guidance, it is apparent that age quota 
systems
43
 and age-based selection and reward procedures
44
 are acceptable, 
notwithstanding the goal of ‘equal treatment’.
45
 Equal treatment of all generations 
cannot occur when age-based criteria form the raison d’être of legitimate aims, 
highlighting the shortcomings of the goal. The tension that can arise between 
generations with regard to employment is very apparent when examining aims 
connected to redundancy, recruitment and retirement ages. Indeed, the ECJ
46
 and the 
Supreme Court
47
 have considered this issue when examining the need for default 
retirement ages and confirmed that the need to distribute employment between the 
generations is a legitimate aim and can be achieved by forcing older workers to retire.  
The Directive gives other suggestions for legitimate aims such as employment 
policy, labour market and vocational training objectives.
48
 In MacCulloch v ICI
49
 the 
EAT proposed that an aim of encouraging turnover and preventing blockage in the 
employment system by tempting older workers to leave could be a legitimate aim as 
this was an employment policy objective.
50
 The Directive was intended to encourage 
the continued employment of older workers, not to tempt them away with early 
withdrawal payments, indicating that legitimate aims can even be contrary to the 
intentions of the Directive. There is surely a distinction to be made between 
appropriate employment policy objectives and those that may be contrary to the 
intentions of the Directive itself. 
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A vital question which should be addressed is whether employers are required to 
have social and employment factors at the heart of justification of discriminatory 
treatment. The ECJ has held that ‘Article 6(1) … imposed on Member States the 
burden of establishing to a high standard of proof the legitimacy of the aim relied on 
as a justification.’
51
 The Court of Appeal interpreted this as underlining the 
‘distinction between justification of the legislation which either renders lawful or 
unlawful the actions of an employer or a firm, and those actions themselves as 
contemplated by the legislation’
52
 and whilst legislation had to ‘be justified by 
reference primarily to social and employment policy choices, it did not follow that any 
particular employer or firm, seeking to justify the enforcement of a retirement age, 
also had to establish such an aim’.
53
 Thus whilst the justification of discriminatory 
treatment provided for in legislation must satisfy a high standard of proof, it does not 
follow that employers must satisfy this rigorous standard. This interpretation gives the 
employer more flexibility in setting out his objectives as it appears that aims do not 
have to be closely related to social and employment policies.  
In the consideration of Heyday
54
 at the ECJ, Age UK complained that the 
justification defence, including the phrase ‘legitimate aim,’ failed to comply with the 
duty of legal certainty as it transposed the Framework Directive in ‘a vague and 
general way’ and ‘the failure to identify what the social aims were results in a situation 
where the private interests of the employer can be permitted to usurp the policy-
making role of the state’.
55
 After the reference for a preliminary ruling, Mr Justice 
Blake concluded that the government was afforded a broad measure of discretion in 
transposing the Directive but concentrated in his judgment on the legitimate aim of the 
default retirement age rather than addressing the issue of employers’ aims. However, 
he offered contradictory guidance to that proffered in Seldon and stated that the: 
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private employer is not afforded the wider margin of discretion in the 
application of the regulation that the state is
56
 … the individual 
employer would have a more rigorous task in justifying particular 
practices or treatment in reliance on the social aim.
57
  
This conflicting view on whether the aim should be rigorously examined for its 
‘social’ content led to inconsistent decisions at the tribunal. Some tribunals felt that 
there must be a social aim, although most did not. If an employer has to put forward 
social and employment policy reasons supporting a legitimate aim more age 
discrimination claims made to the tribunal would succeed as most employers had only 
private, financial reasons with which to justify their discriminatory conduct in the 
judgments examined as part of this study.  
7.4.1.2: Legitimate aims and ‘cost plus’ 
The government has asserted that ‘discrimination will not be justified merely 
because it may be more expensive not to discriminate’.
58
 This may be difficult to 
differentiate from justification based on ‘business needs’ as ultimately all employers 
have costs at the heart of their business needs. The ECJ reaffirmed in 2010 that 
‘rigorous personnel management is a budgetary consideration and cannot therefore 
justify discrimination’
59
 and although it referred to a sex discrimination case there has 
been no definitive assertion that age discrimination should be treated differently to 
sex. In Cross v British Airways
60
 the court indicated that an ‘employer seeking to 
justify a discriminatory provision, criterion or practice cannot rely solely on 
considerations of cost. He can put cost into the balance however, together with other 
justifications if there are any’.
61
 This has often been interpreted as the ‘cost-plus’ rule, 
indicating that cost alone cannot form the basis of legitimate aims.  
However, Mr Justice Underhill, President of the Employment Tribunal, in the 
EAT in Woodcock v Cumbria PCT,
62
 although clearly stating that ‘the avoidance of 
cost is not in itself a legitimate aim,’ went on to contradict that, saying: 
                                                          
56
 ibid para 92. 
57
 ibid para 97. 
58
 Department of Trade and Industry (n 35) 4.1.16. 
59
 C-486/08 Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols v Land Tirol [2010] IRLR 631. 
60
 Cross v British Airways [2005] UKEAT 0572_04_2303, [2005] IRLR 423. 
61
 ibid [72] (Mr Justice Burton).  
62
 Woodcock v Cumbria PCT [2010] UKEAT 0489_09_1211, [2011] ICR 143. 
207 
 
we find it hard to see the principled basis for a rule that such 
considerations can never by themselves constitute sufficient 
justification or why they need the admixture of some other element 
in order to be legitimised. The adoption of such a rule, it seems to us, 
tends to involve parties and tribunals in artificial game-playing – 




He went on to find in Woodcock that ‘cost saving’ alone was sufficient to form a 
legitimate aim. This suggests that in claims of age discrimination the ‘plus’ in the 
‘cost-plus’ rule has been abandoned. If cost is the only factor involved in a workplace 
decision this may mean older workers find themselves lawfully discriminated against 
as employers trying to make cost savings may target those most highly paid. Older 
workers are often paid more than younger workers because they have been in a 
position for a longer period, gaining valuable experience and may be on higher salary 
scales than those younger. The precedent established in Woodcock, confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal,
64
 is now being used as a precedent in other types of discrimination 
claims for the fact that cost alone can suffice to justify a discriminatory policy.
65
  
Mr Justice Underhill has since reasserted that cost-saving in redundancy 
selection is a legitimate aim.
66
 In Land Registry v Benson a group of 50-54 year old 
workers were not selected for early retirement rather than those older or younger 
because ‘the most costs would be saved’.
67
 It was found that it ‘is (to put it no higher) 
legitimate for a body such as the Appellant, like any business, to seek to break even 
year-on-year and to make redundancies in order to help it do so where necessary’.
68
 
Hard-pressed employers, especially in times of recession, may find themselves 
proposing an aim based on costs alone, but the uncertainty surrounding this may lead 
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In Loxley v BAE Systems
70
 the EAT declared that preventing workers close to 
retirement receiving a financial ‘windfall’ by awarding them reduced redundancy 
payments was a legitimate aim. In Kraft Foods UK Ltd v Hastie
71
 the EAT followed 
the decision in Loxley and held that a similar provision which prevents workers 
‘recovering more than they would have been entitled to earn had the employment 
continued is necessarily justifiable whether the amount of the windfall is large or 
small’.
72
 However, in an apparently contradictory statement the EAT insisted that such 
a scheme depends upon length of service rather than being compensatory – ‘an 
employee is entitled to payment even if he or she walks into an equally well-paid job 
the next day and suffers no loss of earnings at all’.
73
 Mr Justice Underhill admitted this 
approach appeared to be an ‘anomaly’ but found that the compensatory element was 
sufficient to allow justification.  
Those older workers who have been made redundant and desire to continue 
working past the age of sixty-five will find it very difficult to find work, especially in 
the current recession, yet their expected loss of remuneration will be larger than those 
who had expected to retire at 65 or earlier. The ‘windfall’ may accurately reflect the 
amount that such employees would have expected to receive had they continued to 
work and indeed evidence was given to the court in Kraft that many employees chose 
to work for that company after their 65
th
 birthday and ‘were normally permitted to do 
so’.
74
 The EAT found this fact ‘immaterial, unless he (Hastie) had a legal right to work 
beyond that age’ and it will be interesting to see how the tribunals and courts approach 
this issue now the DRA has been abandoned. The effect of this continued age 
discrimination against older workers, permitted by the exception in Regulation 30 of 
the 2006 Regulations,
75
 is glaringly illustrated in this judgment. Workers who are 
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younger and obtain a new job quickly may also receive a ‘windfall’ yet there is no 
suggestion that their enhanced payment should be reduced. 
A similar type of ‘windfall’ was discussed by the ECJ. In Ingeniørforeningen i 
Danmark v Region Syddanmark
76
 a 63 year old’s job severance allowance was refused 
because he was entitled to a substantial pension. The ECJ, although concluding the 
treatment was not proportionate, felt that it was a ‘legitimate aim’ to prevent an 
‘allowance from being claimed by persons who are not seeking new employment but 
will receive a replacement income in the form of an occupational old-age pension’.
77
 
However, in Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz,
78
 in the context of sex 
discrimination, the ECJ held that a legitimate aim must ‘correspond to a real need’.
79
 
Denying workers a ‘windfall’ hardly seems to ‘correspond with a real need.’ Does an 
employer really ‘need’ to deny an employee a payment he/she would otherwise 
receive but for age? Moreover, younger workers who receive enhanced redundancy 
payments and obtain alternative work soon after also receive windfalls. These 
‘windfalls’ were only concerned with cost, indicating again that cost alone can 
determine a legitimate aim in age discrimination claims. 
The ECJ was asked to consider this issue directly in Fuchs and Köhler v Land 
Hessen
80
 in 2011. Fuchs was a state prosecutor in Land Hessen forced to retire at 65 as 
part of a cost-saving measure. The German national court asked ‘Does an interest in 
saving budgetary resources and labour costs … represent a legitimate aim within the 
meaning of Article 6(1)?’
81
 It received the reply that ‘while budgetary considerations 
can underpin the chosen social policy of a Member State and influence the nature or 
extent of the measures that the Member State wishes to adopt, such considerations 
cannot in themselves constitute a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 6(1) of 
Directive 2000/77’.
82
 The ECJ’s judgment, criticised as ‘verging on 
incomprehensible,’
83
 concentrated on the aim of the legislation rather than the aim of 
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an individual employer and was inconclusive although this seems to suggest that cost 
alone cannot form a legitimate aim.  
 
7.4.1.3: Legitimate aims in judgment reports 
The lack of definitive guidance on the meaning of ‘legitimate’ led to inconsistent 
interpretation of the Regulations by tribunals and indeed, in one folio report found on 
the Register Employment Judge Hodgson stated that ‘It is unclear to us what exactly is 
meant by ‘legitimate’ in the legislation’.
84
 Nonetheless tribunals found in many claims 
from as early as 2007 that cost alone could form the basis of acceptable aims. In 
Bloxham v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
85
 the reform of a pension scheme at a legal 
firm, instigated to save the firm money, was held as legitimate with little discussion.  
However, in a handful of cases cost reasons alone were found not legitimate. In 
Patterson v Merseyside Police Authority
86
 the tribunal found that a pension plan which 
benefitted older but not younger workers did not have a legitimate aim as it was solely 
concerned with saving the Police Authority money. Employment Judge Creed found 
the justification was flawed as there was no ‘other legitimate reason advanced’ apart 
from cost. In Rainbow v Milton Keynes Council
87
 the council’s decision to employ 
someone with a maximum of five years’ experience solely on the grounds of cost (as 
the recruit could be placed on a lower salary scale) was found unlawful. The tribunal 
stated that ‘if cost is going to be put forward as a justification for otherwise 
discriminatory practice‚ the evidence should be such that the respondent was more or 
less compelled to take the discriminatory decision for costs plus reasons. That was not 
the quality of the evidence in this case. A legitimate aim was not established’.
88
 
Similarly in Hurry v DEFRA
89
 the tribunal found that DEFRA, in refusing 
Hurry’s application to take voluntary redundancy because it was ‘not affordable’ at her 
age, put forward an aim that was purely determined by cost and as the court was 
‘bound by Cross’
90
 they found that it was not legitimate. DEFRA asked the tribunal to 
distinguish the case from Cross, arguing that Cross was concerned with sex 
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discrimination and that in an ‘age context economic factors were more likely to 
feature’.
91
 However, Employment Judge Carlton insisted he was ‘not prepared to make 
a distinction between sex and age in terms of economic considerations in a defence of 
justification’
92
 and the claimant succeeded. 
Several aims were accepted by tribunals with little discussion or empirical 
evidence provided by the employer in support of their legitimacy. Some claims 
concerned employees who were objecting to the removal of pension, pay or holiday 
schemes which benefited a particular age group and were being abandoned by the 
employer because they were thought to contravene the Regulations. In these instances 
the aim of complying with the Regulations was accepted without question.
93
 Tribunals 
also found legitimate all aims based on security concerns. For example, the dismissal 
of a 74 year old security guard was justified by the aim of ‘maintaining the security of 
government buildings’
94
 as was the need to ‘avoid industrial unrest’ by bringing ‘about 
an orderly and satisfactory closure’ of a manufacturing site.
95
 
Aims which concerned health and safety were always accepted as legitimate 
without evidence. A tribunal found that the dismissal of a dental surgery cleaner was 
justified by an aim which was ensuring that the dental surgery was cleaned to a high 
standard in order to reduce the risk of infection.
96
 In Baker v National Air Traffic 
Services Ltd
97
 it was held an aim ‘to ensure existing safety processes and systems are 
not compromised … must be a business need and therefore is a legitimate aim’.
98
 
Similarly in Evans v CAA, withdrawing licences to helicopter pilots over 60 was 
justified by an aim ‘to protect the fare paying public’.
99
 Yet the ECJ in Prigge, Fromm 
and Lambach v Deutsche Lufthansa AG,
100
 interpreting the Directive very strictly, 
found that ‘air traffic safety does not constitute a legitimate aim’
101
 because it is not a 
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social policy objective ‘such as those related to employment policy, the labour market 
or vocational training’.
102
 Much more difficult to understand is the paternalistic aim 
described in Fryett v Suncrust Bakery concerning an employee’s well-being as she 
approached 65. The tribunal found the bakery’s requirement that Fryett take early 
retirement was a result of an acceptable legitimate aim of maintaining the ‘health and 
welfare’
103
 of the claimant.  
Employers often put forward a number of legitimate aims to justify their 
conduct. In Williams v Mistral Telecom
104
 a requirement that an employee be over 18 
was justified by three aims. Firstly, the employer did not want workers under 18 
wandering around Leeds City centre after 7.00pm, secondly they did not want to 
breach the Working Time Regulations by asking someone under 18 to work over the 
statutory maximum for their age and thirdly the rest of the workforce would be upset if 
someone under 18 was treated more leniently because their age necessitated it. These 
three aims were dismissed. The tribunal noted that there were many unaccompanied 
17 year olds in Leeds city centre after 8 o’clock, that it should be possible to allow an 
employee to work less than the 40 hours per week statutory maximum and if the other 
workers were told it was not lawful for him to work more hours it would probably not 
upset them. None of the aims, although based on health and safety and compliance 
with the law, were therefore found legitimate. 
In the field of education ‘maintaining quality standards in education and 
training’
105
 was cited as an aim in several cases. In Evans v Middleborough College a 
requirement that applicants produce certificates showing their qualifications was 
justified by an aim of ensuring ‘staff had adequate standards of literacy and 
numeracy’.
106
 The requirement that staff involved in a reorganisation at Stafford 
College show that they had ‘recent business experience’ was justified by the need ‘to 
maintain a skill set’ for lecturers.
107
 This aim was unquestioned by the tribunal, yet no 
evidence was given to support the proposition that recent experience was part of a 
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necessary skill set for lecturers. The dismissal of a swimming teacher who could not 
use a computer to record the swimming lessons she gave was justified by the aim of 
‘increasing efficiency,’
108
 which although a clear business need, does appear to be one 
solely based on cost and private concerns. 
When examining the aim of a discriminatory action the tribunal looks at the 
effect of the whole scheme rather than the effect on the individual claimant because it 
is the aim of the action that is being examined not the effect on the individual.
109
 This 
was stressed in Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes
110
 where it was held that legitimate 
aims are achieved by applying general policies which must be justified and the 
individual is then treated in accordance with the policy or rule. Seldon, a partner in a 
firm of solicitors, was refused the opportunity to continue working part-time past the 
age of 65 and claimed that he had suffered direct discrimination on the grounds of age. 
Had Seldon been an employee and the firm followed the procedure set out in Schedule 
6 of the Regulations
111
 the dismissal would have been automatically fair for the 
purposes of the Employment Rights Act 1996 but as a partner this procedure did not 
apply.  
Clarkson Wright & Jakes stated it had six legitimate aims. Three were found not 
acceptable – ‘ensuring that there is a turnover of Partners such that any Partner can 
expect to become Senior Partner … enabling and encouraging employees and Partners 
to make adequate financial provision for their retirement and … protecting the 
Partnership model in that, if equity Partners could not be forced to retire at 65 but 
employees could be, it would be preferable to keep lawyers as employee or salaried 
partners rather than Partners’.
112
 The tribunal thought three aims legitimate. Firstly – 
the aim of retaining associates by offering partnership opportunities after a reasonable 
period was thought acceptable, the tribunal citing Mummery LJ who, in the Court of 
Appeal, stated that maintaining expectations for younger employees was a legitimate 
policy objective.
113
 Secondly, facilitating workforce planning was an acceptable 
employment policy aim. Thirdly, an objective of maintaining a more congenial and 
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supportive culture within the firm – the ‘collegiality’ factor – was legitimate. These 
three were felt to be good business aims which encouraged associates to stay within 
the firm enabling the partnership to have a good strategy for growth.  
These aims were confirmed as legitimate by the Supreme Court
114
 which relied 
on the ECJ judgment in Rosenbladt where it was held that ‘guaranteeing workers a 
certain stability of employment and, in the long term, the promise of foreseeable 
retirement, while offering employers a certain flexibility in the management of their 




Ease of ‘succession planning’ was often cited as a reason for requiring workers 
to retire at particular ages and some tribunals accepted this as a legitimate aim, whilst 
others did not. In Hampton v Lord Chancellor
116
 an aim of planning for succession of 
younger appointees, who might then proceed to the more senior levels of the judiciary, 
was accepted as a legitimate aim. On the other hand, in Martin v Professional Game 
Match Officials
117
 which concerned the lawfulness of a rule which required football 
referees to retire at 48, the tribunal insisted that the legitimate aim must have a social 
and employment policy requirement. It held that, although football was a national 
pastime with significant public interest, that succession planning for younger referees 
did not have either a social or employment requirement.
118
 The tribunal thought that 
‘[w]e do not consider that the primary aim of the respondent is capable of meeting the 
social policy requirement … It seems to us to be purely private to the business’.
119
  
This narrower interpretation of the legislation by a first-instance tribunal is not 
evident in decisions in higher courts although has been seen in some judgments of the 
ECJ.
120
 It clearly deviates from the approach seen above in Hurry where the need to 
reduce cost, a private business aim, was accepted as legitimate. It is apparent that the 
uncertainty over the definition of legitimate and the open-ended transposition of the 
Framework Directive by the UK has led to first-instance tribunals making inconsistent 
and sometimes contradictory decisions. The uncertainty as to whether succession 
                                                          
114
 Seldon (n 47). 
115
 Rosenbladt (n 46) para 68. 
116
 (2007) ET 2300835/07. 
117
 Martin v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd (2010) ET 2802438/09. 
118
 ibid [7.6] (Rostant EJ). 
119
 ibid [7.9]. 
120
 Eg Prigge (n 100). 
215 
 
planning is a legitimate aim is reflected in the finding that, when questioned, only one 
out of 157 employers said they planned to use it in justifying a specific retirement age 
following the abolition of the default retirement age.
121
 
7.4.2: Proportionate means 
7.4.2.1: Introduction 
A test of proportionality is applied to the discriminatory conduct, which the 
Directive described as needing to be ‘appropriate and necessary’.
122
 The ECJ set out 
the classic test to consider when assessing proportionality in discrimination cases in 
Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber Von Hartz
123
 which is that the measures must ‘correspond to 
a real need … are appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued and are 
necessary to that end’. The pattern seen in age discrimination cases in the USA, 
Canada and Ireland is that a strict standard of proportionality is required, backed by 
statistical evidence,
124
 of ‘reasonable necessity, not reasonableness’.
125
 This is similar 
to the rigorous manner in which the ECJ applied the standard in Mangold v Helm
126
 
where it found the test to be applied was whether the measure was ‘objectively 
necessary to the attainment of the objective’. This has been described as the ‘least 
restrictive means’
127
 test and is a three stage process. Firstly an objective evaluation is 
undertaken to assess the business need asserted, secondly, an assessment is made of 
whether the provision, criterion or practice is appropriate and thirdly, consideration is 
given as to whether the application is necessary with a view to achieving the 
objectives pursued.  
However, it has been emphasised in cases concerning other types of 
discrimination in the UK that a reference to ‘necessary’ means ‘reasonably 
necessary’.
128
 This was reiterated by Lord Justice Pill in 2005 when, in giving 
judgment in the Court of Appeal in Hardy & Hansons plc v Lax,
129
 he stated that a 
tribunal or court had ‘to make its own judgment, upon a fair and detailed analysis of 
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the working practices and business considerations involved, as to whether the proposal 
is reasonably necessary’.
130
 The House of Lords held in Barry v Midland Bank
131
 that 
applying proportionality necessitates establishing an objective balance between the 
disparate effect of the measure and the needs of the business – the more serious the 
impact on individuals, the more convincing the justification must be. In Seldon v 
Clarkson Wright & Jakes the EAT confirmed that the balancing act is to be made 
between the reasonable needs of the undertaking and the discriminatory effects of the 
measure rather than on the impact on a particular worker.
132
  
The government has stated that the discriminatory conduct must contribute to the 
pursuit of the legitimate aim, it must be weighed against the discriminatory effects and 
if another measure can be used instead it should be seriously considered.
133
 If, for 
example, individual performance assessments can be used rather than using an age 
proxy, they should be seriously considered.
134
 The test used in the UK courts appears 
similar to that required in the disability case Collins v Royal National Theatre, where 
the lack of a ‘genuine examination’
135
 proved fatal to the employer. Nonetheless in 
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Homer Mr Justice Elias stressed that 
concrete evidence was not always necessary but justification may be established ‘by 
reasoned and rational judgment. What is impermissible is a justification based simply 
on subjective impression or stereotyped assumptions’.
136
 
Not only have UK courts found that cost alone can constitute a legitimate aim, it 
can also form the basis of proportionate means if evidence can be provided to show 
that the measure was necessary. If a measure is vital for financial reasons it is also 
clearly appropriate and therefore justifiable. In the sex discrimination case Redcar and 
Cleveland Borough Council v Bainbridge,
137
 the Court of Appeal considered that cost 
alone was sufficient upon which to base an assertion of necessity. Mummery LJ stated 
that we: 
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accept that a large public employer might be able to demonstrate that 
the constraints on its finances were so pressing that it could not do 
other than it did and that it was justified in putting the need to 
cushion the men's pay reduction ahead of the need to bring the 
women up to parity with the men. But we do not accept that that 
result should be a foregone conclusion. The employer must be put to 




In Loxley v BAE Systems
139
 the EAT held that when considering proportionality 
it would also be significant that a collective agreement with a Trade Union supported 
the employer’s justification. Mr Justice Elias cited the analysis given in Palacios de la 
Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA
140
 where the ECJ asserted that the fact that retirement 
rules had been collectively agreed was a relevant consideration when determining 
whether treatment is proportionate, but added that the action must still be subject to 
critical analysis. Indeed the ECJ in Rosenbladt noted that collective agreements 
allowed a balancing act to be undertaken by those (that is, the workers and the 
employer together) who were well-placed to understand the diverging interests 
apparent in ‘the overall situation in the labour market concerned, but also of the 
specific features of the jobs in question’.
141
 
This view was taken in Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes
142
 (which concerned a 
partnership) by the Court of Appeal where it was held that ‘it is a legitimate 
consideration that a rule of this kind has been agreed by parties of equal bargaining 
power’
143
 and in the EAT where it was suggested that employers may be able to 
protect their position by showing that they had tried to reach a settlement with all 
concerned.
144
 A Trade Union has significant bargaining power but it would be 
doubtful if an agreement with a small representative group of workers would have 
sufficiently ‘equal’ bargaining power with an employer. However, even if 
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discriminatory treatment is agreed by the majority of staff it must still be shown that 
proportionate means were used in achieving that aim. It was held in Pulham v London 
Borough of Barking and Dagenham
145
 that in the absence of evidence that alternatives 
to the discriminatory conduct were considered ‘union negotiation is a factor of little or 
no weight in deciding whether the outcome reached struck a proportionate balance’.
146
  
The findings in Rolls Royce v Unite,
147
 although not a case considered by a 
tribunal or the EAT, give guidance on proportionality when considering a length of 
service criterion in a redundancy selection matrix. Rolls Royce sought a ruling on 
whether such a criterion was lawful as it may indirectly discriminate against younger 
workers. The company unsuccessfully appealed against the High Court’s decision that 
the criterion could be objectively justified. Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal 
thought the length of service criterion proportionate because it had been negotiated as 
part of a collective agreement, there were several other criterion in the matrix, it was a 
better solution than a ‘last in first out’ criterion and older workers would have more 
difficulty finding jobs than those younger.
148
 Lord Justice Wall held that: 
the ‘proportionate means’ is in my judgment amply demonstrated by 
the fact that the length of service criterion is only one of a substantial 
number of criteria for measuring employee suitability for 
redundancy, and that it is by no means determinative. Equally, it 
seems to me, the length of service criterion is entirely consistent with 
the overarching concept of fairness.
149
 
On the other hand Lord Justice Aikens thought that a length of service criterion 
was not age discriminatory as it applied to all employees, whatever their age,
150
 
following the line of reasoning given in Homer.
151
 Selection for redundancy based on 
length of service is likely therefore to be found lawful if that criterion is one of a 
number of factors and has been collectively agreed, rather than being ‘necessary’ as 
the normal test would dictate. 
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However, the courts in Rolls Royce v Unite
152
 went further and found that a 
length of service criterion in a redundancy selection also ‘falls squarely’
153
 within the 
exception contained in the Age Regulations for service related benefits.
154
 Benefits 
which are based on length of service given to reward loyalty and commitment help 
employers retain experienced staff but may be considered indirectly discriminatory as 
younger workers may be placed at a disadvantage because they are less likely to have 
long service. The Framework Directive specifically accepts this type of benefit as 
objectively justifiable
155
 and the Regulations contained an exemption for service 
related benefits: 
Regulation 32:  
(1) … nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render it unlawful for a 
person A, in relation to the award of any benefit by him, to put a 
worker B at a disadvantage when compared with another worker C, 
if and to the extent that the disadvantage suffered by B is because 
B’s length of service is less than that of C. 
(2) Where B’s length of service exceeds 5 years, it must 
reasonably appear to A that the way in which he uses the criterion of 
length of service, in relation to the award in respect of which B is put 
at a disadvantage, fulfils a business need of his undertaking (for 
example, by encouraging the loyalty or motivation, or rewarding the 
experience, of some or all of his workers). 
(3) In calculating a worker’s length of service for these 
purposes, A shall calculate (a) the length of time the worker has been 
working for him doing work which he reasonably considers to be at 
or above a particular level (assessed by reference to the demands 
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The employer has discretion to reward only ‘some’ of his workers in Regulation 
32(2) and in the method of calculation of length of service for each individual 
employee.
157
 Regulation 32 has been described as being ‘employer-centric’
158
 as it 
allowed most age-related benefits to continue past five years as the employer could 
decide, for example, to base the calculation on the amount of time an employee has 
been doing a specific task and a new five year period could begin many times 
throughout each employee’s working-life. After this period it must have ‘reasonably’ 
appeared to the employer that the benefit fulfilled a business need, which is a very 
weak standard of justification.  
Sir Thomas Morison in the High Court in Rolls Royce v Unite
159
 gave an 
expansive interpretation of the meaning of ‘benefit’ in Regulation 32 in that:  
the words are general. In a redundancy selection matrix it seems to 
me clear that to give points for long service does confer on the 
employee concerned a benefit ... To remain in employment whilst 
others lose their jobs would properly be described as a benefit. To 
have the benefit of long service is a normal use of language.
160
  
The Court of Appeal agreed that ‘a length of service criterion is plainly capable of 
constituting a ‘benefit’ within Reg. 32’.
161
 This very broad interpretation conflicts with 
the notion that exceptions to the legislation are normally strictly construed. As a 
‘benefit,’ falling under Regulation 32, employers may easily be able to defend such a 
provision, as long as it ‘reasonably appears’ to fulfil a business need. As such, they 
will be able to continue to discriminate in ‘favour’ of older workers in redundancy 
selection procedures, offering them an early exit from work, contrary to the intentions 
of the Framework Directive which was intended to promote their employment. 
This interpretation considerably expanded the scope of Regulation 32 and 
created two different tests of justification of discriminatory treatment, introducing 
further uncertainty and inconsistency into the application of the Regulations. 
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7.4.2.2: Proportionate means in judgment reports 
Tribunals had a mixed approach to the examination of proportionate means – 
some were rigorous in their use of the tests and assessment whilst others were not. In 
Bloxham v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
162
 the claimant was able to establish that 
he had been directly discriminated against but his partners demonstrated that they had 
used proportionate means in achieving their legitimate aim of reducing the cost of a 
pension scheme for younger partners.
163
 In considering the proportionate means used 
the tribunal felt that the measure was justified as ‘no alternative less discriminatory 
solution could be conceived’.
164
 Freshfields produced 17 bundles of evidence showing 
that it had consulted widely on alternative measures although most respondent 
employers could not show such diligent investigations.  
Consultation with the workforce, whether through a union or directly with 
employees, helped employers justify discriminatory measures in a number of claims. 
For example, it was found in Bloxham v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
165
 that a 
collectively agreed discriminating provision was more likely to be objectively justified 
and therefore lawful
166
 and in Syratt v Gate Gourmet
167
 a selection matrix which 
included length of service as a criterion had been agreed with the union so was 
therefore thought ‘reasonable and lawful’.
168
  
Constructive and comprehensive consultation with employees was not 
undertaken in Sharma v Millbrook Beds,
169
 although the employer had met with a 
union representative to try to solve the problem of a potentially discriminatory bonus 
scheme. Millbrook’s action of terminating employment agreements and asking staff to 
sign new contracts with a new bonus structure was found not to be a proportionate 
response to the problem of an age discriminatory bonus scheme because discussions 
with staff had not been comprehensive. The tribunal was ‘not satisfied that there was 
any serious or any consideration at all [of] other methods of seeking a solution to the 
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 It suggested that ‘the respondent could have consulted with 
the entire workforce, could have sought agreement to the change in the terms, could 
have indicated that if change was not accepted then steps would have to be taken to 
achieve to what amounted to a unilateral variation in contract’.
171
 The new bonus 
structure may well have been the most suitable solution to the problem but the 
employer could not show it had sought to find an alternative.  
In Hampton v Lord Chancellor
172
 the Lord Chancellor defended discriminatory 
treatment by claiming that Recorders were subject to a retirement age of 65 in order to 
allow younger recorders to gain sufficient experience of varied cases to enable them to 
qualify as judges. The tribunal found that as a feasible alternative existed, that is, 
ensuring list arrangements allocated varied cases amongst those in the ‘pool’, the 
retirement age was not proportionate. By not making an examination of the alternative 
solutions which would be non-discriminatory the Lord Chancellor was found to have 
unlawfully discriminated against Hampton. 
Foster v Stafford College
173
 concerned a redundancy selection matrix criterion 
of ‘recent and relevant business experience’. Foster claimed indirect discrimination as 
it was harder for him to satisfy this apparently neutral provision by virtue of his age as 
he had worked at the college for many years. A tribunal felt that although Stafford 
College had reached agreement with a trade union this was not relevant because the 
measure was not necessary. It thought that by ‘allowing him to attend a one week 
placement after his provisional scoring the legitimate aim would have been achieved 
and the claimant would have scored maximum marks on this criterion and thereby 
avoided dismissal’
174
 so the treatment was not proportionate. The overriding 
consideration was that the necessity of the measure should be established. 
The proportionate means used must achieve the legitimate aim of the employer. 
In Galt v National Starch and Chemical Ltd
175
 the employer had ‘consulted 
extensively with a Trade Union which had never raised any objection to their course of 
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 but the company’s enhanced redundancy scheme was not introduced in 
order to achieve their legitimate aim of closing down the site peacefully. The tribunal 
found that the Trade Union, although consulted, was in any event unlikely to object to 
the scheme as it was more generous than the statutory scheme. The new scheme did 
discriminate against employees under 40 years old, but would not necessarily reduce 
the possibility of unrest and the company had not ‘consciously addressed’
177
 the 
discrimination. The consultation, although extensive, did not address the 
discriminating conduct precisely. 
Proportionality was also discussed in Martin v SS Photay & Associates
178
 where 
a 70 year old worker was dismissed as her employer felt she had fallen into a high risk 
category for health and safety. The employer obtained no medical evidence about 
Martin’s health nor discussed her performance or health at any time and had 
‘assumed’ a 70 year old was no longer capable of carrying out her job. The tribunal 
decided that it was not proportionate to dismiss an employee without detailed 
investigations. 
These six cases show that some tribunals were rigorous in carrying out an 
objective balancing act and demanding that consultations with staff were undertaken, 
that alternatives were considered and that the treatment was reasonably necessary 
before a discriminatory measure was introduced. However, in numerous other cases 
the tribunal was less meticulous. In Fadairov v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
179
 the 
41 year old claimant had extensive experience in legal work and felt a requirement that 
a paralegal must have completed the Legal Practice Course (LPC) was indirectly 
discriminatory. He complained that older workers were less likely to have completed 
an LPC as in the past it was a course that only aspiring solicitors undertook, rather 
than paralegals. Freshfields claimed that passing the LPC was an essential criterion as 
the worker had to have a good grounding in the law. The tribunal found that to require 
a suitably qualified worker was a legitimate aim and that the criterion was 
proportionate. Nevertheless, it is not apparent why the tribunal thought it ‘reasonably 
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necessary’ as alternative qualifications were available and other screening criteria did 
not appear to have been considered by the respondent. 
The requirement for up-to-date qualifications was a problem for several older 
claimants as successive generations appear to give more weight to new educational 
criteria rather than older qualifications by which to measure competence. The 52 year 
old claimant in Evans v Middlesbrough College
180
 could not prove he possessed the 
required qualifications for a teaching position. The employer insisted that applicants 
produce certificates for GCSE’s and ‘A’ level’s to show they had adequate standards 
of literacy and numeracy. Evans claimed that older applicants would be less likely to 
have certificates, as he had lost his several years previously, but the tribunal found that 
requiring proof by way of certificates was a proportionate means of achieving their 
aim without evidence that the College had considered alternative means of ensuring 
that teachers had adequate standards. 
McCluskey v Edge Hill University
181
 concerned a 59 year old retired head-
teacher who applied for a position as associate tutor at Edge Hill University. She had 
37 years’ experience in teaching, including ‘extensive management experience in 
education’.
182
 She was unsuccessful in her application because the University 
maintained that a requirement to hold a degree was an essential prerequisite for the 
position. The B.Ed degree was not introduced until 1968, a year after McCluskey had 
begun her teaching course. Accordingly, she made a complaint of indirect age 
discrimination to the tribunal on the basis that the requirement to possess a degree put 
her at a particular disadvantage.  
Both parties agreed with the tribunal that the test for proportionality should be 
consistent with that discussed in Hampson v Department of Education and Science
183
 - 
that ‘‘justifiable’ requires an objective balance between the discriminatory effect of 
the condition and the reasonable needs of the party who applies the condition’.
184
 The 
tribunal felt the discriminatory effect on the claimant was unfavourable but it was 
thought possible that she would have been able to get a similar post at another 
university, as not all universities insisted on graduate status. She could also convert 
                                                          
180
 Evans (n 99). 
181
 (2008) ET 2405206/07. 
182
 ibid [8(e)].  
183
 [1990] 2 All ER 25. 
184
 McCluskey (n 181) [9] (Chapman EJ) citing Hampson (n 183) (Balcombe LJ). 
225 
 
her qualification into a degree, by means of additional study, and reapply. On the other 
hand the University was found to need ‘external credibility with the Quality Assurance 
Agency for Higher Education, and to have a fully flexible cohort of potential staff 
qualified to discharge the full range of responsibilities in the ... academic contract’.
185
  
The tribunal found that the needs of the University outweighed the 
discriminatory effect of the condition and the requirement was a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim and justifiable. Yet this requirement was not ‘reasonably 
necessary’ as the tribunal recognised that other universities did not insist on graduate 
status and Edge Hill could have introduced other measures which would have allowed 
the recognition of equivalent qualifications and experience.  
The objective balancing act should be made between the reasonable needs of the 
employer and the discriminatory impact of the condition, as discussed in Seldon.
186
 
The tribunal considered the effect on McCluskey, but did not examine the impact on 
others in her position or on the realisation of the objectives of the Framework 
Directive. Lady Hale SCJ in Homer in the Supreme Court felt that it was the impact of 
the provision on the claimant or affected group, not the broader effect that was to be 
justified
187
 although Lord Hope SCJ indicated that the effect of the discrimination on 
‘others may, however, have a bearing on the issue of justification when it is looked at 
more broadly’.
188
 Numerous other applicants may have been discouraged from 
applying for a job at the University. Whilst McCluskey concerns an individual claim of 
indirect discrimination, anti-discrimination legislation is based upon the need to 
address public policy concerns such as the attainment of social cohesion and the need 
to pay particular attention to supporting older workers, in order to increase their 
participation in the labour force. Discriminatory policies which might lead to inter-
generational conflict and a breakdown of social inclusion do not lend themselves to 
being considered proportionate. They hinder cohesiveness and devalue the experience 
of older workers, excluding them from the workforce, thereby preventing the 
attainment of the objectives of the Framework Directive. This consideration must 
surely add weight to the assessment of the impact of the condition.  
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Requirements for varying periods of ‘experience’ led to several claims of age 
discrimination which were sometimes found proportionate without rigorous 
examination. One of the respondent employers, Aspect Finance, in Keane v Goodman 
Masson Recruitment Services Ltd
189
 justified their aim of recruiting a ‘recently 
qualified accountant’ by stating that ‘someone with too much experience may become 
bored with the role with the result that they would have to continue recruiting’.
190
 No 
evidence was provided by the employer to support their claim that someone with less 
than two years’ experience would be less likely to become bored, or that someone with 
more experience would become bored. Employment Judge Lewzey found without 
discussion that Aspect Finance had demonstrated they used a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim and it is not apparent that any objective balancing exercise 
was carried out.  
In claims where public safety was concerned tribunals always found 
discriminatory treatment proportionate and justified, sometimes without convincing 
evidence to show the conduct was necessary. In Evans v Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA)
191
 the claimant was a helicopter pilot prevented from flying when he reached 
his 60th birthday. The CAA produced evidence to show the policy was not out of step 
with the majority of other countries and suggested there was an increased risk of pilots 
over the age of 60 suffering from ‘sudden cardiovascular incapacitation.’ The tribunal 
relied on guidance on the approach to be taken on proportionality given in the human 
rights case R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School
192
 and held that it ‘would 
be inappropriate for a court, lacking the experience, background and detailed 
knowledge of the decision-maker, to seek to overrule the decision-maker’s judgment 
on matters which fall particularly within its expertise’.
193
 Using the guidance given in 
Begum transfers weight to the employer’s position on the proportionate means and 
virtually removes the responsibility of the assessment from the tribunal. However, the 
tribunal made it clear that they were unhappy with the evidence for justification which 
was: 
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only one page of an incapacity study which was, in effect, a 
literature review. This suggested something approaching a lack of 
rigour by the respondent in its work in an area which is likely to 
affect more pilots if more wish to carry on working beyond the age 
of 60 and the tribunal hopes this will be addressed in the future.
194
  
Despite this lack of evidence the tribunal was prepared to find the action 
proportionate, perhaps indicating a lack of rigour on its own behalf. They could, for 
instance, have insisted that further evidence was obtained or asked whether the CAA 
had considered alternatives such as regular medical investigations to ensure pilots 
were not at risk of incapacitation. However, when tribunals carry out their balancing 
exercise of weighing the discriminatory impact against the legitimate aim, if the aim is 
sufficiently important, the emphasis on the proportionate means seems to be less 
demanding.  
This selection of ten decisions taken from the Judgment Register shows that the 
strict standard of assessing proportionate means found in Ireland, USA and Canada 
and in the ECJ in other types of discrimination cases was not adhered to in age 
discrimination claims in first instance tribunals in England and Wales. Although some 
tribunals used the rigorous three-stage, least restrictive means test, ensuring that the 
treatment was appropriate and necessary, others were less demanding in their 
assessment and were prepared to find that discriminatory measures, utilised with little 
consultation with employees, consideration of alternatives or evidence that the means 
were reasonably necessary, were lawful. 
Claims where proportionality was an issue were more likely to be the subject of 
appeals, particularly when tribunals had not undertaken detailed investigations into the 
financial aspects of discriminatory conduct. In MacCulloch v ICI
195
 the EAT referred a 
claim back to the tribunal because of its failure to show a ‘considered recognition of 
the degree of difference in the payment made to the claimant and to her 
comparator’.
196
 In Pulham v London Borough of Barking and Dagenham
197
 the EAT 
referred a claim back to the tribunal because it had inadequately assessed the financial 
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implications of a discriminatory bonus payment scheme and the details of a local 
authority’s budget proposals. The EAT in Loxley v BAE Systems
198
 thought the 
tribunal had failed to analyse detailed financial information about the various benefits 
paid by the employer and sent it back to be reheard. They found ‘nowhere in the 
decision is there any assessment of what his pension would be, or how that related to 
the redundancy payments’.
199
 No assessment was made of the disparate financial 
impact on the individual but this was a complex case and it may be that tribunals need 
more help in such investigations as the fiscal consequences of some measures are very 
complicated. 
7.5: Compensation awards 
As indicated in Chapter 5.7, compensation awards for successful claimants were 
usually low and often did not cover the cost of legal representation. The size of awards 
varied considerably both between and within tribunals. For example, Beatham v 
Duchy Catering
200
 and Sears v Tarleton Council
201
 concerned 65 year old workers 
who were not informed of the right to continue working under Schedule 6.
202
 Both 
claims were heard at the Liverpool Tribunal but were in front of different panels. 
Beatham received £16,497 whilst Sears received £2,106. The Tribunal in Beatham 
allowed a £6,000 injury to feelings award and an award for future loss, whilst in Sears 
an injury to feelings of award of £2,000 was given and no sum for future loss as the 
Tribunal felt the employee could have been retired fairly with the employer paying no 
salary if the correct procedure had been used (as could Beatham). The facts of these 
two cases were very similar yet the outcome for the claimants, although both 
successful, was very different. 
Tribunals awarded low amounts of compensation to successful claimants who 
were near the former default retirement age as they assumed that the worker would 
retire at 65, despite assertions that they would have carried on.
203
 A typical award was 
£241.62 which was ordered in Chivers v Monmouthshire County Council
204
 when the 
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employer retired the claimant without complying with the statutory procedure in 
Schedule 6. This award compares starkly with that given in Plewes v Adams Pork 
Products,
205
 one of the very few cases where a period of work past 65 was included in 
the calculation. Plewes was a 65 year old factory operative who received £40,332.70 
compensation, including £7,500 for injury to feelings. He stated that ‘he was fit and 
willing to work’
206
 and wanted to continue for ‘at least another three years’
207
 and both 
his line manager and supervisor expressed the view that they would need him for 
another five years.
208
 Yet the tribunal estimated he would work for another 66 weeks 
and based his compensation on that length of time because ‘of the increasing 
likelihood of ill-health’.
209
 Plewes expressed his despair at being ‘left on the scrap-
heap,’ feeling ‘totally deflated’ and said the discrimination had been ‘devastating’ as 
‘he had financial worries due to the uncertainty over his future’.
210
 His injury to 
feeling was articulated expertly by his Counsel (although no additional evidence was 
given in support of his claim). The fact that the employer was large, with ‘1600 
employees and a dedicated personnel department’
211
 was taken into account when 
assessing the award. This large award illustrates the difference legal representation can 
make to a claim, although if Plewes had been unsuccessful his financial worries would 
have been substantially worse. 
Those making a claim related to discrimination in recruitment typically received 
low awards. In order for such a claimant to obtain an award for future financial loss 
they must show firstly that they would have obtained the position if not for the age 
discrimination. This appears to have been very difficult for some claimants as even if 
they showed they had been unlawfully discriminated against in the selection process 
this did not necessarily mean they could prove they would have got the job. Secondly, 
the tribunal had to make an assessment of the length of time the claimant might take in 
obtaining an alternative position and most took a very optimistic view of the job 
market. For example, in Frost v David Harber Ltd
212
 the employer, who was found to 
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have unlawfully discriminated on the grounds of age, stated that in any event he would 
not have given the job to the claimant and the tribunal estimated the claimant would 
get another position very quickly. The claimant denied this would be possible as he 
had been unemployed for some time but no award was given for future financial loss. 
Few judgments were found where the tribunal thought that a claimant would find it 
difficult to obtain another job and award substantial future loss, yet unemployment 
statistics suggest this would often be a problem. 
Some awards were very low in relation to the loss suffered by the claimant and 
may not constitute a sufficient penalty to deter employers from discriminating. For 
example, in Parfett v John Lamb Partnership
213
 a 65 year old director was paid a 
£7,000 discretionary bonus whereas his 41 and 50 year old colleagues received large 
six-figure sums. He resigned, claiming age discrimination and a breakdown of mutual 
trust and confidence. The Tribunal found there ‘was no reasonable or potentially fair 
reason for the lack of a bonus’
214
 as the respondents merely stated there was no 
problem with his performance and presented no evidence. Parfett was awarded 
£66,065 which included £29,799 loss of earnings and a £5,000 injury to feelings award 
as it was felt this was ‘a less serious case’.
215
 The respondent therefore saved a 
substantial sum by discriminating against Mr Parfett as the compensation did not 
match the loss he claimed he had suffered.  
If an employer is faced with an expensive redundancy, pension or wage bill that 
can be saved by discriminating on the grounds of age, then the law does not 
adequately protect the employee from such discrimination. Large sums of money were 
saved by employers in several cases, in particular, in Woodcock v Cumbria PCT
216
 and 
Wooster v Tower Hamlets Borough Council.
217
 For such employers there is no 
deterrence to discriminatory conduct as required by the Framework Directive. Article 
17 of the Directive states that Member States ‘shall lay down the rules on sanctions … 
which may comprise the payment of compensation to the victim and must be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’. If the compensation ordered to be paid by an employer 
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is lower than the sum saved by discriminating against an employee this will be neither 
effective nor dissuasive.  
Injury to feelings awards, discussed in Chapter 5.8, usually fell into the lower 
‘Vento’ band. Tribunals sometimes gave no award whatsoever, contrary to advice 
given in the Court of Appeal. The recommendation in Vento v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire Police, currently representing the guidance that tribunals use in assessing 
such damages, is that ‘in general, awards of less than £500 are to be avoided 
altogether, as they risk being regarded as so low as not to be a proper recognition of 
injury to feelings’.
218
 Yet in Galt v National Starch and Chemical Ltd Tribunal 
Chairman Reed found that ‘we did not consider that the adoption of these measures 
was the source of any sort of upset or concern to the claimants. In those circumstances 
we considered it was appropriate to make no award to represent injury to feelings’.
219
 
The six claimants felt sufficiently ‘injured’ to make a claim to the tribunal and went to 
the expense of being represented by both counsel and solicitor. Their legal costs in 
bringing their claim, which was successful, surely outweighed their awards which 
ranged from £437.38 to £1,977.24.  
Workers often found it difficult to produce evidence of their injury to feelings. 
In Wellecomme v TFGS Construction
220
 the Tribunal handed down a default judgment 
finding that the claimant had been treated less favourably on grounds of age when 
selected for redundancy. He was awarded loss of past and future earnings of £2,700 
and asked for an injury to feelings award as being out of work had put him under 
‘considerable stress’. The Tribunal Chairman (sitting alone) stated ‘I make no separate 
award for injury to feelings in this case as the claimant's simple contention that he 
suffered from stress does not assist me in quantifying an award for injury to 
feelings’.
221
 Similarly the claimant in Kaur v The Council for Asian People
222
 said ‘she 
was shocked by her dismissal’ and claimed she had suffered stress as a result but 
because she had no further evidence was awarded £1,750 and no injury to feelings 
award. 
                                                          
218
 [2002] EWCA Civ 1871, [2003] IRLR 102 [65] (Mummery LJ). Updated in Da'Bell v National 
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children [2009] UKEAT 0227_09_2809, [2009] IRLR 19. 
219
 (2008) ET 2101804/07. 
220
 (2007) ET 23002087/07. 
221
 Wellecome v TFGS Construction (2007) ET 23002087/07 [Gumbiti-Zimuto TC]. 
222
 (2009) ET 303072/07. 
232 
 
However, substantial medical evidence of the effects of discriminatory conduct 
was provided in Koh v Sainsburys Supermarkets Ltd
223
. Koh was a 52 year old branch 
manager who was stereotyped as ‘past it’ by her regional manager. Before the 
discriminatory treatment occurred she was described as ‘fit, active and played a lot of 
sport’ and had ‘an excellent health record and no mental health issue whatsoever’.
224
 
At the hearing she produced evidence from her GP and consultant psychiatrist that she 
suffered acute stress reaction as a consequence of the discrimination, resulting in 
anxiety attacks for up to twice a day with tearfulness, loss of confidence and an 
inability to cope.
225
 She was prescribed Diazepam and sleeping tablets and suffered 
from ‘a severe depressive disorder,’
226
 ‘sleeplessness, nausea, tearfulness, loss of self-
confidence, panic attacks, loss of appetite and weight’.
227
 She had been unable to get 




The Tribunal awarded Koh £7,500 by way of injury to feelings, inclusive of 
aggravated damages, ‘since we find that her feelings were considerably injured by the 
comments and contributed significantly to her feelings of anxiety, depression and very 
low self-esteem, placing the award in the lower half of the middle of the Vento 
band’.
229
 The harassment of Ms Koh was ‘a continued campaign for a number of 
months,’
230
 and her mental health was severely affected yet the Tribunal did not find 
this was a serious case of discrimination in the context of injury to feelings.  
In another instance, Bould v Acme Jewellery Ltd,
231
 the serious harassment of a 
claimant continued over a two year period and included significant physical abuse 
along with daily humiliations by other employees, such as being elbowed, having his 
glasses knocked off, nuisance phone-calls and being subjected to verbal abuse every 
day both inside and outside the workplace. He was awarded an injury to feelings 
award of £10,000 yet this was a very serious case and a lengthy campaign. This 
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pattern of low awards was seen consistently at all tribunal offices throughout the 
period of study. 
7.6: Conclusion 
The judgments examined in this study reveal that the majority of respondent 
employers faced with discharging the burden of proof in a claim of age discrimination 
asserted, unsurprisingly, that age played no part in their treatment of the claimant. As 
‘the application of implicit biases may be nonconscious’
232
 it may be that employers 
are simply not aware that they have been age discriminatory. Numerous employers 
discharged the burden of proof by providing a comparator – the ‘token’ older worker – 
who was used to show that the employer did not discriminate on the grounds of age. 
This was particularly noticeable with employers who had a large number of employees 
covering a wide age-span and this is in part responsible for the lack of claimant 
success against large employers highlighted in Chapter 5.6.  
In many instances the capability of the claimant often became the focus of the 
tribunal and most claimants were unprepared to conduct a defence of their own 
competency to carry out their work. Although the task of discharging the burden of 
proof should have been carried by respondents, in reality claimants often needed to 
produce evidence to counter accusations of lack of capability and show that they were 
able to carry out their work. It would be beneficial to claimants to receive impartial 
advice which is needed at an early stage in the procedure, explaining the process and 
the type of evidence they will need to garner to conduct such a defence. These findings 
support those of Peters et al who found that race discrimination claimants felt 
‘relatively unprepared for their case’
233
 and who suggested that more advice should be 
given at an early stage of a claim advising claimants of the details of the process. The 
imbalance between the parties once again came to the fore, as it was apparent that 
some employers possessed far more evidence than the claimants relating to the 
capability of the worker in the form of personnel files and documented statements 
from workers who were still employed by the respondents.  
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The interpretation of the legislation by tribunals did not favour the claimant. 
Employers using the defence of justification for discriminatory conduct found that 
tribunals allowed them extremely broad scope in establishing their legitimate aims, 
which apparently may be determined ex post facto. There was a lack of certainty 
concerning the validity of aims based solely on cost and/or with no social or 
employment objective although most tribunals appeared to accept these without 
discussion. Closer scrutiny was given to the proportionate means used to achieve the 
legitimate aim but if the employer could show they had considered alternatives to the 
conduct and could show they had consulted with their workers/colleagues, as in 
Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes,
234
 it was likely the tribunal or court found it 
justified. Some tribunals did not make a strict examination or balancing assessment of 
the proportionate means and were inconsistent with the rigour with which they 
approached this assessment. Those that carried out an objective balancing act between 
the needs of the employer and the discriminatory impact of the condition did not 
necessarily look at the overall impact of the discriminating conduct as in McCluskey v 
Edge Hill University.
235
 This wide latitude given to employers towards justification 
and lax approach to interpretation of the legislation by tribunals is not conducive to the 
creation of an environment where age discrimination is deemed unacceptable. Indeed, 
this attitude is likely to allow the perpetuation of discrimination as it does not permit 
an effectual deterrent. 
Legal representation made a significant difference to the quality of a claimant’s 
application and legal representatives certainly helped attain success and higher 
compensation awards. Many claimants were uncertain how to provide evidence of 
their injury to feelings and legal representation helped significantly in this regard, but 
unfortunately tribunals generally gave low awards which often would not have 
covered the cost of such assistance. Overall compensation awards were low and 
inconsistently assessed. Awards varied considerably for claims which appear very 
similar, not only between different tribunals but within the same tribunal office with 
different panel members. The sums that were awarded barely seem to be sufficient 
compensation for the injury suffered by claimants whose application was successful.  
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Injury to feelings awards were low, even in cases where discrimination appeared 
serious and had carried on for a long period of time. Some successful claimants were 
given no injury to feeling awards whatsoever, contrary to guidance given by higher 
courts, yet clearly claimants’ ‘feelings’ had been injured sufficiently for them to make 
a claim to the tribunal. Moreover the size of compensation awards is insufficient to 
form a deterrent; some employers may find that it is financially advantageous to 
discriminate and face a claim of discrimination at the tribunal. The Directive requires 
sanctions to be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’
236
 – manifestly this is not 
being achieved at the moment. Not only does the legislation, with its weak underlying 
structure and numerous exceptions, ‘legitimise’
237
 age discrimination but the 
interpretation and implementation of the Regulations by tribunals is inconsistent and 
ineffectual. The result is a mandate for employers to continue age discriminatory 
conduct. 
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Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
8.1: Introduction 
This Chapter explores the findings of the qualitative analysis in the light of 
significant factors which arose from the quantitative analysis and provides a conclusion 
to this study. The most notable factor that emerges from both analyses is that few 
claimants alleging they had suffered age discriminatory treatment were successful after 
the consideration of the claim by a tribunal. It may be that the conclusion to be drawn 
from this is that age discrimination is not a significant problem in England and Wales – 
that more claimants would be successful if they had actually suffered unjustified, 
unfavourable treatment. But the findings of the qualitative study reveal the many 
problems that claimants had in following the application procedure, finding 
substantiating evidence and facing inconsistent and contradictory interpretations of the 
legislation by tribunals. When this is coupled with the knowledge that there is a large 
body of work which shows that many employees feel they have suffered age 
discrimination,
1
 this leads more readily to the conclusion that the legislation is not an 
adequate mechanism by which such workers could obtain redress for age 
discriminatory treatment. This is the result of a combination of a model of anti-
discrimination legislation which relies on individual fault-finding and an inflexible and 
less than exacting interpretation of statutory provisions by the judiciary.  
In order to achieve the objectives of the Framework Directive, discussed in the 
Introduction, the legislation has to broadcast a message is to society that age 
discrimination is no longer tolerable. A legislative process which depends upon an 
aggrieved individual to bring a claim must not be too complex or challenging, must 
produce fair and consistent results and must provide adequate compensation if 
potential claimants are not to be discouraged from engaging in that process. If the 
process is ineffectual in providing redress and sanctions fail to act as a deterrent there 
is no resulting pressure on employers to moderate their behaviour. No message is being 
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sent to society that ageism is being challenged by the judicial process in any 
meaningful manner and the legislation fails to challenge the ageist conduct which it 
seeks to address. 
The results discussed in this thesis show that the legislation and judicial process 
adopted in England and Wales has failed to mount a challenge to age discrimination by 
providing an effective deterrent. The proportion of unsuccessful claims over the period 
of study increased steadily and in the first quarter of 2010 the number of claims which 
failed was over six times that of those successful. The examination of folio reports 
reveals two reasons for this increase. Firstly, judicial interpretation of the legislation 
became progressively less rigorous. Tribunals after 2008 followed the precedent set at 
the Court of Appeal in Homer,
2
 finding that potentially indirectly discriminating 
provisions had consequences due to age rather than age discrimination; they also 
increasingly accepted legitimate aims which were based on ‘cost alone’ reasons as 
justification of discriminatory treatment, in the manner seen in Woodcock.
3
 Secondly 
(and more noticeably), employers became more likely to successfully defend a claim. 
As discussed in Chapter Seven, this was often achieved by an employer challenging 
the capability, conduct or credibility of the claimant or by producing a comparator to 
show they did not discriminate on the grounds of age. This reverses the traditional role 
of a comparator; although the existence of a comparator is normally essential in 
establishing that a claimant has suffered less favourable treatment, many employers 
cited the more favourable treatment of a comparator – a ‘token’ older person – as 
evidence they did not discriminate on the grounds of age.  
This Chapter discusses a number of issues which emerge from the analyses of 
judgments as highly significant. These include the inconsistency of tribunals and the 
interpretation of the legislative provisions regarding justification, the inadequate 
remedies given to claimants, the difficulty in reversing the burden of proof and the 
problems of the claimant – including the power differential between the two parties, 
the particular issues of women and those suffering multiple discrimination and the role 
of legal representation. A review of these issues provides insight into the effectiveness 
of the interpretation and implementation of the legislation. The applicability of a 
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reasonable adjustments solution to age discrimination is reflected upon and the 
appropriateness of an equal treatment model of legislation is considered. The Chapter 
closes with suggestions for further research and proffers final conclusions. 
8.2: The Tribunal  
The importance of the aim of eliminating inequality within the European 
Community is stressed in the Recitals to the Directive,
4
 yet claimants faced inequality 
of treatment by employment tribunals. A pattern of inconsistency of interpretation of 
the legislation was found, with tribunals not ‘treating like cases alike’,
5
 a fundamental 
concept of the common law system of England and Wales. Without consistency an 
individual is unable ‘to regulate his conduct’
6
 and ‘a distinct and active first principle 
of law’
7
 is abandoned. Nonetheless the qualitative analysis shows that inconsistency 
occurred at every stage in the consideration of a claim – from establishing jurisdiction, 
to the consideration of evidence, reversing the burden of proof, the consideration of 
justification of discriminatory conduct and the awarding of compensation.  
There was substantial variation in the success rates and compensation awarded 
by tribunals for claims which appeared to have very similar facts. The finding that all 
but one of those whose claim was struck out without meaningful consideration was 
over 50 years old may even suggest that tribunals were less prepared to treat seriously 
the claims of older workers whereas they gave more deliberation to claims of those 
who were younger, perhaps indicating intrinsic ageist assumptions by the tribunals and 
even raising the spectre of institutional ageism. In recommending that tribunals be 
given ‘considerable flexibility, allowing tribunals to fix what is considered to be fair, 
reasonable and just compensation in the particular circumstances of the case,’
8
 Lord 
Justice Mummery appears to have given tribunals a license to act in a manner 
inconsistent with the underlying principles of the Framework Directive, which requires 
consistency and equality of treatment.  
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Claimants in the South and South-west were the least successful, received the 
lowest overall compensation and injury to feelings awards and were ordered to pay 
substantially higher additional costs than claimants in other regions (up to six times 
higher than those in the North). Two tribunals – Southampton and Leeds – adjudged 
more claims successful than were dismissed but the Leicester Tribunal failed to find 
any of the 103 age claims it heard successful. It seems likely that the cause of local and 
regional variations in outcome is the inconsistent approach of individual tribunals. If 
this is correct, it is a significant indictment of the quality of the training and guidance 
available to tribunal members. Hepple at al
9
 advised against the adoption of specialised 
tribunals trained to deal solely with discrimination claims as many applications 
included other jurisdiction claims such as unfair dismissal and it was observed during 
data collection in this study that this situation still prevails. But it may be that as the 
tribunal process has become more adversarial and the legislation more complex, that 
training for tribunal members needs to be more rigorous in both depth and frequency.  
Tribunals were not aided by the loose definition of terms in the Regulations. 
Tribunals must be allowed judicial discretion to deal with individual cases based on the 
facts before them but the legislature needs to define terms accurately in order for 
consistent results to emerge. The transposition of the Framework Directive left open 
the construal of many aspects of the legislation to first instance tribunals, leading to 
considerable variation. For example, if the legislation defined the phrase ‘legitimate 
aim’ more consistent interpretation could be achieved. As Joanne Owers, Chair of the 
Employment Lawyers Association, pointed out ‘employment law should be drafted 
carefully – not sloppily – with the intention of it being clear to employees and 
employers when they are operating within the law. This is not the case at present’.
10
  
The consistency of decision-making by employment tribunals has been a concern 
for a number of years. The Woolf Report in 1995 highlighted that it is ‘essential for 
there to be consistency in decision making throughout the country, at each local centre 
and at every level of the judiciary. This will require judicial training and guidance to 
ensure that there is consistency of approach’.
11
 The Leggat Report in 2001 stressed the 
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importance of ‘consistency of decision-making’
12
 by tribunals but the Gibbons Report 
confirmed that the ‘judgments of different tribunal chairs appear to many to give 
employment tribunals a reputation for inconsistency and that reduces the confidence of 
users in the system’.
13
 The Employment Tribunal System Steering Board (ETSSB) 
stated in 2010 that ‘there is potential unfairness resulting from inconsistent application 
of practice and procedure across the system’.
14
 They reported: 
anecdotal concerns about the treatment by some judges of cases 
involving mainly though not exclusively discrimination issues…that 
certain judges were known for deciding cases one way (e.g. in favour 
of claimants) and others the other way … but … where there is 
suspicion of bias, there is the opportunity to appeal the decision.
15
  
This study provides robust, statistical support for these anecdotal concerns. The 
ETSSB has recommended that a five year review should be carried ‘of all 
discriminations cases’ which ‘should look for any patterns that might suggest a 
particular bias towards the claimant or towards the respondent, and/or towards or 
against a particular type of case’.
16
 This recommendation was made against the advice 
of the President of the Employment Tribunal who felt a review was not warranted as 
no evidence had been presented which related to the outcome of cases at the various 
local centres.
17
 It should be stated that, although this study presents evidence of 
inconsistencies, no evidence of actual bias in folio reports was apparent, but 
contradictory interpretations of the legislation and a lack of rigorous scrutiny of facts 
were documented. Data was not gathered which related outcome to individual tribunal 
members although a considerable number of judgments were handed down by 
employment judges sitting alone, rather than as part of the normal three-person panel – 
a practice said to be ‘not recommended' by Lady Smith in the EAT.
18
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8.3: Justification of discriminatory practices 
Age discrimination legislation in England and Wales allows business needs to be 
balanced against the equality principle in the justification of otherwise discriminatory 
practices and requirements. The provision of the defence of justification to all types of 
age discrimination limits the effect of the legislation considerably and the 
interpretation of the justification defence is a measure of the importance that the 
judiciary gives to the notion of age equality. The ECJ has, at the time of writing, 
considered twelve age discrimination cases in order to give guidance to national courts 
as they seek to clarify what is acceptable with regard to justification of age 
discriminatory policies. Nine of these references were considered in the Grand 
Chamber formation and five of them were adjudicated in 2010. The ECJ has developed 
two strands of proportionality tests – a loose balancing act carried out on collectively 
bargained and involuntary retirement from the workplace provisions and a more 
rigorous ‘appropriate and necessary’ test which it has applied to all other types of age 
discriminatory conduct which does not involve exit from the workforce.  
The Directive witnessed a symbiotic relationship between economic concerns 
and social justice – having dual aims of protecting the needs of the individual and 
encouraging older workers to remain in the workforce. Yet in the UK some tribunals 
appeared to have lost sight of these aims and did not apply the test for justification in a 
rigorous manner. Dickens has pointed out that the interpretation of ‘justifiable’ and the 
relative weight given to ‘fairness’ with regard to ‘efficiency’ has varied over the past 
thirty years and is a measure of the consideration that the judiciary extends to 
employers in periods of economic difficulty.
19
 The ease with which justification was 
established by numerous employers in age discrimination claims shows that the 
judiciary feels considerable sympathy for employers in the current economic climate.  
The UK government insisted when the Regulations were introduced that ‘the test 
of justification will not be an easy one to satisfy. The principle remains that different 
treatment on grounds of age will be unlawful: treating people differently on grounds of 
age will be possible but only exceptionally and only for good reasons’.
20
 However, the 
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examination of folio reports revealed tribunals felt that ‘exceptional’ circumstances 
occurred relatively often. A bias towards business needs seen in tribunals, where an 
employer’s convenience outweighed the equality principle, appears to display judicial 
deference to economic and political pressures rather than concern over the application 
of the tests carefully developed by the ECJ.  
This is also evident in the establishment of precedents by the EAT and Court of 
Appeal which show that legitimate aims can be broad, need little social or public 
policy content, can be based on cost determinants alone and that proportionate means 
do not have to be necessary, but only ‘reasonably necessary’. In Western Airlines v 
Criswell the Supreme Court in the USA has stated the test for justification in an age 
discrimination claim should be a strict one of ‘reasonable necessity,’ not 
‘reasonableness’,
21
 yet in first instance tribunals in England and Wales an employer’s 
convenience was often the overriding parameter. ‘Reasonably necessary’ does not 
equate to ‘exceptional’ and is much weaker than the requirement specified in Article 
2(b) of the Framework Directive which states that the means of achieving the 
legitimate aim should be ‘appropriate and necessary’.  
Justification which permits age discrimination is acceptable whenever it is based 
on clearly identified aims benefiting society as whole, such as social inclusion and 
meeting special needs. But employers using the defence of justification for 
discriminating conduct found they had extremely broad scope in establishing their aims 
and not all tribunals made a strict examination or balancing assessment between the 
proportionate means and the discriminatory treatment. If an employer showed 
alternatives to the conduct had been considered and the workforce had been consulted 
it was highly likely that the tribunal found the behaviour proportionate, irrespective of 
whether the measures were ‘necessary’ as is required by the Directive. 
There was a lack of certainty concerning the validity of aims based solely on cost 
and/or with no social or employment objective but following the decision in 
Woodcock
22
 they were likely to be accepted. Older workers can be dismissed because 
of the higher salaries or pensions they incur as it is company economics, not age, that 
is the determining factor in the dismissal – ‘the cost, not age defence’. Employers 
therefore wishing to save money by discriminating against older workers – and they 
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are the workers most likely to earn more as they have progressed along salary scales – 
may find it relatively easy to justify such treatment although even if they cannot the 
low levels of compensation awarded may not act as a deterrent.  
The requirement that an individual retires at a particular age is ‘age 
discrimination par excellence’,
23
 yet the broadness of the justification test has been 
used to permit such enforced dismissal. The decision of the Supreme Court in Seldon
24
 
that ‘promoting intergenerational fairness’ could be a legitimate aim sanctions the 
forced retirement of individuals despite the removal of the default retirement age – 
allowing the rights of those younger to take precedence over those older. Lord Hope 
SCJ in Seldon asserted that there ‘is a public interest in facilitating and promoting 
employment for young people, planning the recruitment and departure of staff and the 
sharing out of opportunities for advancement in a balanced manner according to age’
25
 
and he felt that a fixed retirement age achieves this balance. However, this assertion 
ignores the whole purpose of age discrimination legislation and simply serves to 
perpetuate the institutionalised discrimination that the legislation was intended to 
eliminate.  
The Framework Directive intended to promote the interests of all generations 
with its insistence on equal treatment, rather than sacrificing the interests of older 
workers as discussed in Chapter 1.7. If older workers are allowed to continue to work 
past normal retirement age, younger cohorts would in any case receive equal treatment 
eventually in benefiting equally by being allowed to work until they deemed it 
appropriate, rather than at a particular age. Forcing individuals to retire at a fixed age is 
not ‘putting into effect in the member states the principle of equal treatment’
26
 nor is it 
paying ‘particular attention to supporting older workers, in order to increase their 
participation in the labour force’;
27
 indeed, it is legitimising the enforced withdrawal of 
older workers from the labour force – achieving the opposite of the Framework 
Directive’s aims. 
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8.4: The Claimant 
The quantitative analysis shows that the characteristics of those making age 
discrimination claims in England and Wales differ from those making claims in other 
countries, particularly those in the USA. Service and sales workers form the majority 
of claimants in this country, rather than white collar, professional workers, and far 
fewer claimants are successful here than in the USA where up to a third are adjudged 
successful by the courts.
28
 However, the majority of claimants were in the 52-62 year 
age group, following the pattern found in longitudinal studies of age discrimination 
claims in other countries.
29
 Claimants differed from those involved in other jurisdiction 
claims in England and Wales as nearly 90% were individuals alleging unfavourable 
treatment rather than claiming as part of a group.  
Two secondary claimant age clusters were found; one containing workers aged 
18-25 who claimed they were discriminated against because they were ‘young’ and 
another aged 39-42 who claimed they were suffering unfavourable treatment because 
of the allocation of job benefits or redundancy payments. Individuals aged 15-24 are 
‘five times more likely than those aged 65 or over and about twice as likely as any 
other age group, to report age discrimination’
30
 yet only 7% of judgments were handed 
down to such claimants, indicating perhaps a lack of desire to be involved in an 
adversarial process. The characteristics of young claimants who were prepared to make 
a claim differed considerably from those of older workers. They were more likely to 
follow the correct procedure and more likely to actively pursue their claim whilst 
young women made as many claims as young men and were more successful than 
young men. Their claims were, almost without exception, concerned with irrational 
stereotypical attitudes towards the young and the discriminatory treatment was usually 
denied by the employer with no attempt made to justify it. 
The ‘middle-aged’ 39-42 year old group is not one which has been highlighted as 
being particularly subject to age discrimination; indeed Gee et al found this group were 
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the least likely to report age discrimination.
31
 This cohort has no history of 
disadvantage and does not appear in need of remedial support so is not obviously a 
legitimate suspect group, as discussed in Chapter 1.5. Nonetheless the equal treatment 
format of legislation leads to this type of claim and intergenerational conflict can occur 
as comparison is made between cohorts. Tribunals had little sympathy with these 
claimants, finding the disadvantageous schemes justifiable, and none was successful.  
In previous studies of claimants in race, disability and sex discrimination cases it 
was found that many claimants were unsuccessful, although the success rates were 
substantially higher than those of age discrimination claimants.
32







 are supported by the results of this study. All three 
studies concluded that the tribunal system favoured the respondent because ‘they had 
more experienced legal teams, more financial resources and a greater number of 
witnesses’.
36
 Indeed, the power imbalance between the two parties was striking. The 
most frequently found respondent employer activities were local and central 
government, hospital activities and educational establishments and over half of 
respondent employers had more than 250 employees. Success rates against such 
employers were low. The folio reports reveal that large employers were able to defend 
claims more easily because they usually had clear equality and recruitment policies 
which provided evidence to support their decision-making. This upholds the hypothesis 
of Saridakis et al ‘that firms that have procedures and follow them are more likely to 
win than those firms that do not’.
37
  
In addition, large employers could show that they had other employees of ages 
which demonstrated they did not discriminate on the grounds of age and used counsel 
and in-house legal teams who, over the period of study, clearly became more 
experienced in defending the claims. For example, no claim was successful against the 
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Royal Mail, the employer most often found defending an age claim, mentioned in 53 
judgments, nor in any of the other 71 claims against other employers in the postal 
services industry, such as the Post Office.  
Many claimants found the legal framework very difficult to navigate and even 
lawyers making a personal claim found it complex – not one of the 24 lawyers making 
a personal claim was successful at the hearing and several had followed an incorrect 
procedure. A large number of claimants failed to observe the specified time-limits, 
follow the grievance process or include age in their original complaint. The 
uncompromising approach by tribunals to claimant failure to follow the correct 
procedure contrasts starkly with the accommodation given to employers who had 
default judgments reversed if they had not attended the hearing. Claimants who asked 
for an extension to the time-period allowed within which to submit a claim, because 
they felt it was just and equitable, were as likely to have additional costs awarded 
against them for wasting the tribunal’s time in making a late complaint as to be given 
extra time.  
Tribunals required adherence to the grievance procedure by the claimant from a 
very early stage in a dispute which sometimes necessitated the claimant obtaining legal 
help in drafting the grievance letter. Imposing an arbitrary three-month limit on dispute 
resolution may force some claimants to turn to litigation before they would otherwise 
want to do. An employer receiving a legally drafted complaint may feel it appropriate 
to respond with a legally composed defence and an opportunity for conciliation is lost 
as the two sides become polarised. The grievance procedure may take several weeks to 
complete and the reluctance by tribunals to extend time periods in situations where the 
three month statutory period has been exhausted further intensifies the pressure for the 
dispute to be become litigious. Hepple et al
38
 proposed that the time limit be extended 
from three to six months in 2000, but their astute recommendation was not accepted. 
Tribunals already have the power to extend the time-period, if it is thought just and 
equitable, but they are unwilling to do so, following the uncompromising precedent 
established in Robinson v The Post Office.
39
 A more flexible approach by tribunals to 
time-limits would be more compatible with the government’s desire to ‘support and 
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encourage parties to resolve disputes earlier … to try and preserve the working 
relationship between employer and employee’.
40
  
Claimants often did not understand, not only the law and the procedure, but what 
happens and what is required at the hearing. The government consultation in 2011 on 
the reform of employment tribunals declared that ‘the balance of employer and 
employee rights is in favour of employees; action is needed to deter and deal with 
weak and vexatious claims’.
41
 However, no evidence was found in this study that the 
tribunal system was being used by vexatious claimants seeking to take advantage of 
employers – on the contrary, employees were at a clear disadvantage. This finding 
supports that of ‘tribunal judges and members, representative lawyer groups, and other 
public sector/advisory bodies … [who] questioned the analysis in the consultation 
paper that the system was quite so ‘plagued’ by a flood of weak and vexatious cases’.
42
  
Claimants need more support and information when faced with discriminating 
treatment at an early stage in the claim process so that they do not make basic errors in 
the procedure. Some could not show they had employee status or even identify the 
relevant employer. A small number of judgments revealed that the tribunal did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the complaint because of territorial restrictions, with workers 
falling between fora. Workers who are abroad when the discriminatory act occurs, 
work partly abroad or for an overseas registered employer may fail to find an 
appropriate forum for their complaint. Not only is this unfair for these workers but it 
also hinders the achievement of the objective of the Directive as discrimination which 
occurs across member states within the EU is not proscribed.  
If the claimant succeeded in reversing the burden of proof most respondents 
asserted that age played no part in their treatment and the credibility, conduct and 
capability of the claimant often became the focus of the tribunal. When capability was 
being assessed it was usually based upon evidence from the claimant alone considered 
against several witnesses still employed by the respondent, often possessing more 
information relating to the claim than the claimant. Many claimants appear to have 
been unprepared to conduct a defence of their own capability yet this was crucial to the 
success of the claim.  
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Credibility was often discussed in folio reports and was assessed using ‘hard’ 
factors, such as the consistency of statements, witness support and reports of conduct, 
and ‘soft’ factors, such as the disposition and demeanour of the claimant at the hearing, 
where they may be under stress caused by an adversarial situation and which might not 
be a reflection of their normal persona. These findings support those of a 2006 study of 
race discrimination claimants which found that claimants were personally subjected to 
critical examination in the hearing.
43
 The assessments made of individual character by 
the tribunal often dealt with sensitive and personal issues. Hints of vagueness, 
exaggeration, distortion or defensiveness by a claimant, including any belief that they 
were subject to conspiracy, were highlighted in folio reports and reflected 
unfavourably on claimant credibility. Claimants who made concurrent claims of 
discrimination often suffered in this regard and were sometimes regarded as ‘over-
sensitive’.  
This study supports the findings of Aston et al that claimants ‘perceived a 
significant risk to their current employment status and future career prospects’ and 
suffered ‘emotional and physical stresses already experienced through the act(s) of 
unfair discrimination … compounded by the stresses associated with presenting 
themselves and their case for judgement’.
44
 For example, in Paton v Abakhan
45
 the 
claimant suffered a panic attack both on the way to and at the hearing. For the majority 
of claimants who have paid for legal representation they will be personally ‘out of 
pocket’ having gone through this stressful process. Claimants even faced punitive 
additional costs if they had not followed the procedure correctly or if their evidence 
was insufficient, a practice supported by the EAT in 2012 in Topic v Hollyland.
46
 This 
poses an additional risk for unrepresented claimants who may find it difficult to know 
if their case is legally misconceived. If this risk and stress is considered in relation to 
the low probability of success and level of compensation, claimants need to be very 
certain that they want to make an application to the tribunal as the experience is 
unlikely to be rewarding.  
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The number of claimants making a concurrent claim of discrimination increased 
as a proportion of all claims over the period of study and 38% of claimants made such 
claims in 2009-2010; most of these claims were made against large employers 
involved in public administration, education and hospital activities. Claimants making 
concurrent claims were particularly unsuccessful, with no worker successful after 
consideration out of the 140 claiming age and religion and belief discrimination and 
only one successful out of the 100 claiming age and sexual orientation 
discrimination.
47
 Each additional ground of complaint lowered the success rate further, 
supporting Fredman’s observation that the ‘more a person differs from the norm, the 




The decision in Bahl v The Law Society,
49
 where it was held that an employment 
tribunal could not consider the effect of a combination of race and gender 
discrimination, has resulted in those claiming that they encountered multiple 
discrimination finding it very difficult to obtain a remedy.
50
 The more complex the 
claimant’s identity, the more difficult it seemed to be to find firm evidence of each 
type of discrimination they had suffered, indicating that this legislation, with its 
reliance on finding evidence for each separate ground, is not adequately addressing the 
needs of claimants suffering multiple discrimination. Indeed this approach, which 
separates elements of a person’s identity into ‘suspect’ categories, has been criticised 
as causing adverse psychological effects in victims of discrimination as it further 
isolates them from the norms expected by society.
51
 As one of the Directive’s aims was 
to address the inequalities due to ‘multiple discrimination’
52
 it would appear that the 
UK legislation is particularly unsuccessful in achieving this aim. 
This study supports the work of Rosenthal and Budjanovcani who found that 
‘tribunals look with suspicion on proliferating claims, likely viewing them as a tactic, 
thereby weakening the credibility of the claimant … Tribunals tend to punish multiple 
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claims rather than reward them’.
53
 Rather than accepting the particular problems that 
those suffering from multiple discrimination face, some tribunals felt that such 
claimants were ‘difficult’. The credibility of the claimant is central to a discrimination 




 a reference to the ECJ on a claim of age and sex discrimination, 
Advocate-General Kokott pointed out that direct age discrimination is capable of 
justification (and a claim therefore more likely to fail) whereas direct sex 
discrimination is not and although the case could be ‘examined in the light of the 
prohibition on age discrimination … this would, however, not be overly helpful’.
55
 The 
court proceeded to fully consider the sex discrimination claim but not that of age, 
finding that Kleist had suffered sex discrimination. The implicit suggestion given by an 
Advocate-General at the ECJ was that claimants should consider not making a multiple 
claim including age because of the likelihood that the age claim may fail, whereas 
another suspect ground claim may succeed. It is apparent that, as age is at the bottom 
of the hierarchy of suspect grounds, claimants should consider carefully the 
contribution an age claim makes to a claim of multiple discrimination as it may reflect 
upon their credibility. The recognition that it may be advisable for those claiming 
multiple discrimination to drop their age claim in favour of other suspect grounds 
exemplifies the inadequacy of the legislation in addressing the problems of those with 
complex identities.  
The largest group of workers making a concurrent claim were women claiming 
age and sex discrimination. The particular problems of older women suffering age and 
sex discrimination have been highlighted in high profile tribunal claims
56
 and the 
results of this study show that over three times more women than men claim they have 
suffered such discrimination. A 2007 survey by Moore found ‘for women over the age 
of 50, entering or re-entering the labour market is more difficult because of age … The 
specific impact of age in older women’s working lives appears to be more 
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 Women making a concurrent claim found it more difficult to obtain 
evidence to reverse the burden of proof, because of the ‘intangible’ nature of such 
discrimination. Consequently the success of these claims was very low, highlighting 
again the ineffectiveness of the legislation in providing redress for such claimants. For 
example, out of the 384 women who made a claim of age and sex discrimination only 
six were successful after consideration by the tribunal (1.65%) whereas 3.3% of 
women claiming age discrimination alone were successful.  
Women made fewer age claims than men, despite research which demonstrates 
that they suffer at least as much age discrimination in the workplace than men.
58
 One-
third of claimants were female – there were 10.05 judgments per 100,000 women in 
the workforce and 16.57 judgments per 100,000 men. This is virtually identical to the 
proportion found in race discrimination judgments in a study completed in 2009 
indicating that women are less likely than men to make a claim to the tribunal in 
gender-neutral discrimination claims.
59
 The success and success+settled rates of claims 
for women were extremely similar to those of men suggesting that gender may not be a 
factor in the overall success of age claims at the tribunal. However, significantly more 
women obtained legal representation which was extremely advantageous to claimants 
and it may be that without additional assistance the success rate for women would be 
lower than that of men.  
These statistics show that considerably fewer women are successful claimants in 
England and Wales than in other countries, such as in the USA, where women win up 
to 64% of claims that they initiate, compared to 29% of claims by men.
60
 Women 
claimed against a narrow band of employer activities, mainly those involved in local 
and central government, and the success of large employers in defending claims may 
be reflected in the number of successful claims of women. Very few claims were made 
by women in the legislators, managers and senior officials group where the number of 
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judgments per 100,000 female workers was 0.56 – extremely low, whilst the number of 
judgments per 100,000 male workers was 2.53 – also very low, but nearly five times 
the figure for women. This may indicate that for exceptional individuals age 
discrimination is not as a significant problem as for less skilled workers who received a 
higher number of judgments following the pattern seen throughout history and 
discussed in Chapter 1.2. On the other hand, female lawyers received a noteworthy 
78.79 judgments per 100,000 workers and male lawyers received 55.13 judgments per 
100,000 workers. By comparison, accountants were handed 8.06 judgments per 
100,000 workers – indicating that the legal profession may have a particular problem 
with age discrimination although it must be acknowledged that lawyers are more likely 
than other professionals to be aware of the legislation and therefore make a claim. 
Contrary to Ministry of Justice statistics for all jurisdictions, more than half of 
age discrimination claimants had no legal representation over the period of study. 
There was a strong, statistically significant relationship between the outcome of claims 
and legal representation – those with legal representation were twice as successful as 
those without. This is contrary to the findings of a qualitative study of race 
discrimination judgments by Brown and Erskine in 2009 which found that ‘there was 
no obvious relationship between success and representation’
61
 although their study was 
based on a smaller group of one hundred judgments chosen on the basis of the amount 
of information contained in the folio reports. This result also differs from a study by 
Latreille et al in 2005 which found that the impact of representation on applicants was 
exclusively ‘in raising the level of compensation received by clients’
62
 as not only did 
compensation increase but the chance of overall success was higher.  
There was also a direct relationship between representation and injury to feelings 
awards, with those who were represented given awards on average twice the size of 
those given to unrepresented claimants. Representation made a highly significant 
difference to the number of claimants reaching a settlement at the hearing. This 
supports the findings of Latreille et al which established that representatives performed 
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an important conciliation role, ‘persuading applicants to settle where their typically 
extensive experience leads them to expect a less favourable outcome at tribunal’.
63
 
Evidence was found in judgments that those who were self-represented did not 
understand the detail that is required in assembling evidence to substantiate their claim. 
The presence of legal advisors redressed the asymmetric power relationship between 
the two parties. Represented applicants are at a clear advantage but no legal aid is 
available to support those who cannot afford assistance. The EAT has recently stressed 
‘the importance of competent legal advice at the right stage’ because of ‘the difficulties 
faced by litigants in person’ … ‘Provision of basic legal help to unrepresented litigants 
is important in the interests of the efficiency and economy of the justice system for the 
public, as much for its accessibility to the individual parties’.
64
 Yet many cannot afford 
such assistance which is needed at an early stage in the procedure.  
The legislation is based upon an individualized, adversarial private law model 
which relies on workers who are prepared to enforce their rights against many 
obstacles and who have an awareness of rights, a willingness to enter a litigious 
process and possessing good evidence, yet the UK government has not provided 
appropriate claimant legal support for such a mechanism. The provision of an impartial 
claim advisor who could check claim forms at an early stage to see if the grievance 
procedure had been followed and time-limits observed would help claimants to 
understand from an early stage if they are likely to be successful. Advice on following 
the correct procedure, naming the correct employer and gathering acceptable and 
appropriate evidence would be invaluable for many claimants as well as saving the 
tribunal time spent on ill-founded claims.  
A particularly low number of claimants complaining of discrimination in 
recruitment had legal assistance (28.6%), yet these workers appeared to face the 
greatest evidential difficulty in establishing their claim and would have benefitted from 
advice. However, the low compensation paid to such claimants (due to factors involved 
in estimating loss, discussed in Chapter 7.5) may deter claimants from obtaining advice 
because of the cost. Although contingency fee arrangements extend access to justice to 
those who cannot otherwise afford it, Johnson and Hammersley have described the 
tendency of legal advisors to avoid contingency fee arrangements with claimants likely 
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to be involved in ‘low value’
65
 cases, that is, those where the compensation is likely to 
be low. Legal advisors therefore may be reluctant to take age claims on a conditional 
fee agreement basis, particularly those concerning recruitment and retirement, as they 
may not recoup their fees. Although legal representatives make a significant difference 
to outcome and compensation, by redressing the power imbalance and using their skill 
in negotiating settlements, claimants and legal advisors need to weigh very carefully 
the efficacy of using representation in age discrimination claims as the relatively high 
cost of legal assistance may well negate the value of any award.  
8.5: Remedies 
The ECJ in Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
66
 stressed that sanction for 
discrimination cases must ‘guarantee real and effective judicial protection and have a 
real deterrent on the employer’,
67
 yet remedies for age discrimination claimants in 
England and Wales failed to meet these stipulations. The low awards were particularly 
insufficient to form a real deterrent in cases where the employer stood to save money 
by discriminating against older, highly paid employees. The majority of compensation 
awards for age discrimination claims were under £8,000 and many would not have 
covered claimant legal costs. Legislation which relies on individuals to identify fault 
must recompense the claimant fairly and, at the very bare minimum, seek to cover the 
cost of representation.  
Tribunals usually found that discrimination on the grounds of age did not cause 
substantial injury to feelings even where it had carried on for a long period of time and 
the effects were serious.
68
 Only one award was in the higher ‘Vento’ band whilst some 
claimants received no award, contrary to judicial guidance that this practice may result 
in tribunals being thought not to be making a ‘proper recognition of injury to 
feelings’.
69
 This reflects the ambivalent attitude to ageism discussed in Chapter 1.5 and 
a belief that ageism is not really damaging, yet the impact on individuals was 
sometimes considerable. When assessing compensation no tribunal thought that the 
claimant would find it difficult to find work within a few months, despite high 
                                                          
65
 J Johnson and G Hammersley, The Influence of Legal Representation at Employment Tribunals on 
Case Outcome (ERRSeries No 84, DTI 2005) 10. 
66
 14/83 Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891. 
67
 ibid para 23. 
68
 As in Koh v Sainsburys (2008) ET 23122677/8. 
69
 Vento (n 8) [65] (Mummery LJ). 
255 
 
unemployment rates in the period of study, and the element intended to cover loss of 
future earnings was usually low. Even Ms Koh, who suffered long term mental and 
physical effects as a result of discrimination, was expected to obtain a similar position 
to that which she had lost within a short period.
 70
 Yet Perry and Freeland have 
produced convincing evidence that those subjected to age discrimination suffer a fall in 
confidence and their ‘employability depreciates at a rapid rate.’
71
  
Compensation was the remedy of choice for tribunals, who were reluctant to use 
the alternatives of a declaration of rights or a recommendation for action, despite 
numerous critical remarks about respondent’s practices. Unsurprisingly, no judgments 
were found which ordered what many claimants really want as a remedy – 
reinstatement to their former position. Otto Kahn-Freund has blamed the unwillingness 
of tribunals to impose reinstatement on: 
the power of a legal shibboleth … the ancient doctrine that a contract 
of employment cannot be specifically enforced against either side 
because … the rule of mutuality demands that if no such order can 




Recommendations may form the basis for real change in ageist conduct in the 
workplace rather than retrospective remedies. The Equality Act 2010 extends the 
power of tribunals to make recommendations which benefit persons other than the 
claimant,
73
 whereas under the Regulations the recommendations were directed solely 
to the parties to the claim. The Equalities Review has recommended that employers 
should be given guidance and feedback following a discrimination case ‘to make sure 
that they change their practices for the better’
74
 and this may encourage fairer practices 
in the future. However, the single judgment which was found to make 
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recommendations in addition to compensation was subject to an appeal, indicating the 
employer’s reluctance to accept judicial interference in their freedom to contract.
75
 
A ‘gender award gap’ was found in both overall and injury to feelings awards, 
indicating that the Directive’s goal of eliminating inequalities between men and 
women
76
 was not even being achieved at the tribunal. It is highly ironic that the 
judiciary, whilst implementing discrimination legislation, may be discriminating by 
awarding different amounts of compensation to men and women, over and above that 
which would be expected from the gender pay gap. There is a possibility that the 
difference in overall compensation awards may be a result of additional claims made 
by men relating to other jurisdictions, about which information was not gathered as 
part of this research and which boosted the total amount. Nonetheless this did not 
appear to be the case from folio reports, which revealed a very similar pattern of claims 
by men and women.  
The difference in injury to feelings awards given to men and women is not 
dependent upon occupation or earnings but relates directly to the injury thought to be 
suffered by claimants and it is apparent that tribunals felt women suffered less than 
men experiencing discriminatory treatment. As women made proportionally more 
claims relating to harassment, which were associated with the highest injury to feelings 
awards, and proportionally fewer claims relating to recruitment, associated with low 
awards, this result is even more surprising as it would be expected that this would lead 
to women receiving higher average awards than men. The failure to compensate 
equally for injury to feelings may be regarded as a further aggravation of the 
inequalities between men and women that the Framework Directive was intended to 
address, as clearly stated in Recitals 2, 3 and 4 and in many other EU legislative 
provisions.  
The Equality Act 2010 gives power to impose auditing duties on employers 
which will ‘require employers to publish information relating to … the pay of male and 
female employees’
77
 and compensation awards need monitoring in a similar manner. 
The Tribunal Service should be required to publish the sex of claimants in relation to 
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the awards given under different jurisdictions, making this information transparent and 
taking any necessary action to address the award disparity.  
Young claimants were given overall and injury to feeling compensation awards 
which were on average one quarter of that given to ‘all age’ claimants. This may be a 
reflection of the attitude, discussed in Chapter 1.5, that a deserving suspect group 
should have suffered ‘systemic disadvantage’
78
 and be ‘relatively powerless’
79
 and 
young workers may not be recognised as needing protection from age discrimination. 
Tribunals perhaps felt that young suffer less from ageist treatment as they are able to 
view their situation as temporary whereas older workers suffer more because they fear 
their working life is ending.
80
 This approach is supported by Garstka et al who found 
that age discrimination harms psychological well-being in all claimants but positive 
group identification by young age-cohorts partially alleviates this effect whereas older 




As compensation was directly related to the size and legal status of the employer 
this indicates awards were based on the apparent ability of the employer to pay rather 
than the actual injury suffered by the claimant. Both the young and old deserve 
compensation which reflects the actual level of injury suffered, irrespective of the size 
of the employer, or the age or sex of the claimant. Effective legislation requires 
effective sanctions and adequate remedies. Hepple et al state that ‘individuals should 
be free to seek redress for the harm they have suffered as a result of unlawful 
discrimination, through procedures which are fair, inexpensive and expeditious, and 
that the remedies should be effective’.
82
 Article 17 of the Directive insists that ‘the 
payment of compensation to the victim must be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’. Nonetheless the awards given to age discrimination claimants are low, not 
acknowledging that age discrimination can cause as much injury as other types of 
discrimination, reflecting the ambivalent attitude to age as a suspect ground discussed 
in Chapter One. 
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8.6: Evidential problems - the burden of proof 
A persistent theme emerged from the examination of folio reports that claimants 
could not produce enough evidence to turn the burden of proof to the employer. 
Moreover, when the burden of proof was reversed tribunals did not require the 
respondent to show that their explanation was true, only that it was plausible. Evidence 
that claimants faced ‘silence’
83
 when age was discussed or that a claimant’s age was 
brought up in discussions about workforce planning was dismissed as being part of 
normal working life by employers: this is inevitably true but claimants could often 
produce no other tangible evidence that they were discriminated against. Claims of 
harassment were far more successful (25.1%) than other types of claim (5.7%) because 
evidence of this type of discrimination is far more visible than other manifestations. 
Those in elementary occupations had a significantly higher success rate than 
individuals in more skilled occupations such as professionals. It may be hypothesised 
that tribunals implicitly expect higher status groups to be able to challenge 
stereotypical attitudes independently in the workplace whereas less skilled workers 
may find this more difficult. It has also been suggested that elementary workers have a 
higher credibility threshold than skilled workers and this may act to their advantage.
84
 
However, the folio reports reveal that elementary workers were more successful simply 
because they were more able to find firm evidence to support their claim, whereas 
managers and professionals appeared to face less overt forms of discrimination. 
Respondent employers and colleagues of less skilled workers appeared to be more 
open about discussing age which allowed claimants to substantiate their complaint in 
the form of witness statements or written evidence.  
The overwhelming majority of age discrimination claims (over 90%) involved 
workers at the termination of their employment. This finding confirms Friedman’s 
assertion that age discrimination legislation is concerned primarily with redress ‘for 
wrongful discharge’.
85
 Although the Directive aims to encourage older workers back 
into the workplace ‘in order to increase their participation in the labour force’
86
 the UK 
legislation appears particularly unsuited to address the difficulties of those who suffer 
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discrimination in recruitment, despite a body of work which shows that this is a 
significant problem.
87
 Not only were very few recruitment claims (3.4% of all age 
claims) taken to the tribunal, those that did were particularly unlikely to be successful 
because of the lack of availability of evidence relating to other job applicants which 
would reverse the burden of proof. This supports the OECD’s
88
 and Neumark’s 
opinion that age discrimination legislation is ‘ineffective with regard to hiring older 
workers’
89
 and demonstrates that other tactics are needed to monitor discrimination in 
recruitment. For example, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) could 
play a more investigative, pro-active role in the recruitment practices of public 
organisations by means of random audits and, if thought appropriate in some 
circumstances, demand justification of hiring and short-listing decisions.  
The EHRC currently has a general duty to exercise its functions with a view ‘to 
encouraging and supporting the development of a society in which people's ability to 
achieve their potential is not limited by prejudice or discrimination’.
90
 They have 
power to conduct an investigation and produce a report
91
 pertinent to its functions 
which the tribunal ‘may have regard to’
92
 but does not need to ‘treat it as conclusive.
93
 
Yet no claims were found in the Register which discussed assistance, intervention or 
reports undertaken by the EHRC. Two claimants, Keane and Berry, made multiple 
unsuccessful claims which highlighted age discriminatory advertisements for positions 
for which they were apparently too old.
94
 Both failed in their claims because the 
tribunals concluded that they did not seriously intend to take up employment with the 
respondent employer, yet they both vehemently denied this. Mr Justice Underhill in the 
EAT referred to Keane’s CV which contained ‘factual and typographic errors’ 
indicating ‘a lack of care inconsistent with a genuine desire to obtain these jobs’.
95
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This, he felt, showed she did not actually want the jobs, had therefore not suffered a 
detriment and consequently failed in her claim. The advertisements were undoubtedly 
indirectly age discriminatory but no claimant was available to successfully challenge 
their content and a lacuna exists in the legislation with regard to this type of 
unfavourable treatment. The UK needs a more pro-active ECHR with additional 
resources to bring this type of claim of discrimination in recruitment on behalf of those 
discouraged from even applying for a position but who currently have no voice in the 
tribunal process.  
Riach and Rich postulated that applicants making a claim of discrimination in 
recruitment were very unlikely to be able to find evidence due to the sometimes 
‘dishonest’
96
 attitude of employers and a lack of information relating to other 
applicants. The questionnaire procedure contained within the legislation is an 
invaluable process by which the claimant can obtain information, especially in 
recruitment claims, and is crucial to the evidential basis of alleged treatment.
97
 In Igen 
v Wong it was stressed that ‘the tribunal will need to examine carefully explanations 
for failure to deal with the questionnaire procedure’.
98
 However, new guidance was 
given in 2008 on inferences to be drawn in cases where a questionnaire was not 
returned or was incomplete in D'Silva v NATFHE.
99
 Mr Justice Underhill stated that he 
had: 
observed a tendency in discrimination cases for Respondents’ 
failures in answering a questionnaire, or otherwise in providing 
information or documents, to be relied on by claimants, and even 
sometimes by tribunals, as automatically raising a presumption of 
discrimination. That is not the correct approach. Although failures of 
this kind are … matters from which an inference can be drawn, that 
is only ‘in appropriate cases’; and the drawing of inferences from 
such failures … is not a tick-box exercise.
100
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This guidance resulted in no inference of discrimination being drawn by some 
tribunals when faced with an unreturned or, even more surprisingly, an incorrectly 
completed questionnaire. The status of the questionnaire has been re-examined by the 
government and it has announced that it will be removed, despite considerable 
opposition.
101
 Yet without evidence claimants cannot demonstrate there was a 
difference in age and treatment. An applicant for a job vacancy has no means of 
knowing the age and number of other applicants without such a procedure. As the 
government is committed ‘to improving the employment opportunities for older 
workers,’
102
 it needs to further address discrimination in recruitment as the increased 
opportunities may not translate into employment. The questionnaire process is a vital 
tool with which to address this problem. Not only should the process be retained, it 
should be re-evaluated. A reasonable approach may be that if a questionnaire is not 
returned the employer must be able to demonstrate that there is a valid reason for such 
a failure – without an explanation the burden of proof should automatically be 
reversed.  
The evidence required to reverse the burden in discrimination cases has been 
subject to confusing descriptions in the past. In 1988 Lord Justice May in Noone v NW 
Thames RHA thought that if ‘there is a finding of discrimination and of difference of 
race and then an inadequate or unsatisfactory explanation by the employer for the 
discrimination, usually the legitimate inference will be that the discrimination was on 
racial grounds’.
103
 In 1992 the Court of Appeal held that it ‘is important to bear in 
mind that it is unusual to find direct evidence of racial discrimination … a finding of 
discrimination and a finding of a difference in race will often point to the possibility of 
racial discrimination’.
104
 The circular premise in these cases that ‘a finding of 
discrimination’ would lead to a ‘finding of discrimination’ is particularly unhelpful. 
However, in Madarassy v Nomura it was established that a claimant needs to 
show ‘a difference in status, a difference in treatment and the reason for the differential 
treatment’.
105
 Most age claimants could usually point to a difference in age and 
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treatment but could not find the required additional factor to reverse the burden of 
proof because such evidence was often intangible. Tribunals were reminded by the 
Court in the sex discrimination case Igen v Wong that: 
it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex discrimination. Few 
employers would be prepared to admit such discrimination, even to 
themselves. In some cases the discrimination will not be an intention 




If direct evidence is ‘unusual’ and employers are not prepared to even 
acknowledge ‘to themselves’ that they have discriminated against a worker it is clear 
that claimants face an uphill battle to ‘find the reason for the differential treatment’ and 
present it in a tangible form to the tribunal. The employer’s denial of discriminating 
conduct reflects Greenwald’s, Nosek’s and Rudman’s research, discussed in Chapter 
1.3, which shows that ‘the application of implicit biases may be nonconscious’.
107
 
Ageism is an implicit response and the ‘hallmark of implicit prejudice is that it 
operates without individuals’ conscious awareness’.
108
 This situation is further 
hampered by the reaction that many claimants initially made to the alleged 
discrimination. A number of studies have found that workers react passively in 
response to discriminatory treatment in order to minimise the injury.
109
 A 
confrontational response would be more likely to produce clear evidence but is avoided 
because the victim feels in the weaker position and may fear retribution.
110
 
Lord Justice Underhill, President of the Employment Tribunal, has described 
how, in the consideration of a claim, that an act is rendered discriminatory: 
by a discriminatory motivation, i.e. by the ‘mental processes’ 
(whether conscious or unconscious) which led the putative 
discriminator to do the act. Establishing what those processes were is 
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not always an easy inquiry … it is important to bear in mind that the 
subject of the inquiry is the ground of, or reason for, the putative 
discriminator’s action, not his motive.
111
  
The ‘mental process’ at the heart of the reason of an employer in a discrimination case 
can be speculated about, but it is something that may not be overtly demonstrated, 
despite an employee suspecting that ageism may lie behind the action. Nonetheless, the 
legislation requires the claimant to produce tangible evidence of discrimination.  
Foucault has described how ‘le regard’,
112
 the gaze or measured look, is at the 
centre of power relationships, such as those which exist between employers and 
employees and which often build up over time. The employee/employer relationship 
may have been affected by a multitude of minor incidents which led to the alleged 
treatment, none of which can be evidenced. If ageism is, according to Terror 
Management Theory, the result of deeply, but unconsciously, held inbuilt tendencies 
buffering thoughts of our mortality, the sub-conscious feelings behind the ‘gaze’ may 
be quietly but strongly held.
113
 Providing evidence to a tribunal of the mental processes 





 and ‘resistant to change’
116
 
than other suspect prejudices because age continues to be accepted as a differentiating 
factor and thus is implicitly ‘socially-condoned’.
117
 Such structural ageist attitudes 
have ‘become part of the rules of institutions, govern the conduct of social life and 
blend imperceptibly into everyday values and attitudes’.
118
 Using the principles set out 
by the judiciary to reverse the burden of proof in Madarassy v Nomura,
119
 a sex 
discrimination case, and in Igen v Wong
120
, a sex and race discrimination case, without 
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recognition that ageism is more ‘pervasive’
121
 and a more difficult prejudice to 
substantiate, the failure of a greater proportion of age claims is surely inevitable.  
If, as discussed in Chapter 1.3, ‘the strength of ageist responses is much greater 
than on the basis of racism, ethnic grouping or gender’
122
 a more substantive legislative 
response than currently exists may be needed to address the problem. The results of the 
quantitative analysis also show that the legislation needs to address the imbalance 
between young and old claimants – the young are more successful at the tribunal 
whereas the capability of older claimants was more open to attack. Claimants of all 
ages are entitled to equal protection with other age cohorts but the problems of older 
workers are not being addressed by this legislative format. 
Ageism is more closely related to disability discrimination than racism and 
sexism. The purpose of both disability and age discrimination is to allow individuals 
the opportunity to do things that they are capable of doing, whilst challenging negative 
stereotypical perceptions of their ability. Age may affect an individual’s ability to carry 
out tasks in a similar manner to a disability, for example, the young may not be old 
enough to possess a heavy goods vehicle licence or those older may lack the muscle 
strength to do physical work. Terror Management Theory postulates disability 
discrimination is a manifested fear of the deterioration of our bodies and indeed, the 
fear that we may become disabled may be less intense than the almost certain 
knowledge that we will become old, indicating that the anxiety buffer initiated in ageist 
conduct may be more intense. As such it would be more appropriate to use the same 
model of legislation as exists in disability discrimination. Moreover this requirement 
would partly address the problem of the hierarchical nature of suspect grounds found in 
European and domestic legislation. Inconsistently the Directive places no requirement 
on employers to make reasonable adjustments for all suspect groups, as it does for 
disability discrimination but by at least adopting this requirement in age as well as 
disability the imbalance would be partly addressed.
123
 
A ‘reasonable adjustments’ model of legislation may therefore be an apposite 
format to counter-act age discrimination. Once a claimant has demonstrated that a 
difference in treatment and age has occurred and shown that a provision, criterion or 
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practice puts a ‘person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in 
comparison with persons’
124
 as a result of his/her age then it should be the employer’s 
duty ‘to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage’.
125
 
The reasonableness of the adjustment could be consideration of whether the measures 
in question ‘give rise to a disproportionate burden to an employer’
126
 or ‘impose undue 
hardship on the person who would have to accommodate those needs, considering 
health, safety and cost’.
127
 Undue or disproportionate should not mean inconvenient or 
awkward.  
The emphasis would turn to what would be reasonable for the employer to do in 
order to prevent the disadvantage occurring, rather than on the claimant to show the 





 the requirement for an academic degree that two public bodies insisted 
upon could have been substituted by equivalent qualifications or experience as this is a 
reasonable adjustment that could have been made. The 40 years’ experience of each of 
the two claimants would be recognised as having intrinsic worth if there was a 
requirement to make reasonable adjustment. Riach and Rich suggest that this approach 
is only suited for workers such as Terence Homer who are ‘in jobs which they have 
already been doing’.
130
 However, this would exclude job applicants such as Sue 
McCluskey, for whom a reasonable adjustment is just as appropriate.  
The aim of equality legislation is to encourage the recognition of ‘people’s 
different needs, situations and goals and remove the barriers that limit what people can 
do and can be’.
131
 A reasonable adjustments format would more readily attain this aim 
as it would afford those of differing ages the possibility of differential treatment which 
would facilitate their equal opportunity to participate in the workplace. In Canada this 
legislative format is used over all suspect grounds in all aspects of life and the adoption 
of this type of provision in the UK would enable individuals to receive 
acknowledgement of their particular needs whilst respecting their abilities. 
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A pro-active requirement to make adjustments in order to combat age 
discrimination may produce results but would require a massive change in attitude 
towards ageism by UK political parties, all of which decry ageism but none of which 
support policies to address the problem more aggressively. The government has 
rejected the proposal of the application of a reasonable adjustment format to age 
discrimination legislation as burdensome
132
 and the prohibition of ageist conduct has 
become de-prioritised in the current economic climate. The reform of the employment 
tribunal system proposed by the UK government
133
 seems to be concerned with 
preventing claimants from making an application in order to save costs rather than 
ensuring that individuals obtain a remedy for their complaint, deterring discriminatory 
conduct and achieving true equality. Nevertheless demographics show that the 
population is ageing rapidly and without more positive methods of addressing age 
discrimination and encouraging older individuals to stay economically active the 
shortfall in pensions and rising health and social security costs will cause increasingly 
difficult fiscal problems.  
8.7: Equal treatment 
The Regulations are unusual in that they are age-neutral – they seek to protect all 
age cohorts, rather than a discrete group which shares a particular quality as in other 
equality legislation. Over the life course most will benefit or suffer from factors that 
affect different ages, although certain age cohorts may have particular problems or 
opportunities. This problem is at the heart of the paradox contained within the 
Regulations – labour market conflicts exist between all age groups and whilst one age 
group benefits from a provision it may also serve to disadvantage another. Swift 
commented on the introduction of the Regulations that ‘there is no consensus, or even 
leading view as to what equality requires for the purposes of age discrimination’
134
 and 
this situation still prevails, plainly illustrated in the inconsistent and contrary 
judgments found in the Judgment Register. It was apparent in several judgment reports 
that inter-generational conflict in the workplace was created where workers were 
lawfully treated unequally, for example, where some had received smaller redundancy 
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payments than colleagues who were younger
135
 or older, despite have similar length of 
service
136
 or had received a different minimum wage.
137
  
The reliance on the notion of equal treatment in the legislation means that 
differences that do occur as a result of age are not easily addressed and tribunals found 
the balance between competing age cohorts was very difficult to assess. As Lord 
Mance SCJ pointed out in Homer, an ‘exception for Mr Homer personally, or a general 
exception for employees within four or five years of retirement age, could have 
discriminated unjustifiably against such younger employees on grounds of age’.
138
 The 
Equalities Review stated that the objective of equality legislation is to achieve an equal 
society and attempted to define it as such: 
An equal society protects and promotes equal, real freedom and 
substantive opportunity to live in the ways people value and would 
choose, so that everyone can flourish. An equal society recognises 
people’s different needs, situations and goals and removes the 
barriers that limit what people can do and can be.
139
 
Legislation aimed at achieving formal equality runs counter to this framework 
and does not recognise the needs of different cohorts. The stereotypical assumptions 
which are held about different age groups are sometimes based on facts; for example, 
older people normally have shorter periods left in the workforce and the young are 
likely to have less experience in the workplace. The measures discussed in Chapters 
1.6 and 2.2 which have been recommended to help workers fulfil their capabilities 
throughout the age continuum and may help remove negative age stereotypes – the 
provision of education and training for particular age-cohorts and in-work benefits, 
such as flexible working and reduced national insurance contributions – conflict with 
the underlying principle of equal treatment.  
The dependence of the legislation on age-neutrality has meant that some 
employment practices which had operated to the benefit of older workers have been 
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abandoned. Although positive action to compensate for disadvantage was permitted 
under Regulation 29,
140
 several judgments in the Register were concerned with the 
removal of measures designed to redress problems that particular age groups encounter 
as employers felt they would be unlawful under the legislation. In Sharma v Millbrook 
Beds Ltd
141
 the employer feared additional pension payments to those over 50 could 
not be objectively justified and removed the uplifts. In Patel v Pepsico
142
 the 
traditional practice of allowing older workers to ‘taper down’ over a period of years so 
that they could adjust to retirement (a practice recommended in many studies as 
beneficial to workers
143
) was abandoned because the employer thought it contravened 
the legislation as it discriminated against younger workers. An unsuccessful challenge 
by Patel and others to the removal of the phased-retirement benefit resulted in a costs 
award of £5,000 against the claimants by an unimpressed tribunal at Leicester.  
Unfortunately in striving for equality for all ages, policies which were intended 
to help problems faced by particular age groups are now thought unlawful – a bizarre 
negation of the rationale of the Directive which stressed ‘the need to pay particular 
attention to supporting older workers’.
144
 This finding supports Macnicol’s and 
Duncan’s theories,
145
 which expound the view that age discrimination legislation will 
harm, rather than support, the interests of older individuals. Rather than face the 
possibility of a claim at the tribunal employers have understandably merely removed 
measures which may have been either justifiable under Regulation 3 as being a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, or fallen into the exemption in 
Regulation 29 which permits positive action. Lord Hope SCJ succinctly described 
respondent employers as ‘not a social service’
146
 and indeed, why would employers 
take positive action to compensate for disadvantage without appropriate incentives at a 
time of recession when their main concern is increasing profitability? Unfortunately 
the legislation has produced a defensive attitude in employers so that positive action to 
address cohort disadvantage is discouraged rather than encouraged. This is of serious 
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concern to those who believe the UK’s advance to a fourth generation of equality 
legislation will produce a new era of positive measures to address discrimination.  
8.8: Further work 
As Lady Hale SCJ pointed out in the first age discrimination case heard in the 
Supreme Court – ‘We all have a lot of learning to do’
147
 with regard to age 
discrimination. It is believed that this study is the first large-scale analysis of age 
discrimination judgments in England and Wales and as such has filled a significant gap 
in the literature and advanced understanding of how age discrimination legislation 
operates in reality. This research has uncovered several new, disturbing phenomena 
surrounding age discrimination claims, such as a gender award gap and the difficulties 
that those suffering from multiple discrimination encounter when making a claim. As 
this research has quantified the characteristics and nature of claims made at the 
tribunal, numerous issues emerge as subjects for further research, for example, why 
women and the young make fewer claims than older men and are more likely to rely on 
legal representation. The gender award gap may also exist in other jurisdictions and 
further research needs to be undertaken to investigate why it is occurring and whether 
this inequality is widespread.  
The regional pattern of judgments handed down from tribunals shows that more 
age claims were heard in the South and South-east, particularly in London Central and 
London South, Ashford and Watford and fewer judgments were handed down in the 
North. Other jurisdiction applications did not appear to show this regional pattern 
although this study did not analyse data relating to individual jurisdiction types, such 
as race discrimination or breach of contract, merely the overall number of other 
jurisdiction applications. It seems unlikely that these regional variations are a function 
of differences in employer conduct, but more research needs to be undertaken to 
establish whether there are regional differences in ageist conduct, knowledge of the 
legislation or willingness to make a claim. The review of tribunal bias recommended 
by the ETSSB,
148
 if carried out, may throw light on the variation shown in the outcome 
of claims in different tribunal offices. Further research into the relationship between 
                                                          
147
 Homer (n 128) [27] (Lady Hale SCJ).  
148
 Discussed in Chapter 8.2. 
270 
 
claim outcome and tribunal membership in terms of number, gender and age may also 
be beneficial.  
An extended longitudinal study would provide some understanding of whether 
these outcomes and trends are continuing and are either a response to a new piece of 
legislation in a previously unregulated area or represent a respondent sympathetic 
reaction by tribunals in a period of economic recession.  
8.9: Concluding remarks 
The aim of this thesis has been to assess whether the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006 and the subsequent Equality Act 2010 have been effective 
mechanisms by which to address age discrimination in the workplace and achieve the 
dual objectives of the Framework Directive of enabling equal treatment and 
encouraging the active participation of older citizens in the workplace.
149
 The 
conclusions drawn in this Chapter are that the legislation enacted in this country is not 
an effective mechanism to challenge such discrimination, nor will it achieve the 
objective of encouraging older citizens to participate in the workplace. The insistence 
of the Directive upon an objective of achieving ‘equal treatment’ unearthed, or 
sometimes created, conflicts of rights between the young and old and tribunals 
struggled to differentiate between the rights of workers of different ages. As tribunals 
did so, the underlying aim of encouraging older workers to participate in the workforce 
was disregarded. A further aim of the thesis has been to shed light onto this ‘unknown’ 
territory by uncovering the features of age discrimination claims, parties and outcomes. 
These attributes have been described for the first time in Chapters Four to Seven, thus 
developing our knowledge and understanding of the characteristics, interpretation and 
application of ‘age’ legislation.  
Barnard feels that the Framework Directive ‘provides a valuable vehicle to 
ensure a change in attitude towards the employment of older workers’
150
 and the 
resulting legislation has undoubtedly been an important first step in addressing age 
discrimination. But the post-modernist society is one in which jobs are in such demand 
that age acts as a filter which employers will continue to use unless the legislation is 
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interpreted and applied more rigorously and compensation reflects the true injury 
suffered by claimants. Legislation which prohibits age discrimination does send a 
message to society that such behaviour is unacceptable but this thesis wholly supports 
O’Cinneide’s assertion, referred to in the Introduction, that equality rights can ‘be 
interpreted and applied in a manner that can render them empty vessels, lacking any 
significant legal impact or substance’.
151
 
The difficulties encountered in the prohibition of age discrimination are manifold 
as age discrimination is not always irrational and age cohorts do not form homogenous 
discrete suspect groups deemed worthy of legislative help. Using an individualistic, 
formal equality, modernist approach to this public policy concern is unlikely to 
succeed in achieving the objective of reducing ageist treatment, as a reliance on 
individual fault-finding will not bring about the type of social transformation needed to 
challenge negative stereotypes. Age discrimination issues transcend individual 
workplaces and unfair treatment across society needs to be challenged. The negative 
prohibition of age discrimination, in conjunction with an absence of positive equality 
obligations and lack of agency enforcement, does little to promote true equality of 
capability. Chapter One discussed the hypothesis that the mere ‘induced compliance’
152
 
to the reduction of discriminatory conduct by means of legislation is unsuccessful and 
that the encouragement of free choice decisions to adopt non-discriminatory practices 
leads to reductions in the use of stereotypes.
153
 As this thesis has demonstrated that the 
legislative approach adopted in England and Wales is likely to fail, this further 
reinforces the need for positive actions to facilitate such free choice decisions and 
reduce unfair discrimination. 
The abandonment of the default retirement age was a major step towards 
removing age barriers in employment but the decision in Seldon
154
 that an enforced 
retirement age can be maintained in the interests of intergenerational fairness has 
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ensured that age discrimination has been legitimised by the judiciary. Furthermore if 
the removal of the DRA results in an increase in claims of involuntary dismissal on the 
grounds of age, which is extremely likely, those making such claims need to 
understand that their capability of carrying out their work will be examined in detail. If 
equality law is based on the right of individuals to ‘dignity and participation,’
155
 
claimants facing a tribunal hearing often found their dignity removed, not only by the 
discriminating conduct in the workplace, but by the adversarial claim process. The 
subjective examination of a worker’s ability by a tribunal may seem less preferable 
than the objective use of age as a factor determining retirement: claimants may 
experience a humiliating end to their working life, their chances of success are slim 
and if they do succeed at the tribunal, compensation is likely to be low and will 
probably not cover the cost of legal representation.  
The legislation has placed the burden of addressing age discrimination solely 
and squarely upon an aggrieved employee, rather than attempting to focus on the duty 
of government to solve the public policy issue of encouraging and supporting those 
age cohorts who have particular problems. Yet claimants have little assistance in 
making an application to a tribunal and employers have quickly responded to the 
legislation to develop effective defences in order to maintain their freedom to contract. 
The finding that claimants became increasingly less successful over the period of 
study as employers improved their tactics may lead to fewer workers making claims as 
they realise the stress of litigation may be unrewarding.  
The proposed introduction in July 2013 of a £1200 fee, paid in advance, to bring 
a claim to an employment tribunal will further discourage many potential claimants. A 
tribunal will be given the power to reimburse any fees paid by a successful claimant 
but this is not an automatic reimbursement. Many age discrimination claimants may 
have lost their jobs or failed to obtain work thereby experiencing a sudden fall in 
income; nevertheless they may be in receipt of pay in lieu of notice or redundancy pay 
and therefore not liable for fee remission at the time of making a claim. The time limit 
for filing discrimination claims is shorter than for other legal proceedings and 
claimants may not be able to raise the fee before they make a claim. If low-paid 
discrimination claimants cannot afford to bring a claim their access to justice will be 
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denied. This may breach the UK's obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights
156
 as under Article 6 (entitlement to a fair and public hearing) the right 
of access to a tribunal must be effective. In Kreuz v Poland
157
 it was held that the 
requirement to pay court fees can give rise to a denial of access and the particular 
circumstances of the applicant must be assessed in the light of the fee level. The 
Framework Directive states that access to judicial procedure must be made ‘available 
to all persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of 
equal treatment’
158
 and the introduction of a fee may prevent some from making a 
claim. The introduction of fees will further hinder the aims of the Directive because of 
the deterrent effect on potentially meritorious claims. 
Those claimants who cannot afford legal representation are further 
disadvantaged as this study has shown they have lower chances of success. Those 
without representation are more likely to not follow the application procedure 
correctly and they may in future suffer a loss of the fee as well as possibly incurring 
punitive additional costs orders. As Moorhead and Cumming found that claimants 
‘were largely motivated by a sense of injustice, rather than more instrumental series of 
compensation’
159
 this may lead to workers feeling that they have been subjected to, not 
only discrimination in the workplace, but additional injustice dispensed by the judicial 
system. 
It is disappointing that the observations and criticisms of the implementation of 
sex discrimination and equal pay legislation made by Leonard in 1987
160
 are still valid 
and little progress has been made towards her recommendations of providing 
consistency, more flexible time-limits and establishing effective remedies. It is also 
unfortunate that the UK has not taken advantage of the experience of other nations in 
order to build a substantive approach to age discrimination rather than merely follow 
the minimum requirements insisted upon by the EU. A symposium held in 1997 in the 
USA to discuss the failure of the ADEA to address age discrimination concluded that a 
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multi-faceted approach was needed to improve its effectiveness. It recommended that 
remedies needed to take into account the true loss suffered by claimants,
161
 that judicial 
support for cost-justifications for age-related recruitment and termination decisions 
should be reconsidered
162
 and the evidential problems that claimants faced because of 
the covert nature of age discrimination should be addressed by a lowering of the 
standard of proof.
163
 The evidence produced in this study supports the application of 
every one of these recommendations to the UK legislation. 
Whilst the legislation has provided a remedy for some claimants, the traditional 
anti-discrimination model may be unable to address the institutionalised and systemic 
nature of ageism which appears to be beyond the bounds of such equality law. 
Legislation of this sort can only tackle symptoms of ageist prejudice, which may be 
lessened by measures which re-connect older workers to the workforce, reinforced by 
societal condemnation of ageist practices outside the workplace. Just as the task of 
tackling ageist conduct should not fall upon individual aggrieved employees, the cost 
of achieving equality of capability should not be borne by employers alone but needs 
to be supported by the State and society. The focus needs to move from the modernist 
solution of trying to offer a remedy after an individual has suffered discrimination to 
preventing such treatment, but the ‘comfort’ factor provided by the enactment of 
legislation has resulted in a paucity of alternative, post-modern methods of addressing 
ageism. The findings of this research reflect ageist attitudes which are continually 
reinforced on a daily basis by the media and the subsequent lack of acceptance of age 
as an equivalent ‘suspect’ category, as discussed in Chapter 1.5. Sargeant’s suggestion, 
introduced in Chapter 1.4, that the establishment of a body to counter-act negative age 
stereotypes in the media ‘might be more influential than considering any legal 
alternatives’
164
 appears to have real validity. 
The Equality Act 2010 replaced the Regulations and, in addition to the 
prohibitions contained in the Regulations, the Act recognises the need to advance 
equality of opportunity,
165
 imposing a duty on public bodies to have ‘due regard’ to 
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‘remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic that are connected to that characteristic’.
166
 Unfortunately this duty has 
not resulted in advances in the race, gender or disability discrimination arenas to which 
it has applied for a number of years. The most recent assessment of the duties ‘raises 
serious concerns regarding performance on the equality duties. In particular, there was 
a significant lack of evidence of implementation and impact resulting in a lack of 
evidence of improved outcomes for equality groups’.
167
 Fredman has pointed out that 
the ‘“due regard” standard does not necessarily require a change in policy’
168
 or ‘to 
take steps or achieve results’
169
 and defers to public authorities’ view of the importance 
of equality in addressing disadvantage.
170
 The equality duty with regard to age may not 
bring significant change and it is in any event confined to public bodies and functions 
rather than all employers. 
The goal of equality of capability
171
 will not be achieved by this current model of 
legislation and narrow and inconsistent interpretation by the judiciary. This goal 
depends at least as much upon positive steps such as improving skills, adaptability and 
training as upon the simplistic prohibition of ageist conduct which, as pointed out in 
Chapter 1.6, may escalate rather than curb the problem.
172
 Schiek’s definition of ‘non-
discrimination law’ is that it is ‘a set of legal rules’ which aims ‘to provide legal 
remedies and positive obligations which correspond to individual disadvantaging acts 
and establish structures to counteract disadvantage’.
173
 The Age Regulations provided 
a set of legal rules but established no specific structure to counteract disadvantage 
caused by age. A holistic approach is needed, ensuring positive action is taken to 
address cohort disadvantage and promoting active strategies to counter-act 
stereotyping, following the recommendations given in 2002 by the UN and discussed 
in Chapter 2.2. Long has suggested that a government commitment to continuous life-
long training may counter-act a deficit of up-to-date skills in older cohorts thereby 
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reducing negative stereotyping and associated discrimination.
174
 Pension, tax and 
national insurance rules could be changed to permit more flexible working whilst 
phased retirement and disadvantage suffered by particular age cohorts could be 
addressed by ‘reskilling’ younger and older workers.  
Parallels can be drawn with the traditional view of upholding benefits given to 
older age cohorts in eastern cultures, referred to in Chapter 1.2. Although not providing 
equal treatment for all at any point in time, these measures would provide reasonable 
accommodation for age cohorts to be enjoyed equally by all as they grow older. They 
would also benefit younger individuals as the whole community would profit. Lady 
Hale SCJ pointed out in the Supreme Court that there ‘are benefits both to individuals 
and to the wider society if people continue to work for as long as they can. Put simply, 




This thesis has revealed that age discrimination legislation in England and Wales 
permits, rather than restricts, age discrimination. Employers appear to have been given 
a mandate to continue to discriminate on the grounds of age by the weak provisions of 
the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 and Equality Act 2010 and by a 
tribunal process which displays substantial shortcomings that render the legal rules 
without significant impact. The numerous derogations, loose justification defence, 
ineffective sanctions and low compensation awards demonstrate that age 
discrimination is viewed as a less important type of discriminatory treatment and will 
remain so unless the hierarchical approach to suspect grounds is replaced with one 
where all are regarded as equally undesirable.  
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Appendix A: Abbreviated text of the Employment Equality 
(Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/10311 
 
S T A T U T O R Y  I N S T R U M E N T S  
2006 No. 1031 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING 
AGE DISCRIMINATION 
The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 
Made 
3rd April 2006 
Coming into force 
1st October 2006 
A draft of these Regulations was laid before Parliament in accordance with paragraph 2 of 
Schedule 2 to the European Communities Act 1972(1), and was approved by resolution of 
each House of Parliament; 
The Secretary of State, who is a Minister designated for the purposes of section 2(2) of the 
European Communities Act 1972 in relation to discrimination(2), makes the following 




Citation, commencement and extent 
1.—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, 
and shall come into force on 1st October 2006. 
(2) Any amendment, repeal or revocation made by these Regulations has the same extent as 
the provision to which it relates. 
(3) Subject to that, these Regulations do not extend to Northern Ireland. 
Interpretation 
2.—(1) In these Regulations, references to discrimination are to any discrimination falling 
within regulation 3 (discrimination on grounds of age), regulation 4 (discrimination by way of 
victimisation) or regulation 5 (instructions to discriminate) and related expressions shall be 
construed accordingly, and references to harassment shall be construed in accordance with 
regulation 6 (harassment on grounds of age). 
(2) In these Regulations— 
“1996 Act” means the Employment Rights Act 1996(3); 
“act” includes a deliberate omission; 
“benefit”, except in regulation 11 and Schedule 2 (pension schemes), includes facilities and 
services; 
“commencement date” means 1st October 2006; 
“Crown employment” means — 
(a) service for purposes of a Minister of the Crown or government department, other than 
service of a person holding a statutory office; or 
(b) service on behalf of the Crown for purposes of a person holding a statutory office or 
purposes of a statutory body; 
“detriment” does not include harassment within the meaning of regulation 6; 
“employment” means employment under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or a 
contract personally to do any work, and related expressions (such as “employee” and 
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“employer”) shall be construed accordingly, but this definition does not apply in relation to 
regulation 30 (exception for retirement) or to Schedules 2, 6, 7 and 8; 
“Great Britain” includes such of the territorial waters of the United Kingdom as are adjacent to 
Great Britain; 
“Minister of the Crown” includes the Treasury and the Defence Council; 
“proprietor”, in relation to a school, has the meaning given by section 579 of the Education 
Act 1996(4); 
“relevant member of the House of Commons staff” means any person who was appointed by 
the House of Commons Commission or who is a member of the Speaker’s personal staff; 
“relevant member of the House of Lords staff” means any person who is employed under a 
contract of employment with the Corporate Officer of the House of Lords; 
“school”, in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 4 of the Education Act 
1996(5), and, in Scotland, has the meaning given by section 135(1) of the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1980(6), and references to a school are to an institution in so far as it is 
engaged in the provision of education under those sections; 
“service for purposes of a Minister of the Crown or government department” does not include 
service in any office mentioned in Schedule 2 (Ministerial offices) to the House of Commons 
Disqualification Act 1975(7); 
“statutory body” means a body set up by or in pursuance of an enactment, and “statutory 
office” means an office so set up; and 
“worker” in relation to regulations 32 and 34 and to Schedule 2, means, as the case may be— 
(a) an employee; 
(b) a person holding an office or post to which regulation 12 (office-holders etc) applies; 
(c) a person holding the office of constable; 
(d) a partner within the meaning of regulation 17 (partnerships); 
(e) a member of a limited liability partnership within the meaning of that regulation; 
(f) a person in Crown employment; 
(g) a relevant member of the House of Commons staff; 
(h) a relevant member of the House of Lords staff. 
(3) In these Regulations references to “employer”, in their application to a person at any time 
seeking to employ another, include a person who has no employees at that time. 
Discrimination on grounds of age 
3.—(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates against another 
person (“B”) if— 
(a) on grounds of B’s age, A treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat other 
persons, or 
(b) A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which he applies or would apply equally to 
persons not of the same age group as B, but— 
(i) which puts or would put persons of the same age group as B at a particular disadvantage 
when compared with other persons, and 
(ii) which puts B at that disadvantage, 
and A cannot show the treatment or, as the case may be, provision, criterion or practice to be a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
(2) A comparison of B’s case with that of another person under paragraph (1) must be such 
that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially different, in the 
other. 
(3) In this regulation— 
(a) “age group” means a group of persons defined by reference to age, whether by reference to 
a particular age or a range of ages; and 
(b) the reference in paragraph (1)(a) to B’s age includes B’s apparent age. 
Discrimination by way of victimisation 
4.—(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates against another 
person (“B”) if he treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons in the 
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same circumstances, and does so by reason that B has— 
(a) brought proceedings against A or any other person under or by virtue of these Regulations; 
(b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings brought by any person 
against A or any other person under or by virtue of these Regulations; 
(c) otherwise done anything under or by reference to these Regulations in relation to A or any 
other person; or 
(d) alleged that A or any other person has committed an act which (whether or not the 
allegation so states) would amount to a contravention of these Regulations, 
or by reason that A knows that B intends to do any of those things, or suspects that B has done 
or intends to do any of them. 
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to treatment of B by reason of any allegation made by him, or 
evidence or information given by him, if the allegation, evidence or information was false and 
not made (or, as the case may be, given) in good faith. 
Instructions to discriminate 
5.  For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates against another person 
(“B”) if he treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons in the same 
circumstances, and does so by reason that— 
(a) B has not carried out (in whole or in part) an instruction to do an act which is unlawful by 
virtue of these Regulations, or 
(b) B, having been given an instruction to do such an act, complains to A or to any other 
person about that instruction. 
Harassment on grounds of age 
6.—(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) subjects another person (“B”) to 
harassment where, on grounds of age, A engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose 
or effect of— 
(a) violating B’s dignity; or 
(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. 
(2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect specified in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) only if, 
having regard to all the circumstances, including in particular the perception of B, it should 
reasonably be considered as having that effect. 
 
PART 2 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
Applicants and employees 
7.—(1) It is unlawful for an employer, in relation to employment by him at an establishment in 
Great Britain, to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining to whom he should offer 
employment; 
(b) in the terms on which he offers that person employment; or 
(c) by refusing to offer, or deliberately not offering, him employment. 
(2) It is unlawful for an employer, in relation to a person whom he employs at an 
establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against that person— 
(a) in the terms of employment which he affords him; 
(b) in the opportunities which he affords him for promotion, a transfer, training, or receiving 
any other benefit; 
(c) by refusing to afford him, or deliberately not affording him, any such opportunity; or 
(d) by dismissing him, or subjecting him to any other detriment. 
(3) It is unlawful for an employer, in relation to employment by him at an establishment in 
Great Britain, to subject to harassment a person whom he employs or who has applied to him 
for employment. 
(4) Subject to paragraph (5), paragraph (1)(a) and (c) does not apply in relation to a person— 
(a) whose age is greater than the employer’s normal retirement age or, if the employer does not 
have a normal retirement age, the age of 65; or 
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(b) who would, within a period of six months from the date of his application to the employer, 
reach the employer’s normal retirement age or, if the employer does not have a normal 
retirement age, the age of 65. 
(5) Paragraph (4) only applies to a person to whom, if he was recruited by the employer, 
regulation 30 (exception for retirement) could apply. 
(6) Paragraph (2) does not apply to benefits of any description if the employer is concerned 
with the provision (for payment or not) of benefits of that description to the public, or to a 
section of the public which includes the employee in question, unless— 
(a) that provision differs in a material respect from the provision of the benefits by the 
employer to his employees; or 
(b) the provision of the benefits to the employee in question is regulated by his contract of 
employment; or 
(c) the benefits relate to training. 
(7) In paragraph (2)(d) reference to the dismissal of a person from employment includes 
reference— 
(a) to the termination of that person’s employment by the expiration of any period (including a 
period expiring by reference to an event or circumstance), not being a termination immediately 
after which the employment is renewed on the same terms; and 
(b) to the termination of that person’s employment by any act of his (including the giving of 
notice) in circumstances such that he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the 
conduct of the employer. 
(8) In paragraph (4) “normal retirement age” is an age of 65 or more which meets the 
requirements of section 98ZH of the 1996 Act(8). 
Exception for genuine occupational requirement etc 
8.—(1) In relation to discrimination falling within regulation 3 (discrimination on grounds of 
age)— 
(a) regulation 7(1)(a) or (c) does not apply to any employment; 
(b) regulation 7(2)(b) or (c) does not apply to promotion or transfer to, or training for, any 
employment; and 
(c) regulation 7(2)(d) does not apply to dismissal from any employment, 
where paragraph (2) applies. 
(2) This paragraph applies where, having regard to the nature of the employment or the 
context in which it is carried out— 
(a) possessing a characteristic related to age is a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement; 
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case; and 
(c) either— 
(i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet it, or 
(ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable for him not to be 
satisfied, that that person meets it. 
Contract workers 
9.—(1) It is unlawful for a principal, in relation to contract work at an establishment in Great 
Britain, to discriminate against a contract worker— 
(a) in the terms on which he allows him to do that work; 
(b) by not allowing him to do it or continue to do it; 
(c) in the way he affords him access to any benefits or by refusing or deliberately not affording 
him access to them; or 
(d) by subjecting him to any other detriment. 
(2) It is unlawful for a principal, in relation to contract work at an establishment in Great 
Britain, to subject a contract worker to harassment. 
(3) A principal does not contravene paragraph (1)(b) by doing any act in relation to a contract 
worker where, if the work were to be done by a person taken into the principal’s employment, 




(4) Paragraph (1) does not apply to benefits of any description if the principal is concerned 
with the provision (for payment or not) of benefits of that description to the public, or to a 
section of the public to which the contract worker in question belongs, unless that provision 
differs in a material respect from the provision of the benefits by the principal to his contract 
workers. 
(5) In this regulation— 
“principal” means a person (“A”) who makes work available for doing by individuals who are 
employed by another person who supplies them under a contract made with A; “contract 
work” means work so made available; and 
“contract worker” means any individual who is supplied to the principal under such a contract. 
Meaning of employment and contract work at establishment in Great Britain 
10.—(1) For the purposes of this Part (“the relevant purposes”), employment is to be regarded 
as being at an establishment in Great Britain if the employee— 
(a) does his work wholly or partly in Great Britain; or 
(b) does his work wholly outside Great Britain and paragraph (2) applies. 
(2) This paragraph applies if— 
(a) the employer has a place of business at an establishment in Great Britain; 
(b) the work is for the purposes of the business carried on at that establishment; and 
(c) the employee is ordinarily resident in Great Britain— 
(i) at the time when he applies for or is offered the employment, or 
(ii) at any time during the course of the employment. 
(3) The reference to “employment” in paragraph (1) includes— 
(a) employment on board a ship only if the ship is registered at a port of registry in Great 
Britain, and 
(b) employment on an aircraft or hovercraft only if the aircraft or hovercraft is registered in the 
United Kingdom and operated by a person who has his principal place of business, or is 
ordinarily resident, in Great Britain. 
(4) Subject to paragraph (5), for the purposes of determining if employment concerned with 
the exploration of the sea bed or sub-soil or the exploitation of their natural resources is 
outside Great Britain, this regulation has effect as if references to Great Britain included— 
(a) any area designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964(9) except an area 
or part of an area in which the law of Northern Ireland applies; and 
(b) in relation to employment concerned with the exploration or exploitation of the Frigg Gas 
Field, the part of the Norwegian sector of the Continental Shelf described in Schedule 1. 
(5) Paragraph (4) shall not apply to employment which is concerned with the exploration or 
exploitation of the Frigg Gas Field unless the employer is— 
(a) a company registered under the Companies Act 1985(10); 
(b) an oversea company which has established a place of business within Great Britain from 
which it directs the exploration or exploitation in question; or 
(c) any other person who has a place of business within Great Britain from which he directs 
the exploration or exploitation in question. 
(7) This regulation applies in relation to contract work within the meaning of regulation 9 as it 
applies in relation to employment; and, in its application to contract work, references to 
“employee”, “employer” and “employment” are references to (respectively) “contract 
worker”, “principal” and “contract work” within the meaning of regulation 9. 
Pension schemes 
11.—(1) It is unlawful, except in relation to rights accrued or benefits payable in respect of 
periods of service prior to the coming into force of these Regulations, for the trustees or 
managers of an occupational pension scheme to discriminate against a member or prospective 
member of the scheme in carrying out any of their functions in relation to it (including in 
particular their functions relating to the admission of members to the scheme and the treatment 
of members of it). 
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(2) It is unlawful for the trustees or managers of an occupational pension scheme, in relation to 
the scheme, to subject to harassment a member or prospective member of it. 
(3) Schedule 2 (pension schemes) shall have effect for the purposes of— 
(a) defining terms used in this regulation and in that Schedule; 
(b) exempting certain rules and practices in or relating to pension schemes from Parts 2 and 3 
of these Regulations; 
(c) treating every occupational pension scheme as including a non-discrimination rule; 
(d) giving trustees or managers of an occupational pension scheme power to alter the scheme 
so as to secure conformity with the non-discrimination rule; 
(e) making provision in relation to the procedures, and remedies which may be granted, on 
certain complaints relating to occupational pension schemes presented to an employment 
tribunal under regulation 36 (jurisdiction of employment tribunals). 
Office-holders etc 
12.—(1) It is unlawful for a relevant person, in relation to an appointment to an office or post 
to which this regulation applies, to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements which he makes for the purpose of determining to whom the 
appointment should be offered; 
(b) in the terms on which he offers him the appointment; or 
(c) by refusing to offer him the appointment. 
(2) It is unlawful, in relation to an appointment to an office or post to which this regulation 
applies and which is an office or post referred to in paragraph (8)(b), for a relevant person on 
whose recommendation (or subject to whose approval) appointments to the office or post are 
made, to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements which he makes for the purpose of determining who should be 
recommended or approved in relation to the appointment; or 
(b) in making or refusing to make a recommendation, or giving or refusing to give an 
approval, in relation to the appointment. 
(3) It is unlawful for a relevant person, in relation to a person who has been appointed to an 
office or post to which this regulation applies, to discriminate against him— 
(a) in the terms of the appointment; 
(b) in the opportunities which he affords him for promotion, a transfer, training or receiving 
any other benefit, or by refusing to afford him any such opportunity; 
(c) by terminating the appointment; or 
(d) by subjecting him to any other detriment in relation to the appointment. 
(4) It is unlawful for a relevant person, in relation to an office or post to which this regulation 
applies, to subject to harassment a person— 
(a) who has been appointed to the office or post; 
(b) who is seeking or being considered for appointment to the office or post; or 
(c) who is seeking or being considered for a recommendation or approval in relation to an 
appointment to an office or post referred to in paragraph (8)(b). 
(5) Paragraphs (1) and (3) do not apply to any act in relation to an office or post where, if the 
office or post constituted employment, that act would be lawful by virtue of regulation 8 
(exception for genuine occupational requirement etc); and paragraph (2) does not apply to any 
act in relation to an office or post where, if the office or post constituted employment, it would 
be lawful by virtue of regulation 8 to refuse to offer the person such employment. 
(6) Paragraph (3) does not apply to benefits of any description if the relevant person is 
concerned with the provision (for payment or not) of benefits of that description to the public, 
or a section of the public to which the person appointed belongs, unless— 
(a) that provision differs in a material respect from the provision of the benefits by the relevant 
person to persons appointed to offices or posts which are the same as, or not materially 
different from, that which the person appointed holds; or 
(b) the provision of the benefits to the person appointed is regulated by the terms and 
conditions of his appointment; or 
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(c) the benefits relate to training. 
(7) In paragraph (3)(c) the reference to the termination of the appointment includes a 
reference— 
(a) to the termination of the appointment by the expiration of any period (including a period 
expiring by reference to an event or circumstance), not being a termination immediately after 
which the appointment is renewed on the same terms and conditions; and 
(b) to the termination of the appointment by any act of the person appointed (including the 
giving of notice) in circumstances such that he is entitled to terminate the appointment without 
notice by reason of the conduct of the relevant person. 
(8) This regulation applies to— 
(a) any office or post to which persons are appointed to discharge functions personally under 
the direction of another person, and in respect of which they are entitled to remuneration; and 
(b) any office or post to which appointments are made by (or on the recommendation of or 
subject to the approval of) a Minister of the Crown, a government department, the National 
Assembly for Wales or any part of the Scottish Administration, 
but not to a political office or a case where regulation 7 (applicants and employees), 9 
(contract workers), 15 (barristers), 16 (advocates) or 17 (partnerships) applies, or would apply 
but for the operation of any other provision of these Regulations. 
(9) For the purposes of paragraph (8)(a) the holder of an office or post— 
(a) is to be regarded as discharging his functions under the direction of another person if that 
other person is entitled to direct him as to when and where he discharges those functions; 
(b) is not to be regarded as entitled to remuneration merely because he is entitled to 
payments— 
(i) in respect of expenses incurred by him in carrying out the function of the office or post; or 
(ii) by way of compensation for the loss of income or benefits he would or might have 
received from any person had he not been carrying out the functions of the office or post. 
(10) In this regulation— 
(a) appointment to an office or post does not include election to an office or post; 
(b) “political office” means— 
(i) any office of the House of Commons held by a member of it; 
(ii) a life peerage within the meaning of the Life Peerages Act 1958(11), or any office of the 
House of Lords held by a member of it; 
(iii) any office mentioned in Schedule 2 (Ministerial offices) to the House of Commons 
Disqualification Act 1975(12); 
(iv) the offices of Leader of the Opposition, Chief Opposition Whip or Assistant Opposition 
Whip within the meaning of the Ministerial and other Salaries Act 1975(13); 
(v) any office of the Scottish Parliament held by a member of it; 
(vi) a member of the Scottish Executive within the meaning of section 44 of the Scotland Act 
1998(14), or a junior Scottish Minister within the meaning of section 49 of that Act; 
(vii) any office of the National Assembly for Wales held by a member of it; 
(viii) in England, any office of a county council, a London borough council, a district council, 
or a parish council held by a member of it; 
(ix) in Wales, any office of a county council, a county borough council, or a community 
council held by a member of it; 
(x) in relation to a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) 
Act 1994(15) or a community council established under section 51 of the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1973(16), any office of such a council held by a member of it; 
(xi) any office of the Greater London Authority held by a member of it; 
(xii) any office of the Common Council of the City of London held by a member of it; 
(xiii) any office of the Council of the Isles of Scilly held by a member of it; 
(xiv) any office of a political party; 
(c) “relevant person”, in relation to an office or post, means— 
(i) any person with power to make or terminate appointments to the office or post, or to 
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determine the terms of appointment, 
(ii) any person with power to determine the working conditions of a person appointed to the 
office or post in relation to opportunities for promotion, a transfer, training or for receiving 
any other benefit, and 
(iii) any person or body referred to in paragraph (8)(b) on whose recommendation or subject to 
whose approval appointments are made to the office or post; 
(d) references to making a recommendation include references to making a negative 
recommendation; and 
(e) references to refusal include references to deliberate omission. 
Police 
13.—(1) For the purposes of this Part, the holding of the office of constable shall be treated as 
employment— 
(a) by the chief officer of police as respects any act done by him in relation to a constable or 
that office; 
(b) by the police authority as respects any act done by it in relation to a constable or that 
office. 
(2) For the purposes of regulation 25 (liability of employers and principals)— 
(a) the holding of the office of constable shall be treated as employment by the chief officer of 
police (and as not being employment by any other person); and 
(b) anything done by a person holding such an office in the performance, or purported 
performance, of his functions shall be treated as done in the course of that employment. 
(3) There shall be paid out of the police fund— 
(a) any compensation, costs or expenses awarded against a chief officer of police in any 
proceedings brought against him under these Regulations, and any costs or expenses incurred 
by him in any such proceedings so far as not recovered by him in the proceedings; and 
(b) any sum required by a chief officer of police for the settlement of any claim made against 
him under these Regulations if the settlement is approved by the police authority. 
(4) Any proceedings under these Regulations which, by virtue of paragraph (1), would lie 
against a chief officer of police shall be brought against the chief officer of police for the time 
being or in the case of a vacancy in that office, against the person for the time being 
performing the functions of that office; and references in paragraph (3) to the chief officer of 
police shall be construed accordingly. 
(5) A police authority may, in such cases and to such extent as appear to it to be appropriate, 
pay out of the police fund— 
(a) any compensation, costs or expenses awarded in proceedings under these Regulations 
against a person under the direction and control of the chief officer of police; 
(b) any costs or expenses incurred and not recovered by such a person in such proceedings; 
and 
(c) any sum required in connection with the settlement of a claim that has or might have given 
rise to such proceedings. 
(6) Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to a police cadet and appointment as a police cadet as they 
apply to a constable and the office of constable. 
(7) Subject to paragraph (8), in this regulation— 
“chief officer of police”— 
(a) in relation to a person appointed, or an appointment falling to be made, under a specified 
Act, has the same meaning as in the Police Act 1996(17); 
(b) in relation to a person appointed, or an appointment falling to be made, under the Police 
(Scotland) Act 1967(18), means the chief constable of the relevant police force; 
(c) in relation to any other person or appointment means the officer or other person who has 
the direction and control of the body of constables or cadets in question; 
“police authority”— 
(a) in relation to a person appointed, or an appointment falling to be made, under a specified 
Act, has the same meaning as in the Police Act 1996; 
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(b) in relation to a person appointed, or an appointment falling to be made, under the Police 
(Scotland) Act 1967, has the meaning given in that Act; 
(c) in relation to any other person or appointment, means the authority by whom the person in 
question is or on appointment would be paid; 
“police cadet” means any person appointed to undergo training with a view to becoming a 
constable; 
“police fund”— 
(a) in relation to a chief officer of police within sub-paragraph (a) of the above definition of 
that term, has the same meaning as in the Police Act 1996; 
(b) in any other case means money provided by the police authority; and 
“specified Act” means the Metropolitan Police Act 1829(19), the City of London Police Act 
1839(20) or the Police Act 1996. 
(8) In relation to a constable of a force who is not under the direction and control of the chief 
officer of police for that force, references in this regulation to the chief officer of police are 
references to the chief officer of the force under whose direction and control he is, and 
references in this regulation to the police authority are references to the relevant police 
authority for that force. 
(9) This regulation is subject to regulation 14. 
Serious Organised Crime Agency 
14.—(1) For the purposes of this Part, any constable or other person who has been seconded to 
SOCA to serve as a member of its staff shall be treated as employed by SOCA. 
(2) For the purposes of regulation 25 (liability of employers and principals)— 
(a) the secondment of any constable or other person to SOCA to serve as a member of its staff 
shall be treated as employment by SOCA (and not as employment by any other person); and 
(b) anything done by a person so seconded in the performance, or purported performance, of 
his functions shall be treated as done in the course of that employment. 
(3) In this regulation “SOCA” means the Serious Organised Crime Agency established under 
section 1 of, and Schedule 1 to, the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005(21). 
Barristers 
15.—(1) It is unlawful for a barrister or barrister’s clerk, in relation to any offer of a pupillage 
or tenancy, to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements which are made for the purpose of determining to whom the pupillage 
or tenancy should be offered; 
(b) in respect of any terms on which it is offered; or 
(c) by refusing, or deliberately not offering, it to him. 
(2) It is unlawful for a barrister or barrister’s clerk, in relation to a pupil or tenant in the set of 
chambers in question, to discriminate against him— 
(a) in respect of any terms applicable to him as a pupil or tenant; 
(b) in the opportunities for training, or gaining experience, which are afforded or denied to 
him; 
(c) in the benefits which are afforded or denied to him; or 
(d) by terminating his pupillage, or by subjecting him to any pressure to leave the chambers or 
other detriment. 
(3) It is unlawful for a barrister or barrister’s clerk, in relation to a pupillage or tenancy in the 
set of chambers in question, to subject to harassment a person who is, or has applied to be, a 
pupil or tenant. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person, in relation to the giving, withholding or acceptance of 
instructions to a barrister, to discriminate against any person by subjecting him to a detriment, 
or to subject him to harassment. 
(5) In this regulation— 
“barrister’s clerk” includes any person carrying out any of the functions of a barrister’s clerk; 
“pupil”, “pupillage” and “set of chambers” have the meanings commonly associated with their 
use in the context of barristers practising in independent practice; and 
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“tenancy” and “tenant” have the meanings commonly associated with their use in the context 
of barristers practising in independent practice, but also include reference to any barrister 
permitted to work in a set of chambers who is not a tenant. 
(6) This regulation extends to England and Wales only. 
Advocates 
16.—(1) It is unlawful for an advocate, in relation to taking any person as his pupil, to 
discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements which he makes for the purpose of determining whom he will take as 
his pupil; 
(b) in respect of any terms on which he offers to take any person as his pupil; or 
(c) by refusing to take, or deliberately not taking, a person as his pupil. 
(2) It is unlawful for an advocate, in relation to a person who is his pupil, to discriminate 
against him— 
(a) in respect of any terms applicable to him as a pupil; 
(b) in the opportunities for training, or gaining experience, which are afforded or denied to 
him; 
(c) in the benefits which are afforded or denied to him; or 
(d) by terminating the relationship, or by subjecting him to any pressure to terminate the 
relationship or other detriment. 
(3) It is unlawful for an advocate, in relation to a person who is his pupil or taking any person 
as his pupil, to subject such a person to harassment. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person, in relation to the giving, withholding or acceptance of 
instructions to an advocate, to discriminate against any person by subjecting him to a 
detriment, or to subject him to harassment. 
(5) In this regulation— 
“advocate” means a member of the Faculty of Advocates practising as such; and 
“pupil” has the meaning commonly associated with its use in the context of a person training 
to be an advocate. 
(6) This regulation extends to Scotland only. 
Partnerships 
17.—(1) It is unlawful for a firm, in relation to a position as partner in the firm, to discriminate 
against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements they make for the purpose of determining to whom they should offer 
that position; 
(b) in the terms on which they offer him that position; 
(c) by refusing to offer, or deliberately not offering, him that position; or 
(d) in a case where the person already holds that position— 
(i) in the way they afford him access to any benefits or by refusing to afford, or deliberately 
not affording, him access to them; or 
(ii) by expelling him from that position, or subjecting him to any other detriment. 
(2) It is unlawful for a firm, in relation to a position as partner in the firm, to subject to 
harassment a person who holds or has applied for that position. 
(3) Paragraphs (1)(a) to (c) and (2) apply in relation to persons proposing to form themselves 
into a partnership as they apply in relation to a firm. 
(4) Paragraph (1) does not apply to any act in relation to a position as partner where, if the 
position were employment, that act would be lawful by virtue of regulation 8 (exception for 
genuine occupational requirement etc). 
(5) In the case of a limited partnership references in this regulation to a partner shall be 
construed as references to a general partner as defined in section 3 of the Limited Partnerships 
Act 1907(22). 
(6) This regulation applies to a limited liability partnership as it applies to a firm; and, in its 
application to a limited liability partnership, references to a partner in a firm are references to a 
member of the limited liability partnership. 
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(7) In this regulation, “firm” has the meaning given by section 4 of the Partnership Act 
1890(23). 
(8) In paragraph (1)(d) reference to the expulsion of a person from a position as partner 
includes reference— 
(a) to the termination of that person’s partnership by the expiration of any period (including a 
period expiring by reference to an event or circumstance), not being a termination immediately 
after which the partnership is renewed on the same terms; and 
(b) to the termination of that person’s partnership by any act of his (including the giving of 
notice) in circumstances such that he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the 
conduct of the other partners. 
Trade organisations 
18.—(1) It is unlawful for a trade organisation to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the terms on which it is prepared to admit him to membership of the organisation; or 
(b) by refusing to accept, or deliberately not accepting, his application for membership. 
(2) It is unlawful for a trade organisation, in relation to a member of the organisation, to 
discriminate against him— 
(a) in the way it affords him access to any benefits or by refusing or deliberately omitting to 
afford him access to them; 
(b) by depriving him of membership, or varying the terms on which he is a member; or 
(c) by subjecting him to any other detriment. 
(3) It is unlawful for a trade organisation, in relation to a person’s membership or application 
for membership of that organisation, to subject that person to harassment. 
(4) In this regulation— 
“trade organisation” means an organisation of workers, an organisation of employers, or any 
other organisation whose members carry on a particular profession or trade for the purposes of 
which the organisation exists; 
“profession” includes any vocation or occupation; and 
“trade” includes any business. 
Qualifications bodies 
19.—(1) It is unlawful for a qualifications body to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the terms on which it is prepared to confer a professional or trade qualification on him; 
(b) by refusing or deliberately not granting any application by him for such a qualification; or 
(c) by withdrawing such a qualification from him or varying the terms on which he holds it. 
(2) It is unlawful for a qualifications body, in relation to a professional or trade qualification 
conferred by it, to subject to harassment a person who holds or applies for such a qualification. 
(3) In this regulation— 
“qualifications body” means any authority or body which can confer a professional or trade 
qualification, but it does not include— 
(a) a governing body of an educational establishment to which regulation 23 (institutions of 
further and higher education) applies, or would apply but for the operation of any other 
provision of these Regulations, or 
(b) a proprietor of a school; 
“confer” includes renew or extend; 
“professional or trade qualification” means any authorisation, qualification, recognition, 
registration, enrolment, approval or certification which is needed for, or facilitates engagement 
in, a particular profession or trade; 
“profession” and “trade” have the same meaning as in regulation 18. 
The provision of vocational training 
20.—(1) It is unlawful, in relation to a person seeking or undergoing training, for any training 
provider to discriminate against him— 
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining to whom he should offer 
training; 
(b) in the terms on which the training provider affords him access to any training; 
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(c) by refusing or deliberately not affording him such access; 
(d) by terminating his training; or 
(e) by subjecting him to any other detriment during his training. 
(2) It is unlawful for a training provider, in relation to a person seeking or undergoing training, 
to subject him to harassment. 
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply if the discrimination concerns training that would only fit a 
person for employment which, by virtue of regulation 8 (exception for genuine occupational 
requirement etc), the employer could lawfully refuse to offer the person seeking training. 
(4) In this regulation— 
“professional or trade qualification” has the same meaning as in regulation 19; 
“registered pupil” has the meaning given by section 434 of the Education Act 1996(24); 
“training” means— 
(a) all types and all levels of training which would help fit a person for any employment; 
(b) vocational guidance; 
(c) facilities for training; 
(d) practical work experience provided by an employer to a person whom he does not employ; 
and 
(e) any assessment related to the award of any professional or trade qualification; 
“training provider” means any person who provides, or makes arrangements for the provision 
of, training, but it does not include— 
(a) an employer in relation to training for persons employed by him; 
(b) a governing body of an educational establishment to which regulation 23 (institutions of 
further and higher education) applies, or would apply but for the operation of any other 
provision of these Regulations; or 
(c) a proprietor of a school in relation to any registered pupil. 
Employment agencies, careers guidance etc 
21.—(1) It is unlawful for an employment agency to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the terms on which the agency offers to provide any of its services; 
(b) by refusing or deliberately not providing any of its services; or 
(c) in the way it provides any of its services. 
(2) It is unlawful for an employment agency, in relation to a person to whom it provides its 
services, or who has requested it to provide its services, to subject that person to harassment. 
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply to discrimination if it only concerns employment which, by 
virtue of regulation 8 (exception for genuine occupational requirement etc), the employer 
could lawfully refuse to offer the person in question. 
(4) An employment agency shall not be subject to any liability under this regulation if it 
proves that— 
(a) it acted in reliance on a statement made to it by the employer to the effect that, by reason of 
the operation of paragraph (3), its action would not be unlawful; and 
(b) it was reasonable for it to rely on the statement. 
(5) A person who knowingly or recklessly makes a statement such as is referred to in 
paragraph (4)(a) which in a material respect is false or misleading commits an offence, and 
shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. 
(6) For the purposes of this regulation— 
(a) “employment agency” means a person who, for profit or not, provides services for the 
purpose of finding employment for workers or supplying employers with workers, but it does 
not include— 
(i) a governing body of an educational establishment to which regulation 23 (institutions of 
further and higher education) applies, or would apply but for the operation of any other 
provision of these Regulations; or 
(ii) a proprietor of a school; and 
(b) references to the services of an employment agency include guidance on careers and any 
other services related to employment. 
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Assisting persons to obtain employment etc 
22.—(1) It is unlawful for the Secretary of State to discriminate against any person by 
subjecting him to a detriment, or to subject a person to harassment, in the provision of 
facilities or services under section 2 of the Employment and Training Act 1973(25) 
(arrangements for assisting persons to obtain employment). 
(2) It is unlawful for Scottish Enterprise or Highlands and Islands Enterprise to discriminate 
against any person by subjecting him to a detriment, or to subject a person to harassment, in 
the provision of facilities or services under such arrangements as are mentioned in section 2(3) 
of the Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act 1990(26) (arrangements analogous to 
arrangements in pursuance of the said Act of 1973). 
(3) This regulation does not apply in a case where— 
(a) regulation 20 (the provision of vocational training) applies or would apply but for the 
operation of any other provision of these Regulations, or 
(b) the Secretary of State is acting as an employment agency within the meaning of regulation 
21 (employment agencies, careers guidance etc). 
Institutions of further and higher education 
23.—(1) It is unlawful, in relation to an educational establishment to which this regulation 
applies, for the governing body of that establishment to discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the terms on which it offers to admit him to the establishment as a student; 
(b) by refusing or deliberately not accepting an application for his admission to the 
establishment as a student; or 
(c) where he is a student of the establishment— 
(i) in the way it affords him access to any benefits, 
(ii) by refusing or deliberately not affording him access to them, or 
(iii) by excluding him from the establishment or subjecting him to any other detriment. 
(2) It is unlawful, in relation to an educational establishment to which this regulation applies, 
for the governing body of that establishment to subject to harassment a person who is a student 
at the establishment, or who has applied for admission to the establishment as a student. 
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply if the discrimination concerns training that would only fit a 
person for employment which, by virtue of regulation 8 (exception for genuine occupational 
requirement etc), the employer could lawfully refuse to offer the person in question. 
(4) This regulation applies to the following educational establishments in England and Wales, 
namely— 
(a) an institution within the further education sector (within the meaning of section 91(3) of 
the Further and Higher Education Act 1992(27)); 
(b) a university; 
(c) an institution, other than a university, within the higher education sector (within the 
meaning of section 91(5) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992). 
(5) This regulation applies to the following educational establishments in Scotland, namely— 
(a) a college of further education within the meaning of section 36(1) of the Further and 
Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992(28) under the management of a board of management 
within the meaning of Part I of that Act; 
(b) a college of further education maintained by an education authority in the exercise of its 
further education functions in providing courses of further education within the meaning of 
section 1(5)(b)(ii) of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980(29); 
(c) any other educational establishment (not being a school) which provides further education 
within the meaning of section 1 of the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992; 
(d) an institution within the higher education sector (within the meaning of Part 2 of the 
Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992); 
(e) a central institution (within the meaning of section 135 of the Education (Scotland) Act 
1980). 
(6) In this regulation— 




“governing body” includes— 
(a) the board of management of a college referred to in paragraph (5)(a), and 
(b) the managers of a college or institution referred to in paragraph (5)(b) or (e); 
“student” means any person who receives education at an educational establishment to which 
this regulation applies; and 
“university” includes a university college and the college, school or hall of a university. 
Relationships which have come to an end 
24.—(1) In this regulation a “relevant relationship” is a relationship during the course of 
which an act of discrimination against, or harassment of, one party to the relationship (“B”) by 
the other party to it (“A”) is unlawful by virtue of any preceding provision of this Part. 
(2) Where a relevant relationship has come to an end, it is unlawful for A— 
(a) to discriminate against B by subjecting him to a detriment; or 
(b) to subject B to harassment; 
where the discrimination or harassment arises out of and is closely connected to that 
relationship. 
(3) In paragraph (1), reference to an act of discrimination or harassment which is unlawful 
includes, in the case of a relationship which has come to an end before the coming into force 
of these Regulations, reference to an act of discrimination or harassment which would, after 
the coming into force of these Regulations, be unlawful. 
 
PART 3 
OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTS 
Liability of employers and principals 
25.—(1) Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated for the 
purposes of these Regulations as done by his employer as well as by him, whether or not it 
was done with the employer’s knowledge or approval. 
(2) Anything done by a person as agent for another person with the authority (whether express 
or implied, and whether precedent or subsequent) of that other person shall be treated for the 
purposes of these Regulations as done by that other person as well as by him. 
(3) In proceedings brought under these Regulations against any person in respect of an act 
alleged to have been done by an employee of his it shall be a defence for that person to prove 
that he took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing that 
act, or from doing in the course of his employment acts of that description. 
Aiding unlawful acts 
26.—(1) A person who knowingly aids another person to do an act made unlawful by these 
Regulations shall be treated for the purpose of these Regulations as himself doing an unlawful 
act of the like description. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) an employee or agent for whose act the employer or 
principal is liable under regulation 25 (or would be so liable but for regulation 25(3)) shall be 
deemed to aid the doing of the act by the employer or principal. 
(3) A person does not under this regulation knowingly aid another to do an unlawful act if— 
(a) he acts in reliance on a statement made to him by that other person that, by reason of any 
provision of these Regulations, the act which he aids would not be unlawful; and 
(b) it is reasonable for him to rely on the statement. 
(4) A person who knowingly or recklessly makes a statement such as is referred to in 
paragraph (3)(a) which in a material respect is false or misleading commits an offence, and 
shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. 
 
PART 4 
GENERAL EXCEPTIONS FROM PARTS 2 AND 3 
Exception for statutory authority 
27.—(1) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render unlawful any act done in order to comply with a 
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requirement of any statutory provision. 
(2) In this regulation “statutory provision” means any provision (whenever enacted) of— 
(a) an Act or an Act of the Scottish Parliament; 
(b) an instrument made by a Minister of the Crown under an Act; 
(c) an instrument made under an Act or an Act of the Scottish Parliament by the Scottish 
Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive. 
Exception for national security 
28.  Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render unlawful an act done for the purpose of safeguarding 
national security, if the doing of the act was justified by that purpose. 
Exceptions for positive action 
29.—(1) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render unlawful any act done in or in connection with— 
(a) affording persons of a particular age or age group access to facilities for training which 
would help fit them for particular work; or 
(b) encouraging persons of a particular age or age group to take advantage of opportunities for 
doing particular work; 
where it reasonably appears to the person doing the act that it prevents or compensates for 
disadvantages linked to age suffered by persons of that age or age group doing that work or 
likely to take up that work. 
(2) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render unlawful any act done by a trade organisation within the 
meaning of regulation 18 in or in connection with— 
(a) affording only members of the organisation who are of a particular age or age group access 
to facilities for training which would help fit them for holding a post of any kind in the 
organisation; or 
(b) encouraging only members of the organisation who are of a particular age or age group to 
take advantage of opportunities for holding such posts in the organisation, 
where it reasonably appears to the organisation that the act prevents or compensates for 
disadvantages linked to age suffered by those of that age or age group holding such posts or 
likely to hold such posts. 
(3) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render unlawful any act done by a trade organisation within the 
meaning of regulation 18 in or in connection with encouraging only persons of a particular age 
or age group to become members of the organisation where it reasonably appears to the 
organisation that the act prevents or compensates for disadvantages linked to age suffered by 
persons of that age or age group who are, or are eligible to become, members. 
Exception for retirement 
30.—(1) This regulation applies in relation to an employee within the meaning of section 
230(1) of the 1996 Act, a person in Crown employment, a relevant member of the House of 
Commons staff, and a relevant member of the House of Lords staff. 
(2) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render unlawful the dismissal of a person to whom this 
regulation applies at or over the age of 65 where the reason for the dismissal is retirement. 
(3) For the purposes of this regulation, whether or not the reason for a dismissal is retirement 
shall be determined in accordance with sections 98ZA to 98ZF of the 1996 Act(30). 
Exception for the national minimum wage 
31.—(1) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render it unlawful for a relevant person (“A”) to be 
remunerated in respect of his work at a rate which is lower than the rate at which another such 
person (“B”) is remunerated for his work where— 
(a) the hourly rate of the national minimum wage for a person of A’s age is lower than that for 
a person of B’s age, and 
(b) the rate at which A is remunerated is below the single hourly rate for the national minimum 
wage prescribed by the Secretary of State under section 1(3) of the National Minimum Wage 
Act 1998(31). 
(2) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render it unlawful for an apprentice who is not a relevant 
person to be remunerated in respect of his work at a rate which is lower than the rate at which 
an apprentice who is a relevant person is remunerated for his work. 
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(3) In this regulation— 
“apprentice” means a person who is employed under a contract of apprenticeship or, in 
accordance with regulation 12(3) of the National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999(32), is to 
be treated as employed under such a contract; 
“relevant person” means a person who qualifies for the national minimum wage(33) (whether 
at the single hourly rate for the national minimum wage prescribed by the Secretary of State 
under section 1(3) of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 or at a different rate). 
Exception for provision of certain benefits based on length of service 
32.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render it unlawful for a person 
(“A”), in relation to the award of any benefit by him, to put a worker (“B”) at a disadvantage 
when compared with another worker (“C”), if and to the extent that the disadvantage suffered 
by B is because B’s length of service is less than that of C. 
(2) Where B’s length of service exceeds 5 years, it must reasonably appear to A that the way in 
which he uses the criterion of length of service, in relation to the award in respect of which B 
is put at a disadvantage, fulfils a business need of his undertaking (for example, by 
encouraging the loyalty or motivation, or rewarding the experience, of some or all of his 
workers). 
(3) In calculating a worker’s length of service for these purposes, A shall calculate— 
(a) the length of time the worker has been working for him doing work which he reasonably 
considers to be at or above a particular level (assessed by reference to the demands made on 
the worker, for example, in terms of effort, skills and decision making); or 
(b) the length of time the worker has been working for him in total; 
and on each occasion on which he decides to use the criterion of length of service in relation to 
the award of a benefit to workers, it is for him to decide which of these definitions to use to 
calculate their lengths of service. 
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3), in calculating the length of time a worker has been 
working for him— 
(a) A shall calculate the length of time in terms of the number of weeks during the whole or 
part of which the worker was working for him; 
(b) A may discount any period during which the worker was absent from work (including any 
period of absence which at the time it occurred was thought by A or the worker to be 
permanent) unless in all the circumstances (including the way in which other workers' 
absences occurring in similar circumstances are treated by A in calculating their lengths of 
service) it would not be reasonable for him to do so; 
(c) A may discount any period of time during which the worker was present at work (“the 
relevant period”) where— 
(i) the relevant period preceded a period during which the worker was absent from work, and 
(ii) in all the circumstances (including the length of the worker’s absence, the reason for his 
absence, the effect his absence has had on his ability to discharge the duties of his work, and 
the way in which other workers are treated by A in similar circumstances) it is reasonable for 
A to discount the relevant period. 
(5) For the purposes of paragraph (3)(b), a worker shall be treated as having worked for A 
during any period during which he worked for another if— 
(a) that period is treated as a period of employment with A for the purposes of the 1996 Act by 
virtue of the operation of section 218 of that Act; or 
(b) were the worker to be made redundant by A, that period and the period he has worked for 
A would amount to “relevant service” within the meaning of section 155 of that Act. 
(6) In paragraph (5)— 
(a) the reference to being made redundant is a reference to being dismissed by reason of 
redundancy for the purposes of the 1996 Act; 
(b) the reference to section 155 of that Act is a reference to that section as modified by the 




(7) In this regulation— 
“benefit” does not include any benefit awarded to a worker by virtue of his ceasing to work for 
A; and 
“year” means a year of 12 calendar months. 
Exception for provision of enhanced redundancy payments to employees 
33.—(1) Nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render it unlawful for an employer— 
(a) to give a qualifying employee an enhanced redundancy payment which is less in amount 
than the enhanced redundancy payment which he gives to another such employee if both 
amounts are calculated in the same way; 
(b) to give enhanced redundancy payments only to those who are qualifying employees by 
virtue of sub-paragraph (a) or (c)(i) of the definition of qualifying employee below. 
(2) In this regulation— 
“the appropriate amount”, “a redundancy payment” and “a week’s pay” have the same 
meaning as they have in section 162 of the 1996 Act(35); 
“enhanced redundancy payment” means a payment of an amount calculated in accordance 
with paragraph (3) or (4); 
“qualifying employee” means— 
(a) an employee who is entitled to a redundancy payment by virtue of section 135 of the 1996 
Act; 
(b) an employee who would have been so entitled but for the operation of section 155 of that 
Act; 
(c) an employee who agrees to the termination of his employment in circumstances where, had 
he been dismissed— 
(i) he would have been a qualifying employee by virtue of sub-paragraph (a) of this definition; 
or 
(ii) he would have been a qualifying employee by virtue of sub-paragraph (b). 
(3) For an amount to be calculated in accordance with this paragraph it must be calculated in 
accordance with section 162(1) to (3) of the 1996 Act. 
(4) For an amount to be calculated in accordance with this paragraph— 
(a) it must be calculated as in paragraph (3); 
(b) however, in making that calculation, the employer may do one or both of the following 
things— 
(i) he may treat a week’s pay as not being subject to a maximum amount or as being subject to 
a maximum amount above the amount laid down in section 227 of the 1996 Act(36); 
(ii) he may multiply the appropriate amount allowed for each year of employment by a figure 
of more than one; 
(c) having made the calculation as in paragraph (3) (whether or not in making that calculation 
he has done anything mentioned in sub-paragraph (b)) the employer may increase the amount 
thus calculated by multiplying it by a figure of more than one. 
(5) For the purposes of paragraphs (3) and (4), the reference to “the relevant date” in section 
162(1)(a) of the 1996 Act is to be read, in the case of a qualifying employee who agrees to the 
termination of his employment, as a reference to the date on which that termination takes 
effect. 
Exception for provision of life assurance cover to retired workers 
34.—(1) Where a person (“A”) arranges for workers to be provided with life assurance cover 
after their early retirement on grounds of ill health, nothing in Part 2 or 3 shall render it 
unlawful— 
(a) where a normal retirement age applied in relation to any such workers at the time they took 
early retirement, for A to arrange for such cover to cease when such workers reach that age; 
(b) in relation to any other workers, for A to arrange for such cover to cease when the workers 
reach the age of 65. 
(2) In this regulation, “normal retirement age”, in relation to a worker who has taken early 
retirement, means the age at which workers in A’s undertaking who held the same kind of 
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Restriction of proceedings for breach of Regulations 
35.—(1) Except as provided by these Regulations no proceedings, whether civil or criminal, 
shall lie against any person in respect of an act by reason that the act is unlawful by virtue of a 
provision of these Regulations. 
(2) Paragraph (1) does not prevent the making of an application for judicial review or the 
investigation or determination of any matter in accordance with Part 10 (investigations: the 
Pensions Ombudsman) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993(37) by the Pensions Ombudsman. 
Jurisdiction of employment tribunals 
36.—(1) A complaint by any person (“the complainant”) that another person (“the 
respondent”)— 
(a) has committed against the complainant an act to which this regulation applies; or 
(b) is by virtue of regulation 25 (liability of employers and principals) or 26 (aiding unlawful 
acts) to be treated as having committed against the complainant such an act; 
may be presented to an employment tribunal. 
(2) This regulation applies to any act of discrimination or harassment which is unlawful by 
virtue of any provision of Part 2 other than— 
(a) where the act is one in respect of which an appeal or proceedings in the nature of an appeal 
may be brought under any enactment, regulation 19 (qualifications bodies); 
(b) regulation 23 (institutions of further and higher education); or 
(c) where the act arises out of and is closely connected to a relationship between the 
complainant and the respondent which has come to an end but during the course of which an 
act of discrimination against, or harassment of, the complainant by the respondent would have 
been unlawful by virtue of regulation 23, regulation 24 (relationships which have come to an 
end). 
(3) In paragraph (2)(c), reference to an act of discrimination or harassment which would have 
been unlawful includes, in the case of a relationship which has come to an end before the 
coming into force of these Regulations, reference to an act of discrimination or harassment 
which would, after the coming into force of these Regulations, have been unlawful. 
(4) In this regulation, “enactment” includes an enactment comprised in, or in an instrument 
made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament. 
Burden of proof: employment tribunals 
37.—(1) This regulation applies to any complaint presented under regulation 36 to an 
employment tribunal. 
(2) Where, on the hearing of the complaint, the complainant proves facts from which the 
tribunal could, apart from this regulation, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation 
that the respondent— 
(a) has committed against the complainant an act to which regulation 36 applies; or 
(b) is by virtue of regulation 25 (liability of employers and principals) or 26 (aiding unlawful 
acts) to be treated as having committed against the complainant such an act, 
the tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves that he did not commit, or 
as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act. 
Remedies on complaints in employment tribunals 
38.—(1) Where an employment tribunal finds that a complaint presented to it under regulation 
36 is well-founded, the tribunal shall make such of the following as it considers just and 
equitable— 
(a) an order declaring the rights of the complainant and the respondent in relation to the act to 
which the complaint relates; 
(b) an order requiring the respondent to pay to the complainant compensation of an amount 
corresponding to any damages he could have been ordered by a county court or by a sheriff 
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court to pay to the complainant if the complaint had fallen to be dealt with under regulation 39 
(jurisdiction of county and sheriff courts); 
(c) a recommendation that the respondent take within a specified period action appearing to 
the tribunal to be practicable for the purpose of obviating or reducing the adverse effect on the 
complainant of any act of discrimination or harassment to which the complaint relates. 
(2) As respects an unlawful act of discrimination falling within regulation 3(1)(b) 
(discrimination on the grounds of age), if the respondent proves that the provision, criterion or 
practice was not applied with the intention of treating the complainant unfavourably on 
grounds of age, an order may be made under paragraph (1)(b) only if the employment 
tribunal— 
(a) makes such order under paragraph (1)(a) (if any) and such recommendation under 
paragraph (1)(c) (if any) as it would have made if it had no power to make an order under 
paragraph (1)(b); and 
(b) (where it makes an order under paragraph (1)(a) or a recommendation under paragraph 
(1)(c) or both) considers that it is just and equitable to make an order under paragraph (1)(b) as 
well. 
(3) If without reasonable justification the respondent to a complaint fails to comply with a 
recommendation made by an employment tribunal under paragraph (1)(c), then, if it thinks it 
just and equitable to do so— 
(a) 
the tribunal may increase the amount of compensation required to be paid to the complainant 
in respect of the complaint by an order made under paragraph (1)(b); or 
(b) 
if an order under paragraph (1)(b) was not made, the tribunal may make such an order. 
(4) Where an amount of compensation falls to be awarded under paragraph (1)(b), the tribunal 
may include in the award interest on that amount subject to, and in accordance with, the 
provisions of the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) 
Regulations 1996(38). 
(5) This regulation has effect subject to paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 (pension schemes). 
Jurisdiction of county and sheriff courts 
39.—(1) A claim by any person (“the claimant”) that another person (“the respondent”)— 
(a) has committed against the claimant an act to which this regulation applies; or 
(b) is by virtue of regulation 25 (liability of employers and principals) or 26 (aiding unlawful 
acts) to be treated as having committed against the claimant such an act, 
may be made the subject of civil proceedings in like manner as any other claim in tort or (in 
Scotland) in reparation for breach of statutory duty. 
(2) Proceedings brought under paragraph (1) shall— 
(a) in England and Wales, be brought only in a county court; and 
(b) in Scotland, be brought only in a sheriff court. 
(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that damages in respect of an unlawful act 
to which this regulation applies may include compensation for injury to feelings whether or 
not they include compensation under any other head. 
(4) This regulation applies to any act of discrimination or harassment which is unlawful by 
virtue of— 
(a) regulation 23 (institutions of further and higher education); or 
(b) where the act arises out of and is closely connected to a relationship between the claimant 
and the respondent which has come to an end but during the course of which an act of 
discrimination against, or harassment of, the claimant by the respondent would have been 
unlawful by virtue of regulation 23, regulation 24 (relationships which have come to an end). 
(5) In paragraph (4)(b), reference to an act of discrimination or harassment which would have 
been unlawful includes, in the case of a relationship which has come to an end before the 
coming into force of these Regulations, reference to an act of discrimination or harassment 
which would, after the coming into force of these Regulations, have been unlawful. 
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Burden of proof: county and sheriff courts 
40.—(1) This regulation applies to any claim brought under regulation 39 in a county court in 
England and Wales or a sheriff court in Scotland. 
(2) Where, on the hearing of the claim, the claimant proves facts from which the court could, 
apart from this regulation, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the 
respondent— 
(a) has committed against the claimant an act to which regulation 39 applies; or 
(b) is by virtue of regulation 25 (liability of employers and principals) or 26 (aiding unlawful 
acts) to be treated as having committed against the claimant such an act, 
the court shall uphold the claim unless the respondent proves that he did not commit, or as the 
case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act. 
Help for persons in obtaining information etc 
41.—(1) In accordance with this regulation, a person (“the person aggrieved”) who considers 
he may have been discriminated against, or subjected to harassment, in contravention of these 
Regulations may serve on the respondent to a complaint presented under regulation 36 
(jurisdiction of employment tribunals) or a claim brought under regulation 39 (jurisdiction of 
county and sheriff courts) questions in the form set out in Schedule 3 or forms to the like effect 
with such variation as the circumstances require; and the respondent may if he so wishes reply 
to such questions by way of the form set out in Schedule 4 or forms to the like effect with such 
variation as the circumstances require. 
(2) Where the person aggrieved questions the respondent (whether in accordance with 
paragraph (1) or not)— 
(a) the questions, and any reply by the respondent (whether in accordance with paragraph (1) 
or not) shall, subject to the following provisions of this regulation, be admissible as evidence 
in the proceedings; 
(b) if it appears to the court or tribunal that the respondent deliberately, and without reasonable 
excuse, omitted to reply within eight weeks of service of the questions or that his reply is 
evasive or equivocal, the court or tribunal may draw any inference from that fact that it 
considers it just and equitable to draw, including an inference that he committed an unlawful 
act. 
(3) In proceedings before a county court in England or Wales or a sheriff court in Scotland, a 
question shall only be admissible as evidence in pursuance of paragraph (2)(a)— 
(a) where it was served before those proceedings had been instituted, if it was so served within 
the period of six months beginning when the act complained of was done; 
(b) where it was served when those proceedings had been instituted, if it was served with the 
leave of, and within a period specified by, the court in question. 
(4) In proceedings before an employment tribunal, a question shall only be admissible as 
evidence in pursuance of paragraph (2)(a)— 
(a) where it was served before a complaint had been presented to the tribunal, if it was so 
served within the period of three months beginning when the act complained of was done; 
(b) where it was so served when a complaint had been presented to the tribunal, either— 
(i) if it was served within the period of twenty-one days beginning with the day on which the 
complaint was presented, or 
(ii) if it was so served later with leave given, and within a period specified, by a direction of 
the tribunal. 
(5) A question and any reply thereto may be served on the respondent or, as the case may be, 
on the person aggrieved— 
(a) by delivering it to him; 
(b) by sending it by post to him at his usual or last-known residence or place of business; 
(c) where the person to be served is a body corporate or is a trade union or employers' 
association within the meaning of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992(39), by delivering it to the secretary or clerk of the body, union or association at its 
registered or principal office or by sending it by post to the secretary or clerk at that office; 
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(d) where the person to be served is acting by a solicitor, by delivering it at, or by sending it by 
post to, the solicitor’s address for service; or 
(e) where the person to be served is the person aggrieved, by delivering the reply, or sending it 
by post, to him at his address for reply as stated by him in the document containing the 
questions. 
(6) This regulation is without prejudice to any other enactment or rule of law regulating 
interlocutory and preliminary matters in proceedings before a county court, sheriff court or 
employment tribunal, and has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law regulating the 
admissibility of evidence in such proceedings. 
(7) In this regulation “respondent” includes a prospective respondent. 
Period within which proceedings to be brought 
42.—(1) An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under regulation 36 unless it 
is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of three months beginning when the 
act complained of was done. 
(2) A county court or a sheriff court shall not consider a claim brought under regulation 39 
unless proceedings in respect of the claim are instituted before the end of the period of six 
months beginning when the act complained of was done. 
(3) A court or tribunal may nevertheless consider any such complaint or claim which is out of 
time if, in all the circumstances of the case, it considers that it is just and equitable to do so. 
(4) For the purposes of this regulation and regulation 41 (help for persons in obtaining 
information etc)— 
(a) when the making of a contract is, by reason of the inclusion of any term, an unlawful act, 
that act shall be treated as extending throughout the duration of the contract; and 
(b) any act extending over a period shall be treated as done at the end of that period; and 
(c) a deliberate omission shall be treated as done when the person in question decided upon it, 
and in the absence of evidence establishing the contrary a person shall be taken for the 
purposes of this regulation to decide upon an omission when he does an act inconsistent with 
doing the omitted act or, if he has done no such inconsistent act, when the period expires 










Validity of contracts, collective agreements and rules of undertakings 
43.  Schedule 5 (validity of contracts, collective agreements and rules of undertakings) shall 
have effect. 
Application to the Crown etc 
44.—(1) These Regulations apply— 
(a) to an act done by or for purposes of a Minister of the Crown or government department; or 
(b) to an act done on behalf of the Crown by a statutory body, or a person holding a statutory 
office, as they apply to an act done by a private person. 
(2) These Regulations apply to Crown employment as they apply to employment by a private 
person, and shall so apply as if references to a contract of employment included references to 
the terms of service and references to dismissal included references to termination of Crown 
employment. 
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) have effect subject to paragraph (4) and regulations 13 (police) and 
14 (Serious Organised Crime Agency). 
(4) These regulations do not apply to service in any of the naval, military or air forces of the 
Crown. 
(5) Regulation 10(3) (meaning of employment and contract work at establishment in Great 
Britain) shall have effect in relation to any ship, aircraft or hovercraft belonging to or 
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possessed by Her Majesty in right of the government of the United Kingdom as it has effect in 
relation to a ship, aircraft or hovercraft specified in regulation 10(3)(a) or (b). 
(6) The provisions of Parts 2 to 4 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947(40) shall apply to 
proceedings against the Crown under these Regulations as they apply to proceedings in 
England and Wales which by virtue of section 23 of that Act are treated for the purposes of 
Part 2 of that Act as civil proceedings by or against the Crown, except that in their application 
to proceedings under these Regulations section 20 of that Act (removal and transfer of 
proceedings) shall not apply. 
(7) The provisions of Part 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 shall apply to proceedings 
against the Crown under these Regulations as they apply to proceedings in Scotland which by 
virtue of the said Part are treated as civil proceedings by or against the Crown, except that in 
their application to proceedings under these Regulations the proviso to section 44 of that Act 
(proceedings against the Crown in the Sheriff Court) shall not apply. 
Application to House of Commons staff 
45.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), these Regulations apply in relation to employment 
as a relevant member of the House of Commons staff as they apply in relation to other 
employment. 
(2) These Regulations apply to employment as such a member as they apply to employment 
by a private person, and shall so apply as if references to a contract of employment included 
references to the terms of employment of such a member and references to dismissal included 
references to termination of such employment. 
(3) In relation to employment as such a member, subsections (6) to (12) of section 195 of the 
1996 Act(41) (person to be treated as employer of House of Commons staff) apply, with any 
necessary modifications, for the purposes of these Regulations. 
Application to House of Lords staff 
46.—(1) These Regulations apply in relation to employment as a relevant member of the 
House of Lords staff as they apply in relation to other employment. 
(2) Section 194(7) of the 1996 Act (continuity of employment) applies for the purposes of this 
regulation. 
Duty to consider working beyond retirement 
47.  Schedule 6, which sets out the procedure to be followed if an employee (within the 
meaning of that Schedule) is to be retired, shall have effect. 
 
SCHEDULE 6 
Duty to consider working beyond retirement 
Interpretation 
1.—(1) In this Schedule— 
“dismissal” means a dismissal within the meaning of section 95 of the 1996 Act(63); 
“employee” means a person to whom regulation 30 (exception for retirement) applies and 
references to “employer” shall be construed accordingly; 
“intended date of retirement” has the meaning given by sub-paragraph (2); 
“operative date of termination” means (subject to paragraph 10(3))— 
(a) where the employer terminates the employee’s contract of employment by notice, the date 
on which the notice expires, or 
(b) where the employer terminates the contract of employment without notice, the date on 
which the termination takes effect; 
“request” means a request made under paragraph 5; and 
“worker” has the same meaning as in section 230(3) of the 1996 Act. 
(2) In this Schedule “intended date of retirement” means— 
(a) where the employer notifies a date in accordance with paragraph 2, that date; 
(b) where the employer notifies a date in accordance with paragraph 4 and either no request is 




(i)  he employer has not notified a date in accordance with paragraph 2, 
(ii) a request is made before the employer has notified a date in accordance with paragraph 4 
(including where no notification in accordance with that paragraph is given), 
(iii) the request is made by an employee who has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
employer intends to retire him on a certain date, and, 
(iv) the request identifies that date, the date so identified; 
(d) in a case to which paragraph 3 has applied, any earlier or later date that has superseded the 
date mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) as the intended date of retirement by virtue of 
paragraph 3(3); 
(e) in a case to which paragraph 10 has applied, the later date that has superseded the date 
mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) as the intended date of retirement by virtue of paragraph 
10(3)(b). 
Duty of employer to inform employee 
2.—(1) An employer who intends to retire an employee has a duty to notify the employee in 
writing of— 
(a) the employee’s right to make a request; and 
(b) the date on which he intends the employee to retire, 
not more than one year and not less than six months before that date. 
(2) The duty to notify applies regardless of— 
(a) whether there is any term in the employee’s contract of employment indicating when his 
retirement is expected to take place, 
(b) any other notification of, or information about, the employee’s date of retirement given to 
him by the employer at any time, and 
(c) any other information about the employee’s right to make a request given to him by the 
employer at any time. 
3.—(1) This paragraph applies if the employer has notified the employee in accordance with 
paragraph 2 or 4 or the employee has made a request before being notified in accordance with 
paragraph 4 (including where no notification in accordance with that paragraph is given), 
and— 
(a) the employer and employee agree, in accordance with paragraph 7(3)(b) or 8(5)(b), that the 
dismissal is to take effect on a date later than the relevant date; 
(b) the employer gives notice to the employee, in accordance with paragraph 7(7)(a)(ii) or, 
where the employee appeals, paragraph 8(9)(a)(ii), that the dismissal is to take effect on a date 
later than the relevant date; or 
(c) the employer and employee agree that the dismissal is to take effect on a date earlier than 
the relevant date. 
(2) This Schedule does not require the employer to give the employee a further notification in 
respect of dismissal taking effect on a date— 
(a) agreed as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) or notified as mentioned in sub-paragraph 
(1)(b) that is later than the relevant date and falls six months or less after the relevant date; or 
(b) agreed as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) that is earlier than the relevant date. 
(3) If— 
(a) a date later than the relevant date is agreed as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) or notified 
as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) and falls six months or less after the relevant date, or 
(b) a date earlier than the relevant date is agreed as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c), 
the earlier or later date shall supersede the relevant date as the intended date of retirement. 
(4) In this paragraph, “the relevant date” means the date that is defined as the intended date of 
retirement in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1(2). 
Continuing duty to inform employee 
4.  Where the employer has failed to comply with paragraph 2, he has a continuing duty to 
notify the employee in writing as described in paragraph 2(1) until the fourteenth day before 
the operative date of termination. 
Statutory right to request not to retire 
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5.—(1) An employee may make a request to his employer not to retire on the intended date of 
retirement. 
(2) In his request the employee must propose that his employment should continue, following 
the intended date of retirement— 
(a) indefinitely, 
(b) for a stated period, or 
(c) until a stated date; and, if the request is made at a time when it is no longer possible for the 
employer to notify in accordance with paragraph 2 and the employer has not yet notified in 
accordance with paragraph 4, must identify the date on which he believes that the employer 
intends to retire him. 
(3) A request must be in writing and state that it is made under this paragraph. 
(4) An employee may only make one request under this paragraph in relation to any one 
intended date of retirement and may not make a request in relation to a date that supersedes a 
different date as the intended date of retirement by virtue of paragraph 3(3) or 10(3)(b). 
(5) A request is only a request made under this paragraph if it is made— 
(a) in a case where the employer has complied with paragraph 2, more than three months but 
not more than six months before the intended date of retirement, or 
(b) in a case where the employer has not complied with paragraph 2, before, but not more than 
six months before, the intended date of retirement. 
An employer’s duty to consider a request 
6.  An employer to whom a request is made is under a duty to consider the request in 
accordance with paragraphs 7 to 9. 
Meeting to consider request 
7.—(1) An employer having a duty under paragraph 6 to consider a request shall hold a 
meeting to discuss the request with the employee within a reasonable period after receiving it. 
(2) The employer and employee must take all reasonable steps to attend the meeting. 
(3) The duty to hold a meeting does not apply if, before the end of the period that is 
reasonable— 
(a) the employer and employee agree that the employee’s employment will continue 
indefinitely and the employer gives notice to the employee to that effect; or 
(b) the employer and employee agree that the employee’s employment will continue for an 
agreed period and the employer gives notice to the employee of the length of that period or of 
the date on which it will end. 
(4) The duty to hold a meeting does not apply if— 
(a) it is not practicable to hold a meeting within the period that is reasonable, and 
(b) the employer complies with sub-paragraph (5). 
(5) Where sub-paragraph (4)(a) applies, the employer may consider the request without 
holding a meeting provided he considers any representations made by the employee. 
(6) The employer shall give the employee notice of his decision on the request as soon as is 
reasonably practicable after the date of the meeting or, if sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) apply, his 
consideration of the request. 
(7) A notice given under sub-paragraph (6) shall— 
(a) where the decision is to accept the request, state that it is accepted and— 
(i) where the decision is that the employee’s employment will continue indefinitely, state that 
fact, or 
(ii) where the decision is that the employee’s employment will continue for a further period, 
state that fact and specify the length of the period or the date on which it will end, 
(b) where the decision is to refuse the request, confirm that the employer wishes to retire the 
employee and the date on which the dismissal is to take effect, 
and, in the case of a notice falling within paragraph (b), and of a notice referred to in 
paragraph (a) that specifies a period shorter than the period proposed by the employee in the 
request, shall inform the employee of his right to appeal. 




8.—(1) An employee is entitled to appeal against— 
(a) a decision of his employer to refuse the request, or 
(b) a decision of his employer to accept the request where the notice given under paragraph 
7(6) states as mentioned in paragraph 7(7)(a)(ii) and specifies a period shorter than the period 
proposed by the employee in the request, 
by giving notice in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) as soon as is reasonably practicable 
after the date of the notice given under paragraph 7(6). 
(2) A notice of appeal under sub-paragraph (1) shall set out the grounds of appeal. 
(3) The employer shall hold a meeting with the employee to discuss an appeal within a 
reasonable period after the date of the notice of appeal. 
(4) The employer and employee must take all reasonable steps to attend the meeting. 
(5) The duty to hold a meeting does not apply if, before the end of the period that is 
reasonable— 
(a) the employer and employee agree that the employee’s employment will continue 
indefinitely and the employer gives notice to the employee to that effect; or 
(b) the employer and employee agree that the employee’s employment will continue for an 
agreed period and the employer gives notice to the employee of the length of that period or of 
the date on which it will end. 
(6) The duty to hold a meeting does not apply if— 
(a) it is not practicable to hold a meeting within the period that is reasonable, and 
(b) the employer complies with sub-paragraph (7). 
(7) Where sub-paragraph (6)(a) applies, the employer may consider the appeal without holding 
a meeting provided he considers any representations made by the employee. 
(8) The employer shall give the employee notice of his decision on the appeal as soon as is 
reasonably practicable after the date of the meeting or, if sub-paragraphs (6) and (7) apply, his 
consideration of the appeal. 
(9) A notice under sub-paragraph (8) shall— 
(a) where the decision is to accept the appeal, state that it is accepted and— 
(i) where the decision is that the employee’s employment will continue indefinitely, state that 
fact, or 
(ii) where the decision is that the employee’s employment will continue for a further period, 
state that fact and specify the length of the period or the date on which it will end, 
(b) where the decision is to refuse the appeal, confirm that the employer wishes to retire the 
employee and the date on which the dismissal is to take effect. 
(10) All notices given under this paragraph shall be in writing and be dated. 
Right to be accompanied 
9.—(1) This paragraph applies where— 
(a) a meeting is held under paragraph 7 or 8, and 
(b) the employee reasonably requests to be accompanied at the meeting. 
(2) Where this paragraph applies the employer must permit the employee to be accompanied at 
the meeting by one companion who— 
(a) is chosen by the employee; 
(b) is a worker employed by the same employer as the employee; 
(c) is to be permitted to address the meeting (but not to answer questions on behalf of the 
employee); and 
(d) is to be permitted to confer with the employee during the meeting. 
(3) If— 
(a) an employee has a right under this paragraph to be accompanied at a meeting, 
(b) his chosen companion will not be available at the time proposed for the meeting by the 
employer, and 
(c) the employee proposes an alternative time which satisfies sub-paragraph (4), 
the employer must postpone the meeting to the time proposed by the employee. 
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(4) An alternative time must— 
(a) be convenient for employer, employee and companion, and 
(b) fall before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the first day after the day 
proposed by the employer. 
(5) An employer shall permit a worker to take time off during working hours for the purpose 
of accompanying an employee in accordance with a request under sub-paragraph (1)(b). 
(6) Sections 168(3) and (4), 169 and 171 to 173 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992(64) (time off for carrying out trade union duties) shall apply in 
relation to sub-paragraph (5) above as they apply in relation to section 168(1) of that Act. 
Dismissal before request considered 
10.—(1) This paragraph applies where— 
(a) by virtue of paragraph 6 an employer is under a duty to consider a request; 
(b) the employer dismisses the employee; 
(c) that dismissal is the contemplated dismissal to which the request relates; and 
(d) the operative date of termination would, but for sub-paragraph (3), fall on or before the day 
on which the employer gives notice in accordance with paragraph 7(6). 
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), the contract of employment shall continue in force for all 
purposes, including the purpose of determining for any purpose the period for which the 
employee has been continuously employed, until the day following that on which the notice 
under paragraph 7(6) is given. 
(3) The day following the day on which that notice is given shall supersede— 
(a) the date mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(d) as the operative date of termination; and 
(b) the date defined as the intended date of retirement in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 
1(2) as the intended date of retirement. 
(4) Any continuation of the contract of employment under sub-paragraph (2) shall be 
disregarded when determining the operative date of termination for the purposes of sections 
98ZA to 98ZH of the 1996 Act. 
Complaint to employment tribunal: failure to comply with paragraph 2 
11.—(1) An employee may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that his employer 
has failed to comply with the duty to notify him in paragraph 2. 
(2) A tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this paragraph unless the complaint is 
presented— 
(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with— 
(i) the last day permitted to the employer by paragraph 2 for complying with the duty to notify, 
or 
(ii) if the employee did not then know the date that would be the intended date of retirement, 
the first day on which he knew or should have known that date; or 
(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied 
that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that 
period of three months. 
(3) Where a tribunal finds that a complaint under this paragraph is well-founded it shall order 
the employer to pay compensation to the employee of such amount, not exceeding 8 weeks' 
pay, as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances. 
(4) Chapter 2 of Part 14 of the 1996 Act (calculation of a week’s pay) shall apply for the 
purposes of sub-paragraph (3); and in applying that Chapter the calculation date shall be taken 
to be the date on which the complaint was presented or, if earlier, the operative date of 
termination. 
(5) The limit in section 227(1) of the 1996 Act(65) (maximum amount of a week’s pay) shall 
apply for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3). 
Complaint to employment tribunal: denial of right to be accompanied 
12.—(1) An employee may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that his employer 
has failed, or threatened to fail, to comply with paragraph 9(2) or (3). 
(2) A tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this paragraph in relation to a failure or 
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threat unless the complaint is presented— 
(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the failure or threat; 
or 
(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied 
that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that 
period of three months. 
(3) Where a tribunal finds that a complaint under this paragraph is well-founded it shall order 
the employer to pay compensation to the worker of an amount not exceeding two weeks' pay. 
(4) Chapter 2 of Part 14 of the 1996 Act (calculation of a week’s pay) shall apply for the 
purposes of sub-paragraph (3); and in applying that Chapter the calculation date shall be taken 
to be the date on which the relevant meeting took place (or was to have taken place). 
(5) The limit in section 227(1) of the 1996 Act (maximum amount of a week’s pay) shall apply 
for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3). 
Detriment and dismissal 
13.—(1) An employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act by his 
employer done on the ground that he exercised or sought to exercise his right to be 
accompanied in accordance with paragraph 9. 
(2) A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate 
failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that he accompanied or sought to 
accompany an employee pursuant to a request under paragraph 9. 
(3) Section 48 of the 1996 Act shall apply in relation to contraventions of sub-paragraph (1) or 
(2) above as it applies in relation to contraventions of certain sections of that Act. 
(4) Sub-paragraph (2) does not apply where the worker is an employee and the detriment in 
question amounts to dismissal (within the meaning of Part 10 of the 1996 Act). 
(5) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of Part 10 of the 1996 
Act as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the 
dismissal is that he— 
(a) exercised or sought to exercise his right to be accompanied in accordance with paragraph 
9, or 
(b) accompanied or sought to accompany an employee pursuant to a request under that 
paragraph. 
(6) Sections 128 to 132 of the 1996 Act (interim relief) shall apply in relation to dismissal for 
the reason specified in sub-paragraph (5)(a) or (b) above as they apply in relation to dismissal 




Appendix B: Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 
2000 establishing a General Framework for Equal 
Treatment in Employment and Occupation (OJ 2000 
L303/16)   
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular 
Article 13 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(1), 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament(2), 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee(3), 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions(4), 
Whereas: 
(1) In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union 
is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to all Member 
States and it respects fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law. 
(2) The principle of equal treatment between women and men is well established by an 
important body of Community law, in particular in Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 
February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions(5). 
(3) In implementing the principle of equal treatment, the Community should, in 
accordance with Article 3(2) of the EC Treaty, aim to eliminate inequalities, and to 
promote equality between men and women, especially since women are often the victims 
of multiple discrimination. 
(4) The right of all persons to equality before the law and protection against 
discrimination constitutes a universal right recognised by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States are 
signatories. Convention No 111 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) prohibits 
discrimination in the field of employment and occupation. 
(5) It is important to respect such fundamental rights and freedoms. This Directive does 
not prejudice freedom of association, including the right to establish unions with others 
and to join unions to defend one's interests. 
(6) The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers recognises the 
importance of combating every form of discrimination, including the need to take 
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appropriate action for the social and economic integration of elderly and disabled people. 
(7) The EC Treaty includes among its objectives the promotion of coordination between 
employment policies of the Member States. To this end, a new employment chapter was 
incorporated in the EC Treaty as a means of developing a coordinated European strategy 
for employment to promote a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce. 
(8) The Employment Guidelines for 2000 agreed by the European Council at Helsinki on 
10 and 11 December 1999 stress the need to foster a labour market favourable to social 
integration by formulating a coherent set of policies aimed at combating discrimination 
against groups such as persons with disability. They also emphasise the need to pay 
particular attention to supporting older workers, in order to increase their participation in 
the labour force. 
(9) Employment and occupation are key elements in guaranteeing equal opportunities for 
all and contribute strongly to the full participation of citizens in economic, cultural and 
social life and to realising their potential. 
(10) On 29 June 2000 the Council adopted Directive 2000/43/EC(6) implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. That 
Directive already provides protection against such discrimination in the field of 
employment and occupation. 
(11) Discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation may 
undermine the achievement of the objectives of the EC Treaty, in particular the 
attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, raising the standard of 
living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity, and the free 
movement of persons. 
(12) To this end, any direct or indirect discrimination based on religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation as regards the areas covered by this Directive should 
be prohibited throughout the Community. This prohibition of discrimination should also 
apply to nationals of third countries but does not cover differences of treatment based on 
nationality and is without prejudice to provisions governing the entry and residence of 
third-country nationals and their access to employment and occupation. 
(13) This Directive does not apply to social security and social protection schemes 
whose benefits are not treated as income within the meaning given to that term for the 
purpose of applying Article 141 of the EC Treaty, nor to any kind of payment by the 
State aimed at providing access to employment or maintaining employment. 
(14) This Directive shall be without prejudice to national provisions laying down 
retirement ages. 
(15) The appreciation of the facts from which it may be inferred that there has been 
direct or indirect discrimination is a matter for national judicial or other competent 
bodies, in accordance with rules of national law or practice. Such rules may provide, in 
particular, for indirect discrimination to be established by any means including on the 
basis of statistical evidence. 
(16) The provision of measures to accommodate the needs of disabled people at the 
workplace plays an important role in combating discrimination on grounds of disability. 
(17) This Directive does not require the recruitment, promotion, maintenance in 
employment or training of an individual who is not competent, capable and available to 
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perform the essential functions of the post concerned or to undergo the relevant training, 
without prejudice to the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for people with 
disabilities. 
(18) This Directive does not require, in particular, the armed forces and the police, 
prison or emergency services to recruit or maintain in employment persons who do not 
have the required capacity to carry out the range of functions that they may be called 
upon to perform with regard to the legitimate objective of preserving the operational 
capacity of those services. 
(19) Moreover, in order that the Member States may continue to safeguard the combat 
effectiveness of their armed forces, they may choose not to apply the provisions of this 
Directive concerning disability and age to all or part of their armed forces. The Member 
States which make that choice must define the scope of that derogation. 
(20) Appropriate measures should be provided, i.e. effective and practical measures to 
adapt the workplace to the disability, for example adapting premises and equipment, 
patterns of working time, the distribution of tasks or the provision of training or 
integration resources. 
(21) To determine whether the measures in question give rise to a disproportionate 
burden, account should be taken in particular of the financial and other costs entailed, 
the scale and financial resources of the organisation or undertaking and the possibility of 
obtaining public funding or any other assistance. 
(22) This Directive is without prejudice to national laws on marital status and the 
benefits dependent thereon. 
(23) In very limited circumstances, a difference of treatment may be justified where a 
characteristic related to religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation constitutes 
a genuine and determining occupational requirement, when the objective is legitimate 
and the requirement is proportionate. Such circumstances should be included in the 
information provided by the Member States to the Commission. 
(24) The European Union in its Declaration No 11 on the status of churches and non-
confessional organisations, annexed to the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty, has 
explicitly recognised that it respects and does not prejudice the status under national law 
of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States and that it 
equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations. With this 
in view, Member States may maintain or lay down specific provisions on genuine, 
legitimate and justified occupational requirements which might be required for carrying 
out an occupational activity. 
(25) The prohibition of age discrimination is an essential part of meeting the aims set out 
in the Employment Guidelines and encouraging diversity in the workforce. However, 
differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified under certain 
circumstances and therefore require specific provisions which may vary in accordance 
with the situation in Member States. It is therefore essential to distinguish between 
differences in treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate employment 
policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and discrimination which must 
be prohibited. 
(26) The prohibition of discrimination should be without prejudice to the maintenance or 
adoption of measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by a 
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group of persons of a particular religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, 
and such measures may permit organisations of persons of a particular religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation where their main object is the promotion of the 
special needs of those persons. 
(27) In its Recommendation 86/379/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the employment of disabled 
people in the Community(7), the Council established a guideline framework setting out 
examples of positive action to promote the employment and training of disabled people, 
and in its Resolution of 17 June 1999 on equal employment opportunities for people 
with disabilities(8), affirmed the importance of giving specific attention inter alia to 
recruitment, retention, training and lifelong learning with regard to disabled persons. 
(28) This Directive lays down minimum requirements, thus giving the Member States 
the option of introducing or maintaining more favourable provisions. The 
implementation of this Directive should not serve to justify any regression in relation to 
the situation which already prevails in each Member State. 
(29) Persons who have been subject to discrimination based on religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation should have adequate means of legal protection. To 
provide a more effective level of protection, associations or legal entities should also be 
empowered to engage in proceedings, as the Member States so determine, either on 
behalf or in support of any victim, without prejudice to national rules of procedure 
concerning representation and defence before the courts. 
(30) The effective implementation of the principle of equality requires adequate judicial 
protection against victimisation. 
(31) The rules on the burden of proof must be adapted when there is a prima facie case 
of discrimination and, for the principle of equal treatment to be applied effectively, the 
burden of proof must shift back to the respondent when evidence of such discrimination 
is brought. However, it is not for the respondent to prove that the plaintiff adheres to a 
particular religion or belief, has a particular disability, is of a particular age or has a 
particular sexual orientation. 
(32) Member States need not apply the rules on the burden of proof to proceedings in 
which it is for the court or other competent body to investigate the facts of the case. The 
procedures thus referred to are those in which the plaintiff is not required to prove the 
facts, which it is for the court or competent body to investigate. 
(33) Member States should promote dialogue between the social partners and, within the 
framework of national practice, with non-governmental organisations to address 
different forms of discrimination at the workplace and to combat them. 
(34) The need to promote peace and reconciliation between the major communities in 
Northern Ireland necessitates the incorporation of particular provisions into this 
Directive. 
(35) Member States should provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions 
in case of breaches of the obligations under this Directive. 
(36) Member States may entrust the social partners, at their joint request, with the 
implementation of this Directive, as regards the provisions concerning collective 
agreements, provided they take any necessary steps to ensure that they are at all times 
able to guarantee the results required by this Directive. 
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(37) In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity set out in Article 5 of theEC Treaty, 
the objective of this Directive, namely the creation within the Community of a level 
playing-field as regards equality in employment and occupation, cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and impact of 
the action, be better achieved at Community level. In accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to achieve that objective, 





The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as 
regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member 
States the principle of equal treatment. 
Article 2 
Concept of discrimination 
1. For the purposes of this Directive, the "principle of equal treatment" shall mean that 
there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds 
referred to in Article 1. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1: 
(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less 
favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on 
any of the grounds referred to in Article 1; 
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, 
criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular 
disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons unless: 
(i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, or 
(ii) as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any person or 
organisation to whom this Directive applies, is obliged, under national legislation, to 
take appropriate measures in line with the principles contained in Article 5 in order to 
eliminate disadvantages entailed by such provision, criterion or practice. 
3. Harassment shall be deemed to be a form of discrimination within the meaning of 
paragraph 1, when unwanted conduct related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 
1 takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. In 
this context, the concept of harassment may be defined in accordance with the national 
laws and practice of the Member States. 
4. An instruction to discriminate against persons on any of the grounds referred to in 
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Article 1 shall be deemed to be discrimination within the meaning of paragraph 1. 
5. This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by national law 
which, in a democratic society, are necessary for public security, for the maintenance of 
public order and the prevention of criminal offences, for the protection of health and for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 3 
Scope 
1. Within the limits of the areas of competence conferred on the Community, this 
Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, 
including public bodies, in relation to: 
(a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment or to occupation, including 
selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all 
levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion; 
(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, 
advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience; 
(c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay; 
(d) membership of, and involvement in, an organisation of workers or employers, or any 
organisation whose members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits 
provided for by such organisations. 
2. This Directive does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is 
without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of 
third-country nationals and stateless persons in the territory of Member States, and to 
any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country nationals and 
stateless persons concerned. 
3. This Directive does not apply to payments of any kind made by state schemes or 
similar, including state social security or social protection schemes. 
4. Member States may provide that this Directive, in so far as it relates to discrimination 
on the grounds of disability and age, shall not apply to the armed forces. 
Article 4 
Occupational requirements 
1. Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of 
treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in 
Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the 
particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried 
out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is 
proportionate. 
2. Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date of adoption of 
this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national practices existing at 
the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant to which, in the case of occupational 
activities within churches and other public or private organisations the ethos of which is 
based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based on a person's religion or 
belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of these 
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activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person's religion or belief 
constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to 
the organisation's ethos. This difference of treatment shall be implemented taking 
account of Member States' constitutional provisions and principles, as well as the general 
principles of Community law, and should not justify discrimination on another ground. 
Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall thus not 
prejudice the right of churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of 
which is based on religion or belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and 
laws, to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the 
organisation's ethos. 
Article 5 
Reasonable accommodation for disabled persons 
In order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment in relation to 
persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation shall be provided. This means that 
employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a 
person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to 
undergo training, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the 
employer. This burden shall not be disproportionate when it is sufficiently remedied by 
measures existing within the framework of the disability policy of the Member State 
concerned. 
Article 6 
Justification of differences of treatment on grounds of age 
1. Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that differences of 
treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of 
national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including 
legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if 
the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 
Such differences of treatment may include, among others: 
(a) the setting of special conditions on access to employment and vocational training, 
employment and occupation, including dismissal and remuneration conditions, for young 
people, older workers and persons with caring responsibilities in order to promote their 
vocational integration or ensure their protection; 
(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional experience or seniority in 
service for access to employment or to certain advantages linked to employment; 
(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is based on the training 
requirements of the post in question or the need for a reasonable period of employment 
before retirement. 
2. Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that the fixing for 
occupational social security schemes of ages for admission or entitlement to retirement 
or invalidity benefits, including the fixing under those schemes of different ages for 
employees or groups or categories of employees, and the use, in the context of such 
schemes, of age criteria in actuarial calculations, does not constitute discrimination on 





1. With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall 
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to 
prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to any of the grounds referred to in 
Article 1. 
2. With regard to disabled persons, the principle of equal treatment shall be without 
prejudice to the right of Member States to maintain or adopt provisions on the protection 
of health and safety at work or to measures aimed at creating or maintaining provisions 




1. Member States may introduce or maintain provisions which are more favourable to 
the protection of the principle of equal treatment than those laid down in this Directive. 
2. The implementation of this Directive shall under no circumstances constitute grounds 
for a reduction in the level of protection against discrimination already afforded by 
Member States in the fields covered by this Directive. 
CHAPTER II 
REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT 
Article 9 
Defence of rights 
1. Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures, including 
where they deem it appropriate conciliation procedures, for the enforcement of 
obligations under this Directive are available to all persons who consider themselves 
wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them, even after the 
relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended. 
2. Member States shall ensure that associations, organisations or other legal entities 
which have, in accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate 
interest in ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are complied with, may engage, 
either on behalf or in support of the complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial 
and/or administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under this 
Directive. 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to national rules relating to time limits for 
bringing actions as regards the principle of equality of treatment. 
Article 10 
Burden of proof 
1. Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their 
national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves 
wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, 
before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that 
there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove 
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that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Member States from introducing rules of evidence 
which are more favourable to plaintiffs. 
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to criminal procedures. 
4. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also apply to any legal proceedings commenced in 
accordance with Article 9(2). 
5. Member States need not apply paragraph 1 to proceedings in which it is for the court 
or competent body to investigate the facts of the case. 
Article 11 
Victimisation 
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are 
necessary to protect employees against dismissal or other adverse treatment by the 
employer as a reaction to a complaint within the undertaking or to any legal proceedings 
aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment. 
Article 12 
Dissemination of information 
Member States shall take care that the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive, 
together with the relevant provisions already in force in this field, are brought to the 
attention of the persons concerned by all appropriate means, for example at the 
workplace, throughout their territory. 
Article 13 
Social dialogue 
1. Member States shall, in accordance with their national traditions and practice, take 
adequate measures to promote dialogue between the social partners with a view to 
fostering equal treatment, including through the monitoring of workplace practices, 
collective agreements, codes of conduct and through research or exchange of 
experiences and good practices. 
2. Where consistent with their national traditions and practice, Member States shall 
encourage the social partners, without prejudice to their autonomy, to conclude at the 
appropriate level agreements laying down anti-discrimination rules in the fields referred 
to in Article 3 which fall within the scope of collective bargaining. These agreements 
shall respect the minimum requirements laid down by this Directive and by the relevant 
national implementing measures. 
Article 14 
Dialogue with non-governmental organisations 
Member States shall encourage dialogue with appropriate non-governmental 
organisations which have, in accordance with their national law and practice, a 
legitimate interest in contributing to the fight against discrimination on any of the 








1. In order to tackle the under-representation of one of the major religious communities 
in the police service of Northern Ireland, differences in treatment regarding recruitment 
into that service, including its support staff, shall not constitute discrimination insofar as 
those differences in treatment are expressly authorised by national legislation. 
2. In order to maintain a balance of opportunity in employment for teachers in Northern 
Ireland while furthering the reconciliation of historical divisions between the major 
religious communities there, the provisions on religion or belief in this Directive shall 
not apply to the recruitment of teachers in schools in Northern Ireland in so far as this is 





Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that: 
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the principle of equal 
treatment are abolished; 
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment which are included in 
contracts or collective agreements, internal rules of undertakings or rules governing the 
independent occupations and professions and workers' and employers' organisations are, 
or may be, declared null and void or are amended. 
Article 17 
Sanctions 
Member States shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable to infringements of the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures 
necessary to ensure that they are applied. The sanctions, which may comprise the 
payment of compensation to the victim, must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
Member States shall notify those provisions to the Commission by 2 December 2003 at 
the latest and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting them. 
Article 18 
Implementation 
Member States shall adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to comply with this Directive by 2 December 2003 at the latest or may entrust the social 
partners, at their joint request, with the implementation of this Directive as regards 
provisions concerning collective agreements. In such cases, Member States shall ensure 
that, no later than 2 December 2003, the social partners introduce the necessary 
measures by agreement, the Member States concerned being required to take any 
necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results 
imposed by this Directive. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
In order to take account of particular conditions, Member States may, if necessary, have 
317 
 
an additional period of 3 years from 2 December 2003, that is to say a total of 6 years, to 
implement the provisions of this Directive on age and disability discrimination. In that 
event they shall inform the Commission forthwith. Any Member State which chooses to 
use this additional period shall report annually to the Commission on the steps it is 
taking to tackle age and disability discrimination and on the progress it is making 
towards implementation. The Commission shall report annually to the Council. 
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this 
Directive or be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official 




1. Member States shall communicate to the Commission, by 2 December 2005 at the 
latest and every five years thereafter, all the information necessary for the Commission 
to draw up a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this 
Directive. 
2. The Commission's report shall take into account, as appropriate, the viewpoints of the 
social partners and relevant non-governmental organisations. In accordance with the 
principle of gender mainstreaming, this report shall, inter alia, provide an assessment of 
the impact of the measures taken on women and men. In the light of the information 
received, this report shall include, if necessary, proposals to revise and update this 
Directive. 
Article 20 
Entry into force 
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities. 
Article 21 
Addressees: This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
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Appendix C: Self-certification ethics form 
Applicant Details 
Name  Lynda Diane Irving E-mail  irvingl@coventry.ac.uk 
Department  Law Date  22 June 2009 
Course  PhD/MPhil  Title of Project  Challenging Ageism in 
Employment: An Analysis of the 
Implementation of Age Discrimination 
Legislation in England and Wales 
Project Details 
This project aims to review the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 by means of a 
library study and a statistical analysis of Tribunal decisions over the past four years, in order 
to develop our understanding of the problems of regulating ageist behaviour.  
Participants in your research  
Will the project involve human participants?  No 
If you answered Yes to this questions, this may not be a low risk project. 
If you are a student, please discuss your project with your Supervisor. 
If you are a member of staff, please discuss your project with your Faculty Research Ethics 
Leader or use the Medium to High Risk Ethical Approval or NHS or Medical Approval 
Routes. 
Risk to Participants 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions, this may not be a low risk project. 
If you are a student, please discuss your project with your Supervisor. 
If you are a member of staff, please discuss your project with your Faculty Research Ethics 
Leader or use the Medium to High Risk Ethical Approval or NHS or Medical Approval 
Routes. 
Will the project involve human patients/clients, health professionals, and/or patient 
(client) data and/or health professional data? 
 No 
Will any invasive physical procedure, including collecting tissue or other samples, be 
used in the research? 
 No 
Is there a risk of physical discomfort to those taking part?  No 
Is there a risk of psychological or emotional distress to those taking part?  No 
Is there a risk of challenging the deeply held beliefs of those taking part?  No 
Is there a risk that previous, current or proposed criminal or illegal acts will be revealed 
by those taking part? 
 No 
Will the project involve giving any form of professional, medical or legal advice, either 




Risk to Researcher 
Will this project put you or others at risk of physical harm, injury or death?  No 
Will project put you or others at risk of abduction, physical, mental or sexual 
abuse? 
 No 
Will this project involve participating in acts that may cause psychological or 
emotional distress to you or to others? 
 No 
Will this project involve observing acts which may cause psychological or 
emotional distress to you or to others? 
 No 
Will this project involve reading about, listening to or viewing materials that 
may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others? 
 No 
Will this project involve you disclosing personal data to the participants other 
than your name and the University as your contact and e-mail address? 
 No 
Will this project involve you in unsupervised private discussion with people 
who are not already known to you? 
 No 
Will this project potentially place you in the situation where you may receive 
unwelcome media attention? 
 No 
Could the topic or results of this project be seen as illegal or attract the attention 
of the security services or other agencies? 
 No 
Could the topic or results of this project be viewed as controversial by anyone?  No 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions, this is not a low risk project.  Please: 
If you are a student, discuss your project with your Supervisor. 
If you are a member of staff, discuss your project with your Faculty Research Ethics Leader or 
use the Medium to High Risk Ethical Approval route. 
Informed Consent of the Participant 
Are any of the participants under the age of 18?  No 
Are any of the participants unable mentally or physically to give consent?    No 
Do you intend to observe the activities of individuals or groups without their 
knowledge and/or informed consent from each participant (or from his or 
her parent or guardian)? 
 No 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions, this may not be a low risk project.  Please: 
If you are a student, discuss your project with your Supervisor. 
If you are a member of staff, discuss your project with your Faculty Research Ethics Leader or 
use the Medium to High Risk Ethical Approval route. 
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Participant Confidentiality and Data Protection 
Will the project involve collecting data and information from human 
participants who will be identifiable in the final report? 
 No 
Will information not already in the public domain about specific individuals or 
institutions be identifiable through data published or otherwise made 
available? 
 No 
Do you intend to record, photograph or film individuals or groups without their 
knowledge or informed consent? 
 No 
Do you intend to use the confidential information, knowledge or trade secrets 
gathered for any purpose other than this research project? 
 No 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions, this may not be a low risk project:   
If you are a student, discuss your project with your Supervisor. 
If you are a member of staff, discuss your project with your Faculty Research Ethics Leader or 
use the Medium to High Risk Ethical Approval or NHS or Medical Approval routes. 
Gatekeeper Risk 
Will this project involve collecting data outside University buildings?  No 
Do you intend to collect data in shopping centres or other public places?  No 
Do you intend to gather data within nurseries, schools or colleges?    No 
Do you intend to gather data within National Health Service premises?  No 
If you answered Yes to any of these questions, this is not a low risk project.  Please: 
If you are a student, discuss your project with your Supervisor. 
If you are a member of staff, discuss your project with your Faculty Research Ethics Leader or 
use the Medium to High Risk Ethical Approval or NHS or Medical Approval routes. 
Other Ethical Issues 
Is there any other risk or issue not covered above that may pose a risk to you or 
any of the participants? 
 No 
Will any activity associated with this project put you or the participants at an 
ethical, moral or legal risk? 
 No 
If you answered Yes to these questions, this may not be a low risk project.  Please: 
If you are a student, discuss your project with your Supervisor. 
If you are a member of staff, discuss your project with your Faculty Research Ethics Leader. 
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Principal Investigator Certification 
If you answered No to all of the above questions, then you have described a low risk project.  
Please complete the following declaration to certify your project and keep a copy for your 
record as you may be asked for this at any time. 
Agreed restrictions to project to allow Principal Investigator Certification 
Please identify any restrictions to the project, agreed with your Supervisor or Faculty Research 
Ethics Leader to allow you to sign the Principal Investigator Certification declaration. 
 
Principal Investigator’s Declaration 
Please ensure that you: 
Tick all the boxes below and sign this checklist.  
Students must get their Supervisor to countersign this declaration. 
I believe that this project does not require research ethics approval.  I have 
completed the checklist and kept a copy for my own records.  I realise I may be asked 
to provide a copy of this checklist at any time. 
 
√ 
I confirm that I have answered all relevant questions in this checklist honestly. √ 
I confirm that I will carry out the project in the ways described in this checklist.  I will 
immediately suspend research and request a new ethical approval if the project 
subsequently changes the information I have given in this checklist. 
√ 
Signatures 
If you submit this checklist and any attachments by e-mail, you should type your name in the 
signature space.  An email attachment sent from your University inbox will be assumed to 
have been signed electronically. 
Principal Investigator 
Signed  Lynda Diane Irving ............................................................... (Principal Investigator or Student) 
Date  22 June 2009 ...........................................................  
Students storing this checklist electronically must append to it an email from your Supervisor 
confirming that they are prepared to make the declaration above and to countersign this 
checklist.  This-email will be taken as an electronic countersignature. 
Student’s Supervisor 
Countersigned    Jane Johnson .............................................................................................. (Supervisor) 
Date      22 June 2009 .......................................................  
I have read this checklist and confirm that it covers all the ethical issues raised by this project 
fully and frankly.  I also confirm that these issues have been discussed with the student and 
will continue to be reviewed in the course of supervision. 
  
 



































                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   






Appendix E: Typical employer activity search interface record sheet  









Appendix F: Codes used for input in SPPS PASW Version 17 
Case characteristics 
Date of entry of judgment on Register: Numeric 















15 London Central 
16 London East, Stratford 









91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Issue: 
1 Discrimination on grounds of ‘old’ age 
2 Discrimination on grounds of ‘young’ age 
3 Discrimination on grounds of being in a particular age band 
91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Type of complaint: 
1 Recruitment 
2 Job status 
3 Dismissal 
4 Retirement 
5 Redundancy Selection 
6 Harassment/victimisation 
91 Not applicable 




1 Time expired 
2 Incorrect Procedure 
3 Struck out 
4 Successful for claimant 
5 Settled 
6 Withdrawn Claim 
7 Case dismissed 
8 Default judgment for claimant 
9 Default judgment for respondent 
91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Compensation awarded: Numeric 






91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Age: Numeric 
Occupation: Detailed description of ISCO88 available online at  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/docs/struct08.xls (accessed 
05/10/12) 
1 Legislators, Managers and senior officials, 
2 Professionals  
3 Technicians and associate professionals  
4 Clerical and Related Workers 
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers  
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
7 Craft and related trades workers 
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 
9 Elementary occupations – cleaners, labourers, street vendors etc. 
0 Armed Forces 
91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Claimant representation:  
1 Self-representation  
2 Other legal representation by union, solicitor etc. 
91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Concurrent Claims: 
1 Discrimination on the grounds of sex 
SXD Sex discrimination SDA 1975 Sec 6 & 10 




EQP Failure to provide equal pay for equal value work EPA 1970 Sec 2 (1) 
2 Discrimination on the grounds of race 
RRD Race discrimination RRA 1976 Sec 54 & 64 
3 Discrimination on the grounds of disability 
DDA Suffered a detriment, discrimination and/or dismissal on grounds of 
disability or failure of an employer to make reasonable adjustments 
DDA1 Unfairly dismissed because of disability DDA 1995 Sec 4(2) 
DDA2 Suffered other detriment(s) because of disability DDA 1995 Sec 4 
DDA3 Suffer discrimination in obtaining employment because of disability 
DDA 1995 Sec 4(1) 
DDA4 Employer fails to make reasonable adjustment to accommodate a 
disability DDA 1995 S6 
4 Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
DSO Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
5 Discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief  
DRB Discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief 
6 Breach of Contract  
BOC Breach of contract 
7 Part-time worker 
PTE Suffer less favourable treatment and/or dismissal as a result of being a 
part-time employee  
8 Redundancy 
RPT Failure to pay a redundancy payment ERA 1996 Sec 163 & 164 
9 Other 
91 Not applicable 
 
Employer characteristics  
Employer size:  
1 Micro – less than 10 employees and a turnover or balance sheet total of not 
more than £2 million. 
2 Small - up to 50 employees with a turnover of not more than £6.5 million and a 
balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million 
3 Medium – 50 to 250 employees, a turnover of not more than £25.9 million and 
a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million 
4 Large – over 250 employees a turnover of more than £25.9 million and a 
balance sheet total of more than £12.9 million 
91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Employer status: 
 ‘Business Link’ guide developed with Companies House and HM Revenue and 
Customs available online at http://www.businesslink.gov.uk (accessed 05/10/12) 
1 Sole Trader 
2 Partnership including Limited liability partnership (LLP) 
3 Private Limited Company 
4 Public Limited Company 
5 Government Agency or Public Body  
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6 Community Interest Company (CIC), Friendly Society, Provident Society, 
Members Club, Social Enterprise, Guarantee Company or Charity 
7 Other, including Overseas Company 
91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Employer solvency: 
1 Employer solvent 
2 Employer in administration/liquidation/insolvent 
91 Not applicable 
999 Not known 
Employer activity: SIC-07 code (amended December 2009) to four figures produces 
a numeric code, available online at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/methods_quality/sic/downloads/SIC2007explanatorynote
s.pdf (accessed 04/10/12) 
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  
B Mining and quarrying 
C Manufacturing 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
E Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
F Construction 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H Transportation and storage 
I Accommodation and food service activities 
J Information and communication 
K Financial and insurance activities 
L Real estate activities 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 
N Administrative and support service activities 
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
P Education 
Q Human health and social work activities 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 
S Other service activities 
T Activities of households as employers; 




Appendix G: Data used to calculate number of workers per 
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